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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 3, July-September 1983



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USSR REPORT

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EDITORIAL ASSAILS U.S. POLICIES IN PACIFIC REGION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 7-11

[Editorial: "Crucial Issue in World Politics"]

Today the forces which have a fundamentally different approach to the world issues confront each other in the international arena. On the one hand, these are forces of imperialism and war headed by the USA, which are whipping up the arms race, pushing humankind to the nuclear abyss and use the nuclear arms limitation talks only as a cover for the building up of their war arsenals. On the other, these are forces of peace and progress: the USSR, other socialist states, many neutral and non-aligned countries adhering to the preservation of peace, detente, disarmament, and security of nations.

Day in day out, imperialism is stepping up international tension in different regions of the world, and NATO leaders are building launching pads in Western Europe for the new US medium-range nuclear missiles which are first-strike weapon. The testing of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile is underway in the USA. The arms race is assuming a cosmic scale.

The decision of the June (1983) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee reads in part: "Imperialist reaction, primarily the ruling quarters of the USA, nurturing delirious plans for world domination, is pushing humanity by their aggressive policy to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe."

The problem of preserving and consolidating peace and bridling the swift arms race has today become the crucial problem of the world politics.

Washington's militarist preparations have been covered up by concoctions about the Soviet military threat, the empty verbiage about "flexibility" at arms controls negotiations, and so on. In reality, however, at all negotiations the US stand has been fully oriented towards gaining one-sided advantages. The policy of Washington is a policy of adventurism aimed at establishing world domination with the help of military force. US imperialism has been whipping up international tensions to the utmost, thereby presenting a grave threat to the whole of humanity.

In collusion with the Japanese and the South Korean brass hats, US imperialism has been increasingly seeking to bolster its strategic positions, in particular in the Far East, in South and Southeast Asia, and to turn these vast areas into a constant source of cheap raw materials, and a bridgehead for implementing their aggressive designs against sovereign states.

Washington plans to hand over part of its police functions in the Far East and in Southeast Asia to Tokyo and Seoul while at the same time accelerating the arms race in this region by means of equipping the US 7th Fleet with cruise missiles, increasing the number of aircraft carriers

and atomic submarines, stationing neutron weapons in South Korea and deploying new means for delivering nuclear warheads in Japan.

Guided by the thesis that it has "vital interests" in Asia and the Pacific, the USA is going out of its way to use the integration trends in the region to meet the ends of its imperial strategy. One can easily discern the US intention to impart the functions of the imperialist military bloc to the "Pacific Community" in which Washington would play the key role. Moreover, the countries of Asia and the Pacific are being threatened by the notorious "military menace" from the Soviet Union in that dangerous political game.

In this militaristic political activities the Reagan administration gives priority to the further consolidation of the US-Japanese military ties. As for the Y. Nakasone government, it is openly playing into the hands of Washington. At the meeting of the Big Seven in Williamsburg, Y. Nakasone fully supported the "missile policy" pursued by the United States in Western Europe and East Asia.

Japan's ruling quarters are willingly meeting the demands of Washington to turn their country into a powerful military state, hoping, in their turn, to ensure for themselves not only economic, but also military-political preeminence in the region. US warships, including those equipped with cruise missiles, will have their bases at the Japanese ports. Tokyo agreed to station US F-16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa airbase (the Island of Honshu); these aircraft are capable of delivering nuclear weapons at a distance of more than 1,000 kilometres.

In answer to the questions of a *Pravda* correspondent, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, noted that US medium-range weapons are stationed literally at our doorstep, and this refers not only to Europe. "Along the entire perimeter of the USSR," Yuri Andropov stated, "many hundreds of US carriers capable of delivering a nuclear strike at our territory have been concentrated."

The system of US military bases on other countries' territories, the "hornet nests" of the Pentagon, as they are called by political analysts, contribute to the permanent presence of US naval and air forces in the different areas of the world and represent a major element of Washington's expansionist line. The "base strategy" of US imperialism took and continues to take an important place in the arsenal of the aggressive means of the Pentagon. US politologist J. Kieffer once wrote that the whole world is the morrow's battlefield. Today's task, he went on, is to obtain as many strategically important points as possible and prepare American troops to hold these territories.

As has already been mentioned, the Pentagon's "hornet nests" have been scattered in Asia, in particular in Japan. The White House and the Pentagon continue to regard not only Europe but also Asia as a springboard for an attack against the Soviet Union. Andrei Gromyko stated in this connection: "Japan and the waters washing it have been inundated with nuclear weapons and the corresponding carriers. Okinawa is a major nuclear weapon base. South Korea is an enormous base or, to be more precise, a complex of nuclear weapon bases. The Indian Ocean, especially Diego Garcia Island, is jammed with nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union."

The territory of South Korea is covered by a thick network of US military bases, with US nuclear weapon bases presenting special danger. According to some estimates, in South Korea there are more than 700 nuclear warheads, aviation bombs, howitzer and high-explosive shells.

The Pentagon is planning to expand its "death arsenals" in South Korea dramatically.

The Seoul regime intends to allocate in 1983 more than one-third of all budget expenditures to further militarise South Korea. Together with American military units, the Seoul authorities conduct provocative military exercises near the borders of the DPRK (for example, the recent major exercises Team Spirit-83 with the participation of 200,000 officers and men from the US and South Korea).

Thus, the tension in the Far East and Southeast Asia has been intensified because the feverish formation by the US imperialism of the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military alliance is afoot. Moreover, Washington is becoming increasingly active in a bid to subordinate a number of other Southeast Asian countries to its expansionist course. Here we mean the notorious "Pacific Community" in which the USA would like to draw ASEAN members as well (including Indonesia).

At a regular conference of the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries, which was attended at a certain stage by foreign ministers of the USA, Japan, FRG, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the United States and its allies raised hue and cry, as was the case in Williamsburg, concerning the "strengthening security" of ASEAN countries with an eye to pushing them towards converting the Association into a military-political grouping.

In November 1983 Ronald Reagan paid a visit to Japan, South Korea and Indonesia. According to the Japanese *Mainichi*, the route itself "ultimately implies the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc". Militarisation of Japan or, to be more exact, "NATOisation" of that country, i. e., the drawing of the latter into the Pentagon's global strategy, the striving to connect Washington's bilateral military agreements with Tokyo and Seoul, and the attempts to fetter ASEAN to Washington's policy comprise stages towards forming another military-political coalition spearheaded against the USSR and other socialist countries.

The military buildup of US naval forces in the Indian Ocean presents a mounting threat. Through the fault of imperialist powers, the United States above all, the decisions to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean have been frustrated more than once. Resorting to the tactics of procrastinations, Washington and its allies continue to build up their military might in the Indian Ocean. Washington's policy of boosting armaments, creating new and expanding the existing air and naval bases in different regions of Asia, as well as in other areas causes growing apprehension in Asian and African countries, in particular in the states of the Indian Ocean. Many political and state leaders of the Indian Ocean countries reject US attempts to pull their countries into the orbit of US confrontation with forces of peace and progress.

The militarisation of the Indian Ocean is an obstacle to the setting up of a zone of cooperation and goodneighbourliness in South Asia. India expresses serious concern in connection with the turning of Diego Garcia Island into a US naval base. The plans to turn the territory of Pakistan into a "transshipping point" for the US rapid deployment forces brings about great alarm among the public of South Asian countries. The setting up of the so-called CENTCOM (Central Command) by Washington is a grave obstacle to the formation of a zone of cooperation between the seven countries of South Asia, inasmuch as the sphere of action of the CENTCOM includes part of the area of the future zone for cooperation of the South Asian Seven. The setting

up of the US CENTCOM presents a threat to the political and economic sovereignty of the participants in South Asian regional cooperation.

Imperialism led by the USA was and remains the chief source of a military threat and international conflicts. The very nature of imperialism is such that it regards force as the main instrument for attaining its political ends. The process of the unswerving change in the alignment of forces to the detriment of imperialism as a system and in favour of socialism, the forces of progress and the national liberation movement is an important tendency in international relations. It was the weakening of the general positions of imperialism that brought about a U-turn in the military political strategy of the imperialist camp, especially in the strategy of the USA as its leader. The reactionary forces headed by the USA embarked on whipping up tensions, exacerbating relations with the countries of socialism, and displaying greater aggressiveness along the entire front of international relations. Both politically and ideologically, US imperialism is increasingly becoming the principal hotbed of militarism, aggression, and preparations for a nuclear war.

The stand of imperialism was formulated at the meeting of the Big Seven in Williamsburg and at the session of the NATO Council in Paris. Neither the Big Seven in Williamsburg, nor the NATO session in Paris offered anything realistic or positive. Western leaders reject all proposals made by socialism. Imperialism is unwilling to weaken or discontinue the nuclear confrontation.

The June (1983) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee and the 8th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet devoted much attention to the key issues of international relations. A meeting of the leading party and state figures of Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, USSR, and Czechoslovakia was held in Moscow. The participants issued a joint statement. The stand of socialism at the current stage in the development of international relations was determined at the three above-mentioned forums.

The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries proceed from the premise that to safeguard peace is the most crucial task facing all peoples of our planet. The struggle for the solution of the questions of war and peace in the interests of the peoples and the progress of mankind determines the content and the most important specifics of the contemporary stage in the development of international relations.

No doubt, the ideological struggle on the problems of war and peace bears on the sphere of foreign policy of states. Western powers transfer the struggle of ideas into the field of interstate relations and block a normal development of the latter, hampering the practical resolution of the outstanding international issues. At the same time the stand taken by the USSR is as follows: Andrei Gromyko, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Foreign Minister of the USSR, stressed that "in the course of negotiations on military matters, be it the strategic weapons or medium-range arms, or conventional weapons; or chemical weapons—ideological differences, just as differences in the social systems of states, must recede to the background. They should not be brought about here. We express it by a brief but clear-cut, mathematically exact formula: to search for the solution of problems and to live in peace regardless of the differences in social systems". In his report "On the Inter-

national Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" Andrei Gromyko pointed out that the principle of peaceful coexistence remains the major foundation of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in its relations with countries with different social systems.

Everything possible should be done under the contemporary acute international situation to check the arms race, to get back on the road of detente, and to buttress peace. Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, noted in his speech at the June (1983) Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU: "We see an unprecedented exacerbation of struggle between the two world social systems. At the same time, an attempt to solve the historic dispute between these systems by means of a military clash would be fatal for humankind."

The recent policy-making statements and constructive actions of the USSR were met with satisfaction by the world public. Washington's militaristic programme aimed at mobilising efforts of the biggest West European states and Japan to implement the goals of imperialism, US attempts to reverse the course of history, the declaration of war on the liberation movements, and the neocolonial threat to the independence of Asian, African and Latin American countries are countered by the Soviet Peace Programme and the readiness of the USSR to continue to struggle for peace and for a radical improvement in international relations. The peace-loving policy and constructive actions by the CPSU and the Soviet state are being approved and supported by the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces. For example, in their Joint Statement the participants in the June 1983 Meeting in Moscow of the party and state leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia noted that the imperialist policy of force and diktat is in profound contradiction with the vital interests and cravings of the peoples of Europe and the whole world, which make themselves felt in numerous massive anti-war demonstrations.

True to the socialist ideals of peace and disarmament, the Soviet Union is persistently and consistently striving for a positive outcome to the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. As evidence of this is one more major step which Yuri Andropov has announced the Soviet Union is willing to take. Andropov, in answer to a question by *Pravda*, said: "In the case that an agreement acceptable to both sides will be reached, including the US's backing away from deployment of new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to the same number as possessed by France and England, and would destroy the dismantled missiles. Among the missiles to be dismantled would be a large quantity of the most modern missiles, known in the West as the SS-20".

The extreme importance of this fresh display of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union is self-evident. The step has pulled the rug out from under the widespread assertions in NATO countries that the USSR reportedly intends to preserve the dismantled SS-20 missiles by moving them from Europe to the East. It also leaves the concern expressed by China and Japan about such a possibility without grounds.

Millions of ordinary people, thousands of political and public leaders, hundreds of national and international organisations are being drawn into the struggle against the nuclear militarism of the USA and NATO.

The peoples of all continents are coming out in defence of peace and life on our planet.

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USSR-DPRK: MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 12-26

[Article by V. I. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Osipov, candidate of juridical sciences]

Thirty-five years ago, on December 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed. The birth of the DPRK is linked with the rout of militaristic Japan by the Soviet Army in 1945 and the liberation of North Korea.

The road traversed by the working people of Korea in creating their national state was not a smooth one. For more than 40 years Japanese colonialists oppressed and plundered Korea with "unparalleled brutality"¹, and regarded it as a domain of their own. Japan went all out to preserve the reactionary colonial-feudal relations in Korea. The country was deprived of political independence and national dignity; the culture and civil rights of Koreans were grossly flouted. However, neither cruel repressions nor police terrorism could smother the Korean people's desire for freedom and independence.

The liberation movement in Korea assumed a broad scope after the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The ideas of the October Revolution exerted a revolutionising influence on the struggle waged by the Korean people for national and social emancipation. General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, President of the DPRK Kim Il Sung said: "The present-day history of the Korean people and its destiny are directly linked with the revolutionary developments which took place under the impact of the October Revolution. Having merged with the great current of the revolutionary struggle waged by the world proletariat and having embarked on the road charted by the October Revolution, the Korean people set upon a path towards their emancipation."²

Overcoming tremendous difficulties which resulted from the 1950-1953 war and from the arbitrary division of the country, the working people of the DPRK managed, during the years of the people's power, with the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to restore their national economy and convert the country, once a backward colonial appendage of Japan, into a developed, industrialised Asian state.

In determining the directions and forms of its cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union has proceeded from the specific tasks cha-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 443.

² Kim Il Sung, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1962, p. 324 (in Russian).

racterising different stages of socialist construction in a country, its internal political and economic goals, its resources and potential, general tasks faced by the countries of socialism, and the international situation.

For the USSR cooperation with socialist countries is not some abstract phenomenon. It rests on the unshakeable principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian socialist internationalism, implies goodwill in the partner and also the ability to adapt assistance to local conditions, be it experience of socialist construction or economic aid. Economic cooperation with the USSR has been of paramount importance for countries which, like the DPRK, stepped on the road of building socialism having an undeveloped colonial economy, and an absence of a scientific and technological basis. This cooperation, which is developing along the lines of complete equality and mutual assistance, makes a tangible contribution to raising economically backward countries to the level of advanced ones, overcoming the lopsided nature of their economies, eliminating the aftermaths of colonialism and accelerating the rates of creating the material and technological basis of socialism and a developed socialist society.

The mutual urge by the Soviet and Korean peoples for cooperation was fully translated into life after the Korean people obtained their statehood, i. e., after the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the signing of the corresponding documents regulating this cooperation. It would be a false step, however, to disregard the enormous assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the Korean people, to the Korean patriots who struggled against the Japanese invaders, politically, diplomatically and militarily before the liberation of Korea by the Soviet Army. Account must be taken of the fact that it was the Soviet Armed Forces that liberated Korea and of the great, allround creative work which had been done with Soviet assistance and with direct participation of Soviet citizens during the years after the liberation and before the formation of the first workers' and peasants' state in the history of the Korean people.

Having discharged its liberation mission in Korea, the Soviet Army did all it could to create favourable conditions for the people to remake society in conformity with their strivings and interests. In the very first days, Japanese colonial administration was abolished throughout the country. Soviet troops took under their guard factories, plants, mines, railways, means of communication and other property of the Japanese bourgeoisie and Korean compradors, which were handed over to the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea in 1946-1947.³ Soviet officers and men took part in restoring plants and factories destroyed by the retreating Japanese and their accomplices. They shared their experience of peaceful construction and helped train national personnel. Experts in industry, agriculture, transport and communication, justice, trade, health care and culture worked in the Soviet Civil Administration.

In noting the deserves of Soviet servicemen in restoring the devastated national economy, Comrade Kim Il Sung wrote: "The Great Soviet Army, which was in the northern part of our Republic, stretched out a hand of selfless assistance in restoring factories, enterprises, rail transport, mines and pits. Officers and men of the Soviet Army worked with enthusiasm in all districts of the northern part of our Republic shoulder-

³ See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea — 1945-1980. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 25-27, 31-32 (in Russian).

to-shoulder with our workers and specialists and left us the valuable fruit of their selfless labour."⁴

In order to normalise life and ensure the necessary conditions for building a new life, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with large-scale material support, giving it free food, consumer goods, automobiles, fuel and many other commodities, even though at the time the Soviet people themselves were facing difficulties and privations as a result of the destruction of the Soviet economy by the Hitlerites.

This period saw the beginning of trade between our two countries, which was implemented on the basis of annual protocols of mutual deliveries of goods. For example, during a three-year period from 1946 to 1948, overall trade between the two countries increased by 370 per cent, comprising nearly 90 per cent of North Korea's total foreign trade.⁵ Among the basic Soviet export items were machinery and equipment necessary for the restoration and reconstruction of industry, rolled ferrous metals, raw materials, and fuel; among imports were ferrous and non-ferrous metals, ores and concentrates, chemicals and agricultural produce.

During the March 1949 visit to Moscow of a DPRK government delegation headed by Kim Il Sung, an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK was concluded. Based on the principles of full equality, mutual benefit, comradely assistance and support, it was the very first equitable agreement signed by sovereign Korea with a foreign state. It determined the basic principles and was the beginning of a large-scale planned cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK in various spheres of the economy and culture. "The Korean people," *Mingzhu Chuosuong* wrote, "concluded an equal agreement for the first time in its history."⁶

In accordance with the abovementioned agreement which is still in operation, the USSR and the DPRK, based on the confidence that strengthening and developing economic ties is in accord with the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries and will contribute to economic development, agreed to grant the most-favoured-nation treatment to each other in all areas of trade and navigation between the two countries, and in the activities of physical and juridical persons of the one side on the territory of the other. It was decided to conclude agreements determining the volume and nomenclature of the mutually delivered goods for a year and for longer periods, as well as conditions "ensuring uninterrupted and growing trade between the two countries in conformity with the demand stemming from the development of each other's national economy."⁷ The Agreement in no way limited the Soviet-Korean economic relations to trade alone. The sides also undertook to promote the exchange of know-how in industrial and agricultural production by means of dispatching specialists and rendering technological assistance.

Subsequent to the Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, other agreements were signed simultaneously, which were designed to regulate specific fields of trade and economic relations between our two countries: an agreement on trade and payments, which provided for a considerable increase of trade in 1949-1950; agreements on granting the DPRK a long-term credit of 212 million roubles and a trade credit of 47.7 million roubles; on giving technical assistance to the DPRK in construc-

⁴ *Mingzhu Chuosuong*, March 17, 1950.

⁵ See *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1958, No. 9, p. 8 (in Russian).

⁶ *Mingzhu Chuosuong*, March 23, 1949.

⁷ *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, p. 67.

tion projects; and on assistance in training personnel. Somewhat later an agreement was signed on giving aid to the DPRK in geological prospecting of its territory.⁸

Thus, the aforementioned agreements were aimed at granting broad Soviet assistance to the DPRK for restoring and reconstructing its national economy, and for creating the economic basis for an independent democratic Korean state.

Turning to the Soviet Union for assistance, during the first years after liberation, the Korean people scored tangible successes. As compared with 1946, the volume of industrial production increased four-fold in 1949, while the production of equipment went up about 50 per cent as compared with 1944. In that same year the harvest of cereals was 121 per cent of the 1944 level.⁹

However, the plans for peaceful and creative labour were interrupted by the war imposed on the DPRK in 1950-1953 by US imperialism and South Korean reactionaries. True to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union came to the aid of the Korean people in their just struggle. Apart from political and diplomatic support, the Soviet people rendered People's Korea tangible aid in the form of arms, ammunition, transportation means, fuel, industrial equipment, building materials, food, medicines and basic necessities. The rich combat experience of the Soviet armed forces accumulated during the Great Patriotic War was brought at the disposal of the Korean People's Army. Soviet military advisers were in the units of the Korean People's Army, Soviet flying aces took part in combat operations, and Soviet air divisions were stationed in Manchuria, safeguarding the rear of the Korean forces and the units of the Chinese volunteers. Soviet hospitals for wounded servicemen and civilians were set up in the rear areas. If the situation worsened, the USSR was prepared to send five armour divisions to Korea.¹⁰

The war gravely worsened the socio-economic situation in the Republic: industrial enterprises shut down, peasants were deprived of the opportunity to work in the fields, and the country faced the prospect of famine. In these conditions, the USSR again gave aid to the DPRK. In April 1952, Stalin cabled Kim Il Sung: "I was informed that the Korean people are in need of bread. We have 50,000 tons of wheat flour in Siberia. We can send this flour as a gift to the Korean people."¹¹ The DPRK received this gift from the Soviet people, as well as tens of thousands tons of mineral fertilizers, 400 tractors, several thousand pieces of various agricultural machinery, automobiles and a great quantity of consumer goods.¹²

The efficiency of the fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union stood out in an especially bold relief in the years of postwar restoration and construction, which were so hard for the Korean people. The war brought havoc in the economy. In 1953 the gross industrial output fell by 36 per cent as compared with the prewar 1949, agriculture production registered a 24-per-cent drop and national income shrunk by 30 per cent.¹³

⁸ See *Ibid.*, p. 69; *Korea: North and South*, Moscow, 1965, p. 68 (in Russian).

⁹ *Pravda*, April 12, 1949.

¹⁰ See M. S. Kapitsa. *PRC: Three Decades—Three Policies*, Moscow, 1979, p. 53 (in Russian).

¹¹ *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, p. 87.

¹² See *A. History of Korea*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1974, p. 235.

¹³ See *The Development of National Economy and Culture of the DPRK in 1946-1957 Statistical Review*, Pyongyang, 1958, p. 35 (in Korean).

Taking into account that the sources for financing the rehabilitation work in the DPRK were highly limited and seeking to help bring the situation in the DPRK back to normal as soon as possible, several weeks after the signing of the armistice, in August 1953, the Soviet Union granted the DPRK government one billion roubles as free aid for the restoration of the war-devastated economy.¹⁴ Simultaneously, the amount of the DPRK's debt was cut by more than 50 per cent, the payments on the remaining sum were postponed, and more favourable terms for repayment were fixed.¹⁵

Specific problems concerning the use of Soviet aid were discussed in the course of the September 1953 visit to Moscow by a DPRK governmental delegation led by Kim Il Sung. An agreement was reached to use it for restoring and building projects of non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, chemical and cement industries, textile and food industry enterprises. Soviet organisations did the design work, supplied the DPRK with equipment and materials, rendered technical assistance, gave licences and technical documentation for organising the output of production at the abovementioned enterprises, and trained Korean personnel.¹⁶

In August 1956 the Soviet government again granted the DPRK 300 million roubles towards restoration.¹⁷ Using the total sum of 1.3 billion roubles, the DPRK in 1954-1960, thanks to the technical assistance of Soviet organisations and specialists, restored, reconstructed or built anew 20 economic projects. For example, the Suphun power station (first stage), Songchin iron-and-steel works, the Kim Chak metal works of Chongjin, non-ferrous metals plant at Nampho, a factory of nitrogen fertilizers in Hungnam were restored and reconstructed; a hydrochloride acid works in Pyongan, the Madon cement factory (400,000 tons of cement a year), slate shop at the cement factory in Chongnary, a tractor repair shop capable of repairing 300 tractors a year in Sarwon, a veneer factory in Kilju and a furniture factory in Pyongyang, two railway traction substations, a railway bridge over the Tumangan River, a textile combine (65 million meters of fabrics a year), a silk-spinning factory (10 million metres a year) and dye works (45 million metres of fabrics a year) in Pyongyang, a canned fish factory at Simpho, a meat-packing factory in Pyongyang, a radio centre and a city hospital in Pyongyang for 600 beds were built.¹⁸

Having fulfilled its obligations, the Soviet Union thus laid down the foundations of the heavy and light industries, industrial and social infrastructure in Korea, and created prerequisites for a successful development of agriculture and higher standards of living for the Korean citizens. The following figures testify to the significance of the abovementioned projects for the DPRK economy: in 1960 they accounted for 36 per cent of the total output of electric energy, 33 per cent of pig iron, 50 per cent of coke, 90 per cent of ammonium nitrate, and 60 per cent of cotton fabrics.¹⁹

As part of its free aid package, the USSR, in the years after the Korean war, supplied the DPRK with equipment and machinery for the

¹⁴ See *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1973, No. 8, p. 10.

¹⁵ See Kim Il Sung, *On the Results of the Work of the Governmental Delegations of the DPRK Which Had Visited the USSR, the PRC and the Countries of People's Democracy. Report at the 6th Session of the Supreme National Council of the DPRK on December 20, 1953*, Pyongyang, 1954, p. 12 (in Korean).

¹⁶ See *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1953.

¹⁷ *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, p. 405.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

¹⁹ See *Korea: North and South*, Moscow, 1965, p. 72.

enterprises restored and built by Korean specialists and also with industrial raw materials and equipment for restoring railway transport and communications, agricultural machinery, fertilisers, pedigree cattle, horses, fishing vessels, equipment for the restoration of housing and public utilities, hospitals, educational establishments, as well as with food, and consumer goods.²⁰

Successful cooperation between the two countries brought about a more than two-fold increase in Soviet-Korean trade during that period. Machinery and equipment accounted for about 40 per cent of Soviet exports to Korea. The DPRK supplied the USSR with metallic ores and concentrates, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, building materials and agricultural products.

By the end of the 1950s, with the massive assistance from the Soviet Union, the DPRK on the whole completed the period of restoration and reconstruction of its national economy, overcame in the main the economic consequences of the division of the country and of the Japanese colonial yoke, and built the foundations of socialism. The Republic was confidently marching along the road of industrialisation and the building of a new society, relying on economic foundations laid down in the previous years. This made it possible to enter a qualitatively new stage in trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK.

In the 1940s-1950s, North Korea was mainly a recipient of aid. Since the early 1960s, Soviet-Korean cooperation began to gradually reach a higher and mutually beneficial level. It began to be based on the long-term credits given to the DPRK by the USSR and on coordinated trade interests.

In view of this trend and also of the economic difficulties the DPRK still confronted, a Protocol between our two countries was signed in July 1960, which released the DPRK from repayment of earlier granted credits to the sum of 171 million roubles and postponed payment of a 31.5 million roubles debt.²¹

The new stage in the Soviet-Korean economic relations demanded a corresponding legal foundation for the cooperation. After signing a number of important treaties and agreements, the USSR and the DPRK legally formalised and reaffirmed the relations of cooperation and mutual assistance which had taken shape between them and determined their basic principles and directions for the future.

Of special significance among these documents is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the DPRK concluded on July 6, 1961, during the visit to Moscow of the DPRK party and government delegation headed by Kim Il Sung.

This Treaty is the principal agreement determining the entire extent of the Soviet-Korean relations. Its prime goal is to ensure conditions for peaceful and creative labour of the Korean people, and safeguard its socialist gains and fruits of labour from possible encroachments from outside. Member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Kim Il stated: "By the conclusion of this treaty the peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union expressed their firm resolve, standing shoulder-to-shoulder in the struggle against imperialism and in the name of the common cause of peace, socialism and communism, to cooperate even closer and to render mutual support and assistance, demonstrated clearly to everyone that there is no force that

²⁰ See *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1953.

²¹ See *Korea: North and South* p. 69.

can shatter the friendship and cohesion between the peoples of our two countries."²²

As for the economic relations between our two countries, the Treaty confirmed and developed the main provisions of the Soviet-Korean Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, signed in March 1949. Its Article 4 notes that the two sides undertake to develop and consolidate economic ties and carry out the necessary cooperation in economy, give allround assistance to each other in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's domestic affairs.²³ Of great importance to the development of trade and economic ties between the USSR and DPRK was the Treaty of Trade and Navigation signed on June 22, 1960 and which became effective in March 1961. In conformity with the abovementioned Treaty, the sides pledged to take all necessary measures to develop and consolidate trade relations between the two states in the spirit of friendly cooperation, and on the basis of mutual assistance and benefit.²⁴

The Soviet-Korean trade and economic cooperation found its concrete expression in the agreements on mutual deliveries of goods for 1961-1965 (signed on December 24, 1960) and on rendering Soviet technical assistance to the DPRK in building and expanding industrial and other enterprises (signed on March 17, 1959) which took into account the tasks set by the first DPRK seven-year economic development plan for 1961-1967.

The first long-term agreement was overfulfilled considerably. In 1965 the trade between our two countries increased by 60 per cent as compared with 1960. This was especially true of deliveries of machinery and equipment, primarily the supplies of complete plant and materials for the building of enterprises, which increased by more than 1,300 per cent.²⁵

In accordance with the agreement on giving technical aid to the DPRK, the Soviet Union undertook to build a thermal power station in Pyongyang, factories producing ammonia and polychlorvinyl, a flax-spinning mill, a wool-spinning and weaving factory, and also to render assistance to expand the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works (to reach a total capacity of one million tons of steel, and 700,000 tons of rolled steel a year) and silk-spinning and weaving factories. In addition, agreement was reached on the Soviet Union's delivery of certain types of electrical equipment, devices and cableware for blast furnace No. 2 at the iron-and-steel plant in the town of Huanghae, which was being restored by the Korean side; on giving technical assistance for drawing up plans for enterprises producing melamine and boric acid; on giving consultations to organise the production of these chemicals and comprehensive use of nepheline raw materials.²⁶

In accordance with the agreement on economic and technical cooperation in building and expanding industrial and other projects, signed on June 20, 1966,²⁷ the Soviet Union granted the DPRK government a credit of 160 million roubles with an annual interest rate of two per

²² *Nodon Sinmun*, July 6, 1962.

²³ See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, p. 197.

²⁴ See *Collection of Trade Treaties and Agreements on the Trade and Economic Cooperation of the USSR with Foreign States*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1977, pp. 421-426.

²⁵ See *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1975, No. 8, p. 11.

²⁶ *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 170, 171.

²⁷ See *Ibid.*, pp. 210-245.

cent to pay for the prospecting and the equipment and materials supplied by the USSR, as well as for covering the costs of Soviet organisations sending specialists to the DPRK to render technical assistance in the building of industrial enterprises and projects and also in inviting Korean specialists in the USSR to undergo vocational training and apprenticeship at Soviet enterprises. The DPRK was to repay the credit over the period of ten years in equal annual installments beginning one year after equipment and materials have been delivered and work has been completed at every project.

At the same time, meeting the request of the DPRK government, the Soviet government agreed to reschedule all payments on the long-term credits granted in conformity with the Soviet-Korean agreements of March 17, 1949, July 6, 1961, and May 31, 1965 the USSR was due to receive in 1966-1970: these were to be made by the Korean side within the period of 14 years, in equal annual installments from January 1, 1971. For the postponement period the DPRK was released from paying interest.

Another agreement on economic and technical cooperation was concluded between the Soviet Union and the DPRK on October 21, 1967, and the protocol to it was signed on September 18, 1968.

The mounting volume of the economic and trade cooperation, the more complicated mutual ties, the need for coordinating efforts of all agencies and organisations of the two countries participating in it, and also the desire of both the DPRK and the USSR for the further development and expansion of cooperation prepared the way for the formation, in October 1967, of an intergovernmental Soviet-Korean Consultative Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technological Issues, made up of Soviet and Korean parts led by deputy heads of government.²⁶ The Commission is charged with conducting a systematic study of the possibilities for the steady development of economic ties between the two countries and with coming up with measures for expanding them further; elaboration of proposals on the growth of mutual trade; examination of questions connected with the cooperation in the deliveries of complete plant and other work and preparation of corresponding measures; working out proposals on extending scientific and technological cooperation; controlling the implementation of its decisions and agreements on economic, scientific and technological cooperation concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, and taking measures for effectively carrying out decisions and agreements. At a sitting of the Commission held in Pyongyang in May 1983, the sides examined problems connected with the implementation of mutual commitments, state of, and prospects for, cooperation in building and expanding DPRK industrial enterprises and other economic projects with technical assistance from the Soviet Union, the carrying out of the Protocol on Trade and Payments between the two countries in 1982, and also the tasks in trade for 1983. Besides, the Commission analysed problems relating to the further development of scientific and technological cooperation, and other matters.²⁷ While receiving head of the Soviet part of the Commission at that sitting, V. Talyzin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Premier of the Administrative Council of the DPRK Li Jong Ok reiterated that the Soviet-Korean economic, scientific and technological ties were making a tangible contribution to the solution of the tasks of socialist economic

²⁶ See *Relations Between the Soviet Union and People's Korea*, pp. 250-254.

²⁷ See *Pravda*, May 19, 1983.

construction set forth by the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. He stressed that the DPRK would bend every effort to consolidate the relations of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.³⁰

Direct contacts between the USSR State Planning Committee and the DPRK State Planning Committee promote coordination of trade and economic ties between our two countries. In 1975 and 1980 consultations were held through the state planning committees of the two countries on the development of economic cooperation for 1976-1980 and 1980-1985 to assign a planned character to the latter. Today preparatory work is afoot to hold consultations on trade and economic cooperation for 1986-1990.³¹

The 1960s and the 1970s were fruitful decades for Soviet-Korean economic cooperation. On the basis of the aforementioned and also some other agreements and protocols, 38 projects were built in the DPRK with Soviet assistance during those two decades, including an oxygen-converter plant with the capacity of one million tons of steel and a hot rolled sheet mill with a capacity of 850,000 tons a year at the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works in Chongjin, the Pyongyang thermoelectric plant with a capacity of 400,000 kiloWatt hours, a thermal power station at Pukchang with a capacity of 1.2 million kiloWatt hours, an oil refinery at Ungi for processing two million tons of crude oil, Yonghuing coal quarry producing 1.5 million tons of coal a year, coal mine No. 1 near Anju producing 1.5 million tons of coal, a medium-wave radio station with a capacity of one thousand kiloWatts, a plant producing 550 tons of enameled wires a year, a main radio relay line of communication from Pyongyang to the border with the USSR with ramifications and TV relays, and a number of other important economic projects.³²

It is almost impossible to overestimate the significance of such economic cooperation with the USSR for the development of the DPRK national economy and the strengthening of its might. The projects built in the DPRK with Soviet assistance in the 1970s alone ensured an increase, during those years, in electrical energy output of 40 per cent, 30 per cent in coal, 30 per cent in steel, 40 per cent in rolled metal and 25 per cent in nitrogen fertilisers.³³ Estimates show that the share of production of all enterprises built in People's Korea with Soviet assistance in 1982 accounted for 63 per cent of electric energy, 33 per cent of steel, 11 per cent of pig iron, 38 per cent of the rolled ferrous metals, 50 per cent of oil products, 20 per cent of fabrics, 14 per cent of chemical fertilisers, and 42 per cent of iron ore.³⁴

In 1982, the Tedongan accumulator plant with the capacity of 1.1 million various automobile accumulators was commissioned with Soviet technical and economic assistance in Pyongyang and ammonia-producing factory in Aoji with a capacity of 50,000 tons of ammonia.

Today the assistance in building and reconstructing enterprises is carried out on the basis of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, which also regulates the payments. It was signed on February 9, 1976 in Moscow.³⁵

The payment relations between our two countries are regulated by an intergovernmental Protocol signed May 13, 1981 on the repayment by the Korean side in 1981-1985 of the debt on the credits.

³⁰ See *Pravda*, May 20, 1983.

³¹ See *Pravda*, May 19, 1983.

³² See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 407-408.

³³ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1981, No. 28, p. 20.

³⁴ See *Ibid.*, 1980, No. 33, p. 20.

³⁵ *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 343-351.

The new refinancing of the DPRK's debt to the Soviet Union meant that the Korean side started repaying the debt in the 1980s—35 years after the beginning of the Soviet-Korean cooperation, when the DPRK turned into an industrially developed socialist country.

Thus by the end of 1982, that is, during the entire period of the Soviet-Korean economic cooperation, 61 economic projects, including 34 industrial enterprises, have been restored, reconstructed and built with Soviet assistance in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Another nine enterprises are under construction or reconstruction on the terms of a long-term credit, among them the Kim Chak iron-and-steel plant, de-oxygenising copper works at Nampho, a factory producing micro-electric motors in Pyongyang with a capacity of one million pieces, a ball-bearing plant at Ranson with a capacity of ten million ball-bearings and roll-bearings, the Pukchang thermal power station which will attain a capacity of 1.6 thousand MVt, the Chongjin thermo-electric power plant with a capacity of 150 MVt, an aluminium plant producing 23,000 tons of aluminium, coal pith No. 2 and 3 near Anju which together will produce 2.5 million tons of coal. The construction of a number of other projects is nearing completion.³⁶

The projects built with Soviet assistance comprise the backbone of the DPRK national economy, help effect the policy of industrialisation pursued by the Workers' Party of Korea and encompass practically all major branches of the economy: power generation, mining industry, non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy, engineering, chemical industry, building materials, transport, communications, textile and food industries. They have been designed with due account of the latest scientific and technical innovations and are equipped with the most up-to-date Soviet plant. Hundreds of Soviet specialists worked and continue to work at them side-by-side with Korean workers.

Today Soviet-Korean economic cooperation is carried out on the basis of a fundamentally new economic mechanism with the use of most effective forms, including compensation deals when, with Soviet assistance, factories are built in the DPRK for delivering their output on a long-term basis to the Soviet Union to repay the credits, including during the first five years beginning one year after commissioning, in compensation for the cost of equipment and materials, and that of other types of technical aid in subsequent equal installments of accordingly 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 per cent of the cost of each project, as well as on the basis of the clearing system.

This form of cooperation is developing on the basis of the agreement on economic and technical cooperation signed on September 15, 1970 between the governments of the USSR and the DPRK, in accordance with which an accumulator plant, factories producing enameled wires and micro-motors have been constructed in the DPRK,³⁷ and also on the basis of the agreement of February 9, 1976, which provides for assistance in expanding the converter shop and the hot and cold rolled sheet shops at the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works. Agreement was reached that the Korean side would supply the USSR, while the Soviet side would purchase in the DPRK no less than 80 per cent of the automobile accumulators and enameled wires and no less than 60 per cent of micro-engines produced at those factories. The credit granted for expanding the capacities of the corresponding shops is to be paid by the deliveries of steel and hot- and cold-rolled sheets.

³⁶ See *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 6, pp. 4, 16.

³⁷ See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 279-283.

The trade and production cooperation on a compensation basis makes it possible to extend the nomenclature of Korean goods delivered to the USSR and other countries and makes it much easier for the DPRK to repay the debt to the USSR. It also contributes to the diversification of its economy, and creates conditions for the DPRK to more actively participate in the international socialist division of labour. For example, small electrical motors are produced for refrigerators, washing machines and other durable goods put out in the USSR. The Tedongan accumulator plant, a great part of whose production is sent to the USSR, receives at the same time from other socialist countries primary goods and materials, which are not produced in the DPRK, of more than 30 varieties (including 50 per cent from the Soviet Union), such as sulphur, antimony, tyre reclaim, and so on.

The growing and delivery of hothouse vegetables to the Soviet Far East in exchange for setting up a production base and infrastructure is a new area of development.

The Soviet-Korean economic cooperation is developing successfully in other spheres as well. Worthy of mention is the joint wood-felling scheme in Eastern Siberia involving Korean workers. In definite proportions timber is used both for the needs of the Soviet economy and for those of the DPRK. This cooperation began on a large scale in 1967, and in 1975, in connection with the accumulation of positive experience and great importance of lumbering for the development of the two countries' economies it was deemed expedient to extend it considerably. As a result, an agreement on expanding lumbering on Soviet territory by Korean workers was signed between the governments of the Soviet Union and the DPRK in January 1975.³⁸ Mills to produce industrial chips from the lumber waste have been built and turpentine gum is produced in the forests which are to be felled.

Cooperation in fishery has achieved a high level. This industry is of exceptional importance for the DPRK economy because fish and sea products are major sources of protein in the Korean people's diet due to the fact that, for certain objective reasons cattle breeding and poultry farming have not been developed. This is why a higher standard of living for the working people and the solution of the food problem are directly linked with the growth of the catch of fish and sea products.

Higher requirements for the technical equipment in fishery and the introduction of the 200-mile economic zone have made fishing much more complicated, which now calls for sophisticated gear and the full use of scientific methods.

The agreement on cooperation in fishing signed between the governments of the USSR and the DPRK on January 18, 1974, and a protocol to it of July 28, 1977, have contributed greatly to the solution of the abovementioned problems.³⁹ Guided by the desire to cooperate in the development of fishery, the technology of catch and processing of sea products, in the organisation of fishery on a scientific basis with the purpose of preserving the maximum stability of fishing reserves to ensure a stable catch, the Soviet Union and the DPRK undertook, on a reciprocal basis, to exchange experience and hold consultations on the problems of organising fishing and using fish resources; the technology of finding and catching fish; the pond fishery and bio-technology of breeding mollusks and algae; technology of processing the sea catches, storage, trans-

³⁸ See *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1975, No. 8, p. 13; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1980, No. 33, p. 20.

³⁹ See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 317-322, 371-375.

portation, and production of packing materials; technical equipment, exploitation and repair of the fishing vessels, and exploitation of ports.

It is also planned to exchange specialists in fishery and technical information on the catch and technology of fish processing, biotechnology of pisciculture, and sea-weed cultivation, and to conduct coordinated and joint research on specific problems.

Soviet and Korean fishing vessels were given an opportunity for fishing within the Soviet and the Korean 200-mile zones, to lay in at each other's ports and carry out repairs there, if necessary.

Cooperation in giving the DPRK technical and economic assistance in the building of economic projects and also some other kinds of economic cooperation are implemented by means of trade between our countries. Through foreign trade, the DPRK not only obtains equipment, but also pays for it and other types of assistance by deliveries of its own commodities in accordance with the terms provided for by the agreements.

Today the trade between our two countries is regulated by an intergovernmental agreement on mutual deliveries and payments for 1981-1985, signed on July 12, 1981, which envisages a 40 per cent growth in trade in five years.⁴⁰ The first two years of that agreement demonstrate that it is being carried out successfully. In 1982 trade between the Soviet Union and the DPRK reached the record figure of 681 million roubles, registering a 28.7-per-cent increase over the previous year. Moreover, Soviet exports grew 14.2 per cent and imports 44.8 per cent (see Table 1).

The existing pattern of mutual deliveries of commo-

Table 1

Dynamics of Soviet-Korean Trade in the 1970s-1980s (in mln roubles)

Year	Turnover	Export	Import	Turnover in per cent compared with 1970	Trade in per cent to the previous year
1970	329.3	207.0	122.3	100.0	111.5
1975	338.2	186.8	151.4	102.7	102.7
1980	572.1	287.9	284.2	173.7	169.2
1981	529.2	278.9	250.3	160.7	92.5
1982	681.0	318.5	362.5	206.8	128.7

Source: *USSR Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbooks*

Table 2

Composition of Soviet Exports to the DPRK in the 1970s-1980s (in per cent)

Section*	1970	1975	1980	1982
Export in mln roubles	207.0	186.8	287.9	318.5
I. Machinery, equipment, transportation means	43.5	40.5	28.5	23.5
II. Fuel, mineral raw materials, metals	23.5	21.8	38.8	41.9
III. Chemical products, fertilizers, rubber	3.3	3.0	1.0	0.9
V. Raw materials and products of processing (non-food)	4.8	3.2	2.9	4.6
VII. Raw materials for producing foodstuffs	8.4	8.1	12.9	12.1
VIII. Foodstuffs	2.7	0.7	—	—
IX. Industrial consumer goods	2.8	3.3	3.0	2.6

* The names of sections and their numerical succession here and in Table 3 are cited in accordance with the Single Commodity Nomenclature of Foreign Trade.

Source: *USSR Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbooks*.

⁴⁰ See *Pravda*, July 15, 1981.

Table 3
Composition of Soviet Imports from the DPRK
in the 1970s-1980s (in per cent)

Section	1970	1975	1980	1982
Import in mln roubles	122.3	151.4	281.2	362.5
I. Machinery, equipment, transportation means	6.0	8.1	6.8	7.3
II. Fuel, mineral raw materials, metals	39.3	40.5	28.4	25.9
III. Chemical products, fertilizers, rubber	1.7	2.4	1.2	1.5
IV. Building materials, parts	14.8	17.4	25.1	21.4
V. Raw materials and products of processing (non-food)	—	0.9	1.7	1.5
VII. Raw materials for producing foodstuffs	3.3	2.2	1.8	3.3
VIII. Foodstuffs	15.1	14.4	18.2	16.4
IX. Industrial consumer goods	16.1	11.2	9.4	15.7

Source: USSR Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbooks.

dities mirrors the level of economic ties and meets the needs of the development of the two countries' national economies. In the deliveries from the USSR the biggest share is taken by machinery, equipment and transportation means, solid and liquid fuel, raw materials for producing foodstuffs and consumer goods (see Table 2). Overall, the list of Soviet commodities numbers more than 200 items.

In its turn the USSR is Number One Buyer of the traditional commodities of the Korean exports: magnesite powder, barite, cement, non-ferrous and ferrous metals and rolled metals, chemicals, metal-cutting tools, agricultural produce, consumer goods (see Table 3).

Scientific and technical cooperation plays an important part in the Soviet-Korean economic ties. It enables the DPRK, within the

shortest amount of time and with the least outlays, to produce new items, introduce advanced technology and machinery in industry and agriculture, use more rationally the available material and human resources, and accelerate and improve the training of personnel.

The agreement on scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK was signed on February 5, 1955.⁴¹ It provides for exchange of experience in all spheres of the economy and the transfer of technical documentation to each other, exchange of information and sending specialists to give technical assistance. A Soviet-Korean Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was set up to coordinate the efforts of the two sides in this field. Its functions were transferred, in 1967, to a sub-commission of the intergovernmental Soviet-Korean consultative commission on economy, science and technology.

During the entire span of scientific and technical cooperation, the Soviet side gave the DPRK about 2,800 sets of production forms and records in the fields of geology, engineering, metallurgy, chemistry, food and fishing industry, energy and agriculture.⁴² In engineering alone, several dozen types of products began to be put out on the basis of the Soviet production forms and records, including Suyngr-58 trucks (GAZ-51 type) and Charchuho (KRAZ-214 type), wheel tractors Chollima (Vladimiretz-28 type), excavators, bulldozers, perforators, compressors

⁴¹ See *Relations of the Soviet Union with People's Korea*, pp. 109-110

⁴² See *Ibid.*, p. 406; *USSR Foreign Trade*, 1975, No. 8, p. 12

and other types of equipment.⁴³ Soviet technology is applied in many branches of the DPRK economy. Furthermore, the Korean side received specimens of industrial goods and agricultural produce, and over 5,300 standards used to create the national standardisation service.⁴⁴

In turn, the DPRK provided to the Soviet Union about 30 sets of production forms and records, including for producing ferrous coke and polyvinyl alcohol, for intensifying pond pisciculture, improving methods of fishery and processing the sea products, and also for growing certain agricultural and medicinal plants, ginseng in particular. The Soviet side was also given specimens of planting stock and seeds of frost-proof and high-yield varieties of fruit trees and berry shrubs.⁴⁵

In accordance with the Soviet-Korean agreement of 1959, the USSR lent the DPRK technical assistance in using atomic energy for peaceful purposes: in equipping a radium-chemical laboratory and a nuclear physics laboratory, and in building a cobalt installation. It also supplied other sophisticated research equipment.⁴⁶

During the existence of the DPRK the Soviet higher educational institutions trained over 1,500 highly skilled specialists; and more than 250 DPRK citizens graduated from post-graduate courses in the Soviet Union. As of the early 1980s about 40 students from the DPRK studied at Soviet higher educational institutions. Thousands of Korean specialists underwent practice at Soviet enterprises or got acquainted with the achievements of Soviet science and technology. There are always Soviet students enrolled in the department of Korean philology at the Kim Il Sung Pyongyang University.⁴⁷

The scientific and technological cooperation between our two countries is closely linked with the activities of the Academies of Sciences of the two countries, based on the agreement on scientific cooperation concluded on February 4, 1969, and the two-year plans signed ever since. On May 17, 1982, in Pyongyang a regular plan of scientific cooperation for 1982-1983 was signed.

The just struggle of the Korean people for the reunification of their Motherland, for peace and security in the Korean Peninsula enjoys broad support among the Soviet people, the fraternal socialist countries and the progressive public the world over. In the conditions of the aggravated international situation caused by the aggressive forces of imperialism led by the USA, the tension in the Korean Peninsula has grown tangibly. The April 1983 memorandum issued by the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK lays bare the attempts of the United States to set up a new aggressive military alliance consisting of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo, which aims at undermining peace and security in Asia and the world over.

It is common knowledge that the Reagan administration regards South Korea as a "frontline state", a potential "theatre of military operations". Proceeding from this premise, Washington is boosting military preparations in South Korea beefing up its 42,000-strong army there. The

⁴³ See *Korea: North and South*, p. 76.

⁴⁴ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1980, No. 33, p. 20.

⁴⁵ See *Korea: North and South*, p. 76; *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1980, No. 33, p. 20.

⁴⁶ See F. I. Shabshina, *Socialist Korea*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 178-179 (in Russian).

⁴⁷ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1981, No. 28, p. 20.

Pentagon is planning to station in South Korea new medium-range nuclear weapons systems, cruise missiles in particular. Plans for supplying neutron weapons to South Korea are being worked out. US military credits earmarked for modernising the South Korean army are growing considerably. For example, in 1981 Washington gave \$150 million, in 1982—\$170 million, in 1983 it was envisaged to grant \$210 million, and in 1984 \$230 million will be earmarked for this purpose.

The military buildup by US imperialism in the Pacific, Seoul's increasingly close ties with the American war chariot cause the well-grounded apprehension of the peoples in the Far East. That is why the friends of the Korean people—the USSR, other countries of the socialist community, and progressive world public—support constructive efforts of the DPRK leaders aimed at peaceful and democratic reunification of the Motherland without outside interference. It was stated at the 8th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 9th convocation: "We express solidarity with the struggle of the Korean People's Democratic Republic for peaceful and democratic reunification of Motherland".

35 years of the socialist construction in the DPRK is a period of selfless labour of the Korean people and the period of mutually beneficial cooperation between the Soviet Union and People's Korea. At the November (1982) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, pointed out: "We are striving for the comradely cooperation and socialist mutual assistance of the fraternal countries to become deeper and more efficient, including in the joint solution of scientific, technological, production, transport, energy and other tasks".⁴⁸ It is in this that the CPSU and the Soviet state see the guarantee of the successful march forward of the entire socialist community.

⁴⁸ *Kommunist*, 1982, No. 17, pp. 19-20.

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ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN SOVIET FAR EAST, SRV VIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 27-36

[Article by M. Ye. Trigubenko: "Participation by Soviet Far East in USSR-Vietnamese Trade and Economic Cooperation"]

The current tasks of developing the USSR's economic cooperation with socialist countries are outlined in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the speeches and remarks on this question by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state. While socialist economic integration is singled out as the main, priority direction of the USSR's foreign economic policy in respect of socialist countries, attention is invariably given also to the development of cooperation with individual member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

When the prospects of developing the USSR's foreign economic ties with CMEA countries are coordinated, when concrete programmes of cooperation are worked out and the main directions of long-term economic policy are determined, account is taken of the specific conditions in which each fraternal country develops. The USSR guides itself by the agreed-upon decisions of CMEA countries on the application to Vietnam of the fundamental provision of the Comprehensive Programme on measures to intensify the growth and raise the efficiency of the economy with the aim of gradually raising the level of economic development and bringing it in line with that of other CMEA countries, as it is envisaged in respect of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Republic of Cuba (36th Meeting of the CMEA Session) and on the application in respect of these countries of the agreed-upon preferential terms of cooperation (36th Meeting of the CMEA Session)¹.

At the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, held in the spring of 1982, the head of the Soviet party and government delegation, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev noted in one of his speeches: "As to the Soviet Union, it will continue to give socialist Vietnam resolute support and assistance."²

The joint Soviet-Vietnamese communique, signed on the occasion of the official friendly visit to the USSR of a party and government delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam headed by member of the Po-

¹ See *Pravda*, June 11, 1982; *The Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries*, 1982, N. 8, p. 16 (in Russian).

² *Pravda*, March 31, 1982.

litical Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Chairman of the State Council of the SRV Chuong Tinh in October 1982, said that "economic cooperation has become closer, the coordination of the economic plans of both countries is deepening, new forms of cooperation are developing and its efficiency is steadily growing".³

Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation is developing at the present stage on the basis of intergovernmental agreements signed late in the 1970s and early 1980s and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, the conclusion of which gave a powerful impetus to the deepening and expansion of allround relations of the two fraternal states. Among the most important trade and economic agreements signed in 1978-1981 mention should be made of the agreement between the USSR and the SRV on the further development and deepening of economic, scientific and technical cooperation, the agreements on assistance to the SRV in ensuring normal traffic on the Hanoi-Hochiminh City railway, on technical assistance to the SRV in the completion of the construction of the Thanglong bridge over the Red River, the reconstruction of the Hanoi railway hub and the widening of the gauge of the Hanoi-Haiphong railway, the agreement on cooperation in the training of Vietnamese specialists and skilled workers (November 3, 1978) and in its furtherance the April 2, 1981 Soviet-Vietnamese agreement on cooperation in geological prospecting and the extraction of oil and gas on the SRV's continental shelf (July 3, 1980), as well as the agreement on trade turnover and payments in the period from 1981 to 1985 between the USSR and the SRV (July 30, 1981). The agreement on greater purchases by the Soviet Union of vegetables and fruits in Vietnam, reached during the friendly visit to the USSR in September 1981 by a party and government delegation of the SRV headed by the General Secretary of the CPV CC Le Duan, is of much importance.⁴

The following specificities are characteristic of the developing cooperation between the USSR and the SRV late in the 1970s and early 1980s:

- the concentration of efforts on the construction of key projects in various branches of Vietnam's national economy;
- continued high rates of growth of mutual trade, search for ways of overcoming the unbalanced nature of Soviet-Vietnamese trade and of ways of increasing its effectiveness;
- introduction of various forms of industrial cooperation;
- acceleration of scientific and technological cooperation;
- growing Soviet assistance to the solution of the problem of providing employment for Vietnamese citizens and raising their professional skills.

Soviet assistance in the construction of new big projects, forming the backbone of the developing material and technical base and initiating the formation of the socialist sector, has played a tremendous role at all stages of Vietnam's socialist construction.

288 projects have been built or are being built in the SRV with the USSR's technical assistance.⁵ 194 of them, including 101 in industry, were put into operation by the beginning of 1982.⁶ The main directions, aims and tasks of the current five-year-plan period (1981-1985) were approved by the 5th Congress of the CPV and more attention is being

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1982

⁴ See *Pravda*, Sept. 8, 1981

⁵ See *Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 6, p. 23 (in Russian)

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4

given to making more effective use of capital investments by stopping the practice of scattering resources among numerous projects and concentrating them instead at the most important ones. In the spring of 1982 the Council of Ministers of the SRV approved a list of 42 top-priority projects for the period of 1981-1985 and for a longer span of time.⁷ The main of them are enterprises in the fuel and energy branches of industry, in transport, major export enterprises and some other enterprises that are being created with the Soviet Union's technical assistance. Oil and gas prospecting and extraction, mostly on the SRV's continental shelf, the Hoabinh hydrocomplex and the hydropower station with a capacity of 1,920,000 kilowatts⁸ on the Black River (Da), the Phalai thermal power station with a capacity of 640,000 kilowatts in the north of Vietnam and the Chian hydropower station with a capacity of 320,000 kilowatts in the south of Vietnam, the Thanglong bridge across the Red River (Hongha), which is being built as a gift, the Hetam collieries, the Bimson cement works with an annual capacity of 2 million tons (currently it already produces 600,000 tons of cement a year)⁹ are the most labour and capital intensive projects.

The comprehensive approach is being increased in Soviet assistance to the construction of new projects. The agreed-upon measures concerning the further improvement of the servicing of machinery and equipment supplied to the SRV by the USSR and the repair of Soviet sea-going ships in the docks of Hochiminh City belong to the field of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in which the sides work in a new manner, on the basis of a comprehensive approach.

The rates of growth of Soviet-Vietnamese trade in 1976-1981 were the highest among all CMEA countries. In the period between 1976 and 1981 the USSR's trade with CMEA countries doubled, while with the SRV it increased 4.9 times.¹⁰ Moreover, whereas in 1976-1980 the average growth rates of the USSR's trade turnover with the SRV were 24.3 per cent, in 1981-1982 they already were 28.5 per cent. The volume of mutual trade turnover in 1982 reached the record level of 1,011 million roubles.¹¹

While noting the successes in the development of cooperation between the USSR and the SRV it is also necessary to mention the problems which should be solved in the current and subsequent five-year periods. It is necessary to overcome the imbalance in the trade. In 1980, Soviet import amounted to 34.6 per cent of its export, while in 1981 this figure was 23 per cent. The volume of the USSR's trade so far is smaller than that with other CMEA countries. The SRV's share in the USSR's trade with socialist countries (including countries not belonging to the CMEA) amounted in 1982 to a mere 1.5 per cent.¹² The task of finding in the SRV additional sources of increasing export is now being moved to the fore. Special importance is being given in this connection to the all-round utilisation of the resources of agriculture and tropical forestry,

⁷ See *Asia and Africa Today*, 1983, No. 3, p. 20.

⁸ A big volume of construction work has already been carried out at this project of the five-year-plan period. The river Da was dammed in January 1981, modernisation and repair facilities have been created, a big motor pool has been set up and housing has been built for the builders.

See *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1983.

⁹ See *Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 6, pp. 14-15 (in Russian).

¹⁰ See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1983, No. 13, p. 20.

¹¹ See *Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 6, p. 20 (in Russian). *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1983, No. 13, p. 20.

¹² Estimated on the basis of data in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 1983, No. 1, p. 20.

light industry, to increasing mining, the development of fisheries and to the gradual transition to the export of some types of products of heavy industry and increasing the export of raw materials.

Vietnamese experts are of the opinion that in the future it is necessary to increase the share of perennial crops (rubber, coffee, tea, fruits) and vegetables, to increase the export of light industry goods manufactured from local raw materials and raw materials supplied to the SRV by socialist countries (cotton fibre, cotton yarn, raw wool). Vietnamese economists also believe it necessary to expand the export of some types of industrial raw materials and fuel: coal, tin, chromites and apatites.¹³

At the present stage the SRV's foreign economic strategy is characterised by struggle for a gradual transition from using predominantly the aid of socialist countries, granted in the form of long-term credits or gratis, to the development of mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation. As it was stressed by the General Secretary of the CPV CC Le Duan in the political report of the CPV CC to the 5th Party Congress "it is necessary to devote special attention to economic efficiency, to the effective use of the credits and assistance of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, to press for the fulfilment of the country's obligations, to promote international trust and resolutely to struggle against a sponging attitude to foreign aid".¹⁴

The expansion of ties between the Soviet Far East and Vietnam is becoming at the present stage an important direction of the development of trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the SRV.

The Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas play an active role in the Soviet economy as a whole and in the USSR's cooperation with socialist countries. Rapidly developing there are such important industries as mining, timber felling and wood-working, as well as the fishing industry. Those areas account for 40 per cent of the entire Soviet fish catch and for 8 per cent of the total output of logs, sawn timber and pulp. These areas are the main producer of soy beans in the Soviet Union. The manufacturing branches of industry have grown considerably in the Soviet Far East in recent years—the petrochemical, engineering, metal-working, light and food industries.

In accordance with the "Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period Ending in 1990" even greater prospects are mapped out for the economy of the Far East. It is intended to ensure there a further development of non-ferrous metallurgy, oil refining, the fishing, wood-working and pulp-and-paper industries, and a further growth of the output of soy beans, rice and other farm crops.¹⁵

Being carried out there are economic measures directed at the comprehensive utilisation of natural resources and a more effective use of raw materials and energy. The work of all types of transport is being perfected. A number of major mineral-raw materials complexes (petrochemical, iron ore, coal, non-ferrous metals, building materials) are being created in the Far East and they form a good basis for the establishment there of territorial-industrial complexes.¹⁶ The Far East is making a weighty contribution to the fulfilment of the Soviet Union's Food Programme and is developing its agriculture, its fishing and food industries

¹³ See *Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries*, 1982, No. 8, p. 13 (in Russian).

¹⁴ *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982.

¹⁵ See *Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress*, Moscow, 1981, p. 188 (in Russian).

¹⁶ See *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1982, No. 11, pp. 33, 34, 37.

to ensure a still fuller satisfaction of the population's requirements in foodstuffs.

At the same time, while possessing diverse resources for the comprehensive development of the economy, this region encounters difficulties in the cultivation of vegetables, fruits and grain because of harsh climatic conditions. The consumption of basic foodstuffs in the Far East exceeds local production. Thus, in 1980 the output of meat and meat products in the Far East in the per capita estimation was 33 kilograms, while consumption was 65 kilograms, the corresponding figures for milk were 189 and 354 kilograms and for vegetables—68 and 99 kilograms.¹⁷ It is necessary to increase the output of some commodities that are in great demand, to expand facilities for recreation and tourism. The region experiences a big shortage of manpower and for this reason the expansion of labour-intensive industries, construction and other work there meets with difficulties. The solution of these problems could be facilitated by the development of the trade and economic cooperation of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas with Vietnam.

The importance of the USSR's Far Eastern region in this respect is determined by the following factors: the relative closeness of the territory, the existence of a cheap and short sea route (it takes seven days to sail from Haiphong to Vladivostok), the interest of the Soviet side in the purchase in the SRV of foodstuffs and manufactured consumer goods, in launching labour cooperation in conditions of a shortage of manpower in the Soviet Far East. The industry in the Soviet Far Eastern areas is already oriented to a certain extent at servicing Vietnam's economic needs: about 20 Far Eastern industrial enterprises are fulfilling orders placed by Vietnam. They produce for the SRV steel rolled stock, lifting- and-conveying machines, power-generating plant, metal-cutting machine tools, ship diesels, chemicals, cement and sawn timber. The contribution of the Soviet Far Eastern region to the development of the SRV's transport system is also considerable.

The big market of the Soviet Far Eastern region could become a purchaser of traditional and new items of Vietnam's export. So far, however, the share of the Far East in the USSR's trade with Vietnam is 12.5 per cent as against 5 per cent in 1980.

Vietnam's interest in expanding trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas is also determined by a whole number of factors: the desire to develop industrial cooperation by getting orders or raw materials for the manufacture of products and thus putting to work idle production capacities and manpower, to effect a mutual exchange of goods directly and getting thus industrial and consumer goods from the Far Eastern areas of the USSR, to expand contacts in the field of scientific and technical cooperation and in many other fields (setting up of facilities for tourism and recreation, cooperation in the field of transport etc.).¹⁸

The cooperation of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas with the SRV has long-standing traditions. Already starting with the 1950s assistance is being given to Vietnam in geological prospecting, in studying marine resources, and there is intensive cooperation in fishery, oceanological and limnological studies in the western part of the Pacific with the aim of working out scientific recommendations for intensifying the repro-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1983, No 1, p. 93.

¹⁸ See *Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Social and Economic Problems*, Nov. 1982 (16) (in Russian).

duction of fish and other sea products and for regulating fishing. It was at that time also that a number of joint studies were launched in the waters washing the shores of Vietnam.

By now the Soviet Union has accumulated positive experience in developing trade, economic and other forms of ties on a regional level with CMEA countries and also with a number of neighbouring developed capitalist countries, for instance, Japan.

The USSR's cooperation with CMEA countries, including on a regional level, is being carried out within the framework of socialist economic integration and for this reason is directed at the planned development of economic areas of the USSR. The combination of their home and international specialisation enhances the rational siting and forming of territorial-production complexes, the development of export industries of importance for the above-mentioned integration. As a factor of the regional development of the USSR's economy socialist economic integration is directed, especially in the current decade, at the priority development in the eastern areas of the USSR of joint production in the mining industry (first of all the oil and gas industries and partly in the coal industry), in the energy-intensive branches of chemistry and metallurgy, in the timber chemistry industry and in some branches of machine-building. As regards the European CMEA countries, it is the western areas of the USSR that are engaged in across-the-border cooperation with them and as regards Mongolia and the DPRK, it is the eastern areas. Coastal cooperation is being developed with Japan and Australia. In the opinion of Soviet economists across-the-border cooperation has already become an independent factor of the world socialist economy and is closely connected with the development of integration.¹⁹

There are all grounds for studying the USSR's coastal trade with the Pacific countries, carried out through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade's Dalintorg association. According to economic estimates, it is sometimes cheaper for the USSR to buy some types of consumer goods from its Far Eastern neighbours than to bring them from the European USSR.²⁰

It is an important feature of coastal trade that the imported commodities are sold through the local trade network in exchange for goods manufactured in these areas, this making it possible to mobilise better the export possibilities of enterprises in the Far East and to include in the trade turnover handicrafts, as well as products of the local industry and other branches that are put out in small batches.

It goes without saying that the aims, nature and content of the USSR's cooperation with the SRV on the regional level, the possibilities of developing coastal trade at the present stage differ somewhat from the similar forms of the USSR's cooperation with European CMEA countries.

The SRV is at the initial stage of the period of transition and for this reason sets itself tasks that are typical of this stage of development.

The CPV's economic strategy for the 1980s, adopted by the 5th Congress of the party, provides for the top priority development of the agro-industrial sphere, including traditional branches of the economy, for the speediest solution of the food and other problems connected with the need to raise the people's living standards. Branches servicing the agro-

¹⁹ See *The USSR and Socialist Economic Integration*, Moscow, 1981, p. 325 (in Russian).

²⁰ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1981, No. 1, p. 32

industrial sphere, as well as the branches of industry and agriculture that export their output, will develop simultaneously. The construction of major projects in the fuel and energy industry will be continued. The fulfilment of the economic programme for the 1980s will enable Vietnam to start its initial accumulation and switch in the subsequent years to socialist industrialisation.

The problems of the SRV's cooperation with the USSR, including on the regional level, that is, with the Far Eastern areas of the Soviet Union, were discussed during the stay of SRV party and government delegations in Moscow in July 1980 and September 1981.²¹

The party and economic officials of the territories and regions in the Far East and the scientific institutions of the USSR and the SRV that deal with the subject-matter of cooperation between the USSR and the SRV are giving attention to this problem. A certain contribution to the elaboration and practical fulfilment of the task of increasing the participation of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas in the trade and economic cooperation with Vietnam was made by the Soviet-Vietnamese scientific symposiums held in Khabarovsk in October 1980 and in Hochiminh City in November 1982.²²

They were held within the framework of scientific cooperation between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, including the Far Eastern Scientific Centre of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the Committee for Social Sciences of the SRV. Both scientific symposiums attracted the attention of the scientific community and state bodies, both in the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The meeting in Hochiminh City was attended by officials of the Maritime and Khabarovsk Territorial Executive Committees, of the Amur, Kamchatka and Sakhalin Regional Executive Committees and from the Vietnamese side by officials of central and local (city and provincial) planning and economic bodies.²³

The need to intensify the USSR's economic interaction with the SRV in the Far Eastern region along a number of directions was noted at the symposiums. The main of these directions is to increase deliveries from the SRV to the Far Eastern areas of the USSR of vegetables, spices, tropical fruit and technical crops, fresh or processed, as it was noted at the summit meetings of Soviet and Vietnamese leaders.

The Far Eastern areas of the Soviet Union are the main consumers of the fresh vegetables, fruits and liquors shipped from the SRV and of more than a half of all tea. But so far the deliveries of these products from Vietnam fall below the import requirements of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern areas, especially in the winter and spring, and below the export possibilities of the SRV. Thus, in 1980 the SRV exported to the USSR 2,700 tons of fresh vegetables, 15 tons of red pepper, 12,700 tons of fresh fruits, including 6,500 tons of bananas and 4,200 tons of pineapples.²⁴ The share of deliveries of fresh fruits from the SRV in the total purchases of these product by the USSR abroad amounted in 1980 to 1.2 per cent,²⁵ this being both below the requirements of the Soviet side and the possibilities of the Vietnamese side.

Vietnam can become for the Far Eastern areas of the Soviet Union an important source of vegetables and fruits. As compared to interre-

²¹ See *Pravda*, Sept. 4 and 8, 1981.

²² See *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1981, No. 3, p. 158; *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 10, 1982.

²³ See *Nhan Dan* Nov. 25, 1982 and Dec. 27, 1982.

²⁴ See *Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1980*, p. 203 (in Russian).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

gional deliveries, the import of vegetables and fruits from the SRV has a number of advantages. Delivery is made by the cheapest type of transport—sea transport—throughout the year; the variety of vegetables and fruits imported from the SRV is great; 7 types of vegetables and fruits of the 40 types cultivated in Vietnam are imported at present.²⁶ It is of considerable interest to the Far Eastern areas of the USSR to purchase in the SRV peanuts, tea, black and red pepper, vegetable and fruit preserves. These products store well, easily lend themselves to packing and transportation and do not require any special conditions for marketing. Greater purchases of agricultural produce in Vietnam are envisaged by the agreement on economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and the SRV in 1981-1985.

Much attention is being given in socialist Vietnam to expanding areas planted to vegetables and fruits and to increasing harvests. Thus, in 1981, area planted to vegetables increased, as compared to 1975, from 147,000 hectares to 202,000 hectares, and vegetable harvests went up from 1.76 to 2.28 million tons.²⁷

Vietnamese economists believe that the SRV has big possibilities for increasing deliveries of fresh vegetables and fruit to the USSR already during the present five-year-plan period—to 100,000-130,000 tons, and can also additionally allocate for these crops from 10,000 to 20,000 hectares presently planted with rice.²⁸ But this involves certain difficulties. At present the main efforts and material resources of the SRV are directed at the solution of the food problem during the current five-year-plan period, first of all at increasing the output of grain.

As a result of the introduction of a set of measures, including to stimulate the development of agricultural production, gross harvests of food crops grew considerably in 1981-1982 and amounted in terms of rice to 16.2 million tons in 1982, this being an increase of 13 per cent over the level of 1980. This created preconditions for terminating the import of foodstuffs starting with 1983.²⁹ But as it was noted at the 5th CPV Congress, the full solution of the food problem would require a comprehensive approach within the framework of which capital investments, the redistribution of labour resources and also the raising of the standard of management would be bound together.³⁰

Along with the solution of the food problem on the national level much attention is being given in the SRV to the creation of specialised zones for the cultivation of rice, technical crops, fruits and vegetables.³¹ At the meeting in Hochiminh City in 1982 Vietnamese economists spoke of their plans to set up specialised zones for the cultivation of vegetables and fruits, including for export to the Far Eastern areas of the USSR. For example, areas adjoining Haiphong, and also the Lamdong, Phuochanh and Tchuanhai provinces can specialise more in the year-round cultivation of vegetables, while the eastern and western part of Nambo in the cultivation of diverse tropical fruits, the central part of the country can specialise in the cultivation of pineapples, while Vinhphu province in the north of the country—in the cultivation of bananas. Vietnamese economists are of the opinion that the concentration of joint

²⁶ See *Nhan Dan*, Jan. 8, 1981.

²⁷ See *Statistical Yearbook of CMEA Countries*, 1982, Moscow, p. 35 (in Russian).

²⁸ See *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 24, 1982.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, May 13, 1983.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, March 30, 1982.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

efforts should be directed in the coming 5-10 years at the development of precisely the above-mentioned zones.

It is exceedingly important for the development and perfection of the trade and economic ties of the Soviet Far East with the SRV to create a production infrastructure: the production of standardised packing and the building of warehouses, the delivery of transport means. As I see it, a serious approach to this problem must be based on a long-term purpose-oriented special programme of producing vegetables, fruits and other farm produce imported from Vietnam and on the solution of the transport problem and related matters (packing, delivery, unloading, acceptance, storage and processing).

The south of Vietnam is playing an ever greater role in supplying vegetables and fruits to the Far Eastern areas of the USSR. Vietnamese specialists hold that a number of questions must be solved jointly to ensure a more active participation by the southern areas in the supply of the Far Eastern areas of the USSR with vegetables and fruits that are grown in the south of Vietnam in larger amounts and are much more varied there than in the north: the question of the reconstruction of river ports, Soviet assistance to the SRV in the repair of dry-cargo ships with refrigerators, the question of equipping enterprises in the south for the processing of vegetables and fruits, and the question of refrigerator capacities. Questions of packing, transportation and storage of this produce on the territory of Vietnam will be studied parallel to this.

As to cooperation in branches producing various consumer goods in the SRV for delivery to the Soviet Far East, it is expedient to develop it mostly on the basis of industrial co-production which has become developed in the previous and current five-year periods between the SRV, the USSR and some other socialist countries.³² Products of the light and handicrafts industries comprise about a half of the Vietnamese export to the USSR. These are made mostly from local materials—jute, bamboo, rushes, clay, leather, sea shells, etc. Produced from Soviet raw materials are carpets, fabrics, ready-to-use cotton products (underwear, bed linen, tablecloths, towels, knitwear and other garments), cloth footwear, work clothes, etc. A whole army of craftsmen, and they number 1.6 million in Vietnam,³³ can be drawn into co-production to put out commodities for which there are orders. Vietnamese economists are of the opinion that the utilisation of the yet idle manpower in the southern areas of the country, especially in Hochiminh City, plays a particularly important role in the development of this form of cooperation.³⁴

Vietnam's cooperation with the USSR in the timber and wood-working industry is closely associated with the output of consumer goods on the basis of co-production. The Far East possesses considerable timber resources. Several dozen mechanised felling enterprises and a number of wood-working plants are engaged there in the felling and processing of timber. At the same time the Far Eastern areas are interested in purchasing valuable species of timber for the needs of the furniture industry, in the manufacture of wooden packing, planed veneer, furniture and parquet blanks. All this could be organised at Vietnamese plants for subsequent delivery to the Far Eastern areas. The orders for the output in the SRV of certain types of products of the wood-working in-

³² See *Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 6, p. 21; *Economic Cooperation of CMEA Countries*, 1982, No. 8, p. 15.

³³ See *Asia and Africa Today*, 1983, No. 4.

³⁴ See *Nhan Dan*, May 25, 1981, Feb. 28, 1983.

dustry could be placed on the basis of the customer's raw materials, as it is being practiced by the USSR in relations with other branches of the Vietnamese industry.

The need to develop such forms of cooperation as the setting up of facilities for tourism and recreation in the SRV for the population of the Soviet Far East, mostly utilising the accumulated potential, was noted at the symposiums in Khabarovsk and Hochiminh City. Thus, the existing hotels in Hochiminh City make it possible already now to accommodate hundreds of Soviet tourists every month. Conditions for receiving Soviet tourists have been created at Doshon, a picturesque sea resort near Haiphong. Beautiful and well-appointed resort areas exist also in other parts of Vietnam—Niachang, Hue and Dalat.

The Far Eastern areas of the USSR are capable of making a considerable contribution to the development of the Soviet Union's ties with Vietnam. The involvement of the economic potential of the USSR's Far Eastern areas in the cooperation with the SRV will help accelerate Vietnam's economic development and increase its export potential. The problem of making fuller use of production capacities and labour resources in Vietnam can be solved on the basis of industrial and labour cooperation. The social problems of the transitional period in the SRV could thus be solved with greater success as well: the strengthening and expansion of the positions of the socialist sector in industry and the accelerated introduction of socialist forms of economy in agriculture. By drawing on the advanced experience and scientific and technical know-how of the USSR's Far Eastern areas, Vietnam will be able to accelerate the process of the scientific and technological revolution, this being one of the main tasks at the present stage of the country's development. As it was noted by Comrade Le Duan, "scientific and technological progress must become the principal component of the social and economic plans in all branches and at all levels. It is imperative to make proper use of scientific and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, and also of the assistance received from them in this field".³⁵

³⁵ *Prauda*, March 28, 1982.

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JAPANESE MILITARY POLICIES, U.S. ALLIANCE SAID TO UNDERMINE CONSTITUTION

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 37-46

[Article by V. N. Yeremin, candidate of juridical sciences: "Struggle of Japan's Progressive Forces for Democratization of Legislation and Justice"]

As the general crisis of capitalism grows deeper it entails a further aggravation of the crisis of bourgeois legislation and a continuing decline of justice in capitalist countries. These phenomena, common to the legal superstructure in any capitalist country, also obtain in modern imperialist Japan. It is known that Japanese law is in fact divided into a system which concurs with the Constitution and a system which contradicts it (the latter is an outcome of the Japan-US military-political alliance); departmental orders in Japan hold increasing sway in comparison with laws, and the population often prefers not to take civil and criminal cases to court. The ruling circles are out to make legislation and justice more reactionary and to turn them into a more effective instrument of the finance-monopoly bourgeoisie.

REACTIONARY CRUSADE AGAINST JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION

The current Constitution, which was adopted in 1946 and came into force in 1947, contains a number of points which on the whole meet the interests of the people. Even though these points "do not overstep the limits of bourgeois democracy, have a declarative character and are not backed by any material, economic guarantees",¹ thanks to their inclusion the democratic forces have obtained a legal basis to struggle for peace, democracy and social progress.

Of special significance in Japan's postwar Constitution is Article 9 with its following lines: "...The Japanese people for ever renounce war as a sovereign right of a nation, as well as the threat or use of armed force as a means of resolving international issues.

"To achieve the goal mentioned in the above paragraph, Army, Navy, Air Force, or any other means of war shall never be created. The right of the state to wage war is not recognised."²

This article was dealt a heavy blow by the 1951-1952 San Francisco legal system and especially by the Japanese-US "security treaty" that sealed the military-political alliance between Japan and the USA. The Hatoyama government, formed in 1955, openly unveiled a reactionary plan to revise Japan's Constitution.

¹ *Modern Japan*, Moscow, 1973, p. 422 (in Russian). The Supreme Court even adopted in 1967 a decision according to which the Constitution's Article 25 in its first paragraph only declares the state's duties to ensure the minimum level of healthy and cultured life of the whole people, but does not directly give individual citizens concrete rights. The paragraph states that "all have the right to maintain the minimum level of healthy and cultured life".

² *Ibid.*, p. 758.

Having decided to revise the Constitution as a whole or at least Article 9, the most reactionary, nationalist wing of the ruling circles postponed the fulfilment of this plan until the country achieved economic success. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the top rulers strove to upgrade Japan's role in international affairs, to be accomplished through greatly increased economic might coupled with militarisation and still closer military-political links with the US. As for the situation of the 1980s, it can be seen that, continuing the above course, the ruling reactionary circles are coming to grips with the task of undermining the Constitution.

The offensive of Japan's ruling circles against the country's peaceable Constitution takes the following directions:

- unjustified interpretation of important provisions, suggestion of all sorts of "amendments" and new laws that contradict the Constitution in principle, as well as taking of foreign policy steps which run counter to the spirit of the Constitution; the drawing up of concrete changes of the text of the main law;

- demagogical statements alleging the existence of public opinion demands to revise the Constitution; ostentatious pressuring of the government by the most rabid enemies of the Constitution from the LDP ranks; mass ideological pressure on the population in favour of a constitutional reform and building up of an appearance that the nation inclines to it and even demands it;

- the government's game of hypocritical "moderation", of striving to secure conditions for a "quiet" discussion of the problems of revising the main law, regularly interrupted by anti-constitutional statements by cabinet members.

The working out of concrete changes of the Constitution's text is undertaken in the first place by the "Commission to study the Constitution" set up within the central machinery of the Liberal-Democratic Party. After eight years in limbo the commission reactivated its work in 1980 with the publication of a draft revision of Art. 9, which, if enacted would legalise both the armed forces and waging of war (Japan's most reactionary forces demand full exclusion of Article 9).

As examples of laws that contradict the Constitution and thus undermine its stability and authority one can cite the above-mentioned "security treaty" which is part of a whole system of Japanese law (*ampo hotaiki*) including the Special criminal law, the Law on defence secrets, and others. Another example can be provided by the norms on the state of emergency contained in the Law on police (Articles 71, 72) and the Law on the self-defence forces (Articles 78, 81), despite the fact that a clause on state of emergency is not contained in the Constitution.³ Of course, the very existence of the "self-defence forces" and the enactment of the law that legalised them are at loggerheads with the Constitution. But Japan's ruling circles are impatient to make these "forces" even more incompatible with the peaceable Constitution through certain "amendments" to the existing legislation. In the summer of 1982 the then Foreign Minister Sakurachi proposed that the Law on the self-defence forces be changed in such a way that the Japanese contingents could be included in the UN forces, i. e., that their appearance on the international arena be legalised.

Obscuring the clear provisions of the Constitution by their arbitrary interpretation, thinking up all sorts of "legal" pretexts for combat ope-

³ See V. N. Yeryomin, "Reaction's Assault on the Rights and Freedoms of Japanese Citizens", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1979, No. 3.

rations of the armed forces, seeking justification for removing troops from "civilian" control, representatives of the aggressive circles often bandy the notions of "self-defence", "self-protection", etc. Speaking before the Diet in February 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone declared that the "self-defence forces" would render combat support to the US Navy in case of an "emergency" in the region of Japan. He alleged that such an action would be of a "self-defence" nature and would not contradict the Constitution.

Speculations of this kind are based on ill-advised attempts to make use of the norms of criminal law to justify the beginning of military operations by troops before the Prime Minister's order on "self-defence actions", envisaged by Article 76 of the Law on the self-defence forces. In the autumn of 1978, Nagano, the Chief of Staff of the "self-defence" land forces, using demagogic verbiage about "countering a surprise attack", insisted that military units could act on the basis of Article 35 of the Criminal code, according to which "punishment is not meted out for actions performed on a legal basis or as part of legitimate professional activity". Japan's National Defence Board (NDB) also let out suggestions that in this case Article 36 of the Criminal code can be applied. The article concerns the concept of legitimate defence, in which the notion of "collective legitimate defence" was included. In this connection even the bourgeois *Asahi* wrote as follows: "In short, if it is recognised that the steps against a surprise attack constitute legitimate actions as part of professional activity then Article 76 of the Law on the self-defence forces will be turned into a mere scrap of paper. The brake of civilian control will stop working completely and a situation will emerge wherein the self-defence forces will be acting on their own."⁴

Preparation of emergency laws for wartime (*yuji rippo*),⁵ which is directly connected with Japan's militarisation and stepped-up participation in US military-strategic plans in Asia and the Pacific basin, is also directed against the Constitution. In this respect most activity is displayed by the NDB. Back in 1963 it conducted a secret investigation regarding the use of legislation in case of emergency and in 1966 "issued instructions to launch a programme of preparing legislation for a state of emergency, including draft laws on special emergency measures, on keeping defence secrets of the state, etc."⁶ Stressing the danger of such activity for constitutional legality in the country, Japanese progressive lawyers have written that "within the National Defence Board secret activity is conducted on drawing up emergency laws that utterly ignore the Constitution. According to Japan's Constitution, diverse conceptions of this kind have no right to exist. Apparently, we must say that these conceptions from beginning to end are permeated with disdain for the Constitution, since they were thought over by the leading group of the self-defence forces whose very existence violates the Constitution".⁷ Since 1979 representatives of Japan's ruling circles "have been publicly debating the question of the need to streamline legislation on wartime measures",⁸ i. e., on passing wartime emergency legislation. There is a direct connection between the demand to adopt such legislation put forward by the Pentagon at a meeting with representatives of the NDB

⁴ *Asahi*, 15 Sept., 1978.

⁵ Also see the above-mentioned article by V. N. Yeryomin (p. 74).

⁶ Ts. Inako, *Law in Japan Today*, Moscow, 1981, p. 107 (in Russian).

⁷ Ts. Kitsukawa, T. Oanaka, *Public Peace and Human Rights*. Kyoto, 1974.

⁸ 348, 352.

⁹ Ts. Inako, *Law in Japan Today*, p. 260.

in 1970 and the fact that the question of emergency laws was openly discussed by Japan's ruling circles in 1979. The hallmark of this period was a growing propaganda campaign against the "Soviet threat" which made it possible for the question of emergency legislation to be discussed.

The Japanese government's decision in December 1982 to give the US free access to innovations of Japanese technology having military applications (this decision was timed for Y. Nakasone's visit to Washington in January 1983) seriously violates the spirit of the Constitution. A resolution of the LDP Congress in Tokyo in January 1983 for the first time demanded a revision of the Constitution. Members of the "League for an independent constitution", embracing about 300 prominent LDP figures headed by the former Prime Minister Kishi, visited Nakasone and demanded from him practical actions to revise the Constitution. The League is busily setting up its branches in prefectures and inspiring resolutions by municipal rallies calling for a revision of the Constitution and substitution of some of its Articles.

Back in 1981, while attempting to curb the popular movement in defence of the Constitution, the LDP set itself the task of achieving "national consensus" on the question of constitutional reform and fixed this task in its policy line. Through all kinds of strained interpretation of the results of public opinion polls, government bodies are trying to prove that an ever greater number of Japanese approve the existence of the "self-defence forces" and renounce the idea of the country's unarmed neutrality. These efforts are helped by a shameless propaganda campaign against the "threat from the north".

The LDP plan of influencing public opinion in order to revise the Constitution alleges that the latter does not agree with the "Japanese nation's spirit of historical development" and that many of the constitutional provisions, being outdated, are hindering the solving of a number of important domestic problems.

What "contradiction" do LDP ideologists see between the current Constitution and the Japanese nation's "spirit of historical development"? In their opinion, the postwar Constitution had undermined Japanese society's "traditional" relations between authority (emperor, director, father, husband) and those who respect and obey it (incidentally, Nakasone repeatedly promised the emperor to restore his status, limited by the Constitution). As an argument for the "nonconformity" of the Constitution they even cite the fact that the document is a Japanese translation of the English text written at General MacArthur's headquarters during American occupation, and say that at the time it was impossible to render in translation the style of Japanese legal documents.

The concrete problems whose solution is allegedly hindered by the Constitution are meant to be first of all the problems of "defence", education and fiscal policy. The Constitution slows down the pace of country's militarisation and prevents the ruling circles from introducing reactionary elements into public education and the upbringing of the young generation. As regards fiscal policy, reaction is not happy with the principle of "fiscal democracy" (*zaisei minshushugi*), embodied in a number of Articles which empower the Diet with certain control over the government's fiscal activity. It is asserted that revision of these provisions would expedite the cabinet's handling of budgetary questions, avoiding, in particular, delays in the Diet's budgetary commissions.

Reaction gives special weight to the claims that the Constitution was "forced" on the Japanese people by the occupational authorities. In this way the revision of the Constitution is presented as a struggle for the

"independent" main law. However, this assertion fails to hold water when analysis is made of the process of passing the postwar Constitution both from the point of view of contents of this process and its form.

The crucial point here is that the "acting Constitution was passed ... at a time when the democratic movement had reached unprecedented heights. In drawing up the Constitution the American occupational authorities and the Japanese ruling circles were obliged to take into account the will of the Japanese people and the world democratic public".⁹ With all that, the occupational authorities assessed the situation more realistically than representatives of Japanese reaction. The latter had continued to think in terms of the past. A draft of the new constitution, compiled by the Japanese government's commission, was turned down by MacArthur's headquarters as odiously reactionary and therefore unable to win support given the current political situation in the country. Furthermore, the American representatives had to take into account the sharp criticisms on the constitutional problem in postwar Japan made by the Soviet side in the Far Eastern Commission.

As to formalities, the procedure fixed in the Meiji Constitution (Japan's pre-war constitution) was strictly adhered to. "In accordance with the procedure of altering the constitution, envisaged in the Meiji Constitution, the draft passed the stages of advancing the draft by the emperor, approval by the Privy Council, submission to the Diet, passing by the Diet and sanctioning by the emperor."¹⁰

Regarding the public stance of the government, it has to be noted that its members already happen to put the main law, which requires special stability, on a par with other legal documents whose alteration is more dependable on demands of the moment. Although Article 99 obliges the ministers "to respect and observe the present constitution" and though the ministers on their appointment vow before the emperor to protect the Constitution, two ministers of the Suzuki cabinet in 1980 spoke out in behalf of its revision. The public uproar that ensued forced the head of the government to ask cabinet members to tone down their statements and publicly disavow any plans to scrap the Constitution. As for the present Prime Minister, known to be a zealous opponent of the Constitution, he has repeatedly said that under conditions of a changing society in the Constitution, as in any other document, room could always be for improvement in a changing society.

According to *Asian Security 1981* a yearbook put out by a Japanese research institute that studies problems of peace and security, the majority of opposition politicians continue to view the Constitution as inviolable and are against all discussions on the matter, regarding them as dangerous and militarist,¹¹ while Nakasone, speaking before the Diet, advocated an "atmosphere of free discussion" of the question of changing the Constitution, regretting that at present, allegedly, there is no possibility to voice one's opinion on the matter.

The procedure of altering Japan's constitution is determined by its Article 96 which stipulates that introduction of amendments in the Constitution demands the agreement of not less than two-thirds of the Diet's deputies; after that the amendments are to be approved by the whole people. In the future the ruling party aims at achieving a Diet

⁹ *Modern Japan*, p. 421.

¹⁰ *Essay on Jurisprudence*. Edited by K. Yamamoto, Tokyo, 1972, pp. 50-51.

¹¹ V. N. Bunin, "Evolution of Japanese Militarism", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1982, No. 4.

majority, by which the Constitution can be reshaped, through changing the electoral system by passing over to the so-called "small election constituencies".

REACTIONARY TENDENCIES IN LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE

In other aspects of legislation, aside from the Constitution, Japan's ruling circles are also striving to pass through the Diet such laws and their alterations which are to the advantage of these circles.

An effective way of muzzling those who are in favour of peace and against militarisation is seen by the Japanese government in the adoption of strict rules of safeguarding secrets. The term "secret" is meant to apply to many things connected with the country's military build-up, the joint Japanese-American military-strategic plans, etc. In 1981 the *Akahata* newspaper reported that the authorities were drawing up a draft "Law on keeping secrets" which would allow to prosecute those who criticise military preparations.

Of late the problem of "secrets" has caused renewed concern as a result of the Suzuki cabinet's agreement to station at Misawa airbase American F-16s capable of carrying nuclear weapons and of reaching Soviet territory. The stationing of the F-16s is accompanied by proposed changes in legislation on protecting secrets in the direction of tightening the laws.

The LDP, a party of skillful and highly experienced politicians—is pushing through the Diet some bills whose political significance does not lie on the surface and becomes fully apparent only later. Thus, a significant part in restoring the LDP's positions, after the blows sustained as a result of the 1977-1979 parliamentary elections, was played by the increasing effect of the 1976-1977 laws which provided for measures to protect small and medium businessmen.

The country's rulers handle legal practice in such a way that the law, whose text is "neutral", in reality is made to favour the well-to-do and work against the toilers.

In 1970 Japan passed a law in accordance with which the native population of the country was to achieve full social equality in 10 to 12 years. Yet in fact discrimination against "burakumins"—descendants of the feudal-time untouchables—continues.

On the whole criminal and civil procedural practice in Japan is at present in a critical state. The citizens' constitutional right to speedy examination of cases and the help of qualified lawyers is flagrantly violated: the grass-root bodies of the court system are short of qualified personnel and suffer from overwork; this is one of the reasons for delays in legal procedure; the needy strata of the population are hard put paying lawyers; the state grants insufficient sums to pay the lawyer appointed by the state in accordance with the Constitution when the accused cannot afford it. The powers of the chairman of legal procedure during court sessions are hypertrophied: he arbitrarily limits the presentation of evidence and speeches by the defence, restores "order" among the public, etc. Possibilities of reexamination of cases, in which sentences have come into force, are limited.

If for common people red-tape in the administration of justice means infringement of their interests, then big tycoons view Themis's slowness as postponement of punishment for their machinations. Thus, the Lockheed case has been tied up in Japanese courts since 1976. This case, which involved attempts by officials of the Lockheed Corporation, an American aircraft manufacturing firm, to peddle American-built aircraft

on the Japanese market by way of bribing, entangled top governmental officials, including Prime Minister K. Tanaka, as well as businessmen, the LDP leadership, and representatives of right-wing organisations, in all, close to 20 persons. The total sum of Lockheed bribes amounted to 3 billion yen.

Having to resign his LDP membership¹² because of the Lockheed scandal, Tanaka remains an "independent" deputy of the Diet, continues to guide a powerful faction in the LDP and actively participate in political life. They say in Japan that it was the arch politician Tanaka who invented the "double elections" in 1980, i. e., combined in time in an unprecedented way in the postwar period the elections to both chambers of the Diet, which took the opposition by surprise. Tanaka's faction in the LDP has been steadily growing in number. Its positions in the government have been noticeably strengthened since the formation of the Nakasone cabinet—so much so that the opposition coined the phrase "Tanakasone cabinet". "Tanaka's man" in this cabinet is the Minister of Justice Hatano, formally "independent".

Although Tanaka pleaded innocent, he was unable to disprove the evidence submitted by the prosecution. During court hearings in January 1983 the prosecution demanded that Tanaka be sentenced to five years in prison and fined 500 million yen (the maximum sentence for the crime he is charged with).

The police, the procurator's office, the court of law in Japan are practically powerless in the face of bribery that has also swept across lower levels of authority, administration and business. It can't be said that nothing is done to fight this crime. According to official sources, from 1977 to 1981, 1,084 officials were arrested on charges of bribery. In February 1982 police arrested a large group of local officials, including city mayors of Akita, Aso and Temmei, also accused of bribery.

The spread of bribery is explained not so much by the machinations of criminals as by the vices of bourgeois society, the connivance and corruption of law-enforcement officers. In February 1983 Japan's State Commission on Public Security announced that 120 police officers were brought to trial for taking bribes. The bribe-givers turned out to be owners of gambling houses who for large sums of money were tipped off by the police about intended gambling raids.

Quite a sizable "contribution" to crime in Japan is made by the Americans based in that country. According to official figures, in 1981 the procurator's office of the country accepted for processing incriminating materials against 1,263 US citizens (the figure does not include crimes connected with traffic incidents). The Japanese press reports that over the last 30 years US troops in Japan have committed over 150,000 crimes.

The US military personnel stationed in Japan are well protected from prosecution. And those American servicemen who, after all, have been sentenced by Japanese courts, find themselves in a privileged position. Serving their terms in a prison near the city of Iokosuka, they are well fed and entertained. State expenditure per prisoner here is three times higher than in any other prison.

Those are not the only examples of the Japanese ruling circles' unabashed acceptance of infringement of their country's sovereignty in the sphere of justice. Recently a relevant reminder was provided by a South Korean political figure, Kim Tae Joong, kidnapped by South Korean secret police from Japan in 1973. Pardoned by the dictator regime, Kim

¹² Tanaka resigned as Prime Minister in 1974

Tae Joong in December 1982 arrived in the US, where he gave vent to his indignation over the position of Japanese authorities which assisted in his abduction and did not demand his return from South Korea, even though South Korean action grossly violated Japanese sovereignty.

POPULAR STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE

It is no exaggeration to say that the whole of Japan's progressive public has risen to defend the Constitution. The mounting onslaught on the main law of the country is assessed by the democratic forces in the context of a general deterioration of the internal political situation. A statement by the CC of the CPJ, published in February 1983, points out that a very dangerous situation has been brought about by the Nakasone cabinet coming to power. "The country," stresses the document, "is witnessing the most significant turn in its entire postwar history." Numerous representative forums are voicing apprehension over the future of the Constitution and stressing the necessity to defend its democratic and peace-loving provisions. The 47th Congress of Japan's Socialist Party, held in December 1982, approved a policy which envisions defence of the Constitution and a struggle against the onslaught of the ruling circles and monopolies on the vital rights of the toilers. Speaking before the congress, I. Asukata, chairman of the SPJ CEC, pointed out that the period under discussion had seen stepped-up attempts to make Japan a military power and to revise the country's peaceful Constitution. An extraordinary Congress of the General Council of Japan's Trade Unions in February 1983 adopted a programme of actions which stresses the necessity to unite all the democratic forces, trade unions and opposition parties in the struggle against the reactionary militarist policy of the Nakasone cabinet which does not conceal its intention to revise the peaceful provisions of the Constitution. Participants in a mass anti-militarist rally in Tokyo in February 1983 called upon all fellow countrymen to intensify the struggle against the ruling circles' policy aimed at revising the Constitution.

The Japanese people's struggle for democracy in legislation and justice also touches on other aspects of socio-political and socio-economic life of Japanese society.

An important aspect of the public's legal consciousness in modern Japan can be seen in the attitude of different social groups to legal procedure. It is in this sphere that a remarkable phenomenon manifests itself: along with the well-known peculiar apathy for the court of law there appears a relative growth of interest in it, a staking on it as almost the only arena where class statutes can be "equalised", albeit formally.

Japan's ordinary people are trying to use the tool of law to fight the omnipotence of monopolies, including their disdain for the very health and lives of people in an unbridled race for superprofits. The practice of civil judicial procedure in Japan in the late 1960s and early 1970s was enriched by citizens turning to courts in connection with grave diseases among the population due to environment pollution by monopoly enterprises, the excessive noise of the Osaka airport and the high-speed Shinkansen train, as well as in connection with victims among people who used foodstuffs and drugs which contained dangerous chemical substances.

Among the assets of the struggle of the Japanese popular masses against reaction in legislation and justice are actions against the passing

of new undemocratic laws, against negative changes of existing legislation, mass movements in connection with concrete trials, etc. The democratic forces demanded the realisation of basic human rights, beginning with the freedom of speech, defended the independence of judges in making court decisions, insisted on open trials, etc., using such forms of support for the accused and control over courts as mass public attendance of trials, collection of signatures under demands submitted to judges, etc.

The latter form of voicing public opinion goes back to the occupation period. In 1948, in connection with the case of the Saga branch of the All-Japan Union of finance workers, in which tax collectors, who had gone on strike, were accused, 997,718 signatures under the demand for the verdict of "not guilty" were collected and handed over to the court. The legal and political vocabulary of Japan's democratic forces has made its own such terms as "legal struggle" (*horitsu toso*), "struggle over trials" (*saiban toso*), "struggle in the court hall" (*hotei toso*).

The movement in connection with concrete trials has its own forms of organisation: councils, committees, societies for the defence of the accused, etc. "The hallmark of the day is that in all spheres of the people's life a diverse struggle is mounting around court trials, which often takes form of mass organisations: 'defence societies', 'societies of support', 'action councils', etc."¹³ In 1971, when the "National council of liaison to defend the independence of justice and democracy" was set up in Japan, the Communist party joined it as a collective member.

A prominent role in the "legal struggle" is played by the Communist and Socialist parties, the General Council of Trade Unions, the Union of Free Lawyers (*Jiyu hosodan*), the Union of the Lawyers of the General Council of Trade Union (*Sohyo bengodan*), etc.

Soon after the end of the war, the CPJ came out with demands for the democratisation of legislation and justice which were contained in action programmes approved by party congresses, and in the draft of the constitution published by the CPJ in 1946. The CPJ voiced its protest against the suppression of democratic organisations through abuse of legislation in its appeal to the people, "In the name of national independence" (March 22, 1950). Subsequently, various questions of democratising legislation and of the struggle against giving it a reactionary character were raised in the party's major documents, in the reports of the CPJ CC at party congresses (thus, the report at the 8th party congress in 1961 touched on the questions connected with the government's attempts to push through the Diet in 1958 a bill on the extension of police powers and in 1961 a bill on "prevention of political violence"). "The essence of the Liberal-Democratic party's present course, aimed at giving justice a reactionary character, boils down to the intent to turn judges into powerless and submissive followers of the immediate 'state measures' of the government, to 'legalise' through court sentences reactionary steps that contradict the Constitution and democracy; and this is indeed an important problem which concerns the substance of Japan's course", said the CPJ CC report at the 12th congress (November 1973). The decisions taken by the congress envisaged that a democratic coalition government would establish the Diet's control over the police and democratise the structure of the police and courts. Legal problems are reflected in the "Declaration of freedom and democracy" adopted by the 13th congress of the CPJ (July 1976). It attached much

¹³ *Marxist Science Course of Law*, Vol. I, Tokyo, 1976, p. 323 (In Japanese).

importance to the questions of independent decision-making by judges and guarantees of human rights.

In 1981 the CPJ unveiled its first document fully devoted to legal problems and giving the quintessence of the party's policy in this matter. It is entitled "Draft proposals by the Communist Party of Japan regarding a reform of the judicial system" and subtitled "For independent judicial decision-making and in defence of basic human rights".¹⁴

The major merit of the draft is that it is permeated with the spirit of the most progressive provisions of Japan's Constitution, which are basic for the whole system of justice but are constantly violated by the ruling circles and legal officials subservient to them.

Proposals by the CPJ on a democratic reform of the country's judicial system pursue the following aims:

- broad masses of the population should have real guarantees that they can really apply to court and find legal solution of matters of concern to them, i. e., guarantees of the provisions of Article 32 of Japan's Constitution according to which "no one can be deprived of the right to have his case examined in a court of law";

- court decisions should be made by judges independently, influenced only by "facts and reasonable premises" and reflecting "the voice of the people"; also justly and with respect for basic human rights (adherence to human rights should be ensured not only during court investigation but also during the stages of preliminary investigation and serving the sentence);

- in the sphere of justice sovereignty should be fully restored, being infringed now by the fact that the US military personnel in Japan is virtually excluded from the jurisdiction of Japanese courts.

The struggle for the democratisation of justice is acquiring an ever greater importance in the general anti-imperialist, democratic movement which is paving the way for a drastic remodelling of society on the principles of a higher social justice.

A tendency towards unity, which is shaping up within the movement for fair court sentences, exerts a positive influence on the democratic movement as a whole. Mass movements, even if they do not lead to just solutions of legal cases, involve in the struggle and unite new social groups, give stimulus to resist reaction to democratic elements that have appeared in the judicial corps after the war. Similar to other forms of general democratic movement, the struggle for fair trials involves wide strata of population into actions against the power of big capital and gives these actions an organised character. But this form of mass struggle has its specifics. It lies in the universality of the legal way of settling conflicts, since the jurisdiction of courts embraces all social collisions envisaged by the law in any sphere of social life. The specifics of this form is also connected with the fact that the exploited, subjugated, and discriminated against members of society, when confronted with a court of law, to some extent acquire "equal weight" with the exploiters, enslavers and "masters of life".

Of course, the limits of the struggle for democratising justice have also to be taken into account, for a really democratic and just settlement of judicial cases on the scale of a whole society can be ensured only after a significant remodelling of the latter.

¹⁴ See full text of the document in a special supplement-review in *Akahata*, Aug. 17, 1981, abridged version in the journal *Zenit*, 1982, No. 1, pp. 164-168.

RESULTS OF JUNE 1983 PRC NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SESSION ASSESSED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 83 (signed to press 30 Aug 83) pp 43-55

[Article by V. V. Novozybkov: "An Important Event in PRC Politics (The Results of the NPC Session)"]

[Text] The first session of the National People's Congress [NPC], sixth convocation, was held in Beijing from 6 through 21 June 1983. It was devoted to resolving questions of importance to the country, as can be seen from its agenda:

A report by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, on the government's work, a report by Yao Yilin, vice premier of the State Council and minister in charge of the State Planning Commission, on the economic and social development plan for 1983, and a report by PRC Finance Minister Wang Bingqian on the fulfillment of the 1982 state budget; the election of the chairman, vice chairmen, secretary general and members of the NPC Standing Committee, sixth convocation; the election of the chairman and vice chairman of the PRC; the approval of the candidacies of the premier and vice premiers of the State Council, members of the council, ministers, ministers in charge of commissions, the auditor general and chief of the secretariat of the State Council; the election of the chairman of the Central Military Commission and the approval of the candidacies of other members of the commission; the election of the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.

The session was held in a situation when an intensive search was going on in the country for ways of realizing the ideological, economic, organizational and foreign policy guidelines of the 12th CCP Congress held in September 1982 and the slogan which it put forward of "building socialism with a specifically Chinese nature." The congress evaluated the situation in the country as a "great turning point," set tasks in the sphere of consolidating the party and society, further stabilizing the situation and developing the economy and culture and, most importantly, mapped out, in general outlines, the "common goal" of increasing gross industrial and agricultural production fourfold by the year 2000 by comparison with 1980.

An extensive administrative and structural reform is being carried out in China, accompanied by significant cadre changes on the central and local levels.

A new stage of the "rectification" of the 40 million-strong CCP is getting under way--which, in the opinion of many foreign observers, could develop into a purge of the party. Note is being taken of attempts to accelerate the implementation of the economic reform providing for the long-term consolidation of the mixed economy together with the restructuring of the system of management and planning. At the same time, as the Chinese press points out, the actual state of the national economy precludes haste over the reform and demands the continued implementation of the "readjustment" policy which was designed originally for the period 1979-1981 and was then made the basis of the sixth 5-year plan (1981-1985) approved in December 1982.

The Beijing leadership's efforts continue to be aimed at ensuring the priority development of modern PRC armed forces and increasing the country's military potential. In foreign policy the emphasis is on the task of strengthening China's "independent and autonomous" role as a world power by implementing the "chief principles formulated by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai."

A distinctive feature of the present situation in the country, judging from Chinese press materials, is the fact that direct or veiled debates, frequently in an acute form, are being held on many major, cardinal problems associated with China's development prospects, as well as on practical matters relating to issues of the day. These evidently reflect the differences which remain in ruling circles between different groups (the Chinese press itself acknowledges the existence of factionalism and cliquishness).¹ In particular, the publication of many articles designed to dispel and overcome the obvious public skepticism with regard to the feasibility of the "common goal" set by the 12th congress is noteworthy.

The aforementioned complex processes influenced the NPC session in one way or another and affected the results of its work. The session was planned as a large-scale political event designed to stimulate the broadest possible "unity and cohesion" on the basis of demonstrating the successes achieved, confirming the prospects outlined and bringing to the fore the nation's general and supreme interests associated with China's growing might. Specifically, it was faced with completing the construction of the national government in accordance with the new constitution adopted in December 1982. Thus, the session became a definite stage in China's recent political development, reflecting both the objectively positive things that have happened since the "Cultural Revolution" and the considerable difficulties and problems inherited from the past or engendered by new blunders and mistakes.²

This NPC session was the first to be prepared and held in accordance with the provisions of the new PRC constitution and the new law on elections. The elections to the PRC's supreme legislative organ remained multistage elections and were held last spring. The candidate deputies were put forward by 31 "electoral units"--provinces, autonomous regions, cities of central jurisdiction and the army. The electoral units originally proposed more candidates than the requisite number of deputies to be elected. The list of candidate deputies was subsequently agreed upon and finally drawn up as a result of "the consultations and discussions which took place in the CCP and in various democratic parties and people's organizations."³ A direct and secret ballot

is presently provided for only in elections to organs not higher than the prefecture level (direct elections to prefecture organs were first held in 1981).

Some 2,978 deputies were elected to the NPC, sixth convocation--519 fewer than to the fifth NPC. The drop in the number of deputies is accounted for in China by the need to ensure that the NPC "could still more fully manifest its functions as the country's organ of supreme state power."⁴

Each deputy represents either 1.4 million rural inhabitants or 130,000 city residents. According to law, the provinces and autonomous regions in which ethnic minorities live must be represented on the NPC by at least 15 people. At the same time, each of the 55 ethnic minorities must have its own NPC representative.

The substantial changes which occurred in CCP committees, at meetings of people's representatives and on the provincial level of government in the fall of 1982 through the spring of 1983 affected the selection of NPC candidate deputies. The size of these organs was reduced considerably and practically half the membership was renewed. As Bo Yibo, vice chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission and member of the State Council, declared, the CCP Central Committee adopted a decision "to reduce in the requisite manner" the proportion of CCP representation on the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.⁵ In addition, it was prescribed that not more than one-third of the members of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat may simultaneously hold government posts.⁶ In accordance with that enactment many prominent leaders were not elected NPC deputies, particularly Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, Yu Qiuli, Yang Shangkun and others. Ye Jianying, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, fifth convocation, had previously requested not to be elected to the new NPC. In all, only 11 of the 39 on the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat were in the NPC, as were 10 of the 29 first leaders in the provinces, autonomous regions and cities of central jurisdiction, and no one in the leadership of the State Council is an NPC deputy apart from the premier himself.

Some 2,278 deputies--or 76.5 percent of the total--were elected for the first time. This appreciable renewal of the NPC's composition was motivated by the intention to ensure "the broader nature of the representation of deputies," to raise their cultural level and to bring more "middle-aged and young representatives" onto the NPC.

The CCP, all the democratic parties, people's organizations and "non-party patriotic and democratic figures" are represented on the NPC. The proportion of non-party people is 37.5 percent--or 10 percent more than the fifth NPC. The following structural composition of deputies was announced: 791 workers and peasants (26.6 percent), 636 cadre workers (21.4 percent), 701 members of the intelligentsia (23.5 percent), 543 "non-party patriotic and democratic figures" (18.2 percent), 267 from the Chinese People's Liberation Army (9 percent) (there were 505 deputies from the PLA in the fifth NPC), and 40 returned emigres (1.3 percent). Thirteen NPC seats are allotted to representatives from Taiwan. The total number of deputies from all the ethnic

minorities is 403 (13.5 percent of the total; ethnic minorities make up 6.7 percent of China's population). Some 632 NPC deputies are women.

The increase in the share of non-party people, the intelligentsia and emigre circles attests to the obvious emphasis on the policy of a "united patriotic front."

The PRC press has emphasized "the obvious rise in the cultural level" of NPC deputies and the increased number of "representatives of the intelligentsia who have mastered modern science and technology."

The election and appointment of leaders to top state posts is undoubtedly the most important aspect of the session's work. This was preceded by "democratic consultations" (or conferences) held before the session, on 31 May and 1 June, whose participants were "officials" of the NPC Standing Committee, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference National Committee, all democratic parties, people's organizations and representatives of non-party members. These meetings were chaired by Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, who set forth, on behalf of the CCP Central Committee, the committee's proposals regarding leading figures elected and appointed by the NPC session. He said that these proposals are the result of coordination carried out over more than a year, and that the CCP Central Committee had formed a special group, headed by Bo Yibo, which tackled the selection of specific candidates for the top posts in the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

According to Hu Yaobang, the distribution of posts must be subordinate to the task of ensuring the immutability and continuity of the present course and policy--for which purpose it will be necessary to create a "third echelon" of the leadership without delay. The "first echelon" consists of CCP veterans with the greatest authority, who are released from current administrative work in order that they might be able to concentrate on fundamental state matters. The "second echelon" consists of the present members of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat and the PRC State Council. By way of preparing replacements they must create a "third echelon" from the most capable leaders under the age of 55 who have distinguished themselves with their political and business qualities. It is possible to draw the conclusion from Hu Yaobang's speech (as well as, incidentally, from Chinese press materials) that great difficulties are being encountered precisely in this work of creating a "third echelon."

It was announced on 18 June that the session had elected Li Xiannian chairman and Ulanhu vice chairman of the PRC and Peng Zhen chairman of the NPC Standing Committee by secret ballot, which had been preceded by a week-long discussion in groups. On the PRC chairman's recommendation, Zhao Ziyang was again confirmed as premier of the PRC State Council, and Deng Xiaoping was elected chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission. At the same time, 20 vice chairmen and 133 members of the NPC Standing Committee were elected. The composition of the State Council was approved on 20 June, and the president of the Supreme People's Court and the chief procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate were elected.

The post of PRC chairman was reinstated in accordance with the country's new constitution. The question of its reinstatement is known to have been a topic of long debates in the Chinese leadership. The question of the personal appointment to this post was debated just as long. The point is that the post existed in the 1950's and 1960's but was summarily abolished during the "Cultural Revolution" on Mao Zedong's orders. After the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," Liu Shaoqi, who replaced Mao Zedong in that post on 17 September 1959, was subjected to the most cruel repression from 1966 on and subsequently died in jail.

According to the 1954 constitution, the PRC chairman used to possess broad prerogatives. Now this post will rather be of a representative and protocol nature.

The official biographies published in the PRC of the country's aforementioned statesmen carefully overlook the ticklish period of the "Cultural Revolution." It is possible to say the following about them in brief.

Li Xiannian, the PRC's new chairman, was born in 1909 and is a CCP veteran and a well-known PRC party figure and statesman. Until 1949 he chiefly held various command posts in the PLA and participated in the Long March. After the formation of the PRC he was invariably a member of the top CCP leadership group, he was in charge of financial and economic matters for many years, was finance minister, worked as vice premier of the State Council from 1954 through 1980 and was considered close to Zhou Enlai. Since 1945 (since the Seventh CCP Congress) he has been a member of the CCP Central Committee, and since 1956 he has been a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, including at the time of the "Cultural Revolution." In 1977-1982 he held the post of vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and since the 12th CCP Congress, which abolished the posts of chairman and deputy chairmen of the CCP Central Committee, he has been a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee.

PRC Vice President Ulanhu, a Mongol, was born in 1906 and is also a CCP veteran. In the 1920's he was in the Soviet Union, he worked at Sun Yatsen University and at the Communist University of Working People of the East in Moscow. Prior to 1949 he did party and administrative work in Inner Mongolia. Since 1949 he has been a member of the Central People's Government Council, a member of the State Administrative Council, a member of the State Council, chairman of the Nationalities Committee and vice premier of the State Council and has held a number of other top party, state and military posts, particularly in the autonomous region of Inner Mongolia. He was vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, fourth and fifth convocations. He was elected candidate member of the CCP Central Committee, seventh convocation, and candidate member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, eighth convocation. Unlike Li Xiannian, he suffered severe reprisals during the "Cultural Revolution." Following Mao Zedong's death he was rehabilitated and became a CCP Central Committee Politburo member in 1977.

Peng Zhen, elected chairman of the NPC Standing Committee (born in 1902), is one of the oldest members of the CCP. He did party work in many parts of

China prior to 1949. Following the formation of the PRC and through 1966 he occupied the posts of first secretary of the Beijing CCP Committee and was mayor of the capital. During 1951-1956 he was a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. Peng Zhen is well known for his active participation in the campaign conducted by Mao Zedong for the "rectification of style" in 1941-1945 in Yanan. In the early 1960's he was one of the leading voices in expressing the CCP leadership's "special views" vis-a-vis the international communist movement. At the same time he was one of the prime targets from the very start of the "Cultural Revolution." Peng Zhen is one of the highest CCP leaders to have suffered public scorn at mass meetings. He was rehabilitated in 1979. He was then co-opted into the CCP Central Committee Politburo, brought into the NPC Standing Committee as a vice chairman and took charge of the NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission.

PRC State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang was born in 1919 and has been a CCP member since 1938. Following the formation of the PRC and during the "Cultural Revolution" he occupied prominent party and state posts in southern China, Inner Mongolia and Sichuan Province. In September 1981 he was appointed PRC State Council premier for the first time, replacing Hua Guofeng. A member of the CCP Central Committee since 1973 and a CCP Central Committee Politburo member since 1979, he had a brief spell as vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee. He is currently a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee.

PRC Central Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping is a party veteran, born in 1904. In his younger days he studied in France and the Soviet Union. From 1927 through 1949 he was a political worker in the army and held prominent command posts. He was elected a CCP Central Committee Politburo member for the first time in 1945. Since 1949 he has held leading party and state posts, including those of general secretary of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council. During the "Cultural Revolution" he came under attack along with Liu Shaoqi but did not share his fate. In 1973, at the request of Mao Zedong, he again became involved in work as the vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council. He was out of favor again in 1976, but soon after Mao Zedong's death all of the charges against Deng Xiaoping were declared "erroneous" and he came to the forefront once again as one of China's most influential political figures. Currently he is a member of the CCP Central Committee Military Council. At all times he has been a member of the leading group directly shaping the country's domestic and foreign policy. He is regarded as the inspirer and most active champion of the current CCP line and Beijing's foreign policy strategy. At the 12th CCP Congress Deng Xiaoping put forward the task of "building socialism with a specifically Chinese character" and urged "following our own path."

The Central Military Commission headed by Deng Xiaoping is a new organ in the PRC state structure. According to the constitution, its job is to implement "sole leadership of all the armed forces" of the country. There has been much comment on the formation of the organ. Abroad, for example, Deng Xiaoping's new appointment is seen as the acquisition of state as well as party levers of

control over the army, which remains an important instrument of power. In the process of setting up "collective leadership" and defining the functions of state and party organs, it has been noted in this connection, Deng Xiaoping has taken over a decisive, key sphere.

The NPC Standing Committee is much smaller than the last one, and nearly two-thirds of the members have been replaced, with an increase in the proportion of non-party members. Of the 20 vice chairmen of the NPC Standing Committee, 11 are new to the post, although they are all old politicians of long standing. They include Huang Hua, former member of the State Council and PRC foreign minister.

In accordance with the constitution, the NPC Standing Committee's political role has been increased and its functions have widened despite the reintroduction of the post of PRC chairman. This is evidenced, for example, by the formation of six standing commissions, each headed by an NPC Standing Committee vice chairman: nationalities; legal; financial and economic; education, science, culture and public health; foreign affairs; and Chinese emigres. The chairman of the foreign affairs commission is Geng Biao, a former diplomat who was in charge of the CCP Central Committee International Liaison Section during the "Cultural Revolution"; until 1982 he was PRC defense minister and for a number of years he was in the CCP Central Committee Politburo. He is now a member of the Central Advisory Commission.

There have been changes in the PRC Government--the State Council--as well. For example, a new Ministry of State Security has been formed (to handle matters connected with public order in the country), an auditing administration has been created to supervise and monitor the financial affairs of the State Council and local organs of power, and there have been some other changes.

Zhao Ziyang's report on the government's work⁷ sums up the country's development over the past 5 years--that is, during the activity of the fifth NPC--and outlines the tasks for the next 5-year period. It is clear from the report that the Chinese leadership has endeavored to focus attention on its policy and generate optimism vis-a-vis the state of affairs in various spheres of social life and the country's development prospects by employing generalized indicators. The tone of the report is set by the thesis that "a political situation of stability and cohesion has been created and reinforced" and that "normal production, services and public order have been established in the country" despite the presence of "certain unstable factors" in public life.

To back up these words, the PRC premier quoted many figures. According to him, the "readjustment" policy has "put a stop to the long-standing practice of overaccumulation." In the past 5 years gross industrial and agricultural output increased by 32.6 percent and agriculture's share of gross output rose from 27.8 to 33.6 percent. The average annual increase in agricultural output was 7.5 percent. In comparison to 1978, grain production increased by 16 percent in 1982, cotton production by 66 percent, oil-seed crop production by 126 percent, and so forth. In the 1979-1982 period the average annual increase in output was 11.8 percent in light industry and 3.4 percent in heavy industry. The output of various consumer goods increased.

In 1982 retail trade turnover was 64.8 percent up on the 1978 level, reaching 257 billion yuan. Moreover, trading in meat, poultry and eggs increased by 110 percent. The session stated that a large number of goods formerly obtained by coupon are now sold freely.

The country's foreign trade increased (35.5 billion yuan in 1978 and 77.2 billion in 1982).

The number of higher educational establishments increased, as did the number of students at secondary vocational schools and colleges. In the last 10 years the countryside has seen an improvement in housing construction and so forth.

Zhao Ziyang's report also numbers among the positive results the "first steps in the transformation of the economic system," which include the restoration and consolidation of mixed economy and wider "self-management" rights for industrial units in rural areas. Special attention will be given to the "multifaceted forms of contracted responsibility for the peasant farm."

In fact, it can be said that the domestic situation in China has improved to a certain extent and that there is new life in the economy. Compared to the past, the activity of state and economic organs is somewhat more orderly. At the same time, the figures and facts cited in the report do not provide the entire picture and do not reveal the nature of the complex and far from unambiguous processes taking place in the PRC, which require further analysis and assessment.

First of all, it must not be forgotten that the progress described by Zhao Ziyang in economic development, expressed in the outwardly impressive percentages, started from a position officially described as the "brink of disaster" (because of the policy pursued under Mao Zedong).

Economic work had been in a state of neglect for many years, the working people's standard of living was extremely low and wage leveling was rife, killing the workers' and peasants' enthusiasm to work. There was not even the semblance of planning. As for culture, education and health, they were simply in ruins or run down; there was virtually no housing construction in China. Instead of houses they built shelters and tunnels as part of the "preparation for war."

In the past 5 years the development of the economy and other spheres of Chinese public life has been a restorative process and has amounted to the introduction of elementary order. Therefore, the data cited in the report need proper comparisons, but these were lacking.

The solution to a number of major national economic problems has not been found. This can be discerned in the section of Zhao Ziyang's report where he discusses the tasks for the next 5 years, referring mainly to the need to surmount either existing difficulties which were inherited and have become worse, or new obstacles stemming from the present course. In his assessment of general prospects it is no coincidence that Zhao Ziyang admits that the

situation objectively "presupposes lengthy, difficult and complex modernization work," which can be performed "only in stages, step by step."

Once again (as it has for a number of years), the report demands a "radical improvement" in the country's financial and economic situation, without which it is impossible to stabilize the economy, an end to "poor economic efficiency," "high production costs in industry and transportation and high trade overheads," the elimination of enterprises operating at a loss, the more efficient investment of capital, the correct determination of the overall scale of capital construction, the eradication of localist tendencies and "gulfs between regions and departments," a rise in the exceedingly low level of labor productivity and the elimination of bottlenecks and disparities, reflected primarily in the underdevelopment of primary sectors, the fuel and energy complex and transportation.

In many respects the situation is deteriorating instead of improving, the report observes. Between 1979 and 1982, while gross output from all national production increased 33.6 percent, budget revenues from domestic sources fell by 3.3 percent. If this trend is not corrected, the State Council premier said, "it will not be possible to provide very important projects with financial and material resources, and the task of laying the foundation for progress in the 1980's will come to a standstill and there will be no new economic growth in the 1990's." Prime costs rose 0.9 percent in 1980 and 1 percent in 1981; they remained the same in 1981 and rose again in 1983. This alone has led to a loss of budget revenue of around 4-5 billion yuan per annum. At the same time, industrial, food and trade enterprises lost 10 billion yuan in 1982.

The measures to decentralize economic and financial management, the report says, have exacerbated such problems as the "state's limited financial potential and the serious overstretching of resources," the "meager proportion of resources in state hands" (in 1982 budget revenue constituted 25.5 percent of national income, compared with 37.2 percent in 1978, and over the same period non-budget resources increased by 37.1 billion yuan to 65 billion, or by 75.2 percent), an unbridled increase in the consumption fund and an increase in state subsidies due to serious errors in pricing policy and inflationary processes.

Having noted that the "development of economic construction requires quicker progress in the transformation of the economic system," the speaker said that a "draft reform plan" still has to be drawn up and will not be deployed "in all its aspects" until the seventh 5-year plan (1986-1990), following due experimentation. While pointing out that "it is wrong to place excessively large and strict limits on the economic activity of enterprises," Zhao also said: "However, everything connected with the larger interest in very important economic activity which requires centralized control should be subject to this control. A relaxation of this control would not be progress, but regression, and it would not guarantee the national economy's development according to socialist guidelines."

The responses to the session have already noted a certain lack of coordination between various parts of the report. For example, while demanding that people

should "not pursue overall prime cost and output volume," elevating economic efficiency to the front rank, and calling for the course of "readjustment" to be continued, Zhao Ziyang simultaneously asserts that the "development of production will proceed faster than planned during the sixth 5-year plan, and in the seventh the pace might be even faster." The report repeats the goal set by the 12th CCP Congress of quadrupling industrial and agricultural output by the year 2000 in comparison with 1980, but, just as in the congress materials, this objective is not backed up by figures or statistics.

It is also striking that the report avoids or ignores many important socio-economic problems connected with pursuing the present policy and makes no mention of the "social cost" which would have to be paid for "reviving" the economy. This applies to the growth in private-ownership and petty-trading attitudes, particularly in the countryside, where polarization in terms of property is developing and feudal prejudices are being revived, and to the growth of the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology and a "decline in social morals."

State Council Vice Premier Yao Yilin's report on the plan for the country's economic and social development for 1983 could be called an illustration of the general provisions of Zhao Ziyang's report as they apply to the present moment. Behind last year's outwardly favorable results--an 8.7 percent growth in total industrial and agricultural output--this document cannot hide the fact that in 1982 there was a recurrence of a dangerous relapse into the attitudes of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "pursuit of fast rates" without taking into account the cost and consequences, particularly in industry. Yao Yilin listed the problems now facing the Chinese economy, including the lack of effective control of investments in capital construction, which is causing an acute shortage of rolled metal, timber, cement and other materials; the excessively rapid development of heavy industry; serious dissipation of resources; the lack of improvement in raising economic efficiency, and a number of other problems.

In reference to the implementation of the 1982 budget (the 1983 budget was adopted at the last NPC session in December 1982), PRC Finance Minister Wang Bingqian said that total income was 112,397 million yuan, total expenditure was 115,331 million and the deficit was 2,934 million yuan. Total budget income included foreign credits worth 4,003 million yuan and internal loans exceeding 4 billion. Expenditure on the redemption of foreign loans and interest on loans exceeded 4.9 billion yuan. According to the minister the fall in income that took place in 1979-1982 was ended and last year's budget income rose by 2.3 percent. At the same time, he stressed that the increase in budget income still lags far behind the increase in production.

The scale and depth of the unresolved problems and prevailing difficulties mentioned in the NPC session materials stood out in even greater relief in Chinese press publications both before the session and during it. Thus, a special article in JINGJI RIBAO on the relevant section of Zhao Ziyang's report, analyzing the causes of the negative phenomena mentioned in the report, calls the lack of a stable and scientifically validated strategy for the country's economic and social development one of the main factors of this kind.

The newspaper points to enterprises' arbitrary violations of the state plan, the non-observance of production and financial discipline, and localism. The newspaper considers the "blind pursuit of gross output and the disregard for efficiency"⁸ to be particularly dangerous.

An article published on the eve of the session by the very prominent Chinese economist Xue Muqiao was a unique refutation of the optimism expressed at the session. He writes that the "results of readjustment are still very meager and the imbalances in the national economy have still not been fully eliminated." Assessing the 1982 results, the writer notes with concern that they "conceal a new danger" and threaten the loss of everything positive that had been done in the previous 4 years. Using the same statistics as speakers at the session, Xue Muqiao concludes that it is necessary to adopt the most urgent measures to prevent the continuation of the trends noted: the loss of control over the scale of capital construction, the inability of the center to accumulate the necessary resources for "crucial" construction and the disregard for quality and efficiency for the sake of achieving high growth rates. Xue Muqiao warns that these trends will make another "readjustment" necessary, but under much more difficult conditions.⁹

After the session was over a whole series of articles along the lines of Xue Muqiao's appeared in Chinese periodicals, including the journal HONGQI (No 12, 1983). The press' characteristic tone was one of alarm; shortcomings and miscalculations "which could lead to chaos again" were emphasized.

In reference to the causes of new problems, the newspaper JINGJI RIBAO (17 June 1983) declares that the main one is the failure to clarify and decide several basic questions of principle, such as the distribution of the national income, the relation of funds for accumulation to those for consumption and the determination of the general proportions of the national economy. Chinese scientists have expressed the opinion that the distortion of theory or an incorrect understanding of the basic theoretical concepts of Marxism are leading to a situation where directives are erroneous to begin with and in which the resulting mistakes take on a strategic character.

RENMIN RIBAO has already alluded to the likelihood of the failure of all the long-term plans: "Without focusing all our efforts on creating the most important capital construction projects, it will be impossible to carry out the four modernizations."¹⁰

Just as at previous NPC sessions, this session paid considerable attention to questions concerning the observance of the law and public order. It was noted that even though the situation has improved in the matter of public safety, it is still not as good as it was in the first few years after the PRC's formation. A written report by Jiang Hua, president of the Supreme People's Court, that was distributed to delegates drew attention in particular to the perceptible increase in recent years in such phenomena as corruption, bribery, smuggling, speculation, fraud and the misappropriation of public property. In 1972 alone the courts examined 33,000 cases connected with economic offenses. Special collegiums have been formed under the Supreme People's Court and higher-and middle-level courts to examine cases of this kind.

Zhao Ziyang called the intensification and transformation of the work done by justice and public safety organs the main link ensuring a radical improvement of the state of affairs in the sphere of public safety and public morals.

A characteristic feature of the session was the great attention it paid to the discussion of questions connected with the armed forces and with the course Zhao Ziyang termed "the construction of a modernized regular revolutionary army." It is clear from published materials that this task is viewed as a high priority. At the same time, the discussion of this question showed that the leadership's clear striving to accelerate the development of the armed forces is objectively held back by the weakness of the financial and economic base and the need to ensure from the outset the progress of the economy as a whole as a prerequisite for the further development of military production at the new level.

This was reflected in the thesis voiced at the session on the need to "determine the link between state economic construction and the country's defense construction." In clarifying the present situation, Yang Dezhi, chief of the PLA General Staff Department, said: "The development of defense must correspond to national economic construction. At present our country's material base remains comparatively weak."¹¹ Noting that the army should be modernized "relying mainly on our own efforts," Yang Dezhi stated at the same time that it is necessary to "actively adopt advanced foreign equipment" so as to "improve our army's weaponry and combat hardware at an accelerated pace and raise them to a new level."

The assessments and statements expressed at the NPC session on foreign policy issues proceed as a whole from the guidelines of the 12th CCP Congress and do not amend China's strategic course in the international arena.

The development of the international situation and the disposition of forces in the international arena are viewed within the framework of the well-known Beijing scheme of "the struggle for world domination between the superpowers," which is allegedly the "main source of the troubles and unrest in today's world." But no mention is made of the true causes of the acute deterioration of the world situation--U.S. imperialism's aggressive and adventurist policy, the Reagan Administration's "crusade" against communism and the arms race fueled by Washington. The session ignored the most vital issue of the struggle to preserve peace throughout the world and to oppose the threat of war. No specific proposals were put forward to back up the proclaimed thesis of the Chinese Government's intention to struggle for peace throughout the world.

It is indicative in this context that the Chinese press and other mass media regularly publish materials--virtually each day--which can only be viewed as support for the aggressive militarist circles of the United States and other NATO countries.

Zhao Ziyang defined the PRC's basic course in the foreign policy sphere as a "struggle against hegemonism." It is clear from the content of his report, from Beijing's actions in the international arena and from Chinese propaganda materials, however, that this course actually amounts to combating USSR

policy, and to the criticism of U.S. actions only on rare occasions and in specific matters.

The foreign policy section of Zhao Ziyang's report devoted its main attention to "strengthening cohesion and cooperation with Third World countries." This has been termed the "main pivot of the foreign policy" of China, whose affiliation to the "Third World" is again declared. At the same time, stress was laid on China's desire and intention to develop "relations of friendship and cooperation" with Japan and to "make an effort to expand and deepen cooperation" with the West European and North American countries.

On China's relations with the United States, the State Council premier expressed regrets that their development is "far below the requisite level." The PRC Government and people, he said, attach great importance to Sino-U.S. relations but on no account will they permit encroachments on their country's sovereignty or interference in its internal affairs. The only reproach made against the United States was expressed over Washington's adoption of the "Taiwan Relations Act" and the continuation of weapon deliveries to Taiwan. The premier called on the United States to "stop damaging relations between China and the United States and offending the Chinese people's sense of dignity."

After confirming the 12th CCP Congress' line of cooperation with Romania, the DPRK and Yugoslavia, Zhao Ziyang also advocated the development of China's relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, in various spheres. No mention was made of China's relations with Mongolia, Cuba, Laos or Albania. At the same time, Vietnam was attacked.

The premier justified and extolled the shameful aggression committed by China against Vietnam in spring 1979 and described the current state of Sino-Vietnamese relations as "serious confrontation" in an attempt to blame Vietnam for this without any proof. His report reiterated the familiar range of unfounded accusations against the SRV and People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Hanoi newspaper NHAN DAN has noted that "with regard to our country and the three Indochinese states, China's strategy and tactics have not only failed to change but have even become more hostile."¹²

The DRA was also attacked, and Zhao Ziyang distorted Soviet foreign policy, which is aimed at defending democratic Afghanistan against the aggression organized by imperialism and its accomplices.

The session's assessments of relations between China and the Soviet Union made slanderous assertions about the existence of a "real threat to China's security from the Soviet Union," a threat which must be removed, it is claimed, in order to begin to improve bilateral relations. At the same time, the premier's report acknowledged that the "long-standing tension in relations between China and the Soviet Union is disadvantageous to both sides, and the people of the two countries are interested in the normalization of relations." While professing the intention to improve relations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese side is trying to convince the public that all the difficulties on the path to this goal stem from the USSR's position and they cite a mythical

"Soviet threat" in this connection. All of this is a glaring contradiction of reality, and it is no coincidence that the premier's report ignored the numerous Soviet initiatives, proposals and appeals addressed to the Chinese side in the hope of solving the basic problems in Soviet-Chinese relations and seeking mutually acceptable ways of improving them without making any preliminary conditions and without injuring the interests of other countries.

As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted in reply to PRAVDA's questions, it is true that recently "some positive trends have been noticed" in Soviet-Chinese relations. "Political consultations are being held between the two countries on the level of special representatives."

The volume of Soviet-Chinese trade is increasing and contacts are gradually developing in a number of other spheres. The joint formulation and implementation of confidence-building measures in the Soviet-Chinese border region would help to improve the atmosphere in relations between the two countries to a considerable extent.

"The improvement of relations between the USSR and PRC is acquiring special importance and pertinence in the present deterioration of the international atmosphere," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stressed. "We are that, objectively, the Soviet and Chinese peoples' interests do not diverge in matters concerning the elimination of the danger of war and the consolidation of peace."

The Chinese press called the session's major result the formation of a leadership capable of ensuring the constancy and continuity of the main line (the creation of a "strong China") stipulated in 12th CCP Congress decisions. As foreign reactions testify, the appointments announced at the session are the result of the overall maintenance of a state of compromise between the present groupings and of the balance of forces which took shape at the 12th CCP Congress. Most of the new leaders are representatives of the "old guard" who emerged as political figures under Mao Zedong but have a direct relationship to the formulation of the policy now being pursued.

The session was, therefore, intended to demonstrate the successes in the stabilization of the political situation and in the country's socioeconomic and cultural development on the basis of the guidelines of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (December 1978), at which time there was a shift in the direction of consistently removing those promoted during the "Cultural Revolution" and revising their course. But the session also showed quite clearly that many of the cardinal problems in the country's social and economic development remain unresolved.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, the article "Reform Must Be Instituted on a Steady Basis," RENMIN RIBAO, 16 May 1983.
2. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, No 2, 1982, pp 38-49.

3. RENMIN RIBAO, 10 June 1983.
4. BANYUETAN, No 10, 1983.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 June 1983.
6. CHINA DAILY, 2 June 1983.
7. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 June 1983.
8. JINGJI RIBAO, 14 June 1983.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 June 1983.
10. Ibid., 11 June 1983.
11. Ibid., 9 June 1983.
12. NHAN DAN, 27 June 1983.

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SOURCES OF TENSION IN JAPANESE-INDIAN RELATIONS VIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 60-68

[Article by O. A. Stolyarova: "Some Aspects of Japanese-Indian Relations"]

Japanese-Indian relations are an important factor bearing on the situation in Asia for these are two big powers not only in Asia, but in the whole world. Today Japan is an independent centre of imperialist rivalry. It is the number two economic power among capitalist countries, and Asia is the main arena of its economic and political activity. The *Blue Book* issued by Japan's Foreign Ministry notes that "Asia is a region where Japan is designed to play an important part".¹

As far as India is concerned, it is one of the leaders of the nonaligned movement. Its foreign policy was shaping under the influence of a long and persistent struggle of national-patriotic and democratic forces against colonial enslavement. In its struggle the Indian people drew on the broad support and solidarity of the socialist countries, primarily the USSR, and the progressive forces throughout the world. For India, Asia also represents a major direction of its foreign policy. According to an influential Indian paper, the true interests of India are in Asia.² That is why it is of importance to examine relations between these two countries to gather an understanding of the trends characterising the developments in that region.

The Japanese-Indian relations in the postwar period are based on the interaction of contradictory tendencies which both bring these countries together and hamper their rapprochement.

India is assigned an important place in Japan's political, military and strategic concepts. Key trade routes across the Indian Ocean connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa. "In view of the fact that 80 per cent of oil transported to Japan and 49 per cent of its trade pass through the Indian Ocean, peace and stability in that region are of vital significance to it."³

The growth of contradictions between imperialist countries exerts substantial influence on Japanese-Indian relations. As was stated in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress, "the inter-imperialist contradictions are growing more acute, the scramble for markets and for sources of raw materials and energy is more frantic".⁴ This refers primarily to the Japanese-US economic relations, which have become unprecedentedly strained since the early 1980s. In a bid to diversify to the maximum its ties, sources of raw materials and markets, Japan has been devoting increasing attention to South Asia, trying to pursue a more flexible policy vis-à-vis countries of the region. India above all. Using India, Japan is attempting to create a more attractive image of its relations with the developing countries, and to en-

¹ *The Contemporary Condition of Our Diplomacy*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 383 (in Japanese).

² See *Indian Express*, Sept. 3, 1972.

³ *Mainichi shimbun*, Aug. 17, 1978.

⁴ *Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress*, Moscow, 1981, p. 27.

sure a more favourable climate for the Japanese monopolies. This is because the developing states account for more than 50 per cent of Japan's foreign trade.

Mutual interest in expanding trade and economic relations which is facilitated by geographical proximity, certain mutually complementary nature of their economies, and so on, also contribute to the development of Japanese-Indian relations. According to Yoshio Sakurauchi, Japanese former Foreign Minister, "there are quite a few opportunities for expanding and deepening the existing broad ties in trade, industry, technical exchange and other spheres".⁵

It is believed in Japan that India, despite the difficulties it encounters in economic development, has every opportunity for turning into a leading economic power in Asia. Vast territory, immense deposits of raw materials, and human resources are the cause of the Japanese monopolies' interest in infiltrating the Indian market, which attains specific significance with the raw-material and energy crisis. India is also important for Japan as a buyer of many types of the latter's industrial products.

At the same time there are many factors impeding the development of Japanese-Indian relations. First and foremost, Japan, unlike India, which has opted for the policy of peace, nonalignment and development of friendly relations with all countries along the lines of peaceful coexistence, is steering towards a military-political alliance with the USA, following in the wake of the latter's imperialist policy. This spells a fundamental incompatibility of the foreign policies of the two countries.

Japan's economic expansion in Asia, resting on a powerful financial, economic, scientific and technological potential of the Japanese monopolies, exerts increasing influence on Japanese-Indian relations, particularly since the 1960s. This, of course, brings about alarm and apprehension in India and in other countries of the region, which in the recent past have been the target of Japanese militarist aggression, and are now the object of a Japanese economic onslaught.

Quite legitimate suspicion felt by Asian peoples towards Japan's mounting military activities and towards the urge of the Japanese ruling quarters for a further militarisation is intensifying. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India stated that the military buildup in Southeast Asia by the USA and Japan would lead to war, not to peace, and would inevitably heighten confrontation and tension, especially in the Indian Ocean.⁶

Summing up different factors influencing the Japanese-Indian relations, one can divide them with certain reservations into the following periods: normalisation of relations (the end of World War II—the mid-1950s), enervation (the latter half of the 1950s—early 1960s), long stagnation (up to the end of the 1970s), and fresh attempts to enliven relations (since the beginning of the 1980s).

During World War II the armed forces of nazi Germany and Japan were planning to join together in India. The Japanese militarists planned to break the communications between Britain, India and Australia, and also to oust gradually British troops from Southeast Asia and later from India as well, to the frontiers of which their forces came in 1942. However, in spite of the strong military, political and ideological pressure brought to bear on India by Japan, the former remained in the anti-Hitler

⁵ *Mainichi shimbun*, Aug. 30, 1982

⁶ See *Times of India*, Jan. 1, 1981.

coalition and took an active part in the hostilities both against Japan and Germany. All this left an imprint on the postwar relations between Japan and India and, among other things, made itself felt in the peaceful settlement between the two countries.

India refused to sign the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan, objecting to the terms of placing the islands of Ryukyu and Bonin under US trusteeship. Furthermore, the Indian government was against the provisions of the treaty which envisaged the stationing of US troops in Japan, and opposed the fact that there was no mention in the treaty about who should own Taiwan, the Kurils and Southern Sakhalin.⁷

At the same time the Indian government declared its intention within the shortest span of time to "put an end to the state of war between India and Japan" and "conclude a separate peace treaty with it with the aim of establishing normal diplomatic relations".⁸

In its turn, Japan was seeking to eliminate as soon as possible the aftermaths of World War II in relations with Asian states, unfavourable to it. That is why during the postwar period the Japanese diplomacy faced the key task of establishing in the shortest possible time diplomatic relations with those countries and solving the reparation problem.

On April 28, 1952, the government of India unilaterally declared discontinuation of the state of war with Japan. After a period of negotiations, the Japanese-Indian peace treaty was signed in Tokyo on June 9, 1952, thus halting the state of war between the two sides. Moreover, India refused to demand reparations from Japan and did not insist upon including any items concerning the limitation of the Japanese armed forces in the treaty. This stemmed from India's intention to obtain considerable loans from Japan, as well as scientific and technological aid while carrying out its plans of industrialisation and development of its economy. India was the first Asian country to normalise relations with Japan, in spite of strong anti-Japanese sentiments in countries of that region during that period. On the basis of the peace treaty agreements on cultural cooperation (1956) and on yen loans and trade (1958) were concluded. Nevertheless, at that time, Japanese-Indian relations did not reach a high level of development. They were devoid of political contacts at a summit level, with exchanges taking place in economics and culture only at a private level.

This was due, among other things, to the fact that Japan signed a "security treaty" with the USA on September 8, 1951, and also a peace treaty with Taiwan of April 28, 1952, and embarked on active economic, military and political cooperation with the USA. It was only natural that India, which strongly adhered to nonalignment, assessed those treaties as factors aggravating tension in Asia.

In the latter half of the 1950s and the early 1960s Japanese-Indian relations somewhat invigorated. This was due to a number of factors, including the intensification of the Asian trend in the Japanese policy stemming from the broader foreign trade expansion of the Japanese monopolies in the region, the growth of India's prestige which was manifested during the preparations for, and the holding of, the Bandung Conference in April 1955, the enhanced role of the Afro-Asian group of countries in the UN, and India's support to the admittance of Japan to the UN. A number of summit meetings took place. However, the focus of

⁷ See *Collection of Documents and Materials on Japan, 1951-1954*, Moscow, 1954, pp. 11-12 (in Russian).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

the negotiations was on strengthening cultural relations, expanding mutual visits of researchers, students and so on. Japan agreed to render India technical and also financial aid.

In the middle and in the latter half of the 1960s there were no contacts at the level of heads of government between the two countries, and the political relations between them were in stagnation. It was only at the end of the 1970s that the two sides took some steps towards rectifying the situation. In 1977 and 1978 Foreign Ministers I. Hatoyama and A. Vajpai exchanged visits. In 1980 the Japanese Foreign Minister M. Ito visited India. Although, according to *Hindustan Times*, there were no serious problems in relations between the two countries,⁹ significant discrepancies came to the fore in discussing international problems, above all relating to the Asian region. For example, India could not agree with Japan's proposal to play the part of a middleman in the Indian-Pakistani and Indian-Chinese relations because of the evidently pro-American policy pursued by Tokyo. There were also differences in discussing developments around Afghanistan and Kampuchea.¹⁰

On the whole, the bilateral political relations between Japan and India did not exceed the boundaries of mutual consultations, statements on the need to develop mutual ties, and so on because the stands of the two countries in the world and their approaches to the different aspects of mutual relations and to international issues, above all in Asia, were too different.

Much emphasis in Japanese-Indian political contacts is placed on the problems of Asia, and the attitude to these problems, more often than not, brought to the fore the fundamental differences or disagreements in views. These disagreements made themselves felt in especially bold relief during the convocation of the Bandung Conference of the heads of state and government of Asian countries in 1955. India was the principal initiator and organiser of the Conference and did a great deal to shape the latter's decisions in anti-colonial and anti-imperialist way. As for Japan, it acted as an accomplice of the USA, which was striving to frustrate the meeting in Bandung and break the unity of Afro-Asian countries.

During the US aggression in Korea and the French and later American invasion in Indochina, Japan backed the aggressors—the USA and France—giving them not only moral and political, but also material support, fulfilling special orders placed by the US armed forces. India resolutely supported the peaceloving forces in the struggle for the discontinuation of the US aggressive war in Korea and Indochina. It made a weighty contribution to the achievement of the armistice and ceasefire in Korea, and also rendered support to the Vietnamese and other peoples of Indochina in their struggle for freedom and independence.

Since the 1960s the PRC became a new factor which began exerting influence on the regional policies of Japan and India and their bilateral relations. In the 1950s-1960s, as regards the PRC, Japan adhered to the division of politics and economics" principle which implied that certain economic ties were maintained against the background of total absence of political contacts. This was largely due to the fact that the Japanese ruling quarters were following in the wake of the policy of the United States, which had no interstate ties with China at that time.

⁹ See *Hindustan Times*, Sept. 1, 1980

¹⁰ See *Tomiuri shinbun*, Aug. 30, 1980

India's policy vis-à-vis the PRC was determined by the five principles of peaceful coexistence which were proclaimed by India and China in April 1954. In 1957 Jawaharlal Nehru stated: "If one takes a historical glance with a long-term prospect, Japan, India and China are the three powers in Asia which will come to play an important role in the region. If they manage to establish relations of cooperation, this will be of benefit to other countries as well."¹¹

The Peking leaders, however, made territorial claims to India, which resulted in the 1962 Chinese-Indian border conflict. In October 1962 Jawaharlal Nehru forwarded a personal message to H. Ikeda requesting support for India's stand. The message read in part: "The border clash is not a simple means for settling the state frontier. India's struggle against the Chinese aggression is carried out in the interests of peace in the whole world to avert violence in international relations, and we are convinced that all countries will give assistance to India and display understanding"¹² In his reply H. Ikeda, though stressing that China had embarked on the road of war and that this was an "extremely lamentable fact", on the whole made a low-key reaction to India's request.¹³ Such conspicuously neutral stand demonstrated that Japan was not going to aggravate its relations with the PRC. As the US China policy was changing, the Japanese ruling quarters began treating differently the Indian-Chinese dispute and actually supported China.

Japan and India displayed a different approach to the Soviet proposal on the setting up of a collective security system in Asia. In principle, India supported the Soviet proposal, whose aim was to strengthen peace and security in the region. Simultaneously the Indian government advanced its own proposal on "neutralising" the Indian Ocean, eliminating foreign military bases from that zone, reducing the activities of military fleets and other actions threatening peace and security of the littoral countries.¹⁴ Japan rejected both the Soviet and the Indian proposals and came out for the preservation of the old and building of the new American military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

Japan and India found themselves at the opposite ends of the stick after Vietnam dispatched troops into Kampuchea in January 1979, at the request of its government and in conformity with the agreements concluded between Kampuchea and Vietnam. Following in the footsteps of Washington, Japan called those actions an "invasion" and applied economic sanctions against Vietnam by freezing the deliveries of commodities on account of loans and free assistance for the total sum of 14 billion yen.

Tokyo refused to recognise the legitimate government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea formed in January 1979 and headed by Heng Samrin. Japan continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime and declared its "full support" for the US plan envisaging the setting up of a "neutral state" in Kampuchea headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who is now in exile.

Unlike Japan, India established official relations with the People's Republic of Kampuchea and has been rendering aid to the legitimate Kampuchean government. In an interview to an Australian paper, Indira

¹¹ *Concise History of the Japanese-Indian Relations*, Tokyo, 1969, p. 89 (in Japanese).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

¹³ See *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ See I. I. Kovalenko, *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace and Collective Security in Asia*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 175-181, 317-332 (in Russian).

Gandhi stated that the Heng Samrin government controls a greater part of the territory of Kampuchea and it meets all the requirements necessary to recognise a country. India could not support the Pol Pot regime after what it had done. Regional cooperation, Indira Gandhi went on, can be ensured only provided the interests of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were taken into account on a broader scale.¹⁵ India took a similar stand as regards the Afghan question. It rejected the undeclared war against Afghanistan unleashed by the USA and some other countries and refused to take part in the anti-Soviet campaign staged round the presence in Afghanistan of a limited contingent of Soviet troops sent there on the request of the Afghan government. As Indira Gandhi put it, "the developments in Afghanistan are the internal affairs of that country. The government of Afghanistan used the articles of the treaty which it signed with the Soviet Union and asked for military assistance to repulse the threat to the republic".¹⁶ India approved the initiative of the Afghan government which proposed to settle the conflict created by outside forces by peaceful means.

Japan actively supported the US stand on the developments in Afghanistan, discontinued its economic aid to Kabul, took part in "economic sanctions" against the Soviet Union, and demonstrated anew whose interests it is guided by in Asia.

After World War II the Japanese-Indian economic relations underwent considerable changes similar to the state of affairs in the political sphere. A period of invigoration gave way to a considerable period of stagnation and then activation again. In general the level of mutual economic relations remained low in comparison with the considerable economic potential of the two countries. There are several reasons behind this.

During the early postwar years, with the exception of the provisions of Article 2 of the Japanese-Indian Peace Treaty of 1952, there was no corresponding contractual-legal basis in the trade and economic ties between Japan and India. In accordance with that article, the two countries granted each other a most-favoured-nation status for four years.

In pursuance of the peace treaty the two countries concluded in February 1958, the first allround agreement on trade and economic ties between them. It was on the basis of this agreement that the two countries granted each other a most-favoured-nation status in trade, tariffs and navigation. In October 1958 India lifted restrictions on imports from Japan. Thus, it became the first country of the then British Commonwealth which refused to apply to Japan the discriminatory 35th Article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The creation of a contractual-legal basis and the cancellation of some discriminatory provisions fostered, to a certain extent, the development of the Japanese-Indian economic ties, the main forms being trade, "aid" to India within the framework of the so-called economic cooperation, direct investments and some others.¹⁷

In 1958-1981 the total trade between the two countries grew from \$159 million to \$2,254 billion, an increase of more than 1,300 per cent, making Japan the number three trade partner of India (after the USA and the USSR).

¹⁵ See *Age*, Sept. 16, 1981.

¹⁶ J. Gandhi, *India's Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 19-20 (in Russian).

¹⁷ Here and after according to the data from the *White Book on Trade*, Tokyo, 1982 pp. 337-339 (in Japanese).

The already mentioned certain complementary nature of economy and foreign trade between the two countries was and remains the major factor in the growth in trade between the two countries: a whole number of raw materials in India which Japan is in need of and commodities in Japan which are not produced or produced in little quantities by Indian industry.

Japan's exports to India comprise a high share of machinery and equipment (38.7 per cent), the greatest being general, electrotechnical and transport equipment. Such technically sophisticated commodities as precision equipment, metal-cutting tools and machine tools with programme control, automatic lines, complete plant, and so on make up but an insignificant share of Japanese exports to India.

Metals and metal products, whose quality is rather high, rank second in the Japanese exports to India (about 35 per cent).

**Japan's Share in Foreign Trade of India
(in per cent)**

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
In exports	5.4	7.1	14.0	10.6	10.3
In imports	5.4	5.6	4.6	6.7	7.5

Source: Development of Trade, IMF for the corresponding years.

During the entire postwar period Japanese exports of light industrial products, have played an important role in Japanese-Indian trade. As of 1981 their share was 15.8 per cent. This was promoted by the existence of commodities which India lacks (artificial pearls, paper and cardboard), as well as the change in the structure of the imports of the Japanese textile industry in which the share of synthetic fibre and viscose went up, and the share of cotton fabrics and ready-made clothes produced in considerable quantities in India itself was reduced.

As for India, it mainly exports raw materials to Japan. Iron, manganese and chrome ores in the deliveries of which India ranks third among Japan's suppliers still remain the major export items.

Since the 1970s the imports to Japan of Indian foodstuffs, primarily frozen shrimps, fruit and vegetables, fodder and different kinds of nuts increased considerably. In some of them India takes the leading positions in the Japanese market. The deliveries of other raw materials either show very slow rates of growth (cotton, tobacco) or even go down (timber).

On the whole the group of raw materials in the Japanese imports from India during a long period of time showed a trend towards reduction. From 1960 to 1981 its share went down from 91.9 per cent to 53.4 per cent, although in absolute terms it increased almost tenfold during the same period.

There is a group of commodities in the Japanese imports from India which shows substantial growth for a long period: that is ready industrial goods whose share in 1981 was 18.6 per cent. It is indicative that not only the volume, but also the number of items increases. For example, in 1960 the ready industrial products included only one commodity—processed leather. Now it comprises eight commodities, including chemicals, machinery, equipment, textiles, steel and pig iron. The growth in the above-mentioned group testifies to the progressive changes in the development of the Indian national industry which bear on the structure of the country's exports.

Not only economic factors but also the policy of India targeted in some cases at restricting purchases in Japan exert much influence on

the state of the Japanese-Indian trade. Such policy stems from apprehensions of a large-scale invasion of Japanese commodities into the Indian market, which takes place in many other capitalist countries and, besides, the cause of it is a sad experience of the past when India in some cases (in 1933 and in 1941) was compelled to cancel trade agreements with Japan through the fault of the latter.

The so-called "economic cooperation", or Japan's "aid" in the form of gratuitous subsidies, state yen loans, export credits, and donations to various international organisations which participate in different projects in India on a multilateral basis comprise an important form of economic relations between the two countries.

As to the amount of resources channelled by capitalist countries to India through the "official aid to development", Japan ranks third after Britain and the USA. It is indicative that the "official aid to development" is rendered to India by Japan on worse terms than to other developing countries. For example, the share of gratis subsidies granted by Japan to India is 90 per cent below the average Japanese indicator which, in its turn, is much lower than the indicators of other capitalist countries.¹⁸ The technical aid to India is also insignificant.

The means within the framework of "aid" are mainly granted by Japan in the form of the government yen loans. Let us note that India was the first country which began obtaining such loans from Japan. From 1958 to the end of 1981 Japan granted India 42 yen loans for the total sum of 445.8 billion yen (about \$1.7 billion).¹⁹ In this category India ranks second after Indonesia. The granting of yen loans is as a rule linked with the purchases of commodities in Japan, i. e., with the expansion of the latter's trade. More often than not, commodities which are sold with difficulty in Japan itself or are of obsolete models are sold on the basis of the yen loans.

As for private channels, the exports of capital from Japan to India is carried out mainly in the shape of direct investments. Although India happened to be the first country where the Japanese monopolies started their investment activities abroad after World War II, unlike foreign trade, direct investments did not come to play a considerable part in the entire complex of economic relations between Japan and India. As of April 1980, direct Japanese monopolies' investments in India barely reached \$35 million, amounting to less than 0.1 per cent of all its foreign investments. India was ranked nearly last among recipients of Japanese capital.²⁰

The reluctance of Japanese capital to flow to India is explained in Japan by its business community's apprehensions of India's possible "moving to the left", and also by a rather unstable situation at the labour market of India, from the viewpoint of cooperation between labour and capital and the skill of the former. In addition, among the restricting factors are the limited possibilities of India's entrepreneurs—probable partners at joint enterprises, the risk of nationalisation of foreign property, strict import limitations in India for raw materials and other goods, which impedes the activities of Japanese capital, tough regulation by the Indian side of the time and purpose of the staying of Japanese businessmen and specialists in India, and so on.²¹ Thus, purely

¹⁸ *The Present Stage and Problems of Economic Cooperation*. Tokyo, 1981, p. 437 (in Japanese).

¹⁹ *Nihon keizai shimbun*, Jan. 16, 1982.

²⁰ See *The Present State...* Tokyo, 1981, p. 441.

²¹ See *Indian Foreign Review*, July 1, 1970, No. 18, p. 19; *Commerce*, December 4, 1971, p. 32; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 28, 1971, pp. 42-44.

economic considerations fail to explain in full the existing situation. Explanation should also be looked for in the political and social spheres. No doubt the strained situation in the Hindustan Peninsula, as well as the socio-economic shifts in India inhibit considerably direct Japanese investments. Besides, one should, perhaps, also bear in mind the latent rivalry between the monopolies of these Asian countries in the region.

Japanese capital functions mainly in the form of mixed enterprises. This is due to the desire to penetrate the economic structure of India as deep as possible and reduce the risk of nationalisation. Such "flexibility" somewhat glosses over the most odious aspects of foreign activities carried out by Japanese monopolies, in particular in India. Still, it is unable to conceal the fact that these activities are dictated, first and foremost, by the interests of the Japanese companies, i. e., conducted, in the final analysis, for the sake of obtaining maximum profits, and not in the interests of the recipient countries.

An analysis of Japanese-Indian economic relations shows that the Japanese monopolies failed to gain dominating positions in the Indian market, though attempts at this had been made, for example, in the latter-1950s and the beginning of the 1960s (the inclusion by Japan of the Indian rupee on an equal footing with yen, in different projects of economic association of Asian countries).

India did not support the "Fukuda Doctrine" set forth in 1977, neither did it support the plans for a "Pacific Economic Community" early in the 1980s because it saw in the latter, not without grounds, the urge of the Japanese monopolies to buttress their positions in the region. Thus, India is a shining example of how an independent line in the development of national economy and foreign economic ties with such a powerful capitalist state as Japan can protect the national market from large-scale penetration by the Japanese monopolies.

Japanese-Indian relations influencing the situation in Asia have today become tangibly developed both politically and economically. Nonetheless, their level cannot be regarded as considerable in comparison with the role they are playing in the contemporary world.

Contradictory tendencies caused by the differences in the socio-economic systems of the two countries, their foreign policies and so on are intertwined in the Japanese-Indian relations. Since the beginning of the 1980s, contacts between the two states have been stepped up, and a quest has been made for ways to reconcile their stands in international affairs. However, any rapprochement between Japan and India is unable to bear lasting fruit, for Japan has been pursuing a pro-American foreign policy, whereas India is adhering to the peaceable foreign policy of a nonaligned state.

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ENERGY SITUATION IN THE PRC

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[Article by A. P. Morozov, candidate of economic sciences]

To build up adequate energy supplies has become a crucial economic problem in China in the last few years. Hu Yaobang pointed out in his report at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that the tense energy situation largely "curbs the development of China's economy" and that "the energy output growth in China has lately slowed down slightly, whereas the overexpenditure of energy resources remains, as before, a very serious problem" and "if certain rates of economic development are to be achieved, the energy resources must be tapped more intensively and the energy spending must be cut down in every possible way".¹

THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM AND THE DEGREE OF ITS ACUTENESS

Since the formation of the PRC a big step forward has been made towards the improvement of the energy situation in the country. In the period between 1949 and 1980 the output of primary energy resources went up more than 24 times, the output of coal, among others 19.4-fold, oil 883-fold and electric energy 70-fold.

Positive changes took place in the structure of fuel and energy supply following a sharp increase in it of the share of oil and the appearance of natural gas. In 1949 the share of coal in the total output of primary energy resources amounted to 96.3 per cent and of oil only to 0.7 per cent. In 1980 the percentage changed to 69.4 and 23.8 respectively. The share of natural gas reached 3 per cent.² Nevertheless, the rate at which China's fuel and energy complex was developing proved to be insufficient. The energy deficit began to make itself felt particularly sharply from the mid-1970s. In the two years—1980-1981—the output of primary energy resources fell by 2 per cent for the first time after 1967. The output of coal decreased by 2 per cent, oil—4.7 per cent, and gas—12.2 per cent. In 1982 that downward trend was at last stopped and a 5.7 per cent increase in the output of energy resources was achieved. This rate of growth was however lower than the rate of output growth in industry (7.7 per cent) or the national income (7.4 per cent).

The slower rate of development of the energy industries was turning a more and more serious obstacle in the way of economic and, above all, industrial progress. The newspaper *Gongren ribao* wrote in March 1979 that the demand of industry in energy, if it had been met, would have enabled the country to increase its overall industrial output on the basis of the existing capacities by 20 to 30 per cent.³ Owing to the energy deficit the national economy ran short of 70,000 mln yuan worth of in-

¹ Documents of the 12th All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China. Peking, 1982, p. 19 (in Chinese).

² See *Zhongguo tongji xianjian*, 1981, Peking, 1982 p. 228.

³ See *Gongren ribao*, March 2, 1979.

dustrial goods every year.⁴ Consequently, in the second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s the annual electricity deficit in industry made up about 15 to 25 per cent of its total output

CAUSES AND EFFECTS

The sharp aggravation of the energy problem in the second half of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, was caused, as the Chinese press evidences, first of all by wrong economic strategy, by the increasing elements of anarchy and of spontaneous methods in the economic management, by the violation of the principles of planned and proportionate development. The accelerated development of one group of industries at one time and of some other groups, at another, without due regard for the coordination of this development with the growth of the entire economic complex, especially, of its raw material and energy resources, caused many disproportions inside certain industries and in relations between them. That brought about a sharp downfall in the efficiency of public production and, in certain years, the decrease in the absolute volume of industrial output as a whole and in some individual industries.

One can list a number of factors that have led to the aggravation of the energy situation at the present-day stage. One of them is the noticeably lower rate of growth in the fuel and energy industries as compared to the rate of growth in the national economy and in industry, first and foremost, which is the main energy consumer (about 65 per cent).

Experience amassed all over the world shows that a faster rate of growth in the power industry than in other industries is an indispensable condition for a normal and unimpeded economic advance. This has been admitted by the majority of Chinese economists, too. The minimum ratio between the energy and industrial output growth is believed to be 0.9, that is, there should be 0.9 per cent energy growth per each 1 per cent of industrial output growth. During the First Five-Year Plan assessed today by the Chinese leadership as a period of the most successful, balanced economic development, this ratio was 1.03, though the energy supply was inadequate even then. In the second half of the 1970s, however, this ratio dropped to 0.51.

The energy situation grew tenser because its output lagged behind progressive changes in the structure of Chinese industry where the share of the heavy industry grew steadily, especially, of such main energy-consuming branches as the metallurgic and chemical industries.

There is a direct dependence between the share of the heavy industry in the total volume of industrial and agricultural output (or industrial output alone) and the increase of the energy consumption. At present, 5 times more conventional fuel is spent per every unit of the gross national product (GNP), produced in the heavy industry, as compared to the light industry.⁵

In the 1952-1982 period the share of the heavy industry in the total volume of industrial and agricultural output increased on the whole from 14.8 to 33 per cent. The most intensive growth rate was registered over the period in such energy-consuming branches as the chemical industry, including the production of fertilizers, the metallurgical industry and engineering. The expenditure of energy grew accordingly.

⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 30, 1980

⁵ See *Nengyuun*, No. 1, 1981, p. 5

The non-irrational structure of production in some industries plays a certain part in the aggravation of the energy situation. For example, the demand of agriculture in nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizers is determined by the proportion: 1 to 0.5. Currently however this proportion is 1 to 0.2. If we take into account that 0.82 t. of conventional fuel is spent in China on the production of 1 t. of the nitrogen fertilizers and 0.29 t.⁶ or 1 t. of phosphorous fertilizers, then an increase in the share of phosphorous fertilizers, would help save the country several million tons of conventional fuel every year.

The low scientific and technological level of industrial production and the existence of a multitude of small semi-handicraft shops is one of the reasons causing the aggravation of the energy situation. As a result, 1.6 t. of standard coal is spent in China to produce 1 t. of steel, 2.7 t. to produce 1 t. of ammonia and 453 gr. to generate 1 kWh of electricity. Japan spends 0.77 t., 1.2 t. and 334 gr. respectively. Owing to the low level of technology in these three industries, the over-expenditure of energy amounted in 1979 to 13 per cent of its total output.

Small enterprises drastically overspend energy. In 1979 major metallurgical enterprises used 566 kg of coke to produce 1 t. of pig iron, whereas medium- and small-size local enterprises used 837 kg. Over the same year the medium- and small-size enterprises turned out on the whole 27 per cent of pig iron and used 39 per cent of coke for its production. While big enterprises use 1.4 t. of conventional fuel to produce 1 t. of nitrogen fertilizers, small enterprises use 3.7 t.⁷

The low efficiency of energy consumption, less than 30 per cent, complicates to a large degree the energy supply situation. In the European countries it is above 40 per cent; in Japan and the United States 50 per cent. The efficiency of energy consumption is low in China because equipment used in various industries is outdated and its technological standards low. They are the lowest for the railway transport where steam locomotives prevail, and for everyday need.

The efficiency of coal consumption, this main energy source, is the lowest, a mere 23 per cent (in the industrialised countries it reaches 60 per cent).⁸ This can be explained by a number of reasons, the pattern of its consumption being one of them: about 40 per cent⁹ of the entire coal goes to less economical consumption spheres (transport, power industry and household needs). Wide use of raw coal also results in its overspending. The existing technical basis allows to clean only 18 per cent of the mined coal, while in Britain 87.3 per cent of coal is cleaned and in Japan 94.4 per cent.¹⁰

Among the factors that complicate the energy situation is the progressive tendency towards increasing the use of energy sources (coal, oil, gas) as initial raw materials for the production of various industrial goods, in the chemical industry, above all. In the 1970s China built petrochemistry, an entirely new industry, on the basis of coal and gas extraction. It uses energy raw materials to produce such important goods as fertilizers, synthetic fibre and many other things. For example, in 1981 the Chinese chemical industry used for "non-power purposes" 5.2 per cent of the total output of primary energy resources.

⁶ See *Nengyuan*, No. 1, 1981, p. 5.

⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, May 21, 1981.

⁸ *Jingji guanli*, No. 2, 1981.

⁹ *Gaangtie*, No. 2, 1980, p. 65.

¹⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, May 30, 1980.

The aggravation of the fuel and energy situation is also caused by the need to increasingly export energy resources in order to obtain currency and close the balance of payment deficit in trade with the advanced capitalist countries, and to pay back the foreign debt. In 1980, for example, China exported 23,54 mln. t. and in 1981 24,21 mln. t. of conventional fuel which accounted for 3.7 and 3.8 per cent respectively of the total output of energy resources, to say nothing of the export of 4.2 mln. t. of petroleum products in 1980 and of 4,907 mln. t. in 1981.

In short, the fuel and energy situation in China is so acute and many-sided that it requires a complex solution.

PROSPECTS FOR A SOLUTION

The 12th Congress of the CPC has set a task to increase the annual volume of industrial and agricultural output 4-fold by the year of 2000 as against 1980. Even if the ratio of the industrial output and the primary energy resources growth is 0.9 to 1, China would have to bring the annual output of primary energy resources to 2,300-2,500 mln. t. of conventional fuel by the year 2000. Chinese experts are single-minded about this being impossible to achieve.

Estimates indicate that in the period from 1952 to 1980 a total sum of investments in the coal, oil and electric energy industries reached 128,600 mln. yuan. That brought the annual output growth of primary energy resources from 48.7 mln. t. to 637.2 mln. t. So the increment of 588.5 mln. t. was attained, which meant that the average of 218 yuan was spent on each ton of the conventional fuel. In the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) 325 yuan were spent per each ton of growth, that rise showing the general tendency of the increase in prices and natural deterioration of geological and other conditions in the mining of minerals. To increase the output of primary energy resources from 637.2 mln. t. to 2,300—2,500 mln. t. of conventional fuel in the next 20 years, it would be necessary to invest in the fuel and power industry (according to 1952-1980 norms) from 360,000 mln. to 400,000 mln. yuan and, according to more realistic norms of 1975-1980, from 540,000 mln. to 600,000 mln. yuan. In the latter case the average annual investments in the period from 1980 to 2000 must be 27,000 mln to 30,000 mln. yuan. This can hardly be achieved under the current level of the national income and the accumulation fund in China.

In these conditions the Chinese leadership sees a solution in saving the energy resources. The task is set to reduce the ratio of the industrial increment and the growth of primary energy resources to 0.5. In this case, to achieve a 4-fold increase in the volume of industrial and agricultural output by the year 2000, a double, rather than 4-fold increase in the production of primary energy resources must be ensured so as to bring their annual output up to 1,200 mln. t. of conventional fuel by the end of this century. This would demand approximately 15,000 mln yuan of annual investments in the coming 20 years, which the Chinese economy is in general capable of ensuring, provided the national economy is geared to the use of energy-saving materials and technology, but this, in turn, will require a lot of time and money.

The Chinese fuel-and-energy programme gives priority to the development of the coal-mining industry and the building of hydropower plants. Under this programme the average annual rate of growth in the next 20 years for the primary energy resources and for coal is to be 3.5 per cent, for hydropower resources—6.5 to 8.5 per cent and for oil—5.5-6 per cent.

China tries to use other sources of energy as well. For example, after long debates the building of atomic power plants was decided upon. Besides, with the help of foreign technology and experience China's first tidal power plant was built in Shan Dong province in 1979 with two generating units and a total capacity of 160,000 kW.¹¹ Since the beginning of the 1970s geo-thermal sources have been used to produce electricity among other things. The country has embarked on the use of solar energy.

According to rough estimates appearing in the Chinese press, coal output is expected to reach 1,200 mln. t. in the year 2000 and its share in the country's power balance must reach 70 per cent. The stake on coal as a major energy source is easy to explain since coal is widespread all over the Chinese territory, and can be easily mined by primitive methods; so the economic effectiveness of the coal energy production is higher than that of oil. One ton of conventional fuel obtained from coal is 50 to 60 per cent cheaper than 1 t. of fuel from oil.

After heated and prolonged debates it was decided to give priority in the electricity output to the building of hydropower plants (HPP) rather than thermal power plants (TPP).

By the end of the century the capacities of the latter are expected to increase by 40 mln. to 50 mln. kW. This will make it possible to raise the electricity output to 210,000 mln—250,000 mln kWh. The share of the hydropower plants in the electricity production will increase from 19.4 to 25 per cent¹² while a total amount of electricity generated both by hydropower and thermopower plants will go up to 840,000 mln to 1,000,000 mln kWh.

Chinese experts have brought forward several reasons in favour of the primary development of hydropower resources. First of all, they believe that HPPs are more effective economically: the production cost of the electricity generated by them is from 75 to 80 per cent lower, the profit per each kWh is 3 times higher and the accumulation is 2.5 times bigger in comparison to TPPs. HPPs surpass TPPs from 2 to 7-8 times for the indices of accumulation, and for the profitability level in terms of the cost of sales and cost price.

Secondly, coal, oil and gas resources exhaust sooner or later, while HPPs work on the constantly renewed resources. Thirdly, HPPs have a considerable advantage over TPPs from the ecological point of view. And, finally, the development of the hydraulic engineering will help ease the very acute transport situation in China.

The programme for 1980-2000 envisages no noticeable changes in the structure of primary energy resources.

On the whole, from the financial point of view the decision to begin solving the energy problem by ensuring a double production of primary energy resources seems to be quite feasible. Lack of material resources resulting from the inadequate development of the electrical engineering industry may be the main obstacle here. In this case China will be compelled, as before, to turn to the world market.

The solution of the second part of the task, i. e., reducing by almost 50 per cent the power consumption of the national economy and ensuring the necessary saving of the energy resources, seems to be much more complicated. As some Chinese experts¹³ believe, the necessary saving of the energy resources may be ensured as follows: one-third through saving

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, March 26, 1979

¹² See *Shuli jidian*, No 3, 1982

¹³ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan 21, 1983

primary energy resources directly and two-thirds indirectly. They point out that an increase in the efficient energy consumption from 30 to 50 per cent could give up to 40 per cent of necessary saving. But it's quite evident that a higher energy utilization level demands a radical restructuring of the entire Chinese industry and this, in turn, calls for large investments in the production of modern equipment, for a rise of technological standards in the engineering industry where only 5 per cent of products meet the standards of the 1970s and 60 per cent remain on the level of the 1940s and 1950s.¹⁴

A considerable saving of energy can be ensured through a rise in the coefficient of the use of various non-power raw materials as well as materials and products whose production costs consist to 50 per cent and more, of energy expenditure. For example, in 1978 the coefficient of the useful rolled steel consumption amounted to 65.8 per cent. Its rise up to 80 per cent would allow China to save 2.5 mln. t. of rolled metal and, consequently, 12.5 mln. t. of conventional fuel.¹⁵ But again this economy would be ensured, if the assortment of rolled metal could be expanded and the rolled metal production restructured.

The energy saving problem depends on several more factors. At present, the consumption of energy by the population for household needs amounts to about 320 mln. t. conventional fuel. The average annual per capita spending of energy amounts to more than 0.3 t. of conventional fuel. For this reason a reduction in the current population growth is regarded as an important part of indirect saving measures.

To save such impressive amounts of energy is not an easy task; the results of the efforts to create a less energy-consuming structure of industrial production by increasing the share of light industry branches in it show the scale of the problem.

In 1979 China switched over to a policy of ensuring a priority development of the light industry. The Sixth Five-Year Plan envisaged a 3 per cent average annual growth rate for the heavy industry and a 5 per cent growth for the light industry, which resulted soon, however, in a sharp fall of the heavy industry growth rate, of the industrial output and even led to the economic stagnation.

Efforts were made to improve the situation. According to official reports, in 1982 the heavy industry left behind the light industry for the rate of growth: its gross output increment was brought to 9.9, and to 5.7 per cent in the light industry. The Chinese press assesses this trend as a return to "normal industrial development of the country", and it will obviously remain a dominating trend in the development of the Chinese economy up to the end of this century. Obviously, the hopes to save energy and lower the power intensity through economic restructuring have largely proved to be illusory.

The complexity of the solution of the fuel and energy problem in China, particularly the pressing need to save energy and ensure faster rates of economic growth with smaller investments in the fuel and energy complex, is a serious challenge to the programme of China's economic development over the period up to 2000. In view of this the goal to increase 4-fold the volume of industrial and agricultural output by the end of the century, on the basis of doubling the output of primary energy resources, may turn out to be unattainable.

¹⁴ See *Jingji yanjiu*, No. 7, 1982, pp. 37-41.

¹⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 21, 1983.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGING PRC ATTITUDES ON CONFUCIAN ETHICS EXPLAINED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 83 (signed to press 30 Aug 83) pp 72-80

[Article by L. S. Perelomov, doctor of historical sciences, and E. V. Nikogosov: "Ethical Categories of Confucianism: Contemporary Appraisals and Interpretations"]

[Text] The second half of the 20th century has clearly demonstrated that Confucius and Confucianism have not been forgotten in China. What is more, during the decade of "Cultural Revolution," the "absolute sage," as Confucius was called for 2,000 years, and his teachings were drawn into the political struggle. In the late 1970's and early 1980's the role of Confucius and the nature of his teachings began to be reassessed in the PRC, and this process is still going on. It must be said that this is an extremely difficult process involving many stumbling-blocks. In reference to some of them, Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy wrote: "The fact is that official Confucianism in China, in order to popularize its dogmas among the public and to ensure its absolute domination by the ruling class, created a vast body of literature idealizing not only the founder of the doctrine but also his disciples, prominent popularizers of the doctrine and certain past rulers who had promoted Confucianism with zeal and persecuted its opponents."¹ If this absolutely accurate statement were to be supplemented by even a few appraisals of Confucius, Confucianism and its "manifestations" by the organizers of the campaign for the "Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" (1972-1976), all of the complexity of the problem now facing researchers of Confucianism throughout the world, particularly in the PRC, would be evident. The most difficult problems in the reappraisal of the vulgarized features of Confucius and Confucianism were encountered by PRC propaganda and researchers in 1976-1979. It was at this time that all of the articles began to be published about various periods in the life of Confucius and the fate of his theories, particularly their "presence" in national politics. Summarizing this discussion, Pang Pu noted in an article entitled "Appraisals of Confucius in the Last 3 Years" that several hundred articles had already been written on this topic, and he distinguished between two stages of their publication: the first lasting from 1976 to summer 1978, and the second ending at the beginning of 1980. According to Pang Pu, "the emphasis during the first stage was on the campaign of the 'gang of four' to 'Praise Legalism and Criticize Confucianism.' This campaign was essentially a political plot with the aim of usurping supreme authority in the party and government; appraisals of the ancients were

used only as a screen.... Obviously, criticizing the 'gang of four's' use of the 'Praise Legalism and Criticize Confucianism' campaign primarily meant accusing the gang of political treachery. Many extremely pointed and excellent articles were written from this standpoint during the first stage. It was a great pleasure to read them, they unlocked the fetters of hatred and they did contain a grain of profound disclosures and merciless criticism. But almost all of these articles bore the same aroma, which had politically assigned destructive power or, like a golden hoop, severely restricted the author's train of thought. It appeared that an axiom had been coined to substantiate any thesis capable of being used to strike back at the 'gang of four.'" Pang Pu was referring to the logic of the evidence cited by the many authors who argued with the ringleaders of the campaign for the "Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" by using the same tactic, accusing supporters of the "gang of four" of being loyal to Confucianism.

At the end of his description of the first stage, Pang Pu remarked: "This stage could be called a stage of appraisals without any appraisals of Confucius. It demonstrated with embarrassing clarity the degree to which our researchers are still influenced by inertia and superstition, or, to put it more precisely, it ruthlessly revealed the degree to which our ideology has been severely traumatized!" It would be hard to deny the author's statement. Pang Pu admitted: "I do not know when this began, but political intrigues gradually devoured learning in our country, and advantages and disadvantages gradually took the place of truth and falsity. With the aid of political intrigues, it became possible to attack anything, and everything had to be subordinated to political intrigues. It was in this way that the sense of truth and falsity grew weaker with each day in the social sciences and finally disappeared."

The second stage, according to Pang Pu, began "when Confucius began to be studied as a historical figure who had clearly expressed his own views. This occurred gradually, as discussions began to be conducted in accordance with [scientific] criteria of truth."

During this stage the most diverse views coexisted, and the author applauded this: "In the second year and a half there was an unending stream of articles, reviews, critiques and reports of the most diverse natures and properties, and these contained appraisals of Confucius. They included thorough analyses of his ideology and the examination of specific historical events; they included the acknowledgement that Confucius was a revolutionary and the firm belief that he was a reactionary; they included attempts to find the precursors of the Confucianists and an unrestricted discussion of the evolution of Confucianism. In short, in this grand stream, encompassing all ideas, major and minor, each individual expressed his own opinion and, what is more, said everything he wanted to say."²

There are at least four or five different points of view on each major aspect of Confucianism. In an article entitled "The Reappraisal of Confucius," Liu Shuxun lists the four following views on Confucius' political platform: 1) Confucius was the spokesman of inveterate slaveholders; 2) Confucius was a reformer of slavery; 3) Confucius represented the emerging landowner class;

4) The Confucian ideology cannot be regarded as an invariable entity because it passed through various stages of evolution. Some say that Confucius was an idealist, others call him a materialist, still others say that Confucius' philosophical views began to rid themselves of the influence of religious idealism and to move toward naive materialism, etc.³

The association of Confucius exclusively with the dominant class is hardly a promising approach to his so-called "political platform" because this method impoverishes the process of investigation and complicates the comprehension of all the profundity of Confucius' ideas. Of the many methods used in the study of early Confucianism, the most productive is obviously the one based on L. P. Delyusin's appraisal of Confucianism: "The vulgar attempt to define Confucianism as a doctrine reflecting and defending the interests of a specific class is generally unproductive." Confucius and his followers could be called the heralds of abstract human truth, "which did not keep them from misusing the authority of this doctrine in the interests of the dominant classes in Chinese society."⁴

It was quite gratifying when a number of Chinese researchers of Confucius renounced the vulgar class approach to the appraisal of his doctrine in 1982. For example, Kuang Yaming wrote: "When a historical figure is assessed in the context of his time, it is wrong to renounce class analysis, but it is just as wrong to arbitrarily paste class labels on everything in a mechanical and metaphysical manner."

Quoting the famous statement K. Marx and F. Engels made in the "Communist Manifesto," that in periods of social upheavals "a small segment of the dominant class renounces it and joins the revolutionary class, the class to which the future belongs,"⁵ Kuang Yaming concludes that Confucius' teachings cannot be associated with the decaying slaveholder class.⁶

It would be wise to turn to an analysis of the fundamental--that is, ethical--categories of Confucianism, as only their disclosure can allow the researcher to grasp the essence of the entire doctrine. It is precisely here, however, that the greatest difficulties are encountered. To this day, the views and interpretations of researchers and translators are quite contradictory. There are around 20 known ethical categories. First of all, let us take a look at some dictionaries, as they serve as the researcher's point of departure in his interpretation of a text. The following are the 20 categories (the numbers in parentheses are taken from the Chinese-Russian dictionary edited by I. M. Oshanin):

1. ren (3)
2. yi (6776)
3. li (573)
4. dao (6480)
5. de (8339)
6. zhi (1507)
7. xin (1141)
8. cai (3229)
9. xiao (3045)

10. ti (4650)
11. yong (4746)
12. zhong (8418)
13. shun (8090)
14. he (1082)
15. wu-chang (525; 3879)
16. san-gang (8; 3732)
17. jun-zi (1130; 3038)
18. xiao-ren (8063; 4777)
19. zhong-yong (2625; 3663)
20. da-tong (4885; 3778)

We will use the following letters of the alphabet to designate the dictionaries:

- A--Bishop Innokentiy's Chinese-Russian dictionary, Beijing, 1914.
 B--R. Matthews' Chinese-English dictionary, Shanghai-Cambridge, 1931.
 C--Chinese-Russian dictionary edited by I. M. Oshanin, Moscow, 1952.
 D--Chinese-Russian dictionary of the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, Beijing, 1977.
 E--"Xinhua cidian," Beijing, 1981.

Dictionary pages are in parentheses.

A.

1. Love of mankind (61).
2. Justice, social; adopted (66).
3. Ceremony; ritual; worship (85).
4. Road; zone; passage; doctrine; teaching (45).
5. Virtue; prudence (54).
6. Wisdom; knowledge; prudence (272).
7. Sincerity; faith (144).
8. Talent, gift; force, matter (242).
9. Respectful, honoring one's parents (166).
10. Fraternal respect (172).
11. Brave, bold; strong (327).
12. Faithful, truthful; devotion; devotion to the throne (280).
13. Obey; obedience (312).
14. Harmonious; obliging; peace, accord (206).
15. --
16. --
17. Nobleman (234).
18. Insignificant person, nonentity (166).
19. --
20. --

B.

1. Absolute virtue, free of greed--Confucian ideal; unostentatious love for a person seeking justice; benevolence, mercy, humanitarianism, love (464).
2. Correct behavior; justice; morality; duty (448).

3. Propriety, etiquette, courtesy, ceremony; sense of respect and gratitude (566).
4. Road, passage; Way, Truth; doctrine, principle (882).
5. Virtue, moral perfection; actions; behavior (not always good); energy, force; willingness to do good (889).
6. Wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, prudence (129).
7. Truth, sincerity; faith, conviction (408).
8. Talent, gift, ability; force (976).
9. Respect for parents, filial duty (384).
10. Performing the duties of a young brother (905).
11. Brave, courageous, bold, manly (1136).
12. Loyal, devoted, faithful, conscientious, patriotic (215).
13. Favorable, flourishing; to obey or agree; in accordance with...(843).
14. Harmony, peace, reconciliation; on good relations with..., to harmonize or reconcile (315).
15. Five constant virtues--B(1), B(2), B(3), B(6) and B(7)--(1071).
16. Three moral principles--sense of duty to ruler, father and husband (747).
17. Nobleman, gentleman, wise and absolutely virtuous person--the ideal man according to Confucian criteria (241).
18. Low person, opposite of B(17) in Chinese classical literature; the masses (385).
19. One of the "Analects"--"Doctrine of the Mean" (Legg) or "The Constant Mean" (Giles)--(213).
20. Harmony of the senses; universal harmony; utopia (846).

C.

1. Humaneness, love of mankind; goodness, mercy; virtuous or worthy (person); to love (5).
2. Justice, duty, obligation; sense of duty, adherence to principle; just, principled, truth, just cause; fair; honesty, integrity; unprejudiced, impartial, objective; voluntary; false, artificial (645).
3. Propriety, restraint, culture (as the basis of the Confucian outlook); etiquette, ceremony, ritual, rite; presentation; "Book of Etiquette" (61-62).
4. Way, road; orbit; approach, method, means; principle; morality, ethics; justice; teaching; truth; logos; Tao, supreme absolute law; Taoism; Taoist (611).
5. Virtue, morality, morals, moral qualities; good deeds, kindness, favor (800).
6. Intelligence, wisdom, reason; intelligent, wise; grown wise with experience; to know, to understand (146).
7. To believe; faith; to believe in; to trust, to give in to the wishes (of someone); true, genuine; actually, in fact (107).
8. Abilities, talent; talented person; character, nature (human) (323).
9. Respect for parents; respectful; exemplary son; mourning (for parents), mourner (299).
10. To respect an elder brother; respect for elders; humility; joyful and unconstrained (444).
11. Bravery, valor, manliness; brave, gallant, valorous; hero, epic hero; volunteers (451).

12. Fidelity, devotion; faithful, devoted, loyal (810).
13. To follow; to take a certain course; to agree; to obey or be submissive; obedient; to have good intentions; favorable, lucky; pleasant; convenient; on the way; soft (771).
14. Peace, accord; peaceful; friendly; agreeable; to correspond; soft, moderate; warm; to moderate, to alleviate; harmony; harmonious (102).
15. Basic standards (of human relations); elements of Chinese cosmogony (metal, wood, water, fire, earth) (56).
16. --
17. Conf. perfect individual, person of high morals; nobleman; gentleman; superman; learned dogmatist; husband (addressed by wife) (106).
18. Low (base) individual; I (polite term); common people (781).
19. Zhongyong ("Doctrine of the Mean," the name of the third book of the Confucian Analects); median, average (254).
20. Total harmony (of the senses); great commonwealth (464).

D.

1. (Feudal moral category) humaneness; humanitarianism; love of mankind... when Lin Biao and Confucius say "humaneness" and "love of mankind," they mean murder and cannibalism (749-750).
2. (Feudal moral category) justice (just); righteous (right); truth; principle; friendship; friendly (amicable) relations or feelings (1074).
3. Ritual; (lit.) rite; old precepts (548).
4. Road, way, passage, thoroughfare; channel, gutter, fairway; rule, principle; doctrine; religious doctrine; Taoism; Taoist (177).
5. Morals, morality, ethics; virtue, good deed (180).
6. Intelligent (intelligence); wisdom, wit (1177).
7. Reliable (reliability); to be faithful; to believe; to trust; to take on faith; to profess (1008).
8. Abilities, gift, talent (75).
9. (Feudal moral and ethical category) to respect parents and obey them; respectful and obedient; filial duty; mourning, to mourn (997).
10. (Lit.) love of a younger brother for an older one (883).
11. Brave (bravery); manly (manliness); valorous (valor); bold (boldness) (1092).
12. To be devoted, faithful, honest (devotion, faith, honesty); faithfully and truly (1181).
13. On the way; alongside; getting along well; luck; to one's liking or taste; to obey (obedience), to be respectful (respect), to be humble (humility) (842-843).
14. Benevolence; peace; to be in accord; to resolve something by peaceful means; to end in a draw (353).
15. --
16. San gang wu chang--three fundamentals and five constant principles of feudal society (the devotion of a subject to his sovereign, the devotion of a wife to her husband and the devotion of a son to his father; humaneness, justice, courtesy, reason and fidelity) (765).
17. Nobleman; gentleman (493).
18. Low (base) person; low (base) personality (996).

19. The reasonable mean; the golden mean; ...the "golden mean" is the set of spiritual fetters with which all reactionaries lull and enslave the people (1180).
20. Great commonwealth (160).

E.

1. Concept or sense of sympathy, amicability and love (703).
2. Just and correct remark or just and correct action; everything corresponding to morality and moral standards (996).
3. Name of the system of social statuses and related rituals and rites in the ancient Chinese society; ceremonies and rituals engendered by beliefs of certain classes about morality and morals, as well as old customs and habits (503).
4. Road, direction, way; truth; method, manner; teaching, doctrine; morals, morality; pertaining to Taoism or Taoists (154).
5. Good human qualities; virtue, morality, ethics; kindness, good deeds (156).
6. Intelligence, reason, wisdom, wit, knowledge (1086).
7. Honest, honestly, without deception; reliable; to believe, to have no doubt, to profess (939).
8. Ability, gift, talent (76).
9. A feudal ethical and moral category, consisting in respect for parents and unconditional obedience; mourning, mourning clothes (929).
10. A feudal ethical and moral category; indicates submission to elder brothers and elders (827).
11. Bold, not afraid of danger or difficulties (1015).
12. Devoted, honest (1094).
13. Taking the same direction; alongside; along the way, by the way; in sequence; to put in sequence; to put straight; accordingly; obedient; submissive (788).
14. Soft, untempered; accord; good neighborliness; peace; stopping a fight (336).
15. --
16. --
17. In the pre-Ch'ing period--the opposite of "xiaoren," member of the ruling class; in ancient China--a person with high spiritual qualities (459).
18. --
19. Concept of Confucian moral code, the choice of the so-called "golden mean" (1090).
20. The idea society propagandized by Confucians; a specific idealized view of society of the time of Yao and Shun; some revolutionaries and progressive thinkers also subscribed to the concept of a great commonwealth--Hong Xiuquan, Tan Sitong and Sun Yatsen; the proletariat also used this term at times to define the term "communism" (136).

The reader has probably noticed that these ethical terms are given different, sometimes extremely divergent interpretations in different dictionaries.

Variant readings can also be found in contemporary Russian translations of the Chinese classics, and this interferes with the scientific interpretation of the ethical categories of Confucianism and the analysis of their meaning.

Only the experienced Sinologist can guess, for example, what the parallel quotations presented below are faithful to: their different Russian translations of the same text "Jixu":

1. "Zizhang asked Confucius about the love of mankind. Confucius replied: 'Anyone who can display five [qualities] in the Terrestrial Kingdom is a lover of mankind.' [Zizhang] asked about them. Confucius replied: 'Respect, good manners, truthfulness, keen-wittedness and goodness. If a person is respectful, he is not despised. If a person is well-served, he is supported. If a person is truthful, he is trusted. If a person is keen-witted, he is successful. If a person is good, he can use others.'"
- 1-a "Zizhang asked Confucius about humaneness. Confucius said: 'The person who can do five [things] in the Terrestrial Kingdom is already humane.' 'Please tell me about them,' [Zizhang] asked. 'Dignity, breadth, trust, quick-wittedness and kindness. The dignified person will not be taken in, breadth wins over the narrow, trust inspires the trust of others, quick-wittedness leads to success, and kindness allows one to control others,'"
2. "The teacher said: 'When people do not improve their morals, do not repeat what they have been taught, and about the principles of duty but are incapable of adhering to them and cannot justify their bad deeds, I grieve over them,'"
- 2-a "The philosopher said: 'The failure to defend rights, the non-exposition of science, the inability to adhere to related truths and the inability to rectify wrongs—these are what make me sad,'"
3. "Yan Yuan asked about the love of mankind. The teacher replied: 'Behaving totally in accordance with the requirements of ritual is the love of mankind. If someone behaves for an entire day completely in accordance with the requirements of ritual, everyone in the Terrestrial Kingdom will call him a lover of mankind. The exercise of this love depends on the individual himself, because how could it depend on other people?'"
- 3-a "Yan Yuan asked about humaneness. The philosopher said: 'Surmounting oneself and observing etiquette represent humaneness. Once you surmount yourself and observe etiquette, the Terrestrial Kingdom will return to humane state. It is far better to observe humaneness in accordance with one's own wishes than by following the example of others.'"

Without going into the manner in which some of these quotations have been translated ("the exercise of this love," "the non-exposition of science" and others), we will concentrate on the amazing ease with which some ethical terms replace others. "Love of mankind" becomes "humaneness," "respect" becomes "dignity," "good manners" become "breadth," "truthfulness" becomes "trust," "morals" become "gifts," "principles of duty" become "truths," "ritual" becomes "etiquette" and so forth.

Of course, the multiple meanings of Chinese characters objectively give each author or translator the right to his own interpretation of an individual

character or group of characters in a specific context, but even the multiple meanings of various ethical terms will not help the reader understand why A. M. Karapetyants translates "de" as "gifts," Z. A. Krivtsov translates it as "morality" and "morals," L. S. Perelomov translates it as "virtue," A. S. Martynov uses the compound phrase "the moral or good force 'de,'" Yang Hingshong uses the transcription "de" or the phrase "a sign of the way of things," S. Kuchera uses the words "moral qualities," "moral principles" and "chastity" and A. B. Krasnov translates it as "good qualities," "merits" and "virtues."⁸ And sometimes the universally known concepts of "Datong" (Great Commonwealth) and "zhong yong" ("doctrine of the golden mean") are turned by the pen of some researchers (V. P. Ilyushechkin, for example) into "great harmony" and "the center of truth and its existence."⁹ Even someone fluent in Chinese might not suspect that the single ethical term "li" could be translated into Russian as "ritual," "etiquette," "rules," "rules of behavior," "ceremony," "ceremonial," "rites," "ritualistic," "respect," "decorum," "standards of behavior" and "precepts."¹⁰ Apparently, authors and translators do not always have a clear idea of the meaning of such concepts as ritual, etiquette, ceremonial and ceremony. In the Academy's four-volume dictionary of the Russian language, these terms are given the following interpretations:

Ritual: 1) a group of rites accompanying a religious act and constituting its external appearance. 2) a customary or established procedure of doing something, a ceremonial (vol 3, p 952).

Etiquette: established standards of behavior, the manners accepted in a particular society (vol 4, p 1,055).

Ceremonial: the established procedures of a particular rite or ceremony (vol 4, p 881).

Ceremony: accepted or established procedure in solemn rituals, or the ritual itself. From the Latin *caerimonia*--reverence or veneration (vol 4, p 881).¹¹

There is no need to list all of the alternative interpretations of the above-mentioned 20 ethical categories of Confucianism.

Polar appraisals of these categories can be found in the PRC scientific and sociopolitical press. They were particularly abundant during the campaign for "Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius," when Confucius was called a reactionary spokesman of the regressive slaveholder class.¹²

The Chinese leadership's acknowledgement of the ultra-leftist errors of the period of "Cultural Revolution" and the officially declared line of "creating a socialist spiritual culture" led to the reappraisal of many of the theories propounded by the supporters of a nihilistic attitude toward Confucius, Confucianism and the interpretation of his categories. In an article entitled "Appraisal of the Doctrine of the 'Golden Mean' ('zhong yong')," Long Bu correctly criticizes the historians of Chinese philosophy who saw this doctrine only as "the ideological basis of eclecticism and unprincipled conciliation."¹³ The noteworthy articles about the study of Kongzi's biography and teachings include the following: "The Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming Dynasties

and the Religious Ideas of Qiu Hansheng"; "On Confucius and the Transformation of His Ideas in History" by Chen Zhengfu; "On the Patrimonial System of the Confucian Clan in Qufu" by Zhang Zhaolin and Zhong Zunxian; "Dubious Aspects of Confucianism" by Li Guoquan and He Kezhang; "About Confucian Ideas of Moral Indoctrination" by Mao Lirui; "Let Us Study Categories from the History of Chinese Philosophy" by Fang Keli; "About the Specific Features and Nature of the Confucian Doctrine of 'Dao,'" by Cheng Hai; "Confucianism Is Not a Religion" by Tang Hai.¹⁴ Some of these authors interpret one of the main Confucian ethical categories "ren" as "the political aim of returning to the society of the 'Great Commonwealth' ('Datong')," others prefer to view "ren" as "the essence of the Tao doctrine" and so forth. Similarly, Cheng Hai and Tang Hai feel that the term "li" should not be regarded as a "religious category" because "Confucianism was originally a purely ethical and moral doctrine, and not a religious one."¹⁵

We realize that the terms in the original Chinese texts often convey multiple meanings, and as Fang Keli correctly pointed out, "sometimes the terms and categories of ancient Chinese philosophy have been given different meanings in different eras and by different philosophers, and this makes them fundamentally different from some concepts and categories of 'Western philosophy.'"¹⁶ A similar view is expressed by renowned Chinese historian Lu Zhongping. In an article entitled "Let the Terms Used in Scientific Discussions Be Precise," he writes: "One concept should not be substituted for another in scientific discussions; A is A and B is B. And it is just as wrong to call A B as to call B A."¹⁷

The current terminological confusion certainly cannot promote the more thorough knowledge of the culture of the Chinese people and the actual role Confucianism played in this culture. It would be useful to conduct a further exchange of views on these matters.¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

1. S. L. Tikhvinskiy, "Ancient Chinese Philosophy and the Political Struggle in the PRC," NOVYY MIR, 1982, No 1, p 262.
2. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 January 1980.
3. GUANGMING RIBAO, 12 March 1980.
4. "Konfutsianstvo v Kitaye. Problemy teorii i praktiki" [Confucianism in China. Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1982, p 9.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, p 433.
6. GUANGMING RIBAO, 13 November 1982.
7. "Drevnekitayskaya filosofiya" [Ancient Chinese Philosophy], vol 1, Moscow, 1972, pp 153, 159, 171 (translated by V. A. Erivtsanov); "Konfutsianstvo v Kitaye," Moscow, 1982, pp 16, 19, 26 (translated by A. M. Karasetyants).

8. "Konfutsianstvo v Kitave," pp 13-14; "Drevnekitayskaya filosofiya," vol 1, pp 149, 160; L. S. Perelomov, "Konfutsianstvo i legizm v politicheskoy istorii Kitaya" [Confucianism and Legalism in the Political History of China], Moscow, 1981, p 87; "Konfutsianstvo v Kitave," p 112; "Drevnekitayskaya filosofiya," vol 1, pp 114, 126; *ibid.*, vol 2, pp 19, 20; "Konfutsianstvo v Kitave," p 145.
9. "Konfutsianstvo v Kitave," pp 241, 242.
10. *Ibid.*, pp 14, 15, 49, 50, 65, 124, 185, 186, 202; "Drevnekitayskaya filosofiya," vol 1, pp 142, 145, 153; vol 2, pp 31, 34, 68, 69, 100, 120.
11. "Slovar' russkogo yazyka, v chetyrekh tomakh" [Dictionary of the Russian Language, in Four Volumes], Moscow, 1957-1961.
12. L. S. Perelomov, *op. cit.*, pp 221-279.
13. ZHONGGUO SHEHUEI KEXUE, 1980, No 1, p 31.
14. LISHI YANJIU, 1979, No 11, pp 62-74; ZHONGGUO ZHIXUE SHI YANJIU, 1981, No 2, pp 62-78; ZHONGGUO SHI YANJIU, 1981, No 1, pp 14-28; ZHIXUE YANJIU, 1981, No 7, pp 22-29; BEIJING SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO, 1980, No 3, pp 76-81; RENMIN RIBAO, 3 September 1982; GUANGMING RIBAO, 28 September 1982, 14 July 1982.
15. GUANGMING RIBAO, 13 September 1982, 28 September 1982, 14 July 1982.
16. *Ibid.*, 3 September 1982.
17. *Ibid.*, 13 April 1983.
18. The journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI has begun an extensive discussion of these problems (see No 3, 1983).

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MARCH 1983 NONALIGNED CONFERENCE IN DELHI DISCUSSED

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[Article by K. A. Krutikov: "Antiwar, Anti-Imperialist Forum In New Delhi (The Results of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries)"]

Early this year the attention of peoples and governments of all continents was turned towards Delhi where on March 7-12 the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries was held. Today, on the 22nd year of its existence, the nonaligned movement includes 99 states of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and Oceania, and also two national liberation organisations—the PLO and the SWAPO. The Delhi Conference was a major international development, for the movement of the nonaligned countries has now become an active and important factor of world politics.

Having emerged during the period of the collapse of the colonial system, the movement was the newly-free states' response to the stronger attempts by imperialist powers led by the US to keep them within the sphere of their domination and make them members of military blocs, like SEATO and CENTO. It is only natural that nonaligned countries from the very beginning clearly adhered to the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial and anti-war stand. That is why J. F. Dulles expressed the views of US imperialists when he declared nonalignment to be "immoral", they take an evidently negative and hostile approach to it till now, though from time to time they seek to cover up their true attitude towards nonaligned countries.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have invariably treated with respect the goals and activities of the nonaligned movement, displaying genuine solidarity with the countries and peoples that are waging a struggle for their equitable status in the world, and against all forms of imperialist diktat, aggression, neocolonialism, and great-power hegemony. Socialist countries welcome the progressive role played by the nonaligned movement in international affairs because, as Yuri Andropov stated at the November 1982 Plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, "the ensuring of durable peace, the protection of the peoples' right to independence and social progress are permanent objectives of our foreign policy".

The Delhi Conference wrapped up a difficult but important and successful period in the history of the nonaligned movement. The three and a half years that passed since the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government in Havana (September 1979) were marked by a grave exacerbation of the world situation. The aggressive forces of imperialism led

by the USA launched a campaign of fueling international tension, boosting the arms race, accelerating the preparations for a nuclear war, and replacing detente with the policy of strength and confrontation. Nonaligned countries experienced even sharper pressure, dictat and interference in their domestic affairs on the part of the United States and other imperialist powers.

Under the Reagan administration the frontal onslaught against detente, and the imposition of imperial claims on the states and governments by US imperialism brought about a tougher allround pressure by Washington on the nonaligned movement and its participants. Statements are directly and officially made to the governments of nonaligned countries that their bilateral, including economic, relations with the United States would depend on the stand they take in the movement. The leaders of the White House and the State Department have usurped the right to label some states "truly nonaligned", teach lessons to others, and "excommunicate" from the movement the countries which resolutely uphold the anti-imperialist objectives and principles of the movement.

After the attempts of American and other reactionary forces to frustrate the Sixth Havana Conference in 1979 proved a fiasco, Washington's strategy spearheaded at pushing the nonaligned countries from their anti-imperialist and anti-militaristic positions began increasingly to complicate the situation inside the movement and create all kinds of difficulties preventing Cuba from discharging its duties as Chairman of the movement. The main objective was to discredit Cuban policy, sow distrust in its ability to guide the movement and, making use of certain countries that were following in the wake of Washington's policy, to paralyse the activities of the movement. The foes of the movement succeeded in creating some difficulties for the nonaligned movement. However, due to the energetic and consistent stand of Cuba and of many other states, and thanks to the profound interest of nonaligned countries in preserving the unity and capability of the movement, far from losing its role and combat nature, it preserved it.

In his speech in Delhi Fidel Castro had every ground to state that the "unity of our movement has not weakened, its energy invigorated and it became possible to safeguard it from all encroachments". In their speeches at the Conference heads of state or government praised the activities of Cuba and Fidel Castro personally in guiding the movement. Indira Gandhi stressed that those were hard times which had been aggravated by international crises but President Castro, she added, took care only of the unity and power of our movement and its contribution to the relaxation of international tension.

During the preparations for, and the work of the Seventh Conference, imperialism resorted to its entire arsenal of methods of propaganda, diplomatic and economic pressures against nonaligned countries. This pressure was brought to bear primarily on India, the organiser of the forum. According to the Indian press, Deputy US Secretary of State L. Eagleburger stressed during the consultations in Delhi in November 1982 that the United States would like at least to rectify the "Soviet turn" of the movement and, ideally, to put it on pro-Western road. As G. K. Reddi, an observer of *Hindu* paper, wrote on November 19, 1982, Eagleburger was told that the main line of the nonaligned movement would undoubtedly remain intact (whether Americans prefer to regard it as anti-Western or not, this is their own problem, especially in international economic relations). Even then the attempts continued to ascribe to, or to impose on, India the intention to make the movement pro-Western. On the eve of the Conferen-

ce Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Parliament that India had become the target of attacks and other hostile actions and that immense pressure had been brought to bear on the nonaligned movement from outside to split its ranks and push it away from the path it opted for.

The imperialists and their henchmen spared no effort to divert the Delhi Conference from examining the truly vital problems facing non-aligned countries, drawing the Seventh Conference into endless and fruitless discussions on the so-called Afghan and Kampuchean questions. The aim was obvious: to make the differences between the participants in the movement more profound and prevent them from concentrating on the tasks of the struggle for peace and international security, against militaristic preparations, aggressive adventures and neocolonial plunder. Singapore, Pakistan and some other countries played the role of zealous executors of this unseemly design.

The leaders of the nonaligned nations, however, embarked on the road of overcoming differences, elaborating mutually acceptable decisions, and developing constructive co-operation. For example, the persistent attempts of ASEAN countries and some other states to alter the decision of the Sixth Havana Conference to leave vacant the place for Kampuchea in the movement and bring the bloody Pol Pot clique posing as a "coalition government", were turned down. It was decided not to discuss this problem at all at the plenary sessions of the Conference, and the Coordination Bureau was instructed to prepare proposals concerning the representation of Kampuchea to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1985.

In their Political Declaration the nonaligned nations wrote down the provisions on the need for a political settlement of problems in Southwest and Southeast Asia. These, like other provisions, which are of a compromise character, showed that some countries still yield to the imperialist pressure in some questions. It is of importance, however, that, dealing with the Afghanistan situation, the nonaligned movement called on all states to show restraint to avoid further intensification of the threat to peace and security in the region and take such steps that would bring about conditions favourable for establishing stable and harmonious relations between the states of the region. Participants in the Conference emphasised that the negotiations held with the good offices of the UN Secretary-General are a step in a right direction, and insisted on their continuation with the purpose of an early political settlement of the problem.

At the press conference devoted to the completion of the forum, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated that adhering to the policy of double standards, many countries which now show concern about Afghanistan, did not utter a single word about the aggression against Vietnam. Like many other heads of state or government, Indira Gandhi spoke with understanding about the stand taken by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: "If any country feels in danger and asks another state for military assistance, this is an exclusively internal affair of that country. We should view this from balanced positions."

According to the Vietnamese paper *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, the section of the Political Declaration dealing with Southeast Asia stresses the need for a comprehensive solution of the problems facing the region and removal of all foreign military bases and encourages a dialogue between the states there. The Declaration also calls on all states of the region to start a dialogue which would result in solving the differences between them and establishing lasting peace and stability in that region, and also removing interference and threat of aggression on the part of foreign powers. It is common knowledge, however, that external forces continue to pro-

voke friction among states of Southeast Asia. Some ASEAN leaders are not yet ready to have a constructive dialogue, while the leaders of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea at their meeting in Vientiane on February 22-23, 1983, again resolutely favoured negotiations on all outstanding issues between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina. "Our states," Sufanuvong, President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic stated at the Delhi forum, "want to live in peace and friendship with the peoples of all countries of Southeast Asia, and also with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the principles of mutual respect." This peaceloving stand taken by the states of Indochina, as well as their reasonable line towards settling regional problems, were approved and supported by the participants in the Conference.

As the Cuban paper *Granma* rightly noted on March 13, 1983, "the enemies of the nonaligned movement suffered a crushing defeat in their manoeuvres aimed at blocking the activities of the Conference by means of the so-called Kampuchean and Afghan issues. Reason, sense of unity and responsibility took the upper hand at the forum".

II

The key problems of our day and age—the questions of peace, detente, and halting the dangerous arms race, especially nuclear arms, and the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war—were central in the work and decisions of the Delhi Conference.

From the very opening of the Conference Fidel Castro and Indira Gandhi stressed the serious nature of the growing threat of a nuclear catastrophe. They pointed out that the latter's source is the policy spearheaded at undermining detente and ensuring military superiority and confrontation. Their speeches and the statements by other participants in the forum voiced a strong appeal for an active position of the movement on these burning issues of our day. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, stated: "We must serve as a foundation of peace and security." Practically all delegates emphasised in their speeches the need for a struggle to strengthen peace and achieve nuclear disarmament.

From the rostrum of the Palace of Science where the Conference was held, the heads of many delegations provided a clearcut answer to the question: who pushes the world towards a nuclear catastrophe and who is against the elimination of the threat of war forever. While denouncing the arms race started by the United States, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said: "The non-stop stockpiling of sophisticated nuclear armaments and other means of mass annihilation combined with the crisis of detente, resumption of the cold war and the stubborn demand to hold negotiations from a position of strength led to the current escalation of tension which may culminate in the much more pernicious world war than all the previous ones."

Head of the Libyan delegation Abdel Salam Jalloud stated that any success in disarmament is possible only in the event Washington abandons its current militaristic line. "The United States," Daniel Ortega, head of the Nicaraguan delegation pointed out, "turns down reasonable proposals which might serve as a positive foundation for the halting of the arms race and the implementation of gradual disarmament. Its stand implies hegemony, frustrating international peace, and unprecedented arms race bringing mankind closer to the catastrophe." Heads of the delegations of the PLO, of Mozambique, Grenada, Vietnam, Mauritius and a number of other countries expressed a similar clearcut and unequivocal opinion.

Not all participants in the forum would dare directly hold the USA and NATO responsible for the further aggravation of the situation in the world. Representatives of some states (and this was mirrored in a number of sections of the Final Documents) preferred to explain the growth of tension, the arms race and some negative phenomena in international affairs by the "rivalry between great powers and blocs". Such formulations are a certain concession to the pressure brought to bear by imperialists and their accomplices, and they run counter to the objective and evident facts. However, as *Granma* rightly noted on March 13, 1983, having read the decisions adopted by the Delhi Conference, "no one would be mistaken as to who is really to blame for whipping up tension and the arms race".

The nonaligned movement demanded an immediate ban on the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by all states, and called on the nuclear powers to conclude an international convention on that score. The heads of state or government appealed to hold negotiations on efficient and urgent measures towards nuclear disarmament, which were of prime significance in the process of universal and complete disarmament under an effective international control. They demanded an early completion of an all-embracing treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests, and providing for a refusal to manufacture and deploy any nuclear means.

The nonaligned movement used its moral and political prestige to call on the great powers to observe the existing agreements limiting armaments and to sincere negotiations turned to the future in the spirit of mutual goodwill and agreements in different fields of disarmament. The Conference attached much significance to the immediate conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons and the elaboration of measures to reduce conventional armaments. The nonaligned nations have reiterated that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The specific measures to ensure international detente and the reduction of armaments and disarmament for which the Seventh Conference appealed find complete understanding and support in the USSR because they correspond to the all-embracing peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union set forth in conformity with the decisions of the 24th, 25th, and 26th Congresses of the CPSU. President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic Souphanouvong, Premier of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Ali Nasir Muhammad, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Sultan Ali Keshtmand and heads of many other delegations stressed the immense importance of the recent proposals made by the Soviet Union, which are the continuation of its Peace Programme. They reminded of the Soviet commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, of the consistent statements by the USSR for agreements about nuclear disarmament, of halting nuclear tests, of non-extending the sphere of action of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and also of the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries to conclude with the NATO states an agreement on the non-use of force in relations among states. Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia Mengistu Haile Mariam, like many other speakers, voiced support of the nonaligned nations to the constructive initiatives of socialist states and on the need to do everything possible not to lose the opportunities to promote disarmament.

As never before, the nonaligned nations at the Delhi forum showed a profound understanding of the fact that peace is indivisible and that each state can and should make its own contribution to the struggle for peace.

detente and disarmament. The Conference stressed the importance of the peace movement that had gained momentum on all the continents. The Political Declaration made a point that the people in industrialised and developing countries are mobilising the public to take actions in the name of disarmament, and that international solidarity in these vital issues has become of prime significance.

Thus, the Delhi Conference demonstrated the growing understanding by the nonaligned nations of the fact that a rebuff to the forces of war and aggression largely depends on the cohesion of all forces of peace, national liberation and social progress. This, in its turn, inevitably leads to a further rapprochement and often practically to coincidence of positions and, consequently, to the expansion of joint or parallel actions by nonaligned nations and states of the socialist community on the issues of war and peace and on many other vital international problems.

The nonaligned nations feel special concern because certain nuclear-weapon states have deployed or intend to deploy nuclear weapons in various regions of the world. Concerned about the security of their states and regions, participants in the forum again favoured the setting up of nuclear-free zones and elaborating an agreement excluding the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. The proposal of the USSR and other socialist countries to sign an international convention on the strengthening of security of states possessing no nuclear weapons has long won broad support among the developing countries.

For many years now Asian and African countries are concerned by the US military buildup in the Indian Ocean, the creation of the rapid deployment force, and the turning of the island of Diego Garcia, illegitimately seized from Mauritius into a nuclear base of the Pentagon. These developments were heartily discussed at a number of forums of the non-aligned nations but they were not properly reflected in their solutions due to the lack of a consensus, inasmuch as threats or promises of Washington influenced the stand of some nonaligned nations. Meanwhile, the USA ignores all measures aimed at implementing the solution taken by the movement and the UN on the turning of the Indian Ocean into a peace zone, and is expanding the nuclear base on Diego Garcia, setting up new military bases and its strategic command (CENTCOM), whose zone of operation arbitrarily includes 19 Afro-Asian countries. This could not but evoke the indignation of many governments and peoples.

In her speech Indira Gandhi stated that the participants in the Conference are unanimous in opposing the intensive militarisation of the Indian Ocean and the conversion of Diego Garcia into a nuclear base. The nonaligned nations should redouble their efforts to ensure a convocation of a UN international conference in accordance with the adopted decision. Prime Minister of Mauritius Aneerood Jugnauth, demanded that Diego Garcia and the entire Chagos Archipelago be returned to the people of Mauritius and stressed that this military base poses a constant threat to the security of Mauritius and of all littoral states of the Indian Ocean. The Seventh Conference rendered full support to Mauritius and issued an appeal for the immediate return of the Diego Garcia Island to it, stressing that the building and reinforcing of military base on Diego Garcia have created a danger to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of Mauritius and other states. The Political Declaration expresses concern about the expansion of military bases in the region, the formation of new bases and of "new structures of the military command" (here CENTCOM is meant). Heads of state or government appealed to invigorate efforts towards turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

securing success in the preparation for, and convocation of, an international conference on that score in 1984. The nonaligned nations have also called on the USA and the USSR to resume talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of the military activities in the Indian Ocean. As is known, Washington walked out from those negotiations back in 1978.

III

In the course of the Conference's proceedings and in its decisions nonaligned countries have reiterated that anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism are still the core of the nonaligned movement. In her speech Indira Gandhi stated that anti-imperialism continued to be the basis of the movement's world outlook. Formally, she went on to say, the colonial era is over, but the urge to dominate remains, and neocolonialism displays itself in most diverse forms. The Conference condemned imperialism, neocolonialism and racism of all stripes.

Unwilling to reconcile themselves with the fresh successes of the national liberation struggle of the peoples and with the shrinkage of the sphere of their political and economic domination, imperialists continue to stand in the way of the independent states, preventing them from choosing freely their own paths of development and social progress. Participants in the forum spoke of evermore gross interference of Western powers, the United States above all, in the internal affairs of the developing countries. President of Benin Mathieu Kérékou noted: "Some imperialist powers elaborate plans of aggression and destabilisation in Africa and in the Middle East, in Asia and in Latin America, seeking by all means to retain their strategic positions in the world." Head of the Libyan delegation Abdel Salam Jalloud stated that his country "has to oppose the CIA, espionage activity and the US 6th Fleet". The speakers denounced the imperial manners of American neocolonialists who often resort to threats, provocation and aggressive encroachments vis-à-vis the sovereign states.

Full of indignation, the participants in the forum spoke of the fanning up by the imperialists of conflicts between developing countries. At the junction of the 1970s and the 1980s such conflict situation were used by Washington on an especially broad scale for whipping up tension in the world and for expanding its permanent military presence, for example, in the Persian Gulf, Sinai, Lebanon and other regions.

The Political Declaration of heads of state or government stated that "imperialist and colonialist attitudes and policies, however, still persist in parts of the world; the nonaligned countries are determined to oppose, resist and eliminate them". The participants in the Conference rejected, in principle, the manoeuvres of the US administration to see the national liberation struggle and certain events in the developing countries through the prism of relations between the East and the West. Moreover, the Declaration stresses that "the attempt to erroneously characterise the struggle of peoples for independence and human dignity as falling within the context of East-West confrontation denies them the right to determine their own destiny and realise their legitimate aspirations".

The Conference passed special resolutions in which it firmly favoured the independence of Namibia, the eradication of the regime of apartheid in South Africa and the implementation by the Arab people of Palestine of their national rights, including the right to create their own independent state.

From the rostrum of the Conference Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO Yasser Arafat stated that Washington's urge to build

up its military presence in the Middle East, to draw Arab peoples into its criminal strategic designs, following the pattern of the Camp David accord comprise the true reasons for the Israeli aggression in Lebanon, and mass extermination of Palestinians by the Zionist military. Dwelling upon US attempts to undermine the unity of Arabs with the help of the bugbear of the "Soviet threat", President Hafez al-Assad of Syria reminded that the "peoples of Arab countries know very well that the Soviet Union has always supported their just demands, whereas the USA was and continues to be the stronghold of Israel's aggressive policy". Participants in the Conference emphasised that the "strategic alliance" of the USA and Tel Aviv "intensifies Israel's aggressive role, threatening stability of the Mid-East countries as well as peace and security throughout the world, and encouraging Israel to pursue a policy of annexation, aggression, and racial discrimination". The Political Declaration censured the US policy in the Middle East, many aspects and manifestations of which are hostile to the Palestinian and all other Arab peoples. At the same time the Conference made a point about the solidarity of the socialist countries, which support the struggle waged by the Palestinian people and the whole of the Arab nation.

The nonaligned movement approved the programme of the Middle East settlement elaborated at the Arab summit meeting in Fez (Morocco) in September 1982. The movement confirmed its complete solidarity with the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Nonaligned countries resolutely voiced their readiness to increase diverse support of SWAPO—the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people. They condemned the US policy because the Reagan administration openly proclaimed the Pretoria racist regime as US friend and ally, thus encouraging it in its intensified repressions against the people of South Africa, stepped up aggression against the neighbours and intransigence over Namibian independence. Anna Enin, head of the Ghanaian delegation, stated that South Africa and Namibia remained under the domination of the racists because of the support from world imperialism.

The Conference most categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the US administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, which is an "unjustified interference into the domestic affairs of the People's Republic of Angola". The nonaligned nations branded as aggressive the interrupted armed inroads, attempts towards political destabilisation and economic sabotage undertaken by the South African racists against the "frontline states" and especially the occupation of Angola's southern districts. On behalf of the "frontline states" President Samora Machel of Mozambique expressed gratitude for the political, diplomatic, material and moral support which they obtain from countries of the socialist community.

Like at the extraordinary meeting of the Coordination Bureau held in Managua in January 1983, in Delhi the nonaligned countries arrived at the conclusion that the situation in Central America "has been aggravated by the intensification of imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the states of the region." They clearly pointed out that the developments in the region "could not be attributed to, or explained by an East-West ideological confrontation", as Washington is seeking to depict it. Head of the Nicaraguan delegation Daniel Ortega stated: "The clouds of a massive US military invasion are thickening in the skies of Central America. The US intends to destabilise and stifle the Nicaraguan revolution, resorting to terror, sabotage and sending gangs of counterrevolutionaries armed to the teeth." The Conference denounced these aggressive acts, called

on the governments of the US and Honduras to take a constructive stand in favour of peace and dialogue, and to put an end to all hostile actions against Nicaragua.

The heads of state or government called on the USA to unconditionally halt the intervention in Salvador and promote the solution of the problems faced by that country by peaceful negotiations with the participation of all Salvadoran representative political forces. The movement reiterated its demands that Washington discontinue the economic blockade and all acts of aggression and threats as regards Cuba, and return to it the territory of the Guantanamo base. The nonaligned states denounced any forms of secret or direct pressure being brought to bear on Grenada, Surinam, Belize, again supported the right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence, and called on the USA to observe the treaty on the Panama Canal. The Conference also firmly supported Argentina's sovereign rights to the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands.

The delegates stressed the dangerous whipping up by the United States of tension in the Far East. Vice-President of the DPRK Pak Sung Chul resolutely denounced Washington's aggressive policy in the Far East and Asia in general and its intensified efforts to form a triple military alliance with the participation of Japan and South Korea. He noted that while setting up this sinister alliance, the USA stations in South Korea huge quantities of nuclear and other weapons. Washington decided to station there neutron weapons as well. The delegates could not stay indifferent as regards the unprecedented in scope US-South Korean military exercises "Team Spirit-83". The use of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, which has become an outpost of US aggressive policy in the Far East and the Pacific, for the heightening of confrontation in that region raises obstacles on the road towards peaceful unification of Korea. The nonaligned nations again voiced solidarity with the Korean people striving to unify their motherland by peaceful means without any outside interference, and stated that the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that area would contribute to the implementation of these aspirations of the Korean people.

In Delhi, representatives of many nonaligned nations made fresh efforts to seek out ways for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. After these efforts failed, the Seventh Conference approved the Address of the Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement Indira Gandhi to Iran and Iraq, which expressed the universal desire that the "hostilities be discontinued immediately, and the sides achieve honourable, just and durable peace through negotiations and by peaceful means". The Soviet Union and other socialist countries addressed the two sides with similar appeals, inasmuch as the continuation of the fratricidal war meets only the interests of imperialist forces.

IV

In the Economic Declaration adopted in Delhi, the nonaligned movement reiterated its firm resolve to struggle for political and economic independence of all developing countries and their peoples, for the attainment of full-fledged and eternal sovereignty and control over all types of national resources and economic activities, and for a fundamental restructuring by means of creating a new international economic order. The Declaration emphasised that the attainment of these objectives as well as economic and social progress of the developing countries, were hampered by imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and other manifestations of imperialist domination.

More profoundly and clearly than at other forums, the heads of state or government in Delhi displayed an understanding of the organic inter-connection between development, elimination of backwardness, on the one hand, and detente, putting an end to the arms race and disarmament, on the other. While noting the close link between development, independence, disarmament and peace, Indira Gandhi in her speech reminded that a nuclear aircraft carrier costs \$4 billion, which is more than the overall GNP of 53 developing states. "The relaxation of tensions in the world and the halting of the arms race, which would release resources for development, are vital necessities for the developing countries."

Another characteristic feature in the approach of the Delhi forum towards the economic problems of the developing countries was that they were examined at length with due account taken of the overall state of the world economy. The documents of the Conference explain the present-day situation in the developing countries by the crisis which "now threatens to engulf the whole world in a major depression worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s". The delegates pointed out that Western powers tried to place the burden of the crisis on other countries, particularly the developing ones.

Transnational corporations, as well as the IMF and the IBRD controlled by the West were sharply criticised in Delhi. The heads of state or government pointed out in the Declaration that the TNCs "carry out illegal and undesirable policies and engage in corrupt practices in developing countries", that the urge of the TNCs to obtain maximum profits upset the economies of those countries and that some developed states and the TNCs applying economic coercion, pressure and blackmail, undermined sovereignty and the fundamental right of the developing countries to pursue their own independent economic policies and their own economic programmes. Data were cited attesting to the greater outflow of monetary resources along the channels of the TNCs. For example, in the 1970s, for each dollar invested in the developing countries, the TNCs removed approximately \$2.2 of profits to the investing countries, and the US TNCs in particular registered a rate of \$4.25. The Conference urged to curtail the uncontrolled activities of the TNCs and to speedily complete in the UN the elaboration of the code of behaviour of the TNCs.

Making use of the extremely hard situation in the developing countries, Western powers and their monopolies are trying to hold and reverse the process of economic decolonisation, impose unacceptable political terms on these young states, and make them abandon the programme of restructuring international economic relations which they tabled in the UN.

The Conference demanded that the imperialist powers "refrain from using economic measures as a form of political coercion". All kinds of economic aggression, including trade sanctions, threats, blackmail, any forms of blockade with the purpose of interfering in domestic affairs of sovereign states and influencing their policies have been resolutely condemned. The delegates also demanded that some capitalist states observe the UN 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, containing progressive norms of international law which have become generally recognised. The nonaligned countries came out for turning the Charter into an efficient guideline in international relations.

Leaders of the nonaligned nations recollected that back at the Fourth Conference (Algeria, 1973) they issued an appeal to establish a new international economic order so as to put an end to inequality and injustice in economic relations. Though the UN passed a declaration and a programme of actions in 1974 to establish a new international economic order, the

monopolies and the ruling quarters of Western powers, the USA above all, continue to take a negative stand towards this action since they are unwilling to abandon their present-day channels of siphoning out profits from the developing countries. The Sixth Conference (Havana, 1979) proposed to convene a UN conference on global negotiations on problems of raw materials, energy, trade, economic development, monetary and financial relations. The proposal was approved by the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly, and the main terms for conducting such negotiations were chartered in its Resolution 34/138. However, the USA and its proponents are seeking to put into oblivion this decision and continue to obstruct the holding of the negotiations as well as any steps leading to the establishment of a new international economic order. Even leaders of conservative countries criticised Western powers in Delhi for an overt sabotage of any measures for establishing a new international economic order. In its documents the Seventh Conference unequivocally laid the blame on the USA for the deadlock in the problem concerning the beginning of the global negotiations.

The Delhi Conference reiterated the adherence of the movement to the global negotiations as a principal strategic line in establishing a new international economic order. The final documents stress that any international economic negotiations should be conducted within the framework of the UN, rather than in organisations like the IMF and IBRD which are pliant tools of the West, as Washington would like to have it, and thus the negotiations should consist in simultaneous, consistent and integrated discussion of the major problems facing the world economy. The nonaligned nations proposed that the UN conference on the global negotiations for effecting a radical restructuring of international economic relations be convened early in 1984.

Simultaneously the nonaligned countries came out with a programme of urgent measures which should be taken in most critical spheres, including alleviating the terms of repaying debts, lifting protectionist measures and trade barriers by the developed capitalist countries against the commodities from the developing states, giving assistance to the latter in satisfying their food and energy needs, and so on. The participants in the forum demanded convocation of an international conference on a reform of the unjust and obsolete international monetary and financial system. Immediate measures should be taken without waiting for the beginning and outcome of the global negotiations. However, these measures in no way can replace the global negotiations in the UN.

The expansion and deepening of the trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation between the developing countries were also mentioned as a major direction in the economic strategy of the nonaligned nations. New programmes of such cooperation have been worked out, assigned to promote the implementation of the principle of collective self-reliance declared by the movement. New measures on multilateral cooperation that were implemented and charted should not only foster the greater self-subsistence of developing countries, but also become an important element in their struggle for the restructuring of the international economic relations along just and equitable lines.

At the Seventh Conference in Delhi the nonaligned nations have elaborated a broad political and economic programme for the nonaligned movement, meeting its basic anti-war, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial principles. Feeling profound concern about the strained situation in the

world, the participants in the forum stated more resolutely than ever that with a growing danger of a nuclear catastrophe there is no place for passivity and neutrality, and that genuine and final decolonisation and freedom for peoples, their development and well-being are inseparable from the struggle for peace, disarmament and detente. At its Delhi Conference the nonaligned movement supported the mounting demands of the peoples to avert a nuclear-missile war and discontinue the unbridled arms race.

Even the enemies of the nonaligned movement were convinced of the greatness of the latter's anti-imperialist and anti-militaristic potential. Indira Gandhi stressed at a press-conference after the completion of the Conference that the calculations of those who predicted disintegration of the movement did not come true. She added: "As long as the peoples are subjected to exploitation, the nonaligned movement will be necessary".

Of course, one should bear in mind that the movement is heterogeneous in its composition, and this has left an imprint on the course of discussions and certain provisions of the adopted documents. However, as Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Pham Van Dong stressed, the inevitable differences were only of secondary importance as compared with the common interests of the nonaligned nations in the face of the dangers which imperialism creates for them and the movement.

The enemies of the nonaligned movement are seeking to downgrade and weaken the importance of the decisions taken by its supreme forum. They again made use of political, economic and propaganda pressure in a bid to prevent the nonaligned countries from following the line they have elaborated collectively in Delhi. Of course, this may cause vacillations and zigzags in the policies of certain governments, but no intrigues and pressure can make the newly-free countries and their peoples give up their major goals: elimination of the nuclear threat for the whole of mankind, opposition to the imperialist, neocolonialist expansion, upholding and strengthening of national sovereignty in politics and economics.

The message of greetings sent by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers evoked great response among the participants in the forum. They were satisfied by the Soviet Union's assurances that in the implementation of their just aspirations the non-aligned nations can always count on the goodwill of the USSR and cooperation with it. During the proceedings of the Conference both its participants and the press in the nonaligned countries praised the policy of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries vis-à-vis developing states.

The Seventh Conference demonstrated that the movement has now turned into an important and influential force, whose significance in the cause of preserving peace is growing. And this cannot but bring satisfaction. Said Yuri Andropov: "We treat with respect the nonaligned movement, whose peaceloving policy makes a useful contribution to international affairs." The forum in Delhi graphically shows that this contribution may continue to grow and that the goals and interests of the nonaligned nations coincide with the efforts of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community aimed at preserving peace in the world and promoting socio-economic progress of the newly-free states.

The experience of recent decades has provided ample evidence that the achievement of the main goals of the nonaligned movement and the implementation of its programme as well as the successful solution of the vital problems facing the nonaligned countries ultimately depend on the consistent carrying out of the initial principles of the movement, and on the readiness of its participants to join hands with all anti-imperialist and peaceloving forces to take forceful and purposeful actions.

AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS IN CHINA IN LATE 1940'S

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[Article by A. M. Malukhin, candidate of historical sciences]

The civil war in China, in which the Guomindang relied on the allround assistance of the United States, reached its culmination 35 years ago. While giving an extensive support to the Guomindang the United States at the same time urged Chiang Kaishek to carry out some bourgeois reforms and reorganise the government so as to consolidate the Guomindang regime, weaken the CPC and the revolutionary armed forces and halt the revolutionary process in China. However, neither assistance to the Guomindang in the civil war, nor the collusion with the Chiang-kaishekists, nor the search for contacts with the CPC leadership served the US to attain its goal. The fulfilment of the American plans was blocked by the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union. Standing firmly on positions of noninterference in China's internal affairs, the URSS actively worked for the termination of any foreign interference in Chinese affairs. This is the subject dealt with in Soviet historical literature, including in some comparatively recent studies.¹

With the culmination in the civil war approaching, the question of US interference in Chinese affairs was given the greatest urgency in Washington. It acquired sudden aspects and there appeared a new attitude. Exponents of different, sometimes mutually exclusive trends in the policy with respect to China emerged on the stage. What united them was the common aim of Washington's diplomacy—to use all possibilities and forces in China so that they would act in favour of the imperialist interests of the United States. This adventurist diplomacy finally reached the Guomindang upper crust and first of all Chiang Kaishek himself, who had blind faith in the patronage of his "American friends". During Chiang Kaishek's last months in power, US policy with respect to China caused Nanking much anxiety.

At the time, the author of the article was a staff member of the Soviet Embassy in the Guomindang capital. Personal observations coupled with the study of various sources enabled him to trace the activity of postwar American diplomacy, which is characteristic to a certain extent also of the imperialist policy of the present US ruling circles.

Before the changes at the fronts of the civil war in China in the autumn of 1948, the United States still fully cooperated with the Nanking government in its armed struggle against the CPC. In the spring and summer Chiang Kaishek concentrated up to two-thirds of his army in

¹ See O. Borisov, *The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Revolutionary Base. 1945-1949. 30th Anniversary of the Rout of Militaristic Japan*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 87-97; A. Ledovsky, *The USSR, the USA and the People's Revolution in China*, Translated from Russian, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1982; *History of International Relations in the Far East. 1945-1977*, Kh. barovsk, 1978, pp. 43-47.

South Manchuria and North China. In the capital he tried to demonstrate Guomindang's unity and vigour in this struggle, to show that he was trying to resolve the chronic crisis in the top echelons of his party and to impart an international colouring to the civil war in the hope of even more resolute interference by US imperialism.

In April 1948, the United States gave to China \$400 million. But Chiang Kaishek, who pinned all his hopes on the US participation in the struggle with the communists, was not pleased with the size of this new assistance. In his policy-making statement in the Legislative Yuan on June 15, Wen Wenhao, who replaced Zhang Qun in the post of Chairman of the Executive Yuan in the Guomindang government on May 29, 1948, stressed the dependence of the pursuance of his cabinet's policy on further American aid. In turn, the United States demanded a more effective use by the Guomindang of the already provided assistance, expecting this mostly of the new Chinese premier.²

Trying to resolve the problems of the civil war by aggravating relations between the USA and the USSR, the Wen Wenhao government resorted to the tested instrument of Guomindang reactionaries—anti-Sovietism. The Guomindangers were scaling down business ties and contacts with the USSR, scanty as they were, and recalled their representatives from Moscow. There was a drop in the activity of Soviet consular institutions in China (with the exception of Xinjiang and, naturally, the liberated territories).

Soviet-Chinese relations continued to develop with success in Manchuria. The material sphere of operation of the 1945 treaty between the two countries was entirely there. The people's democratic authorities, which established control over the whole of Northeast China by the end of 1948, extensively cooperated with the USSR on the basis of that treaty. The successful operations by the People's Liberation Army, which relied on the military-revolutionary and economic base created owing to Soviet-Chinese cooperation under the 1945 treaty, demonstrated with growing clarity the importance of the Manchurian factor in the CPC's liberation struggle.

Chiang Kaishek who hoped for a broader US participation in upholding the Guomindang regime, especially counted on the election of Thomas Dewey, leader of the Republican Party, as president of the United States. Whereas the election platform of the Democrats headed by Harry Truman in 1948 provided for giving China assistance only along with Greece and Turkey,³ the line of the Republicans was much more resolute. In his very first interview on June 25, Dewey declared that if elected, more effective aid to the struggle against communist influence in China⁴ would be a fundamental principle of his administration. The election platform of the Republicans said that "we will foster and cherish our historic policy of friendship with China and assert our deep interests in its integrity and freedom."⁵

The official Nanking propaganda began to associate the civil war in the country with the existence of a purported "external support of the communists" or "external aggression", to call the people's liberation armies "the fifth column of the iron curtain" and to present matters in a

² In *New York Herald Tribune*, Aug. 7, 1948.

³ In *Congressional Record*, July 28, 1948, p. A 4904.

⁴ In *New York Times*, July 26, 1948.

⁵ *Congressional Record*, July 28, 1948, p. A 4908.

way as though the government was engaged not in a civil war but in a national war for China's independence.⁶

The decisive Liaoshen battle (September 12-November 12) was approaching in the north of the country. The Truman administration's diplomatic service was showing alarm in connection with the forthcoming military events and the US Embassy in Nanking had actually lost its bearings not knowing what line to keep to in relations with Chiang Kaishek. As it is evidenced by a White Paper published by the US Department of State in 1949, it was already in the summer of 1948 that the American ambassador in Nanking Leighton Stuart had doubts about Chiang Kaishek's ability to maintain his regime.

In a political letter to the US Secretary of State George Marshall on August 10, Leighton Stuart noted that the communists were continuing to win the civil war while Chiang Kaishek wanted only a military victory over them, being criticised in the Nanking circles for ineffective leadership. Although the embassy thought it expedient to prevent the formation of a coalition government in China and to continue or even increase support for the Chiang Kaishek government in view of the worsening situation, the American ambassador stressed that it was already risky "to involve ourselves in great responsibilities, military, economic, political" because this would be "beyond our [US.-A. M.] resources".⁷

In his reply to Stuart on August 12, Secretary of State Marshall instructed him not to display a positive attitude to the idea of forming a coalition government in China with the participation of communists.⁸ On the very next day the Secretary of State additionally informed the ambassador that the situation did not allow the United States "to formulate any rigid plans for our future policy in China".⁹

Doubts about continued US aid to the Chiang Kaishek government began to be voiced at diplomatic receptions in Nanking that were held by ambassadors almost every week to mark national days. The pro-American press in Nanking and Shanghai began to speak in unison about the need for the Guomindang to count mostly on its own forces.¹⁰

But the Chiang Kaishekist leaders continued self-confidently to demonstrate their conviction that the United States would give them bigger military and financial aid. Defence Minister He Yingqing gave a special interview to the press on this subject on August 24.¹¹ Chiang Kaishek sent Chen Lifu, the leader of the most reactionary clique in the Guomindang, to Washington with a letter of recommendation. As a result of Chen Lifu's meeting with Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate made new statements to the effect that the United States should pursue "a foreign policy in two oceans". Speaking in Salt Lake City on September 30, Dewey supplemented his election platform with the thesis that the United States will share, from beginning to end, the ordeals of its ancient friend and ally, China. It was thus, for the first time since the Second World War, that a representative of US imperialism called Guomindang China an allied power.¹²

Another envoy of Chiang Kaishek, the former premier Zhang Qun, visited Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo with a plan of political and military

⁶ See *Zhongyang ribao*, July 23, 1948.

⁷ *United States Relations with China*, Washington, 1949, pp. 886-887.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

¹⁰ In *China Weekly Review*, Sept. 11, 1948.

¹¹ In *China Press*, Aug. 25, 1948.

¹² In *North China Daily News*, Oct. 1, 1948.

cooperation of countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. The prime purpose of Zhang Qun's mission was to draw Japan's military resources into the struggle against "world communism". Trying in this way to knock together the so-called Asian bloc Chiang Kaishek wanted to "internationalise" the struggle against the Chinese communists. The Guomindangers did not conceal that they were showing initiative and making efforts to "find the way out of the civil war in an international one".¹³

In his address to the nation on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution Chiang Kaishek announced the inevitability of big changes. Commenting on this statement the magazine *Zhongjian* wrote that the "change in the entire situation" predicted by Chiang Kaishek meant an atomic war between the USA and the USSR. For this reason "the prime purpose of China's policy now is not only to endure the difficulties and sufferings in order to wait for the outbreak of the US-Soviet war, but also to display initiative and bring matters to a war between the USA and the USSR". Methods of provoking a war with the Soviet Union and also the obstacles to this were analysed in the article "A New Stage of Chinese Diplomacy". The fact that the USSR "does not want war and consistently keeps to a peaceful position" was found to be a serious obstacle.¹⁴

Shortly before the liquidation by the People's Liberation Army of the Shenyang group of the Guomindang troops and the liberation of Shenyang Chiang Kaishek was interviewed by Arch T. Steele, a correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* in Peking on October 29. He stated that the establishment of communist control over the whole of Manchuria would mean the actual beginning of a "new world catastrophe". In order to save mankind from the catastrophe of the third world war, Chiang Kaishek went on, it is necessary first of all to save Asia. And China should become the centre of efforts to save Asia. "I hope that the American people and their statesmen will dedicate their lives to this task", he concluded.¹⁵

As the presidential elections in the United States approached, the Guomindang circles ever more openly pinned their hopes on the election of Thomas Dewey. Chen Lifu even made a cash contribution to Dewey's election fund. A demonstration under the slogan "Long Live President Dewey!" was staged in Peking. On the day the votes were being counted after the elections the Chinese ambassador in Washington Gu Weijun said he was confident Dewey would win and that, as a result, assistance to China would be increased.¹⁶ But the bright hopes of the Guomindangers were shattered by the election returns. What hurt them most was not only the reelection of Harry Truman, whom they did not want, but their scandalous miscalculation with their "sure bet".

Immediately after the victorious Liaoshen battle the People's Revolutionary Army launched a new offensive operation—the Huaihai battle (November 7, 1948-January 10, 1949) in an area centering in Suizhou and including the Tianjin-Pukou and Longhai railways. Meantime the US Embassy in Nanking still had not yet made up its mind about what

¹³ *Guancha*, Nov. 20, 1948.

¹⁴ *Zhongjian*, Oct. 20, 1948.

¹⁵ Central News Agency in Beiping, Oct. 31, 1948.

¹⁶ In *China Press*, Nov. 4, 1948.

line to take with respect to Chiang Kaishek's actions and the possible development of the military-political situation in China. On October 23, Leighton Stuart demanded instructions from the State Department and on his part offered alternatives on the Chinese question containing diametrically opposite proposals. They envisaged both continued support to Chiang Kaishek and approval of his resignation, a variant of the creation of a coalition government without the participation of communists for "more effectively prosecuting the war" against them and a variant of a coalition government with their participation "for a united China".¹⁷ In his reply to Stuart, Marshall again declined to give him clear instructions and only repeated the explanation that the situation did not allow for rigid plans concerning future US policy in China.¹⁸

So the military situation increasingly determined the line of the US government's opportunistic attitude to methods of interference in Chinese affairs. The troops of the People's Liberation Army were approaching Shanghai and Nanking. American aviation tried to air-drop ammunition and supplies to the surrounded remnants of the Guomindang army. The Truman administration had to urgently react to the critical situation in which the Guomindangers had found themselves.

On November 6, the State Department got a message from Stuart containing the conclusions of a conference on the military situation in China, held by the senior diplomatic staff of the embassy, the military attache and US advisers in Nanking. The conference unanimously ruled out as hopeless any military steps to be taken by the Guomindang government or the United States in the remaining time for a battle with the communists. "Employment of US troops is impossible", it was said in the conclusions. It was also admitted that General Fu Zou's garrison in Peking would not be able to withstand the attacks by communist troops in North China and that units of the People's Liberation Army under the command of Chen Yi were capable of moving from the area of Suizhou to the outskirts of Nanking within two weeks.¹⁹

On November 6, the Wen Wenhao government, acting through the head of the Chinese delegation at the Paris Session of the UN General Assembly Jiang Tingfu, asked Secretary of State Marshall, who was then in Paris, to increase military assistance, in particular, to send American officers to China, headed by a top-ranking military. The United States gave a negative answer on the pretext of the difficulties involved in satisfying this request.²⁰

Chiang Kaishek urgently sent a letter to Truman and it reached the White House on November 9. It said that China was being threatened with an eclipse of "the cause of democracy". Chiang Kaishek alleged that the main factor of the worsening military situation in the country was due to the supposed failure by the USSR to abide by the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance. He demanded from the United States "speedy and increased military assistance" and a "firm statement of American policy in support of the cause for which my government is fighting". In his reply on November 13 Truman did not give Chiang Kaishek any promises for the future, limiting himself to assurances that the United States would fulfil the current programme of aid to China.²¹

¹⁷ *United States Relations with China*, p. 285

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 894.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 888, 2f.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 888-890

The Guomindangers were greatly dismayed by this unfathomable for them stand of Washington's diplomacy in respect of the events in China, which the American papers began to call either a "wait-and-see policy" or "no policy". In reality the absence of a US policy in China was a policy of a selfish choice of prospects for American diplomacy at the crucial period of the civil war.

The Nanking government kept insisting that the United States make an official statement about its course vis-à-vis China. Ambassador Gu Weijun repeatedly approached the State Department and the White House on this matter. On November 24, he published an appeal to the Americans for urgent aid to China in the struggle against Chinese communists, "agents of the Comintern" (incidentally, the Comintern ceased to exist in 1943).

On November 26, Chiang Kaishek appointed Sun Fo head of government in place of Wen Wenhao whose cabinet had to leave the political scene because of its bankrupt course of inciting war against the USSR and miscalculation concerning the outcome of the US presidential elections. On the same day the Legislative Yuan sent a message to the US Congress requesting military and economic aid to China. The Guomindang press promptly responded with leading articles trying again to scare the United States with the spectre of a mythical aggression in the East. The papers wrote: "The US must take a broader view of the Chinese problem. The destiny of East Asia and the whole world is at stake, and the US should not waver";²² "If help does not come in time, there will be a world catastrophe";²³ "China is a key to international peace in the East".²⁴ Throughout December the Guomindang press continued to call on the United States to give urgent help to the Chiang Kaishek government, with anti-Sovietism being an invariable element of their arguments.

The struggle over the China issue continued in the highest echelons of power in the United States, Secretary for the Navy James Forrestal and Commander of the US 7th Fleet Charles Cooke declared for an extensive military support to Chiang Kaishek. Judd, Clark and other members of the Chinese lobby in Congress became very active demanding more aid to the Nanking government. The Republican Chester Merrow tabled a proposal in Congress on "immediate military aid to China even at the risk of war with Russia".²⁵ Zealous patrons and advocates of Chiang Kaishek in the ruling US circles tried to get a law on aid to China adopted while Republicans still comprised a majority in Congress.

In the unceasing struggle of the two trends in the choice of policy on China the Marshall-Truman line, which aimed at finding methods for the United States to remain in China without armed interference, could not ignore the decisive socio-political factors of the Chinese people's revolution with its mighty internationalist rear, which the Soviet Union continued to be. The financial and economic burden placed on the US in connection with the fulfilment of the Marshall Plan in Europe was another factor which the White House had to take into consideration.

When General Claire Chennault, who was in China, began forming the "Flying Tigers" corps from among American "volunteer" pilots in order to "stop the offensive of the communist army", Ambassador Stuart, acting on instructions of the State Department, told the American general

²² *Zhongyang ribao*, Nov. 26, 1948.

²³ *Xinwen bao*, Nov. 26, 1948.

²⁴ *Yishi bao*, Nov. 27, 1948.

²⁵ *China Press*, Dec. 3, 1948.

about the dangerous nature of his undertaking. The Chairman of the Appropriations Committee in Congress, the Republican Bridges officially instructed the former US Ambassador in the USSR Bullitt to collect materials for substantiating assistance to Chiang Kaishek. Bullitt tried very hard but this was to no avail because of the defeat suffered by the Republicans in the presidential elections.²⁶

The China debate raged also in the American press. *Life*, which said that the Chinese communists had a "duty to Moscow", contended that their government would be "disastrous to US security" and that for this reason it was time to declare China an object of special US attention instead of Europe.²⁷ Most American newspapers justified the termination of aid to the Chiang Kaishek government and even such an argument was used: no aid can save a feeble regime in which its people has no faith and which does not have an effective political base.²⁸

Pro-American newspapers and magazines in China openly began to hint at the need to change leadership in Nanking, give up the practice of hierarchy and corruption, and dump feudal traditions.²⁹ Apprehensions were voiced at the same time about the possibility of China becoming an enemy of the United States. To avoid this, it was said, and to "keep China a good friend" it should be given assistance in those fields where it really needs in order to resist the activity of communists.³⁰ The need to search for a compromise with communism in China was also argued because, in the opinion of Americans, "Chinese communists are less Marxists and more genuinely Chinese than Communist parties elsewhere".³¹

The *China Press* tried to explain that the task of American diplomacy was to help those political forces in China that would be prepared to accept a compromise suiting the United States.³²

In reality the American wait-and-see diplomacy in China served as a cover for efforts undertaken to replace the Chiang Kaishek government with a "democratic" coalition one. The plan was to slow down the process of the liberation of the whole country and to limit the victory of the people's revolution. The progressive magazine *Qunzhong* wrote that the Americans would not leave China voluntarily. The United States was setting up and financing centrist parties and groupings, forming and strengthening pro-American forces, and trying to consolidate the local power of militarists by supplying them with arms and dictating to them a policy of "reforms".³³

The US intelligence was in a hurry to expand the network of its agents and everywhere was preparing channels through which to communicate with and assist the enemies of democracy. Concrete plans of counterrevolutionary activity were being drawn up and the United States made a special point of preventing any unfavourable public opinion to form in China. Leighton Stuart stressed the negative aspect of the exposure by the communists of the activity of the US intelligence in China and sent to George Marshall the full texts of the North Shenxi radio broadcasts exposing this activity.³⁴

²⁶ See *Nanjing ribao*, Nov. 24, 1948.

²⁷ See *Life*, Nov. 22, 1948.

²⁸ *Baltimore Sun*, Nov. 23, 1948.

²⁹ *China Weekly Review*, Nov. 20, 1948.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1948.

³¹ See *China Press*, Nov. 16, 1948.

³² *China Press*, Dec. 15, 1948.

³³ See *Qunzhong*, 1948, No. 46.

³⁴ See *United States Relations with China*, pp. 882-885.

Possibilities were probed to stop the dangerous development of the situation at the fronts by peaceful overtures. A "campaign for peace" headed by the Guomindang Professor Liu Butong was launched among the university intelligentsia of Nanking with the result that a group of professors sent a letter to Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong.³⁵ The Chiangkaishekists used Liu Butong's provocative methods in their attacks on the CPC.

After the People's Liberation Army entered Shenyang, it became clear that the United States intended to preserve its official missions in the liberated areas. But already two weeks later the new authorities arrested the US Consul in Shenyang Angus Ward and four of his associates on charges of espionage. It turned out that the consulate had eleven points in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia for conducting political and military espionage and for subversive activities against the new regime. When publishing the Xinhua agency report on the sentence passed by a people's court on the American spies, *Renmin ribao* wrote: "While protecting the private interests of foreigners, the People's Government will not tolerate their criminal actions."³⁶

Many Americans were in no hurry to leave their homes and depart together with the retreating Chiangkaishekist troops. This was received with approval in the monopoly circles: US business intended to remain in China and do business with the communists, this being the brightest of the grim alternatives.³⁷ The State Department allowed businessmen to act "at their own risk" from positions of "neutral friendliness toward the people of China".³⁸ Up to 40 American and 150 British businessmen decided to remain in Tianjin, the *China Press* reported on December 8. American missionaries also stayed in the liberated territories. Thus, the Lutheran Church decided to continue its activity in China in its churches, schools, seminaries, hospitals and libraries.³⁹

By leaving staff members of its consulates and resident agents in the liberated territories the United States demonstrated the possibility of establishing relations with the new authorities. At the same time the main task of US policy vis-à-vis the liberated territories was to preserve in China the atmosphere of internal strife, of sharp struggle by reactionary forces against the forces of people's democracy. Pro-Guomindang lobbyists and sinologists in the United States predicted that the victory of communists would not unite China and that militarists and politicians would yet long retain power in provinces. Hopes were pinned not only on seats of resistance and gangs of counterrevolutionaries, but also on the disintegration of the CPC from within as a result of growing nationalistic tendencies and differences over questions of economic policy. At the very close of 1948, the US press and the pro-American newspapers in China gave big coverage to the discussion of bourgeois sinologists in the American academic centres and the State Department on the political nature of the CPC which most of them considered to be a nationalistic "party of agrarian reform". The debate on the Chinese issue in the US diplomatic establishments concerned already not so much the nature of aid to Chiang Kaishek and participation in the fate of his regime as what stand to take in China considering the eventual victory by the communists over the Guomindang.

³⁵ See *Heping ribao*, Nov. 23, 1948.

³⁶ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 28, 1948.

³⁷ *Business Week*, Nov. 20, 1948.

³⁸ In *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, Dec. 8, 1948.

³⁹ *China Press*, Jan. 7, 1949.

At the height of the Huaihai battle Chiang Kaishek made his last attempt to get immediate help from the United States and save his regime. His wife Song Meiling arrived in Washington with a special mission on December 1. She was received twice by Marshall and her second conversation with him lasted for four hours. On December 9 Song Meiling was received by Truman. Her task was to make Washington issue a statement on its China policy; ensure the solution of the question of aid to China before the convocation of new Congress with the Democrats in majority; ensure the sending of General MacArthur to China to guide the Guomindang armed forces as well as the approval of draft allocations to China to the tune of \$3 billion. But Song Meiling's mission was a failure. President Truman did not make any new promises and stated that the US would not interfere in China's military affairs.⁴⁰

On the same day, December 9, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the British Foreign Secretary Bevin made a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that his government would adhere to the resolution of the 1945 Moscow Conference of three foreign ministers on non-interference into China's internal affairs.⁴¹

The trip by Paul Hoffman, the Administration Head of the American-Chinese Economic Corporation, to China was US diplomacy's next step in the Chinese issue. At a press-conference in Shanghai on December 13, Hoffman stated that the United States would be ready to give economic assistance to China in the event of a coalition government there that would include even communists, should the latter respect "basic freedoms".⁴²

It was then that deliveries to the Chiang Kaishek government of industrial and transport equipment to be paid for out of the still unused \$70 million were suspended and arms shipments were delayed in Philippine and Okinawan ports on the pretext that they could be seized by the communists.⁴³

Meantime Chiang Kaishek was spending his last weeks in Nanking. Apart from the Huaihai battle in which 55 Guomindang divisions numbering 555,000 men were destroyed the People's Liberation Army launched its third, decisive offensive against Chiang Kaishek's troops—the Peking-Tianjin battle (December 5, 1948-January 31, 1949). The Nanking government's military situation was acquiring a catastrophic nature.

On December 13, Zhang Qun visited the US Embassy as an envoy of Chiang Kaishek to learn Stuart's opinion on how should Chiang Kaishek react to the persistent rumours about the need for him to resign since this view had been voiced by Americans as well. In the course of the lengthy conversation Zhang Qun repeated the Chiangkaishekist insinuations that in the civil war the CPC was supposedly backed by the USSR. In the end Stuart unambiguously said that Chiang Kaishek should "step down", that his retention of power was "the main obstacle to terminating hostilities", that this was the "impression of most Americans" and the desire of the "broad masses of the Chinese people". Stuart said further that the US was ready to help make peace on "honorable terms" in China and that Zhang Qun and other Chinese leaders should "have to do something constructive and to it fast".⁴⁴

⁴⁰ See *Heping ribao*, Dec. 14, 1948.

⁴¹ See *China Press*, Dec. 10, 1948.

⁴² *China Daily Tribune*, Dec. 15, 1948.

⁴³ See *Central News Agency in Washington*, Dec. 14, 1948.

⁴⁴ *United States Relations with China*, pp. 895-896.

On December 17, Premier Sun Fo had a conversation with Stuart and asked for advice: should the Guomindang continue the war or "beg for peace". Stuart presented a dilemma: on the one hand, the United States was concerned with preventing the spread of communism in China but, on the other hand, it could not do this with the help of a government that had lost the support of its own people, who wanted peace, whereas Chiang Kaishek aspired to war. The American ambassador diplomatically stated that the question of more effective struggle against communism by military or political methods was to be decided by Sun Fo himself and his colleagues.⁴⁵

In a telegram of December 21 Stuart informed Marshall of his meeting with Hu Shi which also took place on December 17. Hu Shi, a prominent bourgeois scholar, in the past the head of the reformists who opposed Marxism, a Guomindang "liberal" closely connected with the United States, an influential figure among Chinese intelligentsia, naturally, appeared to American diplomacy as a promising candidate for the role of the leader of a coalition in China without Chiang Kaishek. Despite the fact that during his conversation with Stuart Hu Shi had emphasised his loyalty to Chiang Kaishek, the ambassador asked the Guomindang professor again to head the "movement of new ideas", come out for "freedom and democracy". He held a discussion with him on the subject of what policy the US would pursue in the event a coalition government was formed.⁴⁶

An influential US newspaper noted at the time that the United States had no choice but to allow the events to take their own course before a possibility emerged to help the Chinese replace communist rule with a desirable form of government.⁴⁷

Sun Fo managed to form a cabinet of ministers only on December 23. The government crisis lasted for almost a month and ended only when the Guomindang upper crust had to switch to the tactics of manoeuvring in order to save the regime. The principal task of the Sun Fo government was to secure peace talks.⁴⁸

American diplomacy tried to induce the Nanking government to start the search for an "honorable peace" as quickly as possible. On December 28, Stuart invited the new Vice-Premier Wu Tiecheng and repeated Washington's view that the US was expecting a solution of the present problems, that it was up to the Chinese to make the decisions, and that American aid would not be long in coming when the time is ripe. When briefing Marshall on December 30, Stuart was pessimistic in his assessment of the first steps taken by the Sun Fo government because they were made only on Chiang Kaishek's consent whereas his resignation was a precondition of any talks whatsoever with the communists.⁴⁹

In his New Year address to the nation Chiang Kaishek stated his government's readiness to discuss with the communists ways of putting an end to the war and hinted at "the gravity of the responsibility" and "difficulties" of his mission. Press commentaries evaluated this announcement as a sign that he was preparing to leave the post of head of state. But the New Year articles in the Guomindang press were devoted not to the problem of attaining peace in the country but mostly to regrets about

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 896-897.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 899.

⁴⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, Dec., 17, 1948.

⁴⁸ *See China Press*, Jan. 1, 1949.

⁴⁹ *United States Relations with China*, pp. 899-900.

"changes in Sino-American relations" and arguments that the United States supposedly "has vital interests in the Eastern Hemisphere".⁵⁰

In connection with American imperialism's "vital interests", the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine came suddenly to the fore both in the United States and China, with the reservation that under given conditions its operation supposedly should not be limited to the American continent. Senator George Malone demanded "an extension of the Monroe Doctrine" to the Western part of the Pacific and to Asia.⁵¹ The newspaper *Yishi bao* published in two issues the leading article "From Monroeism to Trumanism" in which it was contended that China supposedly belonged to the "sphere of US vital interests".⁵²

As the new year set in staff members of the US Embassy in Nanking began to voice supposition that in connection with Chiang Kaishek's forthcoming resignation the communists could suggest their own form of a coalition with the aim of reaching a political settlement. The embassy held that the military conflict on a national scale was coming to an end⁵³ and that for this reason an important part of Washington's diplomatic activity in China was almost over. It was during those days that George Marshall had left his post and Dean Acheson became the new Secretary of State, this causing a wave of new speculation in all the Guomindang newspapers and magazines.

During those critical days for the Chiang Kaishek regime the Soviet Embassy in Nanking, as well as the Soviet General Consulates in Peking, Tianjin and Shanghai could not conduct their normal daily activities. Uniformed police and plainclothesmen intensified their surveillance of Soviet institutions and people. Contacts between embassy staffers and Chinese organisations and institutions were in practical terms reduced to nil.

But despite its anti-Soviet positions the Guomindang upper crust did not dare to totally break off diplomatic relations with the USSR. Moreover, acting on American advice they tried to employ peaceful manoeuvres as a way out of the military crisis and did not avoid contacts with the Soviet Ambassador in a hope that this could indirectly influence the position of the Chinese communists. Such contacts were maintained by Vice-President Li Zongren. Late in 1948, the Soviet Embassy was visited by General Zhang Zhizhong and the former ambassador in Moscow Shao Liji who, in January, were appointed members of the Guomindang delegation to conduct peace talks with the CPC leadership.

On January 8, Chiang Kaishek appealed through the Foreign Ministry to the USSR, USA, Britain and France to serve as intermediaries in Guomindang's talks with the CPC. The Soviet government, naturally, could not agree to that because this would mean interference in China's internal affairs. Negative answers also came from the other powers. More than that, in its lengthy answer sent on January 12 Washington explained to Chiang Kaishek that the US government did not find it useful to serve as an intermediary "in the present situation".⁵⁴

By then the People's Liberation Army had completed the partitioning and routing of the Chiang Kaishek divisions numbering 520,000 men on the approaches to Peking and Tianjin, and on January 14 captured Tianjin taking prisoner 130,000 Guomindang soldiers and officers. General Fu

⁵⁰ *Jiuguo ribao*, Jan. 1, 1949; *Heping ribao*, Jan. 2, 1949; *Zhanwang*, Jan. 15, 1949, etc.

⁵¹ *China Press*, Nov. 30, 1948.

⁵² *Yishi bao*, Jan. 2, 3, 1949.

⁵³ *United States Relations with China*, p. 289.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

Zuoyi with his garrison of 250,000 was presented with an ultimatum to surrender.

On entering office for his second term as President of the United States on January 20, Harry Truman did not even mention the problem of relations with China in his policy-making speech. On that day the majority in Congress went over from the Republicans to the Democrats. Chiang Kaishek lost the last shred of hope of a favourable attitude to him of his "American friends". The Guomindangers were confronted with the imminent danger of the crossing of the Yangtse river by the PLA units and, consequently, with the desperate need to win time at any price in order to prepare for the defence of the Nanking-Shanghai region and South China.

On January 21, Chiang Kaishek announced his departure for Fenghua "to rest" and delegated his presidential duties to Li Zongren. The Sun Fo cabinet resigned on the same day as well. Simultaneously "peace mission" was formed for talks with the CPC leadership. On January 23, General Fu Zuoyi accepted the terms of surrender. Newspapers in Nanking and Shanghai reported that the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, that assisted and advised the government of the Republic of China, had completed its work.⁵⁵

Troops of the People's Liberation Army entered Peking on January 31, 1949.

The collapse of the Chiang Kaishek regime took place as a result of the victory of the people's revolution. Despite all its efforts American imperialism could not prevent Chiang Kaishek's defeat in the civil war and the elimination of his regime. The adventuristic policy of the United States in China suffered a fiasco.

⁵⁵ See *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, Jan. 26, 1949.

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WORKS BY SOVIET SCHOLARS ON MODERN CHINESE HISTORY

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[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences]

The development of China during the modern period of world history, i. e., since the 1640s and up to 1917 is of interest, first and foremost, because it was precisely during that period that in the traditional Chinese society forces emerged and began to grow, which led to a people's revolution. Like other stages of China's history, modern history is being carefully studied by Soviet scholars.

This article analyses works on the history of China published in recent years (with the exception of the history of China's international relations). 1972—the year the collective work of Soviet sinologists entitled *Modern History of China*¹ was published—will serve as the point of departure. For more than ten years a team of authors headed by Academician S. L. Tikhvinsky worked at it. The book sums up results of the research done during the previous decades. After *Modern History of China* was completed, many of the authors began studying other themes. However, despite some reduction, in 1973-1983 of the number of publications on China's modern history (as is usually the case after big summing up works are completed), research on the modern history continues.

In 1973-1982, 24 books on the modern history of China came off the press in the USSR. Thirteen of them belong to six well-known authors. The books can be subdivided into four groups:

- 1) liberation movement;
- 2) socio-economic development;
- 3) national outlying districts of China;
- 4) works by Russian scholars on the history of China.

The liberation movement in China is a long-existing and leading subject of research for Soviet sinologists.

N. I. Fomina examined in detail the history of resistance against the Manchu invaders put up by the population of Southeast China, especially Taiwan (the 17th century). The author succeeded in determining the complicated nature of the composition of the anti-Manchu camp (big feudal-bureaucrats, trade and artisan groupings, peasant elements). According to the author, the forms of self-awareness which appeared in that struggle preceded the emergence of national consciousness.²

B. M. Novikov studied the subsequent forms of the anti-Manchu struggle of the Chinese people.³

A. S. Ipatova thoroughly analysed the beginning of a new stage in the Chinese liberation movement in the 19th century. She discovered, among

¹ For a review of sinological literature published prior to 1972 see *Problems of Soviet Sinology: Collection of Reports at the All-Union Scientific Conference of Sinologists in November 1971*, Moscow, 1973.

² N. I. Fomina, *The Struggle Against Qings in the Southeast of China. The Middle of the 17th Century*, Moscow, 1974. N. I. Fomina, *Anti-Qing Struggle in Southeast China in the Middle of the 17th Century*, Moscow, 1973.

³ B. M. Novikov, *Anti-Qing Secret Society of Heaven and Earth. The Problem of Origin and the Beginning of the Activities*, Moscow, 1976.

other things, that the detachments of *Pingyingtuans* in the South of China which were preparing a fitting rebuff to Britain were led by *shenshi* (scholars). The author managed to bring to light the organisational cells of *shenshi*—the so-called community schools.⁴

F. A. Toder, who has long worked in the sphere of the Chinese and the Japanese history, devoted her monograph to the history of Taiwan in the 19th century.⁵

While continuing to study the peasant war of Taipings, F. B. Beleyubsky completed his many-year research of its sources and historical and ideological aspects, and gave evidence in support of the theory that the programme of Hong Rengan, a Taiping leader, was broader than merely the protection of the interests of peasants, and that his denial, at least in his programme, of the sinocentrist world outlook was an outstanding merit of that peasant leader.⁶

V. S. Kuzes defended his thesis on the struggle of the members of the "Small Swords Union" in Shanghai, and V. L. Larin defended his thesis on the uprisings in Yunnan and Guizhou in the same period.⁷

Of importance in the writings of the 1970s are the two monographs by N. M. Kalyuzhnaya on the historiography of the anti-imperialist uprising of *Yihetuans* (the Boxer Rebellion) and directly on the rebellion itself, which complete the cycle of research on that subject started in the 1950s-1960s with the studying of the pre-history of the movement of *Yihetuans* and the publication of the sources.⁸

In her monograph put out in 1973, N. M. Kalyuzhnaya showed that over the seventy-year period a transition has taken place in studying the *Yihetuans* uprising from the quest of answers to major questions (the origin of the "*Yihetuan*" union, the policy of the Chinese government, and the character of the uprising) to the studying of a broader number of items (motive forces of the movement, its programme and slogans, the war history of the uprising, and its periods). While at the beginning of the 20th century *Yihetuans* were described as a reactionary and anti-Christian force, later the scholars of the world began to admit the anti-imperialist character of the movement in spite of its definitely backward forms. The credit for giving a correct assessment to the movement belongs to Marxist historiography which is now shared by some bourgeois scholars.

Having overcome the stage of certain embellishment of the revolutionary features of *Yihetuans*, Soviet historiography correctly shifted the centre of gravity in evaluating the movement on its anti-imperialist, rather than revolutionary trend. The evolution of Chinese historiography also looks similar at first sight (singling out the "anti-feudal" and anti-foreign stages, then a more cautious definition of the first stage, and only in the 1960s the official concept shared by the PRC historians temporarily went back, intensifying the alleged revolutionary nature of the movement and

⁴ A. S. Ipatova, *Patriotic Movement in the South of China in the 1840s*, Moscow, 1976.

⁵ F. A. Toder, *Taiwan and Its History (19th Century)*, Moscow, 1978.

⁶ F. B. Beleyubsky, *The Work by Hong Rengan, the Leader of Taipings "A New Work Helping Management" (1859) as Historical Source*, Moscow, 1976.

⁷ V. S. Kuzes, *The Shanghai Uprising of the "Small Swords Union" (1853-1855)*, Moscow, 1978; V. L. Larin, *The Rebellious Movement in Yunnan and Guizhou in the 1850s-1870s, (Basic Issues)*, Leningrad, 1981.

⁸ N. M. Kalyuzhnaya, *The Yihetuan Uprising (1898-1901). Historiography*, Moscow, 1973; N. M. Kalyuzhnaya, *The Yihetuan Uprising (1898-1901)*, Moscow, 1978; See also earlier works by N. M. Kalyuzhnaya: *The Emergence and Development of the Yihetuan Movement (Prior to the Expansion of Yihetuans Beyond the Boundaries of Shandong Province. April 1898-April 1900)*, Thesis, Moscow, 1964; *The Uprising of Yihetuans. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1968.

justifying its reactionary features. Of late, the excessively extolling assessments of *Yihetuans* in Chinese historiography were somewhat dampened).

As N. M. Kalyuzhnaya showed in her book, Western historiography made a shift from its former concepts about the *Yihetuan* movement as organised by the Chinese government itself to a more substantiated conclusion that the movement originated independently and that the imperial court just used it in its struggle against foreigners.

At present historians have admitted in general that the participants in the movement mainly originated from working layers (before European sinologists regarded *Yihetuans* as declassé elements).

N. M. Kalyuzhnaya showed that bourgeois historiography continues to condemn *Yihetuans* for their struggle against the great powers, whitewashes the imperialist policies of those powers, and one-sidedly criticises Russia alone. In this point bourgeois historiography joined hands with Maoist historiography.

In her next, summing-up, work on the subject, N. M. Kalyuzhnaya furnished answers to the questions raised in the previous book. She proved that the *Yihetuan* movement had no separate anti-feudal stage, that the uprising, from the very beginning, was anti-foreign, though some anti-feudal elements could be discerned in it. The scholar believes that the composition of the rebels was mixed and included peasants, craftsmen and declassé elements. According to the author, the policy of the Chinese government vis-à-vis the *Yihetuans* was marked by inconsistency. The carriers of feudal ideology cultivated xenophobia and obscurantism among the *Yihetuans*.

Despite the reactionary features which were inherent in the movement, the author evaluates it as a just struggle of the masses against the imperialist oppression.

N. M. Kalyuzhnaya fixed the chronological framework of the movement (1898-1900) and the periods of its development. She traced the history of setting up the secret *Yihetuan* union, and proved that the supposed origin of this organisation from the anti-Manchu "White Lotus" society is nothing but a legend.

Analysing the behaviour of the local Chinese authorities, the author finds three groupings among them: one was consistently opposing the *Yihetuans* (in South and Central China and in Shandong province), the other was for a temporary alliance with them (in Zhili), and the third (in Manchuria, the district where the grass-roots anti-foreign movement was relatively weak) actively came out against foreigners. It is clear that the vacillations of the Qing government mirrored the existence of these three groupings and the alignment of forces among them.

It becomes clear from N. M. Kalyuzhnaya's study, which she worked on for over 20 years, that the uprising of *Yihetuans* was not a "conflict of two civilisations" as Western authors continue to assert, but a struggle of the oppressed people against colonialists, although in a backward and medieval form.

G. V. Yefimov, an historian, worked for 40 years with some intervals on the topic "Sun Yatsen and the Chinese Revolution". In 1973-1983, two of his monographs came off the press: the first one refers to the period of the Xinhai revolution, while the other relates to 1914-1922, i. e., covers half of the contemporary history.⁹

⁹ G. V. Yefimov, *The Bourgeois Revolution in China and Sun Yatsen (1911-1913). Facts and Problems*, Moscow, 1974; G. V. Yefimov, *Sun Yatsen. A Quest for a Road. 1914-1922*, Moscow 1981; See also G. V. Yefimov "Sun Yatsen in the Struggle for China's Independence", *Istorichesky Zhurnal*, 1937, No. 1.

G. V. Yefimov soundly opposed the contemporary bourgeois scholars' concept about the "non-bourgeois nature" and the alleged unique features of the Xinhai revolution. He proves the objectively bourgeois character of the revolution, arguing at the same time that by 1911 prerequisites for a revolution in China were not quite mature, and this naturally impeded its triumphant outcome. In connection with this evaluation of the revolution Yefimov also portrays Sun Yatsen as a great Chinese revolutionary-democrat, noting, however, his weak points but stressing that Sun Yatsen played an immense part in the awakening of the popular masses.

In his second book published posthumously, G. V. Yefimov showed that after the Xinhai revolution (1911-1913), the Sun Yatsen party was the only one which, in spite of its shortcomings (narrow basis and conspiracies) from the very beginning took an intransigent stand vis-à-vis the reactionaries. The author believes that Sun Yatsen played a rather considerable role in the triumph of the revolution over the Yuan Shikai reaction in 1916.

While analysing the "Programme of Building the Country" written by Sun Yatsen at the junction of the two epochs, Yefimov asserts that it outlined important progressive prospects for the development of China, contained ideas of state regulation of economy, and state control over foreign capital which Sun Yatsen deemed it possible to use for the building of a new China.

The two works by V. N. Nikiforov¹⁰ are mutually complementary and examine the history of the revolutionary movement which preceded the Xinhai revolution.

Several essays testifying to the growing interest in this popular genre were published in 1973-1982. Three of them describe different heroes of the liberation struggle, and the essay by V. I. Semanov depicts the Qing empress Cixi and her court. V. S. Kuznetsov published two books and many articles during that period dealing with different subjects of modern and contemporary history of China.¹¹

The regular study of socio-economic relations in China of modern time began in our country in the last decades. Here O. Y. Nepomnin who wrote two books continuing his works of the 1960s heads the list.¹² O. Y. Nepomnin's books are a most exhaustive study of the history of China published within the past decade.

China's Economic History is devoted to the early period of the onslaught of foreign capital against China, i. e., the latter half of the 19th century. The author proceeds from the fact that Chinese society of that time was feudal (domination of natural economy, exploitation of peasants by big landlords; extra-economic coercion which, however, played a smaller role in the conditions of intensive land cultivation and surplus workforce than in feudal Europe). Nepomnin begins the descending line of Chinese feudalism from the end of the 19th century.

The author arrives at a methodologically important conclusion that, despite the decline, a process of accumulation of capital was under way in feudal China (but the capital was invested not in industry but in agriculture, usury, and so on). Another conclusion is as follows: up to the

¹⁰ V. M. Nikiforov, *First Chinese Revolutionaries*, Moscow, 1980; V. N. Nikiforov, "China During the Awakening of Asia", Moscow, 1982.

¹¹ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Amursana*, Novosibirsk, 1980; V. N. Nikiforov, *Sun Yatsen. October 1896*, Moscow, 1978; G. S. Matveyeva, *The Father of the Republic. A Story About Sun Yatsen*, Moscow, 1975; V. I. Semanov, *From the Life of Empress Cixi*, Moscow, 1979.

¹² O. Y. Nepomnin, *China's Economic History (1864-1894)*, Moscow, 1974; O. Y. Nepomnin, *Socio-Economic History of China (1894-1914)*, Moscow, 1980.

1880s Chinese private capital acted under the protection of the state-bureaucratic and mixed enterprise which, to a certain extent, paved its way.

In his subsequent monograph devoted to 1894-1914 Nepomnin takes a much broader approach to the subject by means of thorough studies of the social aspect of the process (this is seen also from the title of the book: not merely "economic" but "socio-economic history"). At the same time, the author chronologically goes far back, providing a generalised view of Chinese feudalism as it was during almost the entire modern history. The key thesis in the book is that about the economic and demographic balance of the two "subsystems" of Chinese feudalism: state-bureaucratic and private-landlord. In conformity with these "subsystems", the origin of the national-capitalist elements in the Chinese countryside went along the following two roads: the first one led to the gradual stratification of peasants into rich farmers—semi-proletariat—proletariat (in the state-bureaucratic sector), while the other—to a part of landlords becoming bourgeois (in the private-landlord sector). Alongside different forms of the genesis of the bourgeoisie the author notes the complicated character of the structure of the bourgeois class that came into being: it had an insignificant middle strata but the elite and the broad lower layers (which were at the level of the economy of manufactory and premanufactory periods) which sharply opposed each other.

The socio-economic analysis made by Nepomnin makes it possible to understand many specific features of the social and political development of China in the 20th century: the social basis of reformers and proponents of the Sun Yatsen teaching, contradictions among bourgeois revolutionaries, and the role played by North and South China in the revolution.

The term "transitional society in China" underlines the main conclusions made by the author: the emergence in China in the mid-19th century of a multisectoral society; a more prominent role played by towns, unlike their lagging behind the countryside in the Middle Ages; the disturbance of the traditional balance between the two above-mentioned feudal "subsystems"; the active and transforming role of the capitalist system though its share was insignificant in comparison with that of feudal relations. Moreover, the immense influence of the "old" economy engendered a reverse tendency—toward self-restoration, conservation, and swelling of the backward forms of capitalism.

Nepomnin argues that the lack of prospects in such an "arbitrary" progressive development of the basis under which the capitalist remaking of society "from below" would prevail is a result of China's complex development. The prospect of conscious, "superstructural" variant of development remains as the only real one; there permanently exists a possibility of "artificial" (i. e., with a big portion of subjective factor, ideology, state, and so on) turn of the country to this or that road.

We appreciate the form chosen by the author: concentrated generalisations are organically fused with a great number of facts and figures. The homogeneous nature of the book is not upset by the fact that one of the 12 chapters—that about the economic crisis of 1909-1913 (section four, Chapter 2 by V. B. Menshikov) was written in a somewhat different style. This economic crisis deservedly takes an important place in the book as a proof of Nepomnin's general concept and as an illustration to it.

While Nepomnin's book and a number of other above-mentioned monographs view China as a single whole or at least the basic part of it, some works are devoted to the situation in China's separate areas. For instance, works by V. S. Kuznetsov (Xinjiang), A. S. Martynov (Tibet), G. S. Go-

rokhova, Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev (Mongolia), A. Khodzhayev (Xinjiang)¹³ deal with the outlying districts of the Qing state.

At the junction of the 1970s and the 1980s the study of Manchuria at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century took shape as a scientific trend. The candidate theses by O. V. Kuchuk, G. A. Shukhacheva and M. A. Patrusheva¹⁴—from the Vladivostok Institute (they studied at the Moscow post-graduate courses) deal with the economic problems of that region.

Apart from well-known Moscow sinologist L. P. Delyusin, among their scientific patrons were representatives of the next generation of Soviet specialists on China—O. Y. Nepomnin and A. N. Khokhlov.

The training of a team of young scholars on the modern and contemporary history of China at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, apparently means the turning of Vladivostok, in the near future, into an active centre of research on the history of China.

In conclusion, a few words about the works on the history of sinology. A major work by P. Ye. Skachkov, a well-known specialist of bibliography and archives, was published posthumously. It is based on the studies of manuscripts of the Russian pre-revolutionary sinologists.¹⁵ The role of V. S. Myasnikov who for a number of years prepared for printing the book which was not completed by Skachkov during his lifetime is worthy of mention.

A monograph about N. Milesku Spafary, the first Russian sinologist and prominent diplomat of his time, and two books about the great sinologist N. Ya. Bichurin were put out. Let us also mention a collection dedicated to the great Russian sinologists V. P. Vasilyev (editor—L. S. Vasilyev), whose first part (authors—L. S. Vasilyev, L. V. Simonovskaya, A. N. Khokhlov, G. Ya. Smolin, N. P. Shastina, Ye. V. Zavadskaya, K. Sh. Khafizova) evaluate the contribution made by V. P. Vasilyev to Russian scholarship.¹⁶

At the watershed between the modern and contemporary periods is the book by V. M. Alexeyev entitled *Scholarship on the Orient*. It contains articles and documents by one of the most outstanding scholars and experts

¹³ V. S. Kuznetsov, *Economic Policy of the Qing Government in Xinjiang During the First Half of the 19th Century*, Moscow, 1973; A. S. Martynov, *The Status of Tibet in the 17th-18th Centuries in the Traditional Chinese System of Political Concept*, Moscow, 1978; G. S. Gorokhova, *Essays on the History of Mongolia During the Manchu Domination. The End of the 17th and the Beginning of the 20th Centuries*, Moscow, 1980; Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev, *Anti-Manchu Liberation Struggle of the Mongolian People (the 17th century—the first half and the middle of the 18th century)*, Ulan Ude, 1974; A. Khodzhayev, *Punitive Expeditions of the Qing Government Against the Uprisings of the Peoples of Dzungaria and East Turkestan in 1864-1878*, A Thesis, Moscow, 1973; A. Khodzhayev, *The Qing Empire. Dzungaria and East Turkestan*, Moscow, 1979.

¹⁴ O. V. Kuchuk, *Settlement and Economic Development of North Manchuria in the Second Half of the 19th Century and the First Thirty Years of the 20th Century*, Moscow, 1979; G. D. Shukhacheva, *Crafts and Manufacture in Manchuria of the Second Half of the 19th Century and the First Quarter of the 20th Century*, Thesis, Moscow, 1981; M. A. Patrusheva, *The Chinese Colonisation of Manchuria and the Policy of the Qing Government (Latter Half of the 19th Century and the Beginning of the 20th Century)*, Thesis, Moscow, 1982.

¹⁵ P. Ye. Skachkov, *Essays on the History of Russian Sinology*, Moscow, 1977.

¹⁶ D. T. Ursul, *Nikolai Gavrilovich Milesku Spafary*, Moscow, 1980; N. Ya. Bichurin and His Contribution to the Russian Oriental Studies. Bicentenary from His Birthday. Materials of the Conference, Parts 1-2; N. V. Denisov, *Nikita Yakovlevich Bichurin. An Essay of Life and Creative Activities of Orientalist*, Cheboksary, 1977; *History and Culture of China (Collection Dedicated to Academician V. P. Vasilyev)*, Moscow, 1974.

in Russian sinology. Alexeyev as a scholar was formed at the end of the new history.

The author expresses valuable thoughts on the ways of training skilled sinologists of which the USSR is in need. He warns that a sinologist should avoid the narrow approach (learning by heart Chinese texts, the lack of a broad world outlook, lack of general intellect) as well as excessive breadth leading to superficiality. He warns also against the danger of emphasising "exceptional specifics" of China, "exoticism" of the Orient and explains that scholarship can be determined as elimination of exoticism. In sinology, he writes, "there were mostly people inclined to learn exoticism by heart for the sake of getting advantageous posts... Scholarship should destroy exoticism from both sides, and an Oriental scholar, like ours, will speak one and the same scientific language... This is precisely the common human features for the sake of which it is worthwhile to struggle against exoticism."¹⁷

The words by V. M. Alexeyev addressed to those studying or going to study the language, history and culture of China are still valid: "Each new sinologist who has mastered the language is desirable, useful and necessary. An enormous amount of activity is facing him."¹⁸

¹⁷ V. M. Alexeyev, *Scholarship of the Orient. Articles and Documents*, Moscow, 1982, pp. 333-334.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

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SINOLOGIST ALEKSEYEV PRAISED AS EXAMPLE OF 'MULTIDIMENSIONAL' APPROACH

[Text] The academic and literary legacy of our predecessors--outstanding Soviet Sinologists--has been presented many times in our journal.

A work written in 1929 by academician V. M. Alekseyev, "Chinese History in China and in Europe," was printed for the first time in the magazine's first issue of 1975. It was later included in "Kitayskaya literatura" [Chinese Literature], a volume of selected works by V. M. Alekseyev.

Readers of the second issue of our magazine in 1981 read V. M. Alekseyev's translations, also previously unpublished, of ancient Chinese blank verse. The translations were preceded by an article by the scholar's daughter, M. V. Ban'kovskaya, containing excerpts from V. M. Alekseyev's letters to academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy about the principles of translating the Chinese classics.

In 1982 a volume of academician V. M. Alekseyev's collected works, "Nauka o Vostoke" [Oriental Studies], was published. All copies of the book were bought up immediately, and the editors are now following their tradition and printing some of the articles from this volume under the rubric "Science and Culture" along with an afterword by Doctor of Philological Sciences L. V. Eydlin, which was also published in the book and is entitled "Alekseyev and Oriental Studies." We feel that this is the best way of presenting this outstanding book to the readers of our journal.

Selected Articles by Alekseyev

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 83 (signed to press 30 Aug 83) pp 108-113

[Selected articles from book "Nauka o Vostoke" by Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Alekseyev, 1982]

[Text] The Mission of the Orientologist

Orientalism is a science which fills in the blank or falsely colored spaces on the map of accurate knowledge about the cultures of the world. Lenin's

orders to assimilate the legacy of all mankind also apply to the Orient. Knowledge is this legacy. We Soviet people should know not only about Goethe, but also about Li Bo and Du Fu. The "History of Eastern Literatures" should be documented with translations conveying the delight of the Eastern reader, and not the disgust of the Westerner.

"Big science" in Orientology is the same as everywhere else. This is research leading to information about the East in a style and language accessible to everyone and capable of revealing the "mysteries of the Orient," which stem from ignorance and which can be assumed to be either non-existent or the same as the mysteries of the West. Our big science consists in the academic invention of contrasts between the East and West in the field of ideas and in the ultimate establishment of thorough and definitive histories and theories of civilization.

Big science includes the opuses of F. I. Shcherbatskiy, who introduced Indian philosophy to the European academic community. It includes I. Yu. Krachkovskiy's work about Arabic words in the Russian language, which, along with his Arab geographies of Eastern Europe, represented a rare and precious contribution to science. Our big science includes, for example, the research of S. A. Kozin, who revealed the workings of Genghis Khan's mind and the mysteries of the nomadic epic, which is not folklore, but real literature (oral!)--the nomads lacked a written language, but they were not lacking in sophistication (these are not primitive epics!).

Eastern Studies--Western Studies. Parallels

The Eastern scholar who knows little about the West is a nonentity, a blind man and a narrowminded divulger of information. The Western scholar who knows little about the East is also narrowminded: Everything he reads about the East seems new to him. But in reality, *nil admirari* is the academic principle! A scholar should not be awestruck or gasp with delight, but should weave knowledge into a logical chain of events--this is science!

Comparative studies are our declared aim. The more comparisons we can cite, the broader and more profound our conclusions will be (*Un traite manicheen retrouve...*). I am planning to amplify the comparative studies "Horace and Lu Ji" and "Boileau and the Chinese."

Without Orientology many fields of Western studies (the culture of Spain, the history of Russia, the history of Greece and the ancient world) could not be a science. What is more, without Orientology there would be no history of Asia at all. The history of religion, the history of philosophy and so forth could not exist without Orientology. Without Orientology it would be impossible to write histories of world literature...and, in general, of world science and art, as the Eastern experience has often been richer and greater than the Western.

If Sethe included all of the written languages that had ever existed, even dead ones and maximally defective ones, in his "Vom Bilde zum Buchstaben..." for the sake of a complete overview, what might be said about cultures, which

are so much more abundant? The Cornish dialect was nursed until just recently! But what about the Chinese language? Should science really take a deep interest in something only when all that remains of it are scraps of papyrus and shards of marble? Actually, we should "hurry to live and hasten to feel."

The Orientologist should take part in collective projects. For example, the Mongolian scholar, Turkologist and Sinologist should research the history of medieval Russia; ...the Sinologist, Manchurian scholar and Paleo-Asian scholar should participate in studies of the maritime Far East; the Turkologist and Arabist should research Crimean history; the Caucasian scholar should research the history of the Caucasus, and so forth. In general, much of the history of the USSR is a field of Orientology.

But the Eastern scholar is not just an appendage of autocratic researchers--historians, philologists, philosophers, linguists and so forth. His role consists not only in the publication of papers, but also in their interpretation. We have no more of the inane Orientologists who used to say: "Now that I have translated it, it is your job to understand it!"

The more quickly and fully Eastern studies gain recognition as the equal of Western studies, the more complete our studies of civilization will be. If our army of scholars of French, English, German and even Norwegian, Spanish, Dutch and other cultures were to be more like our platoon of Orientologists, what, I ask you, would we know about the West? Ergo, we must triple and quintuple our ranks.

In the Department of Language, Literature and History of the Academy of Sciences, there is no division between West and East (and there never was!). This is an example of normal operations for universities. There is no need to build "great walls of China." The Oriental studies department is one of the departments of general university science.

How I studied and Am Still Studying China*

I began to study China under conditions extremely unfavorable for academic pursuits: My contemporaries had little academic interest and it was almost the prevailing tendency to apply one's elementary knowledge to a diplomatic career. I put up as much resistance as I could to this lack of scope because I was guided by absolutely different interests and fought a constant battle with the older Sinologists who viewed the abstract study of China as a way of simply passing the time. After I completed my studies in the Department of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University, I was sent abroad to prepare for my career as a professor, primarily to London, Oxford, Cambridge, Paris and Berlin, where I was supposed to learn about contemporary academic studies in Sinology and update our old and largely outdated courses. In the British Museum in London I studied the marvelous art of Chinese ceramics under the supervision of one of the most famous authors and collectors of that time and I also studied forms of Chinese fold art (for example, the coin-shaped plates

* "Articles for Wall Newspaper (1944-1945)," Archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Leningrad Branch, f 820.

used as good-luck charms). But the main thing was that the museum's large collections of literature offered the appropriate scope to me and to my interests. I could not, however, find any real mentor-professors for myself in England, and it was only in Paris that I had the good fortune to meet Professor Chavannes, the greatest and most brilliant Sinologist of that time, from whom I learned a great deal, particularly his historical method. But in China I took my own approach, engaging in broader studies of the culture and striving above all to master the language and assimilate texts on the scales dictated by my teachers, the learned Chinese of that time--broad and diversified scales.

At the beginning of 1910, when I began to teach the Chinese language in the university, I included many new things from Chinese culture, literature, especially poetry and the analysis of poems, history, art history and even everyday life in China. In this way, I acquired a fairly broad grasp of the Chinese culture in my own interest. But I did not dissipate my energies and tried to concentrate on Chinese literature and on its classical foundations--Confucianism, Taoism and (to a slightly lesser degree) Buddhism.

During the war I devoted all my time to writing several works based on my translations of Chinese masterpieces, with analytical (usually comparative) introductions and annotations. These works were intended to provide the historian of Chinese literature and, what is more, the historian of world literature with absolutely complete information. I hope that these historians will be able to use my articles and books from the correct standpoint and avoid, with my help, exotica and other phenomena contributing to mistaken ideas about the centuries-old Chinese literature with its brilliant form and profound content. One example of this kind of work (although a less than perfect one because it was cut in length) is my latest article (1944), "The Roman Horace and the Chinese Lu Ji on the Art of Poetry," in which I compared these two authors, who were approximately equidistant from the roots of their poetry, and found that the global basis of their outlooks may have differed in form (and even these differences disappeared when the works were analyzed more thoroughly), but not in content, not with regard to the confessions and inspirations of the real poet. In this way, I found methods common to all people in Chinese poetry, in the works of the poet Sikong Tu (9th century) and in the works of his earlier fellow poet Lu Ji (died 303), and I now hope to continue this work, investigating the matter in greater depth to develop this major theme and to put an end to the sense of the bizarre which alienates the East from the West and vice versa. An individual is not merely a local entity, particularly if he is a poet, philosopher or scholar whose very nature revolts against any kind of narrowmindedness and any kind of absolutely unjustified isolation.

Education. The Cultural Personality of the Sinologist

In 1890 I did not understand what was going on.... Words? Characters? Why? What happened to science? What happened to learning? The reply was: You are only translators!

But the student of Chinese affairs can start by developing and establishing a scientific and intellectual personality, thereby attaining the university's

highest objective. Chinese scholarship is a tremendous and systematic education in itself. Studying the Chinese language can broaden one's mental horizons at least as much as studying Latin and Greek, and even more: This is a newer and fuller world because it had a rich culture for not just 1,000 years, as the classical world did, but for 3,000! But the main thing is that everything is new, new, new! There are new things to learn about China and its civilization, new things to teach to those who do not know, new ideas from learned China to be revealed to the academic community. I could not tell you all of the new things I added to my education by studying China, but here are some educational and scientific news items.

I learned that the Chinese world is truly a world in itself, and not merely a local variation on some other world. Acquiring a grasp of this world from all possible vantage points is one of the most fundamental learning processes.

I learned that the Chinese culture had answered most of the questions by which the human mind had always been tormented. And that it had also raised a number of great questions and investigated them, but had not been able to answer them.

I learned that Chinese books and works of art had met many of the requirements of the human mind and human imagination. In fact I can say they met them all!...that all of this is new, that it does not exist in Europe or Russia and that it is a fortunate person who has a firm grasp of two worlds.

I learned and realized that my brain was meager and limited, that the European world with its knowledge and culture represented only one variety of world thinking and that the Chinese world represented another variety, equally strong but newer in all respects, and so much newer that it seems paradoxical ("Everything is the opposite in China").

I witnessed and experienced a definite reversal in my own mind and development, becoming a judge of a whole new world during the slow process of accumulating knowledge. I was frightened by the "defendant" and learned not to think of him as "odd" and inferior.... On the contrary, I am now consumed by pure, sincere and complete respect for this race of thinkers and race of creative individuals.

I learned and realized that "Chinese scholarship" is not the quaint attribute of an "odd people," but the valuable property of all mankind, and that it is unknown and incomprehensible only due to a lack of understanding, misunderstandings, bewilderment and a shortage of Sinologists.

I learned that China had done more than any other country for the world science of history by preserving the history of the Mongols and all their rulers, the history of Central Asia and, in particular, its own history. I learned to value things in China that had disappeared forever in so many cultures, such as, for example, the Egyptians, Babylonians, Medes, Lydians, Aegeans, Hindus, Mongols, Tibetans...and in all of Asia!

I learned that the philosophy of Lao Zi is one of the most fascinating. I realized when I studied Lao Zi ("inaction"--wu wei) why Tolstoy was mistaken

("non-resistance to evil"). This took a great deal of work, reading, learning and thinking. I recognized the colossal power of this thinking, and all of the mysteries of the Chinese mind were revealed to me...particularly Chinese poetry and art....

I learned that the Christian world, in which I was raised and in which all of Europe still lives, is not only insufficient but is also much less than it seems. Its disintegration was made clear to me by my study of China, where the intelligentsia, particularly scholars, lived without any gods, simply by a code of morals and imagination, without any angels and cherubims.

I learned the mysteries of Chinese poetry, with its palette that included colors not found in Russian poetry or any other (despite all of my love and respect for them)! Listing all the new things Chinese poetry offers would be absolutely impossible: It would have to be a list of every Chinese poem....

I learned that bronzes of magnificent beauty had been cast in China in the 18th century B.C. and are recognized as a world revelation.

I sensed the enchanting qualities of Chinese painting--something absolutely new that exists neither in the Hermitage nor in the Louvre, it exists nowhere else. The silk material (su--its simplicity and poetry), the colors, the images requiring the use of imagination, the landscapes.... I take just as much pleasure in a Chinese picture as in a European one. But this did not come immediately when I first saw them. I had to overcome the force of habit in comparing them to European oil paintings.

I realized the beauty of Chinese porcelain (luminous!), an unparalleled human masterpiece (even in Sevres--only an apprentice!).

I realized the beauty of Chinese architecture, particularly with the aid of its interpreters--magnificent albums, Chinese and Japanese.

I began (and only began!) to understand the mystery of the Chinese theater (a real mystery!). I present lectures on it, but I have not acquired a complete understanding or appreciation of it.... Not yet!

I realized the mysterious charm of Chinese calligraphy (my entire office is full of it!). I translated a poem about calligraphy. All of this was new.

And I became convinced that an entire great human world had opened up to me. And I have studied it all of my life. But I am far from the peak of perfection!

When I studied China, however, I also learned to judge it. I lived and am still living through the fall of the old China and I welcome the new one. But since I know all of the merits of the old one, I cannot accept the new one blindly, without any reservations. My knowledge of Chinese history has taught me to do this.

My Aphorisms

It is important not to be afraid of criticism. Fear of criticism has ruined the majority of scholars who write in such a way as to conceal, and not reveal,

their thoughts--and they are concealing them precisely from critics. This is self-castration; it is nothing more than wrapping oneself in cotton-wool to attain the same inaccessibility as a fat man in a fur coat.

It is the height of spiritual joy to talk with a person who is your superior and who confers upon you the blessings of a lively, new and constructive interpretation. Nothing is comparable to this--not the theater, not music, not novels. And this joy can only be served by the native language.

I do not love the Chinese more than I love the French, the Germans or the English. I do not love their literature more than I love Russian, French or English literature, and the same thing is true of their language.... I love their search for the truth and their propagation of it. This has illuminated my entire life. When I run my eyes over something, the word "China" seems to me to be written in an absolutely different style of script--in red, perhaps.... My hand reaches out for a pencil and paper. The pencil jerks back and forth with indignation or with delight.... Therefore, it appears that I really love China!

In my own books and the books of others, what I like more than anything else and value above all else is a strictly systematic line of reasoning. A system which ties up all of the loose ends is vastly preferable to remarks leading in all directions, as if according to the motto: "On the one hand, the truth appears to be this, but on the other, this might be wrong."

It is important to feel like a missionary among today's young people--to adhere to a strict moral code and absolutely upright beliefs and to do excellent work. I believe that this is the way to reach the hearts of the young.

The connection between a teacher and a student can be more vital and can entail greater sacrifices than the bond between father and son. I was happy to forgive Chavannes much--both personal slights and general shortcomings--and I am happy that this sense of humility triumphed!

The negative side of my character (one of them) is extreme impatience (with pain, with irritation, with my appetite and with sleep). The opposite side of the coin is positive: impatience with an undertaking or job; the rapid completion of the job, the desire to finish it at all costs; impatience with others and with myself.

It is pleasant, you know, when a serious person, not to mention an extraordinary one, is interested in you, your thoughts and your knowledge. This is a source of strength and satisfaction: You feel that you are useful to someone. Talks like these are the basis of scientific public opinion, and this is how the most talkative people become involved in it.

Today (20 July 1945) I was told that the most valuable thing in life is laughter and that I arouse it with my appearance and conversation. I think so too. There is no better way of getting close to other people than with humor and laughter. A laughing person is receptive, he opens himself up to you and, what is more, feels that you have done him some good: as if you have given him something. I like this.

Eydlin Describes Alekseyev's Approach

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, Jul-Sep 83 (signed to press 30 Aug 83) pp 113-126

[Afterword by L. Z. Eydlin, doctor of philological sciences, to book "Nauka o Vostoke" by V. M. Alekseyev, 1982: "Alekseyev and Oriental Studies"]

[Text] We have before us a collection of works by V. M. Alekseyev, called "Nauka o Vostoke" by the compiler. But in his discussions of Orientology in general, the author also touches upon some specific issues which are of extreme importance to us and have not lost their pertinence to this day, and by tracing the author's line of reasoning we can guess at his entire outlook in all of its human--that is, moral--significance.

This afterword will not include anything beyond the confines of this book, and the reader who takes an interest in any of the facts mentioned here can easily find the necessary materials and delve into the meaning of the scholar's writings on his own.

1

Vasiliy Mikhaylovich Alekseyev was born on 14 January 1881 in St. Petersburg. His family was poor to the point of destitution. "After being driven out of a shower-room, and later even out of a corner where we had tried to make ourselves comfortable, into the street, I stayed outside all day.... At home there were constant tears, violent fights, endless threats, drunkenness and unruly behavior by the tenants." Alekseyev's memories and many years of personal friendship with Alekseyev gave academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy the right to say at Alekseyev's 60th birthday celebration that even as a student he had been a "self-made man," referring to his first journey from the yard-keeper's lodge on the Vyborg side of the river to the university. "And later your life was no better, you graduated from the university and again were on your own, and again you were able to find the right road."

"On his own," without any immediate guidance, Alekseyev acquired a teacher and then a friend in academician S. F. Ol'denburg, whose attentive concern in "the cellarlike building of the Asian Museum" made him so happy ("I will be glad to see you, come in," he named a date and time, "and we will talk"). An idea of how Alekseyev became a self-made man can be gained from his reports of his studies in China in 1906-1908. He chose his own Chinese "xianshengs," teachers from whom he learned how to speak the language, how to read literary texts, how to decipher the folk art he was collecting and how to prepare for his future university classes. On 16 May 1907 Alekseyev traveled to the north of China with renowned French Sinologist Edouard Chavannes. From the time he returned to Beijing four and a half months later until October 1908 he continued to study with the "xianshengs," working on the materials he had gathered during his journey and perfecting his "understanding of serious Chinese literature."

This is the road Alekseyev was "able to find." We will simply note that on this road, Alekseyev displayed a desire to discern the moral state of the

individuals in the Chinese society he was studying, noticing what his predecessors had so frequently missed. In his report of 1907-1908, he writes that the inscriptions on the folk art he was collecting "include all of the maxims which seem particularly impressive to the ordinary Chinese honoring the religion of the conscience." It was this religion of the common man that he discerned in the dense mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, which he later analyzed in depth separately.

Alekseyev was so amazingly zealous that his first trip to China provided him, according to his own testimony, with enough material for his entire academic career. "No one will try to argue that it is unnecessary for an Orientologist to travel to these sites, and yet...Rosen, Mel'nikov and Schmidt were Arabists who had never been to Arabia, and Julienne, Potier and Remeuse had never been to China." (We could add Alekseyev's contemporary, Arthur Whaley, the outstanding English translator of Chinese and Japanese classics who never visited China or Japan, to this list.) Nevertheless, "each Orientologist should travel to the countries he studies, settle there for a year or two, study, learn and collect material and books." And what is most important to us: "I brought back enough collections and materials from China in 1909 to last me my whole lifetime. Krachkovskiy, Malov, Bertels and Freiman did the same." He cherished the materials he brought back from China ("My worst fear is the loss of an album of Chinese folk pictures like Rovinskiy's! It would be life-long anguish"). By endowing him with uncommon knowledge, these materials illuminated the rest of his journey.

In a work written in 1944-1958, "The Sinologist's Vantage Points," Alekseyev explained the role of these "materials" in his achievements in Chinese scholarship. The introduction itself is an inspired poem and it also contains his sharp disagreements with the views of his university teachers on the teaching of the Chinese language and the history of Chinese culture after his studies in China. "I learned that the Chinese culture had answered most of the questions by which the human mind had always been tormented. And that it had also raised a number of great questions and investigated them, but had not been able to answer them." The young scholar delved ever deeper into his field of study and, as we can see, gave it discerning appraisals, separating admirable elements from imperfections.

Even in the beginning he was consumed by a fascination with Chinese poetry: "I learned the mysteries of Chinese poetry, with its palette that included colors not found in Russian poetry or any other (despite all of my love and respect for them)! Listing all the new things Chinese poetry offers would be absolutely impossible: It would have to be a list of every Chinese poem." For Alekseyev, Chinese poetry was second only to Chinese folk painting, and when he returned to his own country it moved up to first place.

But the main thing was: "I learned and realized that 'Chinese scholarship' is not the quaint attribute of an 'odd people,' but the valuable property of all mankind, and that it is unknown and incomprehensible only due to a lack of understanding, misunderstandings, bewilderment and a shortage of Sinologists." The "shortage of Sinologists" existed even after Alekseyev began teaching courses in the university with his two most important acquisitions--folk art

and poetry. Then he was truly alone with all of his disillusionments and his joys, but his mind and morals drew people to him, and they became his models.

2

What a galaxy of Orientalists shone at the beginning of the century! An article Alekseyev wrote in 1918 was called "Public Lectures on the Orient in the University." The names of the lecturers are listed in this article. They need no introduction or explanation, and even today the combination of all these names evokes a sense of amazement at this sudden masterpiece of nature: N. Ya. Marr, I. A. Orbeli, I. Yu. Krachkovskiy, F. I. Shcherbatskoy, B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, V. M. Alekseyev, V. V. Bartol'd, S. F. Ol'denburg.... It was a galaxy of minds and talents.

This meant that Alekseyev could not complain about a shortage of real men around him. He sought and found them, beginning with Edouard Chavannes, whom he went to see in China and with whom he shared the troubles and joys of a difficult journey for several months. Even then Alekseyev displayed a discerning maturity in his judgments, giving Chavannes' genius its due and learning from him how to penetrate the essence of scholarship, but he was also able to notice Chavannes' narrowmindedness and national biases in some areas of life. From Alekseyev's travel diary and articles, we see Chavannes as a man who never sought "the embraces of Parisian high society," a man who felt contempt for all sorts of trumpery and was prepared to investigate "matters not within the scope of aesthetic diletantism." In an article called "European Sinology at the Coffin of Edouard Chavannes," Alekseyev bowed to his teacher, in whom he acknowledged "a combination of gifts, action and all academic virtues with a universally admired moral image." Alekseyev then adds that this was a "truly remarkable combination." This combination represented Alekseyev's own human and academic ideal. It is only from the height of this combination that Alekseyev judged other scholars.

And the first among them was S. F. Ol'denburg, who represented the belief that "the scholar should learn from his own science: He should develop his moral and public image in precise proportion to his scientific achievements" and who combined "sophistication and simplicity, perfected to an ideal and irreproachable state" and who "was absolutely devoid of any kind of envy, particularly professional jealousy...and tried to treat all of his colleagues at least as equals." When we look into Alekseyev's life, we see that he has listed all of the features which became traits of his own character, but not without a struggle against his sometimes stormy temperament. When Alekseyev described Ol'denburg in articles and letters, he was portraying himself as he wanted to be. And we know that he eventually became the kind of moral scholar he admired, although he himself exaggerated the negative implications of his hot temper and impatience and would never have accepted any comparisons to Ol'denburg and the other irreproachable scholars he respected.

It is true that although Alekseyev admired N. Ya. Marr and spoke of him in lofty terms, he never forgot (as always, all such descriptions applied to him as well) the particular traits which made communication with Marr difficult:

Of course, a man this fiery, passionate, obstinate and rebellious could not help but inflict injury and distress on himself and others when he came into conflict with them." In Alekseyev's opinion, both Ol'denburg and Marr were fighters for the academic ideal, revolutionaries in science and organizers of Soviet Orientology who were prepared to give up, and did give up, all of life's comforts for the sake of science. About Ol'denburg he wrote: "This was an unquestionably unselfish man at all times, not like a politician striving for effect." (When Alekseyev wrote these lines, he may have been thinking of the "poor scholars" in Tao Yuanming's poems.)

Alekseyev praised Marr in a eulogy: "A remarkable man, in the full sense of the word, lived, dreamed, worked and suffered among us, tormented by the thirst for great, universal, worldwide, unrestricted truth." A thirst for truth. This is how Alekseyev defined science. And when Alekseyev speaks of the torments the restless Marr suffered when his unbridled temper inflicted injury and distress on him and on others, he adds: "But after all, this was not a man who imposed himself upon us, but a great man we always recognized and encouraged." Pasternak used approximately the same words 21 years later to describe another "remarkable man," with whom Alekseyev had been acquainted when they both worked in the World Literature Publishing House established by Gor'kiy:

But Blok, thank God, was different,
Luckily, he was a different case.
He did not come down to us from Sinai,
He did not treat us as his sons.

He did not attain conventional fame
And was always an outsider to schools and systems,
He was not manufactured by hand
And was not forced on us by anyone.

This similarity is not a coincidence, but stems directly from the train of thought and terminology of people of the same circle and of closely related generations who appeared on this earth at the end of the last century.

Ol'denburg and Marr were Alekseyev's teachers in his career. The Mongolian scholar B. Ya. Vladimirtsov and Arabist I. Yu. Krachkovskiy were his colleagues and comrades. All of them served Alekseyev as models of a moral attitude toward science. "As a man, Boris Yakovlevich was the reflection of his academic image, which harmonized to a rare degree with his way of life. He valued science above all, regarding it as a special level of mental consciousness, and this governed all of his actions." The view of science as a thirst for truth and a state of mental consciousness led to the scientific sense the scholar had in every sphere of life. Although Alekseyev separated the circumstances of life from those of science, he also associated them, never conceiving of the existence of science and life in confrontation or incompatibility or of the isolation of science from everyday morality. This is why he said that Vladimirtsov was "a wholly sincere and frank man in science and in everyday life." And this is why he wrote the following in a letter to Krachkovskiy after the publication of the book "Nad arabskimi rukopisyami" [Working on

Arabic Manuscripts]: "How pleased I am by the success of your wonderful, highly praiseworthy book! Only you could have interested others in your personal life to this degree because your life is so pure and irreproachable!" According to Alekseyev, a pure and irreproachable life could not help but affect academic pursuits by ennobling them. For Alekseyev, science was the same as poetry. And for this reason, he saw the scientific sense as eternal and uninterrupted inspiration, which would take hold of the scholar's readers even after his death and be transmitted to the most worthy of them.

Alekseyev apparently learned about the scientific sense when he read a "remarkable and highly intelligent" book in his student years: "In the book 'Universitet i nauka' [The University and Science] (1899), Professor Petrazhitskiy described the basis of science perfectly as the 'scientific sense' (or, more precisely, a sense or feeling for science)." Alekseyev valued the scientific sense because it could lead "to the unlimited birth of new truths in the name of the constant scientific psychosis, lasting until death, consisting of constant insights and also named science." For example, Krachkovskiy "approaches us from no other standpoint than scientific truth and the scientific sense, which is highly developed in him: He never allows himself to descend to the level of personal gossip and trivia, which so often encumber the lives of philistine scholars, who are learned leviathans inside their offices and pygmies outside."

It turns out that Alekseyev's solitude was confined only to his specialty, in which he had no close colleagues, but he never experienced moral solitude after he went to work in the Asian Museum and came to the attention of Ol'denburg. After this he also experienced the pleasure of being surrounded by students. It was as though the scholar had been rewarded for selfless service to his talent.

Alekseyev was the only major figure in Sinology after V. P. Vasil'yev, and his solitude was compounded by the new road he took from the very beginning, which he himself paved for science. He notes the events of the century which affected his work, including "the main one--the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, which ushered a new era for all mankind." He realized that he was superior to Vasil'yev in some ways, but--placing scholarly sincerity above all--he did not want to conceal what he thought of as his own lack of breadth: "V. M. Alekseyev progressed beyond Vasil'yev in all cases (let us recall Pasternak's: "But Blok, thank God, was different/ Luckily, he was a different case"--L. E.), but his legacy does not compare to Vasil'yev's in terms of its diversity and its grasp of Sinology."

Alekseyev's support for everything new was a confirmed belief, dictated by the times and by scientific discoveries, which were not to be resisted but, as Ol'denburg taught, were "to be sided with, so as to swim with the current of the century instead of staying in a stagnant ditch." Alekseyev took Ol'denburg's advice to heart and amplified it: "My basic principle is to avoid stagnation and compromise." He was afraid of old habits in science and always felt the need to have his work checked by genuine connoisseurs. He wrote in "My Aphorisms": "Living up to the acknowledgements of people who acknowledge you is a great joy. God forbid that it should be replaced by estrangement from people walking away from an aging ruin."

Given this attitude, which permeated the entire being of the scholar, and given the broad grasp of Chinese culture and profound study of it which distinguished Alekseyev, it is not surprising that Alekseyev's students included such brilliant and outstanding individuals as N. A. Nevskiy, Yu. K. Shchutskiy, K. K. Flug, V. N. Kazin and K. I. Razumovskiy. Alekseyev personally saw to it that his forced isolation was replaced by the friendly work of a group of colleagues.

What did Alekseyev teach his students? What demands did he make on them? This was discussed in reports and articles, some of which became casualties of war. Everything Alekseyev respected in his teachers, everything he admired in his scientific colleagues, everything he regarded as important for himself--he wanted to see all of this in his students, and without any condescension or envy. He was pleased that O. O. Rozenberg's master's thesis was written in a "strong, artful, subtle, open and simple" style, and that Yu. K. Shchutskiy's dissertation was "distinguished by scientific merits of the highest priority: simplicity, frankness and sincerity," the qualities he most valued in a scholar, revealing his own personality traits in his academic work.

Alekseyev's articles about his students are colored by affection. His tone is gentle and moving: "My student, comrade and friend," he said about Razumovskiy. Or: "K. K. Flug's years as a student are one of my favorite memories." And as part of this reminiscence: "K. K. Flug was a man of uncommon decency.... At difficult moments, when many went against their conscience, Konstantin Konstantinovich refused to give in, not with a single word or even a gesture." The scientific force of Flug's works, as we now realize, is directly related to this statement: "All of our future Sinologists should learn from the articles of this excellent scholar: They are devoid of scientific defects, immaturity, poor translations, dangerous comparisons, personal attacks and other flaws." Scientific defects, immaturity and poor translations are equated with personal attacks and dangerous comparisons due to the inseparability of science and morality, in which a lack of knowledge or training is the first sin against morality.

The students were not indulged. Alekseyev did not try to maintain unclouded good relationships by concealing their errors and omissions, even in official references: Good relationships could be built only on genuine scientific merit. But even here Alekseyev was fair, balancing praise with blame. In a report on the work of his student L. N. Lebedev, who had displayed exemplary knowledge and academic training, Alekseyev wrote: "In view of the exemplary work of this young Sinologist, exceeding all expectations, it would be unfair to give equal weight to his shortcomings, and I can therefore recommend without the slightest hesitation that the author of the work be rewarded."

Alekseyev valued devotion to science, and he never made negative references to it. One of Alekseyev's colleagues was L. N. Rudov, in whose prosaic external appearance Alekseyev was able to detect tragedy and poetry. He spoke of this eloquently after Rudov's death during the siege of Leningrad. As Alekseyev described him, he was a "zealot with a tragic destiny and an eternally burning pure internal light, leaving an unforgettable imprint on the dark sky of our difficult science." This was the rare case when Alekseyev publicly called his science difficult, and even then only in the desire to give his colleague the credit he deserved.

Through his own efforts, Alekseyev overcame the solitude of the early years and entered the fortunate state of a man who lived and worked in a salutary atmosphere created by three generations of outstanding scholars. And we must not forget what an inspiration Alekseyev was to all three generations!

3

Not one of the members of the three generations serving science in Alekseyev's lifetime is still alive. But nothing died with them, and we are studying their science. They live on in Alekseyev's writings. Other things that live on are Alekseyev's views "on Orientology as a special field" and on the "point at which the science of Sinology begins." And it begins, "as everywhere and always, at the moment of complete understanding." "As long as we judge exclusively according to our own European tastes and experience, we will have writing, but not science." Alekseyev did not look down on "writing" and "journalism" in themselves, but only as substitutes for science. I do not know whether Alekseyev had ever heard George Bernard Shaw's paradox that "journalism is the only profession in the world which does not demand accuracy" or whether he would have agreed with this aphorism, but he called journalism a lack of accuracy in science and spoke in extremely contemptuous terms about "people who write more than they know."

The necessary "moment of complete understanding" in science, understanding which grew constantly ("The dictionary is one of the most entertaining books to read"), was only a prelude to the mastery of science, which required a special frame of mind that never left the scholar throughout his lifetime, the "scientific sense" discussed above. The scientific sense is also a synonym for the protection of morality in science, and at the basis of this morality lies the moment of complete understanding (not of the final result, of course, but of the field of study).

Alekseyev underscored this in his thoughts about Orientology, which did not leave him even when he was in Borovyy during the war years. This was the basis for the report he presented in Borovyy on "The Orient and Oriental Studies." The report stressed that knowledge and the scientific sense should put Orientology on the same level as Western studies: "The history of religion, the history of philosophy and so forth could not exist without Orientology. Without Orientology it would be impossible to write histories of world literature...and, in general, of world science and art, as the Eastern experience has often been richer and greater than the Western."

Alekseyev said this in 1943. If we turn to the first volume of VOSTOK magazine, published in 1922, we will read in the introductory article, written by Sergey Ol'denburg, that "only the Orient has revealed the full spiritual strength of the individual, the colossal immediate force of his thoughts and feelings, which was so great even without the powerful weapon of knowledge" and that "the old East, the great creator in the spiritual sphere, gave us eternal images which will never lose their significance for man and will never be repeated." There is no doubt that the theme of East and West was the subject of many conversations between Ol'denburg and Alekseyev, that they had the same views and that these are the roots of the actual step Alekseyev took.

Of course, Sinology with its vast horizons was the field of Orientology in which Alekseyev was most interested: "In Sinology there are no 'reserved' themes and subjects (as there are in classical philology). Our science is a pioneer science!" In the more than 30 years since 1948, when these words were written, much has been accomplished in Sinology, but has it been so much that Alekseyev's words do not sound valid even today? And his theoretical and procedural remarks are even more valid--for example, his statement that "Chinese history must be known in all of its details before any one event can be interpreted" and, what is more, "the use of the materials of world history will produce, if not immediate results, then at least a better understanding of things." He was sincerely pleased when the research of our Sinologists consisted "not in placing foundations under a priori conclusions, but in a search for them."

In light of this conviction, Alekseyev's remark about his famous work about the immortal Hehe doubles and the daoist Liu Hare with the golden toad in the retinue of Caishen, the god of riches, is of special, fundamental significance: "The study was written in response to an article by an ancient ethnographer about the Hehe twins and was meant to inform people that their twin birth had not been documented and was only an ethnographic hypothesis." Only a hypothesis, Alekseyev said. Alekseyev's position is clear and uncompromising: A hypothesis is permissible only when backed up by facts--that is, when it is documented.

Alekseyev could not conceive of Chinese scholarship without the active participation of the very object of this research or, in other words, without consideration for Chinese Sinology, which he had researched quite extensively, including ancient Chinese studies, "without a knowledge and understanding of which no Sinological research project can be undertaken." Alekseyev's amazing erudition grew out of the knowledge he acquired from the old-school "xianshengs." For this reason, in his maturity, pleased by the progress of Chinese Sinology ("Chinese Sinology has surpassed the European science in many respects"), he said: "If I were in China today, I would not learn from the old type of dogmatist, but from an outstanding professor of Sinology in a field of even further specialization." When Alekseyev learned from the "old type of dogmatist," such learned Sinologists as Wang Guowei (1877-1927), Zheng Zhenduo (1898-1958), Yu Pingbo, Guo Shaoyu and Yu Guanying were still in school or were toddlers taking their first steps, and the generation of Qian Zhongshu and Wu Xiaoling had not even been born yet. Some of us were lucky enough to have followed Alekseyev's instructions.

But what does Alekseyev mean when he says "a field of even further specialization"? He means a great deal, and this must not be overlooked. From the very beginning, Alekseyev trained for a single specialty--Sinology. In time, Sinology became a multitude of sciences, united by their subject matter. As he said in "Soviet Sinology," "our common revolutionary consciousness changed the entire image of old science and all of its forms." As an "all-encompassing" Sinologist, and one who was well aware that this kind of Sinology no longer existed, he advised Sinologists "not to follow their teacher's example if possible, but to diverge from it to the maximum by choosing a single Sinological specialty." In a review of K. I. Razumovskiy's work "The Chinese Theory

of the Portrait" in 1938, he wrote: "Sinologists are finally starting to specialize, and I welcome this. We old Sinologists are more amorphous and diffuse (with our subject of general knowledge)." Therefore, "further specialization" is the same as the "narrow" specialty which was legitimized by experience and by Alekseyev and for which the Sinologist, and any Orientologist in general, must start preparing in his student years.

4

Strictly speaking, Alekseyev's multidimensional approach also had its limits. His scientific sense was most acute in the history of Chinese culture, the most extensive (and, in Alekseyev's time, almost all-encompassing) field of Chinese scholarship. He was the one who initiated the systematic and consistent study of the Chinese culture in Russia by offering a course in the history of Chinese culture in the university, and he later wrote that the school he headed "considered its mission to be the replacement of the school of drills with the school of cultural studies and analysis."

From the very beginning, Alekseyev's ebullient nature could not be satisfied with the study of only ancient China: He needed history for a better understanding of events that took place during his years as a student--in the old, seemingly "immutable" China, and then in the new China, which shattered the traditional (and mistaken) view of this country as one in which only the names of the dynasties changed. Alekseyev asserted that "the new China is at least as complex as the old one, and an accurate understanding of it requires a full understanding of the history of Chinese culture, which should be studied with the aid of Marxist methodology." A full understanding. Never a partial one, and certainly not an approximate--and therefore distorted--picture. This was Alekseyev's creed at all times and in all things. This remark is still valid today, and it is true that only this will make the complete comprehension of current Chinese events possible.

Alekseyev's thoughts extended further, beyond culture as such. Irritated by the abundance of seemingly pertinent works on various aspects of Chinese life, in which superficial features were interpreted freely, he asked, for example, "can a popular science study be based only on contemporary material, without any excursions into Chinese history--excursions requiring broader knowledge than that possessed by the majority of our comrades who try to analyze current economic issues?" This was a rhetorical question: Alekseyev hoped "for an end to onesided, amateurish, incompetent studies."

Excursions into Chinese history were within the power of a scholar equipped with substantial knowledge in the science Alekseyev described as a difficult, pioneer science. This was warranted by the very nature of this science, which revealed the magnificence of the centuries-old Chinese culture and the complexities of life in the Chinese society for thousands of years. Alekseyev offered a definition of traditional Chinese culture which is extremely meaningful, eloquently reflecting its complexity and unwieldiness. He defined it as "a Confucian universal complex, but then also as a Buddhist infiltration, whose juices nurtured not only everyday life in China, but also, for example, all of Chinese literature, and finally as a Taoist culture, without which

Confucianism would probably have been nothing more than lifeless pedantry." Alekseyev's remark about Yu. K. Shchutskiy's study of Taoism is quite indicative of his understanding of the history of traditional Chinese culture. "With his knowledge," he wrote about Shchutskiy in 1924, "he will aid in establishing the principles on which Chinese religion, philosophy and all higher forms of poetry are based. There can be no Sinology without the study of Taoism."

Defining the essence of Chinese culture, Alekseyev touches upon literature and upon everyday life, which is nurtured not only by the juices of the "Buddhist infiltration," but by the entire group of elements making up the concept of culture and that which is often called living tradition. Alekseyev's warning against excessive enthusiasm for "living tradition," in this case Confucianism, is interesting (and, to some degree, unexpected): "It helps in the same way that a musical instrument produces the note. But it is distinguished by limitations because it generally finds a home in banal minds.... A vivid example is the Chinese who represents living tradition. He does not know the meaning of Confucianism, but he repeats what he has memorized.... The essence of Confucius' genius is inaccessible to him because it was beyond him even in 500 B.C. He has transferred it to the level of his mundane intellect and tries to pass this off as the original! Therefore, living tradition is more bad than good, it is mass limitation, a muddy stream; it is a hindrance rather than a help." Alekseyev wrote this in October 1918 and it never required later revision, just as the main conclusions of his research were never revised but were only confirmed by subsequent experience. Alekseyev's scientific views were not comprised of sudden impulses, but were the result of lengthy contemplation and were based on the "full knowledge" he advocated.

Although Alekseyev firmly believed that specialization was essential, he could not conceive of a Sinologist, and not only a Sinologist, without a background in philology: "Just as in all other fields, the historian must first be a philologist, so that he will know the value of what he is reading."

Alekseyev also provides an example of the universal applicability of this statement: He says that "just one history of Rome, written by someone with an expert knowledge of the Latin language (not to mention an expert in Latin and Greek), entails thousands of compilations and narrations. And science accounts for only a negligible percentage! The same is true of Orientology." As a zealous defender of scientific ideas when he convinced of their accuracy, Alekseyev adds a parenthetical remark, almost naive in its simplicity: "Ten years ago a writer, who had written about the Chinese revolution and the Chinese economy but did not know the Chinese language, was seriously being considered as a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences. I protested." Later, he remarked with amazement: "And he was just one vote short of acceptance." A writer! We will have to return to this point later.

Alekseyev could not calmly accept the rejection of the Chinese language when any aspect or any period in the life of Chinese society was being researched: He had no doubt that Sinology represented "a provisional scientific theory of the Chinese cultural complex and its form of expression--the Chinese language, a theory necessarily combined with the mastery of this language for the free

use of all Chinese sources." Alekseyev is distinguished by a discerning view of Chinese sources, the magical complexity of which had bewitched many European Sinologists, and it was important to him that "a knowledge of the Chinese language, beyond formal literacy, creates what could be called internal literacy, reflected in a sense and feeling of proportion in the use and appraisal of sources, while the Sinologically illiterate author is quite inclined to choose the wrong source and put his trust in it instead of criticizing it." But this was obvious, it seemed to Alekseyev. After all, "this feature is common to all of the humanities and social sciences," and Russian history and literature cannot be studied either "without a thorough ability to read Russian texts."

This is what Alekseyev thought, but the stormy events of the 1920's--the rise of revolutionary forces in China, the Chinese people's struggle for freedom from imperialist and feudal oppression and the desire of Soviet youth, drawn to the liberated East, to come to the aid of China as quickly as possible--engendered the mistaken desire to accelerate the VUZ course of study and avoid the lengthy difficulties of mastering the Chinese language, the Sinologist's need for which was even argued. This aroused bewilderment and stubborn protests in Alekseyev, who asserted that "our work is not nearly as condescending to us as we are to it."

The impatience of some is understandable, and the principled, patriotic (and perhaps even maximalist) position of others, which gave him so much grief, is also understandable. Now that half a century has gone by, we can look at the attacks to which the unyielding Alekseyev was subjected and we can separate integrity from all of the opportunistic aims of the belligerent idiots who always come to the fore in such cases, and who sometimes even set the tone.

But let us return to the objectives of philology, which Alekseyev defined when he was dividing Sinology into "narrow" specialties. Alekseyev had an unconditional belief in the inevitability of specialization in Orientology. But he still felt nostalgia for what had been or, rather, for the great men who had been. "Multidimensional Orientology is becoming extinct. No one has replaced academicians Bartol'd, Kokovtsov and Shcherbatskiy. We, their weak colleagues, will die, and then everything will fall apart. The historian-Sinologist will not be able to read philosophers, the philosopher-Sinologist will not be able to read poets; the poetry scholar will have no knowledge of conversational Chinese; the geographer will know nothing about literature; the literary scholar will know nothing about archaeology, and so forth. Each will look at the East from his own corner and will not see the whole East." "Cultured worlds require multidimensional studies!" exclaimed Alekseyev.

But there is salvation, according to Alekseyev, in the knowledge of the language by all those who have divided multidimensional Orientology among themselves, if we firmly believe that the study of these countries--that is, Orientology--is impossible without the aid of the Oriental languages.

Furthermore, the Oriental language is not merely an auxiliary aid. No, Alekseyev assigned a complex and distinguished role to language: "After all, language is not merely the mechanics of letters and words, but also the

mechanics of ideas and cultural combinations." The Orientologist will always need an accurate, thorough and maximally complete reading of a text, because the text did not come into being spontaneously, but as a result of many factors, and these should also be known to the scholar. Therefore, "Orientalology is primarily philology. No one should draw conclusions from texts which have not been studied according to all the rules of science."

Orientalology has remained multidimensional as a result of the difficult and not easily deciphered text, if we consider the text over its entire history. In an article about Sinologist V. M. Kazin, Alekseyev wrote: "In Sinology the scholar's maturation is a slow process. The struggle to understand difficult texts (particularly, and understandably, when one deals with a great variety of subject matter) takes up much of his time. For this reason, not every Sinologist, even one in his forties, has the right to call himself mature." Alekseyev dreamed of the study of the Chinese language by relatively mature people. He believed that a student armed only with the elements of the usual school background was incapable of gaining the proper understanding of a complex human culture alien to him. Acting on Alekseyev's idea, and under his guidance, Professor V. M. Shteyn, the renowned economist, had the courage to study the Chinese language just before he turned 50, and the result was the publication of the book "Guan'tszy. Issledovaniye i perevod" [Guanzi. Analysis and Translation] in 1950.

Alekseyev promoted the Chinese text this cogently and consistently in all of the diverse fields of Sinology.

5

Indeed, what can be more important than the text in research? Life? But it is also reflected in the text, and in a foreign one, which no one but the specialist, who converts it into ideas, can read. "The text must be converted into our ideas by means of translation, analysis and synthesis. This is what the Sinologist must do." These are Alekseyev's words from his abovementioned account of O. O. Rozenberg's defense of his master's thesis. The young Alekseyev's reports on his stay in China will always be an argument for the study of the Chinese text. His notes on what he read are interesting and educational, both by virtue of his conclusions and by virtue of his characteristic accurate self-analysis. "This year I was able to read more than 500 poems by various authors dealing with various subjects. Only now do I feel prepared to study any one great author." Even then, at the very beginning of his academic career, he had this simple and intelligent view of what would later be defined as the "full knowledge" without which science could not exist. But to what degree is full knowledge accessible to the Sinologist? We will continue our reading of Alekseyev: "It would seem that after this kind of exercise I could have anticipated a thorough understanding of Chinese texts of this type. Unfortunately, this was not completely true. I think the main reason is that the European who has not memorized the Chinese classics and famous works of fiction cannot be confident of understanding the text or of mastering Chinese literary symbols himself, as these require the confident use of stock phrases and allusions to incidents from history and folklore. In addition to all the aids (dictionaries and grammar books) which make up for

this shortcoming in part, he will also need many years of experience--at any rate, more years than I now have--to achieve perfection."

All of this is true today, with the sole difference that there are no more Chinese of the old school and it is no longer only the European who has difficulty, although the Chinese, whose native language this is, will surmount the difficulty more easily: After all, no matter how the Chinese feels about the text to be deciphered, it has become a part of his life, of "living tradition." After we read these lines by Alekseyev, we can certainly understand why he stood firm when he was accused of being "backward" by impatient young people: In contrast to them, he knew the truth about Sinology and insisted on what his mind and his experience had taught him. In essence, he was referring not only to the mastery of the text, but also to the highest level of understanding--the aesthetic analysis of the text. Dictionaries and grammar books are necessary but crude instruments. In "A Student at the Turn of the Century" (written 45 years after he had graduated from the university), Alekseyev remarked: "I wanted (and he was taught to do this!) to confront obstacles head-on--that is, to conquer a text with the aid of a dictionary and a grammar book. How crude!"

The Chinese, however, in contrast to the European, can not only make use of his advantages as a native speaker of the language when he studies a text, but can also leave it untranslated into contemporary language and simply explain it. The European cannot resort to this trick and must write for everyone, even if he makes the broad assumption that the original text is fully comprehensible to his colleagues. This is what Alekseyev believed, and he affirmed this belief in his reminiscences of Ol'denburg: "He read everything and he demanded that the language of narratives and translations be accessible to everyone. He believed that everything was written for everyone, and not just for people who had mastered a set of symbols and relied on the text as a document, considering a translation to be unimportant and certainly unnecessary." The untranslated text has not come to life. Alekseyev's view was backed up by the opinions of Chavannes and Pellio when he said that "the untranslated and unpublished text has not been put into academic circulation."

What kind of Chinese text was Alekseyev's greatest concern with regard to translations? In addition to the evidence provided by his translations, an answer to this question can be found in his work "Soviet Sinology": "Of all the manifestations of Chinese culture, we were naturally most interested in Chinese literature, indisputably the greatest and most vivid indicator of the spiritual life of this people, in whose development literature played an exceptional role." It would be difficult to say whether Alekseyev definitely preferred prose or poetry for translations and analysis. He appears to have preferred different ones during different periods of his life. In his remarks on the new Chinese literature curriculum, for example, in "Sinology in University Instruction," we read: "We always assigned priority to poetry, as the richest part of Chinese literature." It was not only the richest, but also the dearest to Alekseyev's heart. "When Chinese poetry showed me how many of the supreme problems of life and philosophy could be solved without the aid of sex, I learned a great truth," he wrote in "A Student at the Turn of the Century."

But in addition to poetry, there was the related genre of philosophical essays (in general, this was also part of the genre of poetry), which originally played a functional, and not literary, role in Chinese life. This was pointed out by Alekseyev: "Obviously, historically celebrated epistles (for example, Sima Qian's letter to his friend) were not viewed as an exclusively literary genre, and certainly not as common literature."

But aside from poetry (rhymed and blank verse), novellas and novels were also quite popular in Chinese society and did not lose their charm and their fascination even in what Alekseyev termed "modest translations," which, as we know, are capable of destroying a great work of poetry but through which great prose can still be divined.

Apparently, the work which Alekseyev found so fascinating in Gor'kiy's publishing house contributed much to his ideas about translation. This was also the time when he worked on the novellas of Pu Songling, and the first two books of his superb Russian versions of these writings were published in 1922 and 1923. General ideas about translation are stated constantly, and the more fully the work of translation is developed, the more frequently they come up in a multitude of examples, which do not always improve with age, particularly in view of the great variety of individual abilities and approaches. Alekseyev had something to say about this in reference to translations of Chinese works: "We have arrived at the conclusion that there are no permanent principles of translation in the case of Chinese poetry and prose: Each has its own readers and its own aims, and the art of translation is an individualized skill." His only stipulation was the translator's "full knowledge": "Of course, the literacy of a translation is obviously not open to question." Alekseyev also expressed the incontestable opinion that translation is not always a matter of mere skill and art, and that the translation of the great works of the human mind also requires some sacrifice: "As we know, translations of the Bible or the Koran, of Lao Zi or Confucius cannot be 'ordered.' We can only wait for a reliable expert to devote his entire life to one of these."

Alekseyev made the latter remark when he was working in the World Literature Publishing House. It is possible (and even probable) that not everyone will agree with the opinions he expressed at that time with regard to the principles of translation. In the annual report of the board of experts in the Oriental division of the publishing house (28 April 1919 to 28 April 1920), Alekseyev praised the "highly literal translation, conveying the spirit of the translated original," in a manuscript by Arabist V. R. Rozen, which constitutes "the principle of accurate translation." But the critics of verbatim translations will not find a bone to pick here. Alekseyev insisted on a literal translation which conveys the spirit of the original but does not violate the rules and spirit of the Russian language: "Nevertheless, clumsy examples of slavish literalism were rejected more than once by the board, regardless of the other merits of the translation." Therefore, he was referring to literal translations which did not bind the translator, particularly in the case of Chinese characters, which lent themselves to the free use of synonyms. Alekseyev proved this in his own translations, as he demonstrated in "My Aphorisms," when he explained that "xian" in Chinese meant "resolute,

determined, confirmed and poetic security--the entire purpose of a life with sufficient intellectual content."

Alekseyev's views on translation did not change; in fact, they became stronger after he praised the highly literal translations in the manuscripts of Arabist Rozen and produced some of his own in "Fox Charms" and "The Sorcerer Monks." On 17 May 1942 he wrote to I. Yu. Krachkovskiy from Borovyy, saying he could not leave his "evergreen verses" (he was translating blank verse and T'ang poems) and that he wanted "to produce a documented translation, intended primarily and mainly for the literary historian, and only then, with whatever remains after this, for the 'general' reading public."

Although Alekseyev made modest references to the artistic merits of the translations he had produced in Borovyy, which were extraordinary in their emotional force and in their correspondence to the original, he did say that they were "literal and conscientious." As in all other areas of his work, Alekseyev automatically took morality as a guide, and here this is reflected in the strict preservation of the author's words and tone and the avoidance of any kind of arbitrary elements detracting from authenticity.

Alekseyev was a scholar and an artist. In his second guise (did it come second?), he presented science and literature with splendid Russian translations of Chinese prose and poetry. He regarded his translations, as pointed out above, as documents, and he therefore made stricter demands on them. "Although the translation of Oriental masterpieces is not a science in itself, it is for science and must produce authentic documents." (The first part of this statement might be disputed.) The absence of a document gave rise to what Alekseyev regarded as the worst possible sin and could drive him into an absolute frenzy. "Without it, there is nothing but exotica"--that is, something "absolutely impermissible in the Soviet press, which is interested in, and not amused by, aspects of foreign cultures."

Alekseyev was not tempted by exotica. His was the inspiration of a man fascinated by his subject matter, an inspiration born of sober realism, with no tolerance for the groundless whims of bad taste: "We resolutely refuted the ideas of the mystics whose obsession with Chinese characters led them to look for hidden meanings in the Chinese written language, and even some of our colleagues who indulged in this kind of investigation, but mainly the writers who tried to give readers their variations on Chinese themes in the form of incredible and illiterate exotica."

In his contemptuous and indignant attitude toward the smug ignorance and outrageous dilletantism accompanying the taste for exotica, we can also see the impatience of a man of labor, a "working man," as he liked to call himself, with trivia, with parasitism and, finally, with the falsity that he despised in any form. "We believe that one of the functions of our science is the cultural refutation of the unequal treaties with our Eastern neighbors, the political implications of which were so clearly understood by our revolutionary consciousness and destroyed by our revolutionary activity." It would be wrong to read this as a statement that different cultures are identical or even similar. (It is only an acknowledgement of a belief in the need for

mutual respect and mutual understanding, which are the aims of Oriental studies.)

On the contrary, Alekseyev approached the Chinese culture with extreme prudence, never completely trusting his own view of it and never agreeing with the approach of even individuals he recognized as genuine experts--for example, his renowned predecessor V. P. Vasil'yev, who contributed so much to the understanding of Shijing folk songs but simultaneously rejected all of the Chinese commentaries accumulated over centuries. "V. P. Vasil'yev regarded the Chinese commentators as abstruse counselors who obscured the simplest of matters during two and a half millenia of philosophizing, as they did, for example, in the case of the Shijing 'folk' songs. How fortunate the vulgarizers who can believe this! I feel that the conclusions drawn by learned people over centuries cannot be discredited this easily."

After translating huge quantities of Chinese blank verse, dating from its origins to the period of its golden age, and an anthology of T'ang poems, Alekseyev felt the desire to compile an anthology of his own "favorite" Chinese poems. But he did not do this. He wrote about this to I. Yu. Krachkovskiy on 3 June 1942. "Who is a judge of Chinese poetry? Not I!" Imagine, he did not feel capable of judging Chinese poetry! But he did arrive at this compromise: "Nevertheless, if (1) I am still alive and (2) I am still capable of working, I will produce a fourth volume--'An Anthology of the Translator's Favorites.'" And then he asked I. Yu. Krachkovskiy, with trepidation and hope, as if his decision would depend on the answer: "What do you think?"

Alekseyev's modesty and self-criticism extended to all areas of his life. After all, he was referring to his own works when he said: "Generalizations should live for only about 10 years. The workings of the scholar's mind will always undermine them." This is true, but the workings of the scholar's mind are based on his previous achievements, and new generalizations in the humanities are inseparable from the more significant older ones whose development, or perhaps even denial, gave birth to the new ones. The generalizations made by Alekseyev mark a period of discoveries in the world history of Chinese cultural studies.

This is merely a rough description of the works included in the volume which has been entitled "Nauka o Vostoke" and which contains the intelligent and noble ideas of the founder of our Sinology, one of the greatest Soviet Orientologists, about the East, about science and, in the final analysis, about the meritorious application of human life.

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SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATION REFORM IN PRC

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An interest in the sociology of education has appeared in China recently. It is being accompanied by the following sort of reasoning: "The social structure determines the structure of the educational system which, in turn, by training a definite kind of specialists joining the social structure, reflects and changes it."¹

Contemporary Marxist sociology singles out three lines along which the educational system affects the social structure: (1) the drawing closer together of classes and social groups (this function finds its strongest reflection in a system of general education); (2) reproduction of the social structure (of primary importance here is the system of vocational training); (3) social movement of the youth (one of the biggest channels).

Let us try and analyse, despite a certain shortage of statistical data, the possible impact of the Chinese system of education on society along the aforementioned lines.

The choice of a system of education became the subject of a heated debate from the very first years of the existence of the PRC. During the 1950s certain successes were scored in creating a single regular system of education that would fit the goals of a socialist cultural revolution. However, this was concomitant with quite a few difficulties such as the lack of organisational experience, the lack of an integral pedagogical concept, the need to oppose the tendencies of empiricism, narrow specialisation, attempts to erase the margins between formal and informal education, general education, and vocational training. Moreover, beginning with the late 1950s to the end of the 1970s the educational system in the PRC underwent repeated reorganisations, which interfered unfavourably with its development. Therefore, towards the beginning of the 1980s it was unable to ensure the elimination of illiteracy or to graduate the required number of skilled personnel of either secondary or higher qualifications.

The "two-track system of education" was put to the trial for the first time in the late 1950s, it was repeated in the middle of the 1960s and introduced anew at the end of the 1970s. It means the coexistence of two types of schools: industrial schools, orienting the trainees towards labour activity, preeminently in the countryside, and schools with a full-day attendance (their number is insignificant) whose pupils may aspire for enrollment at an institution of higher learning. In the best of them—the "key" secondary schools, just as in the oldest universities—the percentage of students from working-class and peasant families was

¹ Fu Weijue, "The Social Structure and the Structure of Schooling" *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1981, № 10, p. 212.

very low. From 50 to 80 per cent of the children of workers and peasants attended the industrial schools which were regarded as "second rate" schools.²

The shortcomings of this organisation prompted, in 1966, a reform of education keyed by a call for its "democratisation". The existence of two types of education—regular and industrial (which actually offered no prospect of further study)—could be justified as a temporary measure, caused by economic difficulties. However, this actually meant unequal levels of education which gave the "leftists" grounds to launch a demagogic campaign about social inequality in the educational system. However, they failed to put forward a programme of genuine democratisation in education. Loud promises to throw open the doors of educational establishments to the children of workers and peasants, to provide equal study opportunities to all at once could not be fulfilled in those years either economically and politically, or culturally. "Equal opportunities" were created, not by introducing free education of equal quality, but by lowering the academic standards in schools with full-day attendance.

Since the late 1970s, a new reform has been underway in the PRC, which presupposes a gradual and broad reconstruction of many aspects of education—structure, administration, the system itself as "failing short of the needs of the country's present development", according to the PRC Minister of Education He Dongchang.³ The 12th CPC Congress, held in September 1982, endorsed as a priority and vital task the introduction of universal primary education towards the end of the 1990s, something that was put forward by the 1980 CPC CC and State Council's resolution "On Some Problems of Universal Primary Education". This goal is much more modest than the one envisaged in 1978, that of introducing universal secondary education by the year 1985. But even in this form it is bound to encounter considerable difficulties, primarily in the countryside, where there are presently some 200-300 million children of school age. At an international symposium on illiteracy and adult education, held in the autumn of 1982, the Chinese delegate reported 90 million illiterates. According to other data, the number of illiterates and semiliterates comes to 230 million.⁴

The new stage in the educational policy, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, is marked by attempts to organise planned proportional development of education according with the needs of the economy and other spheres of social life. It has become possible to reveal and substantiate the need for priority rates of educational effort. He Dongchang, appointed Minister of Education in 1982, stressed after the 12th CPC Congress that "training specialists being 'capital construction' that will take longer than the building of an energy base, it should be given a lead".

Deng Xiaoping, addressing the 1978 All-China Working Conference on Education, urged "not only to lean on the present demands of production and construction, but also fully to take into account and reckon with the trends underway in modern science and technology".⁵

In practice, however, most educational workers reduce the education reform to meeting the present-day economic exigencies. A *Renmin jiaoyu* article stressed: "Automated, mechanised labour will for a long time

² See *Jiaoyu geming*, Nov. 30, 1967.

³ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 3, 1982.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 9, 1983.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1982; April 26, 1978.

be combined in our country's industry and agriculture with semi-mechanised and manual labour [the latter predominates in the Chinese countryside.—N. B.]", and this is why a "right proportion" is so important in the training of workers with different levels of education.⁶

In order to supply China's rural areas with qualified agronomists, skilled machine operators, accountants, cattle-breeders, etc., at present, just as in some developing countries in the 1950s, and in China itself over the last decades, a "ruralisation" of education is taking place, with agricultural secondary schools, specialised according to area, being established on a wide scale.

And so, we again encounter the trends of the late 1950s and early 1960s, though today this type of educational establishments is placed within the subsystem of vocational training, not general education.

According to Deputy Minister of Education Zhang Chengxian, not all in China approve the "village school serves agriculture" course, meaning that education in the countryside is regarded, not as part of the state's general educational system, but mainly as an adjunct to agriculture. This dependence of the content of rural education on local needs hardly helps to overcome the social contradictions between town and countryside. Such a policy may lead to the isolation of individual rural areas from the economically and socio-politically more advanced regions and the towns, and to the perpetuation of social and class distinctions. Such conditions may cause an outflow of young people from the village. "Yet if the village youth leave *en masse* for the towns, this will give rise to new social problems", Zhang Chengxian stated.⁷ The crux of the matter is to find a way to control this migration. It is planned to reduce by one-third the number of general-education day schools in the Chinese countryside, and even more drastically so at the county level, leaving not more than one per each 100,000 of population, the rest bound to be transformed into agricultural schools and training centres.

The opinion that this would limit the prospects of the rural youth for better education has already been voiced in the Soviet Sinological literature. Teachers and sociologists in the socialist community countries have unanimously and convincingly proved that only the general-education day school is an effective factor in eliminating the social contradictions and in gradually erasing social and class distinctions, and moving towards social homogeneity.

An important task and a special feature of the present reform of secondary education in the PRC is the singling out and rapid development of vocational education as an autonomous subsystem ensuring the training of highly skilled workers and medium-echelon specialists.

This is where the social and production demands to education clash. Vocational training emerges as the carrier of a socio-differentiating function, whereas on the industrial plane its expansion is extremely important for a country in which scientific and technical personnel made up, until recently, only 2.8 per cent of all those engaged in industrial production. Forty three per cent of the PRC's 5 million scientists and technicians were persons possessing a higher education and 38 per cent (some 1.9 million) a specialised secondary education. In 1983, the number of scientists and technicians reached 6.3 million in natural sciences alone.⁸

⁶ Zhang Shan, "Remarks on the Two Systems of Labour and Two Systems of Education", *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1982, No. 7, p. 23.

⁷ *Guangming ribao*, Aug. 28, 1982.

⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 12, 1981; April 30, 1983.

Between 1949 and 1979, 5,798,000 persons received specialised secondary education in China.⁹ Despite this, the technical personnel among the country's factory and office workers makes up only some 4 per cent, and still less so in a number of provinces and industries (according to incomplete data, it is 1.9 per cent in Anhui province, and 0.36 per cent¹⁰ in the light industry.) The "cultural and educational standards" of many functionaries lag behind the demands of their positions. A study revealed that at a number of enterprises some 64 per cent of young industrial and office workers, their formal education being complete or incomplete secondary schooling, fail to meet industrial standards. The low literacy and illiteracy of workers reduce, not only their labour productivity, but the effectiveness of utilising medium- and top-grade specialists. According to a field study involving 20 million industrial and office workers, the education of 40.2 per cent is lower than the level of the incomplete secondary school, while 8.2 per cent are illiterate or semi-literate persons.

Minister of Education He Dongchang expressed a resolute intention to alter the structure of institutions of higher learning in the course of the reform, so that the correlation between specialists in different fields, and also between specialists of the higher, medium and lower qualifications, should gradually meet the demands of the country's economic and social development. At present the PRC Ministry of Education is preparing to set up a planning committee in order to forecast the needs of society in different kinds of specialists. For the time being, however, the gap between the needs of the national economy and the actual training of personnel is rather wide: in 1981 the country needed 520,000 young specialists with a higher education, yet the country's institutions of higher learning graduated only 276,000, and not always of the professions required. Graduates in 13 professions out of 17 did not find jobs in the mining industry, and those in 20 professions out of 27 in construction. On the whole, the demand turned out to be for graduates of 450 out of 840 professions in which training is organised.¹¹ The light, food and textile industries are experiencing an acute shortage of personnel.

Optimal proportions need to be urgently established between the general-education and technical vocational institutions of learning and within these subsystems. For the time being (by 1982), specialised vocational secondary education was extended to only 3-4 per cent of pupils in the secondary-education system. This number of graduates of medium-echelon workers, as estimated in China itself, will not meet the needs of the national economy. In the view of top officials of the PRC Ministry of Education, about half the pupils within the secondary education system should be concentrated in specialised secondary schools.

No less difficult is the task of changing the proportion between general-secondary and higher education. 300,000 students were enrolled in the institutions of higher learning in the 1982/83 academic year, 12 per cent more than in the previous year. However, as spokesmen of the Ministry of Education assert, they "will be unable to maintain such rates for long in the future".¹² At the same time, the leadership of the country, in order to resolve the problem of employment, intends to bring up

⁹ See Huang Yao, "In Training Specialists with a Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, a Bumper Harvest Has Been Taken In", *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1981, No. 9, p. 9.

¹⁰ See *Anhui shida xuebao*, No. 2, 1980, p. 2.

¹¹ See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 9, 1980; Aug. 22, 1982.

¹² Jiang Nanxiang, "Let Us Discuss the Rate of Development of Higher Education and the One-Sided Chase for Admission to an Institute", *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1982, No. 1, p. 4.

the proportion of general secondary school graduates entering universities and colleges to 25-35 per cent. The only way to implement these plans at the former scale of enrollment, as the Chinese see it, is to slash admission to the senior secondary school grades to 2.8 million in 1985 and eventually to 1 million, although as it is it has dropped from 9.9 million in 1977 to 3.3 million in 1982.

The PRC's vocational training system is at the making stage. Back in the 1960s, along with the industrial schools, there was a small number of educational establishments which formally could be placed in the category of vocational-technical training. When it is asserted today in China that nearly half the pupils of all the country's secondary schools at certain periods before 1965 attended establishments of vocational-technical training and specialised-secondary schools,¹³ one should bear in mind that predominant among the "different kinds of specialised secondary schools" were secondary agricultural schools or industrial schools attached to enterprises, which, strictly speaking, cannot be placed in the category of vocational schools. In 1964, ten thousand agricultural secondary schools catered to nine million pupils, i. e., 65 per cent of the total number of secondary school students (true, according to 1979 data, this figure is much more modest—4.5 million, or 31 per cent). As regards technicums and vocational schools, these, on the eve of the "cultural revolution", were rather few and poorly equipped: in the spring of 1964 there was about 1,000 of them throughout the country, mainly secondary vocational schools which combined teaching with production. They trained workers for heavy industry (chemical, iron-and-steel), for the textile, and food industry and for trade and communal services. There were only 81 agricultural technicums.

After the 2nd session of the Fifth National People's Congress (1979) adopted a plan for the reorganisation of secondary education, the Chinese press published, in October and November 1980, decisions of the Ministry of Education on the development of a network of vocational and secondary specialised education schools, endorsed by the PRC State Council. A considerable number of new vocational schools were to be set up by reorganising general secondary schools of the second grade. Branch departments and individual enterprises were also invited to show initiative in the establishment of vocational schools.

At present the system of vocational training comprises secondary vocational schools, both urban and rural (*zhiye zhongxue*), technical colleges (*jigong xuexiao*), as well as technicums and colleges which are part of the subsystem of secondary specialised education (*zhongzhuan xuexiao*). The former, with a 1-3-year training period (depending on speciality), mainly enroll incomplete secondary-school leavers, and a certain number of complete secondary-school drop-outs. Technicums, with a 4-year period of training, also enroll incomplete secondary-school leavers, while medical schools and industrial technicums with a training period of 2.5-3 years enroll complete secondary-school leavers. However, in the early 1980s the secondary specialised educational establishments enrolled mainly complete secondary-school leavers. It is only since 1982 that attempts have been made to observe educational qualifications more strictly and restrict the enrollment age in accordance with the speciality of the educational establishments. In 1982 the same educational establishments still admitted both complete- and incomplete secondary-school

¹³ See *Guangming ribao*, March 30, 1982; *Renmin ribao*, December 13, 1982.

leavers, but in subsequent years it is proposed to increase the enrollment of the latter.

At the same time the network of complete general secondary schools is being curtailed without a compensatory expansion of the network of vocational schools, a thing impossible at the present stage, which deprives many incomplete secondary-school leavers, particularly rural school leavers, of any chances to continue education. In the 1982/83 school year this curtailment involved 3.5 million, while the enrollment in agricultural secondary schools and vocational schools increased only by 223,000.

Secondary vocational schools train workers and farm-machine operators, while technicums and other secondary specialised training centres graduate specialists of medium qualifications, who join the ranks of workers by brain.

In 1980, the then Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang spoke of the need to draw up, in the course of the regulation campaign, plans for the rational distribution of institutions of higher learning and technicums over the country's territory, something he tied in with national economic plans. However, the differing interests of different sectors of China's national economy play not the least role in that the structure of the vocational schools in the country is shaping out haphazardly. "Nobody really knows which specialists are needed and how many of them,"¹⁴ though enterprises are supposed to draw up long-term plans for the training of different categories of workers and technicians and send them to the departments of labour.

Nor is it clear yet for which economic sector are the secondary specialised schools training personnel. Theoretically—for enterprises of both the state sector and the collective sector, in the past—first of all for state enterprises of the heavy industry. However, since in the near future their number will hardly increase very much,¹⁵ many economists and sociologists in the PRC suggest an orientation of the vocational schools at training personnel first of all for the light industry, trade, and communal services, with their numerous collective and individual enterprises, and in the countryside—for animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries and subsidiary productions.

In June 1982, the State Council of the PRC endorsed a joint project of the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Education which required the local authorities to ensure the sending of university and college graduates and of secondary specialised school leavers first of all to agriculture and the light industry. Towards the end of 1981 the collective sector employed four times less factory and office workers than state enterprises. This is why a number of authors writing in the central Chinese press, deem it advisable that the vocational and other schools train personnel for labour-intensive sectors of industry, not requiring heavy capital investments. This implies, first of all, handicrafts and art such as silk weaving, embroidery, bone carving, jasper carving, chinaware, garment-making and footwear production.¹⁶

Questions pertaining to specialised education are not purely economical, they are determined by social needs as well, by the incentives and motivation for aspiring to higher or secondary-specialised education. The choice made by children, or, to be more precise, by their pa-

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, Sep. 17, 1981.

¹⁵ See *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 12, 1982.

¹⁶ See *Renmin ribao*, June 26, 1982; Oct. 4, 1980.

rents, after finishing the primary or incomplete secondary school, is an important matter of social development. The majority of children from the families of employees and intellectuals seek enrollment in privileged "key schools", providing training of a better quality and almost automatically paying the way to university, and subsequently into the ranks of workers by brain—the intelligentsia, and the *ganbu*.

The present-day system of education in the PRC is a complicated hierarchical set-up. The existence of "key schools" allows to speak, not only about actual, but also formal, inequality of the educational levels. The gap between schools of different types is tremendous. The "key schools" at the provincial level are regarded as the highest; after them come the urban "key schools", then the district ones. Much less prestigious are the "non-key" schools. One may sooner pass to a "key school" from an incomplete secondary school attached to it (whether officially or not). At a 1980 conference on "key schools" the demand was openly voiced for establishing direct links between "key schools" and "key institutions of higher learning". The "key schools" account for the highest percentage of those enrolled in institutions of higher learning, much higher than the national level (4-5 per cent). In 1980, 75.7 per cent of graduates from the Huafu provincial-level "key school" in Guangzhou were admitted to institutions of higher learning, 63 per cent from another "key school" (No. 2) and almost the same percentage, 61.7 per cent—from the Guyanya school. Commanding such advantages as high quality instruction, special student contingents, material resources, the "key schools" create privileged conditions for their pupils: the senior classes are split into specialised groups receiving intensive training either in the humanities or natural sciences, which is directly aimed at preparing students for entrance examinations to institutes. Pupils at these schools are allowed to take examinations before the end of the school year so as to be able, if need be, to apply again. The "key schools" set up additional yearly classes of graduates who failed at their examinations (tuition fees are 2-3 times higher).

Admission to a "key school" is a tremendously difficult matter. Nine thousand applications were submitted for the 300-400 places at the county school in Taishan. In 1980, 260 graduates of the secondary "key school" No 2 in the city of Guangzhou enrolled in institutions of higher learning and only 36 at vocational schools.¹⁷ And, since attending the "key schools" are mainly children from the families of *ganbu* and the intelligentsia, it is these same strata that supply the bulk of the student body at the regular institutions of higher learning.

Those who are unable to get into such schools prefer to do without general secondary education altogether and after finishing the incomplete secondary school go to work. There are indications that in a number of districts the fall-off of incomplete secondary-school leavers is bigger than that from the elementary schools and complete secondary schools. A Chinese youth newspaper expressed concern that in 1980 only 27.4 per cent of graduates from the incomplete secondary school in Changchou wanted to take examinations for the complete course.¹⁸ Moreover, in meting out jobs, labour departments do not seem to care very much for educational standards.

The openly elite character of the "key schools" sooner or later had to cause, and indeed did cause, the discontent of the population. Last

¹⁷ See S. Rosen, "Obstacles to Educational Reform in China", *Modern China*, 1982, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 21, 36-37.

¹⁸ See *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, July 1, 1980.

spring the *Renmin ribao* wrote with reference to "the masses" that "concentrated in the 'key schools' are the best teachers, the best pupils, the highest allocations; they have the best equipment and for this reason provide a higher percentage of enrollments, whereas graduates from the majority of ordinary schools hardly manage to enroll at institutions of higher learning."¹⁹ The "key schools" were planned as a model for all the rest, but this model remains way out of reach.

Prospects for employment, promotion and social status to a large degree determine the school-leavers' plans of a career and the trends in the formation of the student body. As is known, occupational orientation is an important aspect of a person's social orientation. In the course of the so-called "great proletarian cultural revolution" the incentives for acquiring an education (prestige, material status, prospects of a career) were virtually eliminated by the persecution of the intellectuals, very low payment for mental work, and the obviously ineffective employment of university graduates. Suffice it to recall the so-called theory of the uselessness of studying (*dushu wuyong*) widespread among the youth in those years. Today the social and professional orientation is influenced by such factors as unemployment among the literate youth and substantial differences in the working conditions at different enterprises.

The multimillion army of young people deported from China's cities in 1968-1978 vied for employment with nearly as large a number of first- and second-grade secondary-school leavers. The Chinese figure for the number of secondary-school leavers in 1980-1985, who, in the main, go to work—18.5 million—is probably even underestimated.²⁰ According to a top official at the State Economic Committee of the PRC, some 5 to 6 million young people seek work every year. The same Committee calculated that in the near future the labour force in the cities will grow annually by 3-4 million, not counting those dismissed and pensioned off.

What, then, in these circumstances, are the plans of the youth? A recent sociological poll indicated that young people everywhere "dream of finding work at state enterprises, wish to receive work through state job placement, dream of occupying positions requiring vast knowledge and high technical skills, seek socially prestigious professions". State enterprises attract them, not only by higher pay, prestige, a pension scheme, but also the possibility of life-long employment both for themselves and, if the present custom of workplace substitution remains, for their children. Since in China one cannot move from one enterprise to another at one's free will, it is extremely important for young people (and their parents) which enterprise they will be appointed to upon finishing an educational establishment. However, as recognised by the participants in an all-China conference on youth employment, held in June 1982, such dreams in the present circumstances are nothing but "wishful thinking". The "new course" in the matter of youth employment consists in the graduates of vocational schools being advised "to forget the passive dreams about unified employment and job placement by the state", and instead to "assume a spirit of independence", in other words, to regard the setting-up of self-reliant cooperative enterprises as the best way of ensuring employment.²¹

Chinese youth seek higher education not only because they wish to join the ranks of the intelligentsia, but also out of fear of unemployment.

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, March 12, 1983.

²⁰ See S. Rosen, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

²¹ See *Guangming ribao*, June 10, 1982.

Up till now the institutions of higher learning have in most cases provided, though not always in one's speciality, employment at a state enterprise, and "a steady bowl of rice". No less actively Chinese young people seek to get into technicums, also providing their graduates with a job. As to the secondary vocational schools and the classes of vocational training, opening everywhere under the auspices of secondary schools, so far parents do not recommend them very strongly to their children, and the juveniles themselves are not so eager to enroll, since the graduates of these vocational schools have to seek work on their own, with practically no advantages in job placement.

Amid the acute competition in job hunting, various proposals are made, aimed at making young people interested in the results of their study, and for the sake of "selecting talents", such as to equalise both types of educational establishments, thereby depriving the graduates of technicums of guaranteed jobs, meted out by the state; to introduce a single system of enrollment and job-placement for agricultural vocational schools and urban secondary specialised educational establishments; to grant the best students the right of priority job selection (such experiments are already under way, for instance, in Nanking) and to send them to state enterprises.

Yet for the time being the existing system of hiring workforce at enterprises, first of all the system of apprenticeship, as it is admitted in China, renders a negative effect on the professional orientation of young people. Some measures towards the job placement of graduates from vocational schools are being implemented. Some cities have decided gradually to have enterprises and city departments of planning and labour reckon with the number of vocational school graduates when compiling the plans for the utilisation of manpower reserves. In practice, however, the educational system is at odds with the needs of production, and the national economic planning system.

Knowing their poor standards, the managers of many enterprises are unwilling to employ the graduates of vocational schools, and give preference to graduates of regular general schools. This was admitted by Hu Qiaomu, Secretary of the CPC CC, during his visit to one of the vocational-technical schools in Peking.²² Educational bodies insist that the graduates of vocational schools should be employed upon passing a series of competitive qualification examinations in their speciality. However, the management of enterprises frequently object on the grounds that the specialities in which vocational school leavers were trained (for instance, in the 1980/81 school year) do not tally with the qualification standards of the period at state enterprises, or because the schools provide training in working the equipment of only one specific type. The management believes that graduates of vocational schools should take the examinations for employment just as everyone else. The lucky ones who managed to get an appointment to a state enterprise also have to serve a period of apprenticeship just as other newcomers, and it is only of late that appeals have been heard for graduates of vocational schools to be exempted from apprenticeship, or for its term to be curtailed. Thus, there is a number of reasons which by no means stimulate the enrollment of students in vocational schools.

And so, when planning their careers, Chinese teenagers and their parents prefer technicums to vocational schools. In addition to the poor prospects for employment, there is still another cause. Vocational

²² See *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, June 24, 1982; *Renmin ribao*, April 10, 1982.

schools operate mainly on the principle of self-reliance (a system of training and production), while the technicums are subsidised from the state budget. Enrollment at secondary vocational schools in the 1981/82 school year was even less than in the preceding school year, and there was sharp decline in the number of pupils in some cities (in Hanzhou, for example, from 1,300 to 300).²³ Even with a vast unemployment on, some provinces faced a considerable shortfall of applicants to vocational schools. According to 1981 statistics, the intake of new vocational school students amounted to less than 1,000 per province in 10 provinces out of 23, and in two, which remained unnamed, there was no enrollment at all. Seven provinces failed to enroll a thousand pupils even to agricultural secondary schools, and in four provinces schools of that type had no enrollment at all. A change for the better shaped out in the 1982/83 school year. All over the country the number of students at vocational schools and agricultural secondary schools went up steeply from 481,000 to 704,000, and up to 670,000 in the technical schools, while it topped one million at secondary specialised educational establishments with enrollment in them, just as in technicums, extended to 630,000.²⁵

For the present, it is easier to get into a vocational school than into secondary specialised educational establishments. In the summer of 1982, the number of applications to teachers' colleges in Peking was 19 per place; it was 30 persons per place at other secondary specialised schools, whereas at the vocational schools it was only 6 persons per place.²⁶

The system, legalised in the PRC, whereby children are entitled to the jobs of their parents when the latter retire, also has a negative effect on the Chinese young people's plans of a career. On the one hand, this system restricts the social mobility of graduates from educational establishments, on the other—it denies them any incentive to raise their educational standards. In the incomplete secondary school this factor turned into a strong brake on academic performance, since for stepping into the shoes of one's father or mother the marks in the school-leaving certificates of their children are of no importance, for they are guaranteed the job. The train of thought of many secondary-school pupils is something like this: "Why should we bother to develop our personality when father will soon be fifty?"²⁷ At Chongqing more than 5,000 young teachers have begun in recent years to work as teachers instead of their parents who retired on pension; most of them have not received the necessary education and actually have no right to teach.²⁸ The same situation arises upon the inheritance of other mental work professions.

In the early 1980s, vocational training developed mostly in the towns. According to preliminary data, by 1981 the number of pupils in urban vocational schools throughout the country was 213,000, and in agricultural general and in vocational schools—268,000,²⁹ which by no means reflects the correlation of the urban and the rural population in the country. The establishment of agricultural general and vocational schools

²³ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 17, 1981.

²⁴ See *Guangming ribao*, March 30, 1982.

²⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, April 30, 1983.

²⁶ See *Beijing ribao*, July, 23, 1982.

²⁷ From speeches of National People's Congress deputies and members of NPCCC at a discussion at Ministry of Education, *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1982, No. 1, p. 7.

²⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 5, 1980.

²⁹ See *Renmin jiaoyu*, 1982, No. 2, p. 8.

requires additional allocations, whereas in the cities many complete secondary schools as well as the so-called "May 7 universities" were rebuilt to accommodate vocational schools, of which there are many more in the cities than in the countryside. Despite this, in 1982 the idea was being ever more definitely promoted to the effect that "in its very essence the reform of secondary education has more favourable conditions in the countryside, and, therefore, there it may be implemented much faster and better than in town". Yet, commentators never indicate what these favourable conditions are, but apparently, it is precisely against such an approach that more cautious educational workers protested, believing that it is more difficult to create professional agricultural school than a general educational one, as it requires greater expenditure and it is more difficult to find teachers for it.³⁰ It is not for nothing that even city vocational schools in China are not so large, catering as they do to 80-120 pupils.

Whereas in the towns one of the obstacles to expanding the network of vocational education is the system of hire, a similar obstacle in the countryside is the system of "production responsibility". The introduction of this system on farms lacking machinery made the earning of an income directly dependent on the quantity of live labour; as a result, the peasants began taking their children out of school and the number of pupils in the countryside dropped dramatically.³¹ This process involved both elementary and secondary agricultural schools.

Another aspect of the "education—society" relationship is the influence of society on the social composition of the student body at different educational establishments. In the period of the "cultural revolution" an attempt was made, through the simplification of the educational system, artificially to overcome the existing social differences.

As confirmed by the practice of the USSR and other socialist countries, the system of education is an important, but not the sole, condition of social development. This process is determined above all by the overall development of the productive forces, by the progressive changes in the character and content of labour.

During the first years of the PRC's existence, consistent measures were carried out to bring children of workers and peasants to school. The process proceeded slowly, but steadily: by 1958 they made up 90 per cent of the pupils in the elementary and 70 per cent in the secondary schools, and 48 per cent of university and college students. The system of schools and institutions of higher learning introduced in the late 1950s combined (in about equal proportions) education and productive work. This was intended also for resolving social tasks: the low educational qualifications required for admission, free education as distinct from tuition in the full-day-study schools, which had to be paid for, allowed steeply to increase the percentage of children from working-class and peasant families among the pupils. However, the low quality of training, excessively early specialisation, and orientation toward local economic needs continued to divide town and countryside. Without actually tackling the problem of overcoming class differences, such a policy led at the same time to a decline in the reproduction of the intelligentsia. This was further compounded by such measures as the imposition, in 1966, of social qualifications for entering institutions of higher learning and the massive deportation of graduates from urban secon-

³⁰ *Guangming ribao*, Oct. 21, 1982; Dec. 20, 1982.

³¹ See *Renmin ribao*, May 17, 1982.

dary schools and institutions of higher learning to the countryside for constant residence.

Today for lack of statistical data, it is hardly possible to determine the degree to which the contingent of pupils in all the educational subsystems corresponds to the social composition of the population and the tasks of social development. However, China's possessing a network of elite educational establishments, aimed in practice at self-reproduction of government and party cadres and the intelligentsia, means a perpetuation of social differences, and, in combination with the system of "production responsibility", of social contrasts as well. In 1980-1982, a considerable number of those admitted to higher educational establishments and "key schools" were children of "cadre functionaries" (for example, at Peking University in 1980 they accounted for 39 per cent of the enrollment). The absence of a system of preparatory courses makes it impossible "to pull up" the graduates from non-key schools, to the standards required at entrance examinations to institutions of higher learning.

In the 1977/78 academic year the percentage of students coming from families of intellectuals in proportion to the share of the intelligentsia in the total population was higher than in the previous years, whereas the number of students with working-class and peasant backgrounds was lower.³²

Even a brief review demonstrates the many problems and contradictions between the changes in the educational system and the tasks of social development in the PRC; how important it is to take these problems into account and outline ways of resolving them. Educational workers in China are now very much interested in the administration of the educational system, but forecasting an educational structure is precisely an element and function of administrative activity. Such forecasting not only calls for an optimal satisfaction of the needs of the national economy in various specialists with different skills, but also for tackling such problems as the elimination of social contradictions and the overcoming of social differences by means, in particular, of a socialist system of education.

³² See *Peking Review*, 1978, No. 30, p. 18.

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PRC ARTICLE ON KAZAKH HISTORY ASSAILED AS 'SLANDEROUS'

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 118-127

[Article by G. S. Sadvakasov, corresponding member of Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and Professor U. Kh. Shalekenov, doctor of historical sciences: "Contrary to Historical Fact"]

The falsification of the history of the Kazakh people, of the history of Kazakhstan, has become part and parcel of the slanderous campaign launched against our country on the pages of the Chinese press. Shifting and distorting facts, the Chinese pseudo-historians have been doing their uttermost to distort, in particular, the history of Russo-Kazakh relations, the history of Kazakhstan's voluntary accession to Russia.¹ It is in this manner that the history of the Kazakh people, the history of its voluntary accession to Russia is treated in an article, recently published by the *Herald of the Xinjiang University*, and signed by Su Beihai.²

The main point of this rather wordy and pretentious article consists, if one is to believe the author, in "restoring the true aspect of history" and relating "how the Younger Kazakh *jus* fell victim to tsarist Russia's aggression, and also about its struggle of resistance to Russia". In all probability it would hardly be worth polemicising with the author of the article if one did not bear in mind that the article reflects views dominant at present in the historiography of the PRC, which by no means serve the scientific study of history but seek to distort it in accordance with Peking's territorial claims to the USSR, including the territory of Kazakhstan, to drive a wedge between the peoples of our country, to mislead the Chinese people as well as the Kazakhs and Uighurs residing in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the PRC, and to present matters as if they supported Peking's territorial claims.

The article's tone is strident, yet it is well known that abuse has never been convincing. The author draws mainly on 19th-century literature, with only some references to works on the history of Kazakhstan published in Soviet times, but even these are almost 40-years old. He keeps silent on the creative search of Soviet historical science and its Kazakh branch and the development of historical thought pertaining to the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia. Completely ignored, and deliberately so,

* This article was published in the *Herald of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR*, No. 4, 1983 (in Russian). Translated in a slightly abridged form.

¹ *Historical Science in the PRC*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1981, pp. 9, 60 (in Russian). For more details about the situation in the historiography of the PRC see: *Topical Problems of Struggle Against Maoist Falsifications in the Field of History, Proceedings of a Conference*, Moscow, 1979; R. V. Vyatkin, "Historical Science in the PRC at the Present Stage", *Voprosy istorii* (Questions of History), 1979, No. 2; B. P. Gurevich, "Some Questions Pertaining to the History of Kazakhstan and Central Asia and Their Distortion in the PRC Press", *The History of the USSR*, 1979, No. 2; B. P. Gurevich and V. A. Moiseyev, "Relations of Qing China and Russia with the Dzungar Khanate in the 17th-18th cc. and Chinese Historiography", *Voprosy istorii*, 1979, No. 3; V. S. Myasnikov, "The Ideological Bankruptcy of the Peking False Historians", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1979, No. 1; *Against the Maoist Falsifications of the History of Kirghizia*, Frunze, 1981; S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The History of China and the Present Day*, Moscow, 1976; V. S. Yasenev and A. G. Kruchinin, "A Criticism of the Maoist Falsifications of the History of Russo-Chinese Territorial Demarcation", *China in Modern and Contemporary Times*, Moscow, 1981 (all the works cited above are published in Russian).

² *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, 1983, No. 1.

is the historical literature of the last few decades, monographs specially devoted to the theme of Kazakhstan's voluntary accession to Russia, and the generalising, fundamental five-volume *History of the Kazakh SSR*.

Similar is the author's attitude to the publication of sources, archive documents, which sufficiently fully reflect Russo-Kazakh relationships in the 16th-19th centuries. The devices to which the author resorts are not anything new—pulling quotations out of context, keeping silence on a large number of significant facts for long now used in science, refusal to subject them to concrete analysis, or simply juggling with facts, attempts to present black as white, and wishful thinking. There is no need to go into the full content of Su Beihai's article, so let us dwell only on some of the most important issues.

All the clichés, in which the article abounds, attempt to prove that the Kazakhs have always populated Chinese territory, that, as the author maintains, they are "a fraternal nationality of our country" (i. e., China) and have always been part of China. However, China had many empires, each of which had its own territorial boundaries. As is known from Chinese dynastic chronicles themselves, the peoples—precursors of the Kazakhs, had never been part of any of the Chinese empires either in antiquity or in medieval times. The article appeared, of course, by no means accidentally, after the publication on October 30, 1981, of the resolution of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party *On the 250th Anniversary of the Voluntary Accession of Kazakhstan to Russia* and the celebration of this great event in the Kazakh SSR and throughout the Soviet land.

Acquaintance with the article shows that from beginning to end it is permeated with the spirit of Sinocentrism, great-Han chauvinism, and is nurtured by the ideas of Chinese imperial and Guomindang historiography, which has nothing to do with a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history.

One hardly needs comment on the article's formula to the effect that the Kazakhs "reside in several provinces: Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai. Though the Kazakhs residing in China number only slightly over 900,000, yet there is another 6 million in the Soviet Union". Not a word, of course, about the Kazakh people having their own, Soviet, national statehood in the USSR, about their being equal members of the great community of Soviet nations and, of course, there is no explanation at all of how the Kazakhs found themselves so far from their native lands in Gansu and Qinghai. The silence is rather meaningful. For, despite promises by the PRC leaders, the non-Han peoples of China were actually denied the right to national self-determination, and matters did not go beyond the creation, in several parts of the country, particularly in Xinjiang, of a truncated national regional autonomy. Yet it was not at their own free will that the Kazakhs turned up in the regions of Gansu and Qinghai, for they were resettled there by the PRC authorities.

The reader is told that the Kazakh people, allegedly, "in the historical past always resided within the boundaries of China". And since, as it is further asserted, the Kazakh *juses* spread over a vast territory from the Altai Mountains in the East to the shores of the Caspian Sea in the West, it follows that the Chinese borders also extended to the above-mentioned places. For the reader to have no doubt about this, the author refers to the Chinese historian Fan Wenlan who wrote, for example, that "the political influence of the Tang dynasty spread to the East and North coasts of the Caspian Sea, and its prestige still further", from which he derives the "scholarly" conclusion: "The Tang dynasty directly governed the region of the Younger *jus*," without so much as mentioning the hi-

historical fact that the political influence of the Tang dynasty had never extended "to the East and North coast of the Caspian Sea."

One can hardly believe that the author is ignorant of the real facts about the relations of the imperial Tang dynasty and the rulers of the Turkic state formations existing at that time in the territory of what is now Kazakhstan. For historical science leaves no doubt that in the 6th century A. D. on the vast expanses of Central Asia there was a powerful Turkic Khanate, which later divided into two independent state formations: the East-Turkic Khanate and the West-Turkic Khanate, the political centre of which was in the Semirechie region (now Kazakhstan). Nor is there any doubt that they were invaded by Chinese conquerors. In the 7th century the troops of the Tang dynasty overran the West-Turkic Khanate. Turkic literary monuments brought down to us the echoes of the centuries-long struggles by the Central Asian Turks against the Chinese emperors. Thus, an inscription on a monument erected in honour of Tonjukuk, says that Khan Elterysh alone "set out 17 times to fight" the Chinese.³ The stubborn resistance of the Turks, the rise of Tibet and, lastly, the invasions of the Arabs into Central Asia and South Kazakhstan put an end to the aggression of the Tang Empire. Soon afterwards the emperors of that dynasty were themselves compelled to pay tribute to the rulers of the Uighur Khanate established in the year 745 in place of the East-Turkic Khanate.⁴

What the article asserts differs not only from the evidence of Turkic, but also of Chinese sources. Even such a tendentious historico-geographic composition as *A Geographic Description of the Western Territory with Maps*, done by Royal Assent, prepared and published in 1782 by a special committee of Chinese scholars and dignitaries at the command of Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795), has to note that the "Han Zhang Qian managed to pass over the lands (of the Western territory) only once. Though the Tang (dynasty) did establish in some of the regions the posts of *dudu* and districts, the latter existed only nominally, though actually, they were non-existent."⁵

It remains to add, that the territory of Kazakhstan, as testified by Chinese scholars too, never came under the administration of Xi yu governor-generals.⁶

Moreover, it is clear to any unprejudiced person that one cannot claim the right to succession to one or another territory by reference to the evidence of tendentious chronicles and their indications to the end points of the routes of military campaigns. This is said convincingly in a statement of the Soviet government: "If one is to accept the principle upheld in the statement of the PRC Government, according to which the state ownership of a territory is determined not by the people populating it, but by recollections about former military campaigns, then Latin America would probably have to return under the sovereignty of the Spanish Crown and the USA return into the fold of Great Britain. Greece, as the heir of Alexander the Great, could perhaps claim for itself what is today Turkey, Syria, Iran, India, Pakistan, the UAR, and so on."⁷ The author's

³ S. E. Malov, *Monuments of Old Turkic Scripture Texts and Studies*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1951, p. 69 (in Russian).

⁴ A. G. Malyavkin, *Materials on the History of the Uighurs in the 9th-12th cc.*, Vol. 2, Novosibirsk, 1974, p. 5 (in Russian).

⁵ A. I. Chernyshev, "Materials of Qinding huangyu Xiyu tuzhi on China's Relations with the Western Territory in the Middle Ages", *Society and the State in China: Abstracts and Papers at the 12th Scientific Conference*, Part 3, Moscow, 1981, p. 188.

⁶ See Wang Zhilai, *The History of Central Asia*, Peking, 1980, p. 99.

⁷ *Pravda*, June 14, 1969.

morbid flight of fantasy (how else could it be described?) truly knows no limits when he speaks of the accession of the Younger *jus* of the Kazakhs to Russia. Here the author does not quibble over expressions: there is the "savage aggression", and "aggressors", and "expansion", and seizure aimed at "world hegemony", and "sanguinary wars against the aggressor", in which "numberless hosts of aggressors had perished". Ivan IV and Peter the Great appear in the article also only as "aggressors", while all the Russian ambassadors and embassy staff members, sent to discuss political and commercial matters to the Kazakh Khanates and Central Asia, as secret agents of autocracy. What is completely ignored is the centuries-long history of economic, political and cultural ties of the Russian and Kazakh peoples, their striving to live in peace, the striving of the Russian state to expand mutually advantageous trade ties with the Kazakh steppe, with Central Asia, to make the caravan routes safe.

The article relates about the external danger for the Kazakh people coming from the Oirat (Dzungar) feudals and the Kazakhs' struggle against them, a very serious factor in the history of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia. But the territory of the Dzungar Khanate is presented as Chinese, negating the existence of an independent Dzungar state while the conquest of that state by the Qings in 1758 and the brutal slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people in that territory were, of course, forgotten. In the opinion of Su Beihai, Dzungaria and Mongolia were "united" by the Qing dynasty while the national liberation movement of the Dzungars headed by Amursana is described as a "rebellion". This, indeed, was a "unification" accompanied by the annihilation of virtually a whole people!

Entirely distorted in the article is the history of the voluntary adoption of Russian subjecthood by the Kazakhs of the Younger *jus*. Khan Abulkhair is called "detestable scum" and his policy is described as "venal", the eldersmen who signed the oath of allegiance of September 10, 1731, and all the eldersmen of the Younger and Middle *juses* who followed suit—as "renegades" bribed by the head of the Russian Embassy Tevkelyov.

It is well known that the history of the accession of the Younger *jus* has been studied in detail by Soviet historiography.⁸ A large body of sources in Russian and Oriental languages have been discovered and placed at the disposal of scholarship. The collection of documents *Russo-Kazakh Relations* alone contains more than 600 documents.⁹

The gradual rapprochement and subsequent voluntary accession of the Younger, and then other Kazakh *juses* to Russia was caused by a number of economic, political and social factors, and constituted a process which took a long time and proceeded amidst a complicated international situation. The first documentally recorded contacts of the Russian state with the Kazakh Khanate date back to the end of the 15th

⁸ Among works of recent years see N. G. Apollova, *The Economic Development of Irtysh Lands in the Late 16th-First Half of the 19th c.* Moscow, 1976; N. E. Bekmakhanova, *The Formation of the Multinational Population of Kazakhstan and North Kirghizia*, Moscow, 1980; *Together Forever. On the 250th Anniversary of the Voluntary Accession of Kazakhstan to Russia*, Alma Ata, 1982; B. S. Suleimenov and V. Y. Basin, *Kazakhstan as Part of Russia in the 18th-early 20th c.*, Alma Ata, 1981; B. A. Tulephayev, *The Fruits of a Great Friendship*, Moscow, 1982; T. Zh. Shornbaev, *The Voluntary Accession of Kazakhstan to Russia*, Alma Ata, 1982.

⁹ *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries Collected Documents and Materials*, Alma Ata, 1961; *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 18th-19th Centuries 1771-1867 Collected Documents and Materials*, Alma Ata, 1964.

century, i. e., to the time of the latter's formation.¹⁰ The *letters patent* of May 30, 1574, granted by Ivan IV to the Stroganov brothers ran: "Beginning to arrive together with them in those new places will be trading folks, those of Boukhara and the Kazakh hordes, and from other lands, with horses and all kinds of wares ... and they shall trade there tax-free."¹¹ Owing to the historically evolved division of labour between the nomadic cattle-breeding and settled land-tilling areas, the Kazakh nomads were in need of handicraft wares and the products of agriculture, they were interested in trade relations with the Russian state. After accession to the Russian state of the peoples of the Volga region in the late 16th century, the population of the Younger *jus* entered into direct contacts with Russian subjects, and an exchange of embassies began. In their struggle against the Dzungar Khanate the Kazakh khans and sultans sought the support of the powerful neighbour state. Already in 1594 the Khan Tevekkel,¹² and later the Khans Tauke and Kaip, made requests for the granting of Russian subjecthood to the Kazakhs.

The acquisition and economic development by Russian people of Western Siberia resulted in the intensification of Russo-Kazakh economic and political ties. The growing threat emanating from the Dzungar Khanate, particularly in the 1720s, the invasion still remembered by the people as the "years of great calamity" ("aktaban-shubryndy"), when the menace of utter peril loomed large over them, put forth with new emphasis the problem of accession to Russia. Various conquerors used the feudal division and internecine strife for leading plundering raids into Kazakhstan.

Discoursing about the brutalities of tsarist Russia in regard to the Kazakhs and also contrasting the Kazakhs and the Dzungars, Su Beihai deliberately omits the tragic fate of the Dzungar people.

This is how Chinese historians themselves described the extermination of the Dzungars by Chinese troops: victory over Dzungaria "was gained by the most ruthless, nearly total extermination of the inhabitants of Dzungar. In the period of prosperity Dzungar was the home of more than 200,000 families, or more than 600,000 inhabitants; after the military rout three-tenths of the population were exterminated by the Qing troops, four-tenths died of smallpox, and the Dzungars that escaped the embrace of death had to flee to the Kazakhs into Russian domains".¹³ One can easily imagine that the Dzungars' neighbours, the Kazakhs, could have easily shared their fate. Objectively speaking, Russia appeared as the protector of the historical fate and very existence of the peoples in that region, and it is in this context that F. Engels wrote about the civilising role of Russia in regard to those peoples.

This was the situation in which a number of far-sighted representatives of Kazakh society contacted the Russian government, requesting subjecthood. On February 19, 1731, a decree was issued on granting the request and accepting the Kazakhs into Russian subjecthood.¹⁴ On October 10, 1731, the head of the Russian diplomatic mission A. I. Tevke-lyov, on the one hand, Abulkhair and 27 eldersmen representing the greater part of the Kazakhs of the Younger *jus*, on the other, signed a legal

¹⁰ V. Ya. Basin, *Russia and the Kazakh Khanates in the 16th-18th Centuries*. Alma Ata, 1971, p. 78.

¹¹ B. A. Tulepbaev, *Fruits of a Great Friendship*. Moscow, 1982, p. 5.

¹² *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries*, Alma Ata, 1961, pp. 3-5.

¹³ *Essays from the History of China. From Antiquity to the Opium Wars*, ed. by Shang Yue, Moscow, 1959, p. 549.

¹⁴ *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries*, Alma Ata, 1961, p. 40.

act of voluntary accession of the Khanate to Russia. Such are the facts which are widely known but we decided to recall them to demonstrate that the accession of the Younger *jus* to Russia, just as of the entire territory of Kazakhstan, was of a voluntary character. The attempt by Su Beihai to contrapose Abulkhair and Batyr Bukenbai is obviously untenable. The one and the other fought against the Dzungar feudals, while Abulkhair was even the head of a popular military formation. Both Bukenbai and Abulkhair signed the oath of allegiance to the Russian state.

Of course, Abulkhair's desire to become a Russian subject was prompted not only by the wish to save the Khanate from the onslaught of Dzungar feudals; he counted to strengthen his positions by this policy, which, understandably, could not but cause opposition on the part of individual feudals vying for power. However, this was a struggle not against Kazakh allegiance to Russia, as Su Beihai would like us to believe. Characteristically, after the assassination of Abulkhair in 1748 by Sultan Barak, not a single Kazakh feudal renounced Russian subjecthood. In the 1730-1740s the khans, sultans, eldermen of the Middle and Senior *juses*, that is, of the entire territory of Kazakhstan, also expressed the wish to become Russian subjects. Neither raids by Dzungar feudals in the late 1730s and early 1740s, nor the campaigns by Nadirshakh, nor the emergence of the Qing Empire at the end of the 1750s toward the Eastern borders of Kazakh lands and its military actions in the steppe, nor promises whatever, made to the Kazakh feudal chieftains along with Peking's pressure to make them renounce Russian allegiance, neither of these could wind the clock of history back. The Kazakh people did not abandon the chosen road and life has convincingly confirmed that the choice it made was correct.

The article contains a section entitled "Leaning of the Younger *Jus* to China in the Struggle Against Russia". It deals with contacts by individual representatives of the Kazakh nobility with the Qing court, which are depicted as relations of tribute-paying fealty and vassalage.

Contrary to historical truth, it is maintained that upon the conquest of Dzungaria, "the Kazakhs, who had belonged to China all the time, met the news with enthusiasm and again pledged submission to the united government of the Qing dynasty," that "the Kazakh people and the overwhelming part of the Kazakh nobility strove with all their hearts towards their motherland."

Untruthfully stressing the "closeness" of the Kazakhs to China, inflating the thesis about China's presence on the borderlines of Central Asia, Su Beihai keeps silent about China proper being thousands of kilometers away from Kazakhstan, behind the Great Wall, and that even after the seizure of Dzungaria and Eastern Turkestan this area was part of the Chinese Empire only with the status of a protectorate, and only at the beginning of the 1880s it was transformed into the Xinjiang province. Kazakhstan, therefore, never was part of the Chinese Empire and was separated from China by other state formations.

Long before the defeat of the Dzungar Khanate Peking showed interest in the state of affairs in the Kazakh steppe, though, as one can see from the same Chinese sources, it had not yet any clear idea of where, precisely, the Kazakh nomad territories were situated.¹⁵ In preparation for the invasion of Dzungaria, Emperor Qianlong issued, on April 9, 1755, a decree which said that the Kazakhs who

¹⁵ *Truthful Records on the Government of the Noble Emperor Gaozong of the Great Qing*, Tokyo, 1937, Chapter 481, p. 4b.

would come over to the side of the Empire should be awarded titles and sent to Peking, if they refused and put up a resistance, "then attack and capture (by military force)".¹⁶ Naturally, the Kazakhs of the Senior and Middle *juses* had no intention to give up their pasture lands along the Ili River and the Tarbagatai to the Qings. The Qings' emissaries demanded that the Kazakh feudals hand over to them Amursana, Bolan, Kazak-sara and others who had risen in struggle against Chinese rule.¹⁷ The message of the Chinese Emperor to the Kazakhs threatened: "If you fail to comply with our demands, we shall undertake a punitive campaign", "think about the consequences before opposing us."¹⁸ Peking's demands, however, met with resolute resistance of the Kazakh rulers.

In these circumstances the Qing court took the decision to invade Kazakh lands with a large military force, and use the "method of intimidation by military might". The search for Amursana was given out as the pretext for the invasion. The Kazakh steppe was set ablaze. The Qing troops under the command of Dardana and Khadakha spared neither women, children, nor old people. Fierce battles ensued. Avoiding pitched battles with superior enemy forces, the Kazakh detachments exhausted the Qing troops by skirmishes, lured them into out-of-the-way and waterless places and destroyed them piecemeal. On November 19, 1756, the Russian Foreign Ministry received a report which said that "Amursana together with Kirghiz chieftain Ablai-sultan besieged" one of the Qing detachments and "starved it".¹⁹ Khan Nuraly of the Younger *jus* told A. I. Tevkelyov that "a Chinese army is attacking the Middle Horde and repeated battles with Ablai-sultan occurred... where last autumn his brother Erali-sultan with his regiment also rode out to the aid of the Middle Horde and this is why those Chinese were beaten off in battle".²⁰

The resistance of the Kazakh people, the military-defensive measures of the Russian government, and also the uprising in Northern Mongolia (Khalkhe) under the leadership of Tsengunchjab compelled the invaders to retreat.

In the summer of 1757 the Qing troops again appeared in Kazakhstan. Kazakh camping sites moved to seek protection behind Russian fortifications. Some of the Kazakh sultans, including sultan Ablai, had to enter into negotiations with the enemy. Explaining the reasons of this step Ablai wrote that "he did it against his will, having small forces, being surrounded on every side by Chinese troops and without that he could not rid himself of them by any means".²¹ His envoys sent to Orenburg stated that sultan Ablai entered into negotiations with the Chinese command "in order to keep peace with them", but "he never entertained any thought of becoming their subject".²²

Sources quite definitely describe the relations of the Qing Empire and the Kazakh Khanates, which subsequently developed for some time as relationships not going beyond the framework of China's ordinary relations with neighbouring countries and possessions; these sources contain

¹⁶ B. P. Gurevich, *International Relations in Central Asia in the 17th-first half of the 20th c.*, Moscow, 1979, p. 131.

¹⁷ K. Sh. Khalizova, "On Some Methods of Qing Diplomacy in the 18th c., *Society and the State in China, Abstracts and Papers at the VI Scientific Conference*, Part 1, Moscow, 1975, p. 180.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ AVPR, *Dzungar Affairs*, op. 113/1, 1756, d. 1, p. 86 verso.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Kirghizian-Kaisak Affairs*, op. 122/1, 1756, d. 3, p. 182 verso.

²¹ TsGADA, 1st Senate Department, 1758, op. 113, d. 867, p. 5.

²² AVPR, *Kirghizian-Kaisak Affairs*, op. 122/1, d. 4, 1959, p. 117.

information to the effect that by that time a considerable part of the Kazakh population of the Younger and Middle *juses* had already acceded to Russia. In the autumn of 1757 Emperor Qianlong himself recognised in one of his decrees that he did not consider Kazakhstan as part of the Qing Empire: "When we say that the Kazakhs submitted and came over to our side, this (should) mean only (our) striving to attract (them), just like the possessions of Annam, Ryukyu and Siam... We by no means intend (to establish) regions and districts on their lands, (that is, include them into the territory of the Qing Empire) and establish a system of government and install officials, neither (to introduce divisions) into banners (corps) and tsolins (platoons), as in Khalkhe."²³ The Russian government, despite its small military forces in Siberia, decided, nevertheless, to take measures to protect the Kazakhs. On September 2, 1757, the Russian authorities in Siberia and Kazakhstan were ordered "to exercise every precaution... at the fortresses and foreposts in those areas". They were prescribed to prevent by every means "the ruin" of the Kazakhs and Dzungar refugees by Manchu-Chinese troops, which were to be prevented from approaching close, "and in case they appear and perpetrate brazen and arrogant attacks, then to use the military arm with utmost force."²⁴ When asserting that "the Kazakh people and the overwhelming part of the Kazakh nobility strove with all their hearts towards their Chinese motherland", Su Beihai discards the stubborn and sanguinary struggle which the Kazakhs of the Senior and Middle *juses* waged against the Qing government for the return of their age-long nomad territories, which were lost for a time as a result of the Oirat feudals' raids.²⁵ This, in fact, was an undeclared war by Qing China against the population of Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, facts are known when it was the Kazakhs of the Younger *jus*, together with volunteers from the Middle *jus*, that put up a resistance to the Manchu-Chinese invaders. The situation that evolved in Kazakhstan because of the raids by Qing detachments on the Kazakh camping sites prompted at that time Khan Nuraly, as a Russian subject, to approach Russian authorities to discuss joint military operations. There was a special agreement about this. During the Khan's meeting with deputy of Tevkelyov, Governor of Orenburg, in the autumn of 1757, Nuraly informed him that his brothers Eraly and Aichuvak were prepared, "having rallied no small troops from their individual possessions, to come out in aid of the Middle Horde", and he himself, in case of a Russo-Chinese conflict, upon receiving "appropriate and all possible aid from the Russian command", will be also prepared "at the command of Her Imperial Majesty [Empress Yelizaveta Petrovna.—Ed.] with a large troop and his brothers to move against the Chinese". He promised to put in the field "at least thirty thousand troops ... and sometimes much more".²⁶

One cannot help noting that Su Beihai, without doubt, deliberately leaves unmentioned the objectively progressive consequences of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia. Tsardom, of course, was tsardom. Its policy in Kazakhstan was in the interests of the ruling classes—the landlords

²³ *Truthful Records on the Government of the Noble Emperor Gaozong of the Great Qing*, Tokyo, 1937, Chapter 543, p. 15a.

²⁴ AVPR, *Dzungar Affairs*, 1755-1757, op. 1131, d. 4, p. 614, verso.

²⁵ *Description of the Pacification of the Dzungars, Done With Royal Assent* (Xubian), *Main Records*, 1772, Chapter 22, pp. 11b-12; Chapter 23, p. 2a; *Kazakh-Russian Relations in the 16th-18th Centuries*, p. 632.

²⁶ AVPR, *Kirghizian-Kaisak Affairs*, 1757, op. 122/1, d. 3, pp. 183-183 verso.

and capitalists—and pursued its own economic and military-political goals. Soviet historical science by no means whitewashes autocracy and its policy, but evaluates them from Marxist-Leninist positions. The dialectics of the complex and contradictory historical process consisted, precisely, in that, along with the social and national oppression of the popular masses, the economy of the Kazakh society was gradually drawn into the orbit of the more advanced-capitalist system. Side by side with the Russia of the tsars, landlords and capitalists, there existed a revolutionary Russia of Radishchev, Pushkin, Tolstoi, Chernyshevsky and Khalturin.

But what is all this to the author of the article in the *Herald of Xinjiang University*? Or that historical truth completely refutes all his false constructs?

The last section of his article is devoted to the history of the uprisings in the Younger *jus* in the 18th century under the leadership of Srym Datov, and in the Bukeyev Horde in the 1830s, headed by Isatai Saimanov and Makhambet Utemisov. According to the article's author, these uprisings contradict the views of Soviet historiography about the voluntary accession of the Younger *jus* to Russia. But here his arguments do not hold water either. The history of the national liberation movement of the Kazakh people has been studied in detail and for long by Kazakhstan historians, including the movements of Srym and Isatai.²⁷ Indeed, they were spearheaded against the colonial oppression of tsardom, against the oppression of their own khans and sultans, just as the actions by Kazakh toiling people who joined the peasant war led by Emelyan Pugachev, but by no means against the accession of the Younger *jus* to Russia. The author fails to see (deliberately or not) that there were two Russias and two Kazakhstans, and such failure is a distortion of history. Trying to substitute the national factor for the class factor, lumping together Nicholas the Big Stick (Nicholas I) and his satraps with the Russian people; the Khans Bukey, Janghir and others, with the Kazakh people. This position cannot be described as scholarly. Soviet scientists offered a precise class evaluation of the history of the aforementioned and other movements of the Kazakh toiling people, and the policy of autocracy and of the Kazakh khans and sultans. Those movements did go down in history, but they were not what the great-Han falsifiers pretend they are.

Moreover, Su Beihai forgets, or pretends to forget, that in the Peasant War under the leadership of Pugachev, Russian and Kazakh peasants jointly fought against the social and national oppression. Later on this joint struggle of the peoples—the main progressive consequence of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia—developed into a tradition, into an international revolutionary movement of the workers and toiling peasants, who joined together in the national liberation movement and who were victorious in the Great October Revolution. Without telling the truth

²⁷ M. P. Vyatkin, *Batyr Srym*, Moscow, 1947; E. B. Bekmakhanov, "The Uprising of the Kazakh Sharua of the Bukeyev Horde in 1836-1837", *Transactions of the Kazakh State University. Historical Series*, 1957, No. 3; Zh. K. Kasymbayev, "The Character and Motive Forces of the National-Liberation Movement in the Period of Kazakhstan's Accession to Russia", *Herald of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. Social Science Series*, 1982, No. 3; I. N. Kenzhaliyev, *Isatai Taimanov*, Alma Ata, 1977; V. F. Shakhmatov, *The Inner Horde and the Uprising of Isatai Taimanov*, Alma Ata, 1946; A. K. Yakunin, "On the Assessment of the Character of the National-Liberation Movement in the 1830s-1840s in Kazakhstan", *Questions of History*, 1951, No. 4; N. E. Bekmakhanova, "The Anti-Feudal Movements of the 18th c. and the Incorporation of Kazakhstan Within Russia", *Together Forever. On the 250th Anniversary of the Voluntary Accession of Kazakhstan to Russia*, Alma Ata, 1982, p. 241 and ff.

about this important historical process it is unthinkable to evaluate the accession objectively, as it is reflected in the decision of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party on the 250th anniversary of the voluntary accession of the Kazakh lands to Russia.

There is no need to examine all theses of the notorious article in the *Herald of Xinjiang University*. It is hard to say what prevails in it: ignorance or outright falsifications.²⁸ One thing is clear, though, that the territorial claims of the PRC to the USSR regarding the territories of the Kazakh SSR are being intensified and they are no longer restricted to the regions to the east and south of Lake Balkhash, but a "claim" is now being made to the territory of the former Younger *jus*, that is, the Soviet lands to the west of Lake Balkhash and many thousands of kilometers away from the borders of the PRC; actually, these are claims to the entire territory of Kazakhstan.

There is no doubt that such publications with their strikingly anti-Soviet bias have nothing in common with science and are absolutely at variance with Peking's statements about its wish to establish normal and friendly relations between the Chinese and Soviet peoples.

²⁸ The assertion by Su Beihai on "close political ties" between the region west of Lake Balkhash and north of the Sea of Aral with China in the Han period is a striking example of this kind of falsification.

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HISTORY OF Khabarovsk SURVEYED ON JUBILEE OF FOUNDING

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 128-133

[Article by V. S. Yasenev: "A Fine Old Town on the Amur (125th Anniversary of Khabarovsk)"]

Towns like humans celebrate their birthdays. Khabarovsk marked its 125th anniversary last May. The city's anniversary is first of all a holiday of its inhabitants, the working people of Khabarovsk. But it is also a festive occasion for the builders of the Baikal-Amur railway, the fishermen of the Pacific fleet, farmers and metallurgists, scientists and soldiers, in fact, for those who proudly call themselves Far Easterners.

The biggest city in the Soviet Far East rightly bears the name of Yerofei Pavlovich Khabarov. It is to Khabarov and his fellow trail-blazers that the credit belongs for the joining of the Amur region to Russia in the middle of the 17th century. The first thought of the Russians who firmly established themselves on the banks of the Amur was to start the economic development of this huge territory. "And ploughland will appear here, and this will be a beautiful land of plenty as compared to the whole of Siberia", Yerofei Khabarov wrote. "The Amur region abounds in farmland, meadows and fisheries."¹

But the Amur land also had to be defended from raids by the Manchu feudals who tried to abduct the local population and make it serve in their army which at the time was conquering China. It was Khabarov who made the rallying call which became the motto of the defenders of the Amur region from the Manchu aggression: "We, Cossacks, will go down to the last man fighting our sovereign's enemy and no Cossack will be captured by the Manchus alive."² And the Russians fought to their last breath defending the Achansk and Kumarski fortresses and repulsing the enemy's onslaught on Albazin, the main stronghold of the Amur region.

In May 1858 soldiers of the 13th Line Battalion headed by Captain Yakov Vasilyevich Dyachenko, whose name is now borne by one of the city streets, founded the settlement of Khabarovka on the right bank of the Amur in an amazingly picturesque locality amidst nut-tree, oak and ash-tree forests. The rapid growth of Khabarovsk was stimulated by its convenient geographic location and the general development of the Russian Far East. In 1880 it got the status of a regional city, while in 1913 it was already more populous than such old towns as Kursk, Kaluga and Kostroma.³ A railway linked Khabarovsk with Vladivostok in 1897 and this increased its economic importance as the centre of the entire Amur region.

¹ Quoted from L. Grigorova, Y. Melnichenko, *Historical Monuments and Memorable Places of Khabarovsk*, Khabarovsk, 1958, p. 4.

² *Russo-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century. Materials and Documents* In 2 volumes. Vol. 1, 1608-1683, Moscow, 1969, p. 135.

³ *Khabarovsk in the Past and Now*, Khabarovsk, 1971, p. 8.

Workers with experience of revolutionary struggle came to the city from St. Petersburg, Moscow and Tula and began working at the local enterprises, including the Arsenal and the base of the Amur flotilla. The workers of Khabarovsk took an active part in the first Russian Revolution and like all the workers of the Far East joined the general political strike in 1905. By its organisation and political nature the strike of post and telegraph workers that was supported by the workers of the Arsenal and railwaymen, merits special mention. A Social Democratic group formed in Khabarovsk early in 1906 and in 1907 it became a grass-root organisation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP).

During the October Revolution the working people of Khabarovsk confidently followed the Bolsheviks. In January 1918 the Bolshevik Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies telegraphed to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Soviets in Petrograd: "Since December power in Khabarovsk is in the hands of the Soviet. The toiling population salutes the People's-Peasants' Government which has dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The decrees are being gradually implemented."⁴ The years of Civil War and struggle against foreign intervention in the Far East witnessed great heroism and exceptional loyalty to the cause of Soviet power. The exploits of those who gave their lives for the socialist future of the Amur region and of our entire country are now embodied in the monuments to the heroes of the Civil War in the Far East, to the workers of the Arsenal, to the sailors and workers of the base of the Amur flotilla, to the defenders of Khabarovsk near the Kazakevichevo railway station, and to the Amur sailors near the city railway terminal. On February 12, 1922 the People's Revolutionary Army completed the rout of the White Guards at the Volochayevka bridgehead. The days of fighting at Volochayevka have left their trace in the heart of the entire Soviet people as a model of the greatest heroism, similar to the one displayed on the ice of Kronstadt and during the storming of Perekop. Khabarovsk was liberated on February 14, 1922 after the rout of the White Guards and interventionists at Volochayevka. The time of rehabilitating the economy and of peaceful socialist construction came.

By its position Khabarovsk was and remains a border city. So its history, just as the history of the entire Soviet Far East, could not but reflect the events happening in countries of the non-Soviet Far East: in neighbouring China, in Japan and Korea.

The pre-war years were filled with tension for Khabarovsk. The armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, the seizure of Manchuria by Japan and the preparation by Japan of a springboard for war against the USSR, the numerous border provocations by the Japanese military developed in the Soviet Far Easterners an acute sense of vigilance and a high sense of responsibility for the preservation of peace. War burst into our home from the Western frontiers. Thousands of people from Khabarovsk heroically fought at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and died in the name of routing the German fascist invaders. The industrial enterprises of Khabarovsk produced everything that was needed for the front.

The people of the Far East and Khabarovsk played a tremendous role in routing Japanese militarism. During the Manchurian offensive operation from August 9 to September 2, 1945, the 2nd Far Eastern Front

⁴ Quoted from: V. I. Chernysheva, *Khabarovsk (Centenary of the City)*, Khabarovsk, 1958, p. 27.

with the Amur flotilla that was operationally subordinated to it dealt the main strike in the direction of Harbin. The troops of the Front advanced swiftly along the Sungari direction and this resulted in the clearing of the whole of Northern Manchuria from the enemy.⁵ The exploits of such outstanding soldiers as Hero of the Soviet Union, Petty Officer N. N. Glubokov are revered by the people of the city on the Amur and perpetuated in the names of streets and by memorials.

In the postwar years the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government are giving constant attention to the development of the productive forces in the Soviet Far East. By the mid-1950s Khabarovsk became the biggest industrial centre in the Far East. Its enterprises put out more than 200 types of products.⁶

At the same time Khabarovsk is making a big contribution to the strengthening of our country's friendly relations with the People's Republic of China. The revolutionary ties of workers in Khabarovsk with Chinese workers were established already in 1917. In one of their letters to the workers of Khabarovsk Chinese workers of the East China Railway wrote: "We are happy that the great Russian people is coming to our assistance. We hope that together with our older brothers, Russian workers, we will achieve a better future and will unite with the workers of the whole world for a better life."⁷

The economic ties of Khabarovsk Territory with Heilongjiang province began to be established after the victory of the people's revolution in China. Soviet and Chinese river workers began to cooperate. The draft project of utilising the natural resources of the river Amur, worked out in those years, could have played a tremendous role in the further development of the Soviet Far East and the border areas of China. A joint session of the Learned Council of the Amur and Heilongjiang complex expeditions of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the PRC was held in October 1957 in Khabarovsk and six months later in Peking. On the border stretch of the Amur river alone it was intended to build a cascade of 4-5 hydropower stations that would generate 20-25 billion kilowatt-hours of cheap electricity annually. It was intended to improve also the transport network of the region by linking the Amur with the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. Alas, these plans remained on paper.

In the 1960s, in accordance with the Programme of the CPSU, the Party set the task of ensuring a priority development of the eastern areas of the country and making fuller use of the boundless natural wealth of the Far East. Big deposits of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, lignite and other minerals were found in Khabarovsk Territory. The Solnechny concentrating complex was built at a huge tin deposit near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The modernisation was started of the main industrial enterprises: the Amurstal metallurgical plant, the Daldiesel, Energomash, Dalselkhoz mash and Amurkabel enterprises.⁸

The prospecting for underground treasures, the construction of Gorny, a satellite city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, went parallel with the develop-

⁵ See L. N. Vnotchenko, *Victory in the Far East. Military Historical Essay on the Combat Operations of Soviet Troops in August-September 1945*, 2nd Revised and Supplemented Edition, Moscow, 1971, p. 314.

⁶ See A. Shytikov, "Come to Us in the Far East!" *Ogonyok*, 1956, No. 2, p. 5.

⁷ *Harbinsky vestnik*, No. 4082, April 22, 1917. Quoted from V. I. Chernysheva, *Khabarovsk (Centenary of the City)*, Khabarovsk, 1958, p. 91.

⁸ A. Shytikov, "The Wealth of the Far East to Be Placed at the Service of Communism", *Pravda*, Feb. 3, 1964.

ment of the principal wealth of the territory—timber. Amursk, a city of white stone and a satellite of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, came into being with the construction of a giant pulp-and-cardboard complex. In January 1966 Khabarovsk Territory was awarded the Order of Lenin for fulfilling ahead of schedule the assignments of the seven-year-plan period (1959-1965) and for putting out products to the sum of more than 200 million roubles over and above plan.⁹

The people of Khabarovsk Territory not only sustained the high rates of socialist construction but increased them further. On January 15, 1971 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded the Order of the October Revolution to the city of Khabarovsk for fulfilling the assignment of the five-year-plan period 1966-1970, for big successes achieved in the process in economic and cultural development, and also in recognition of the services of the workers of Khabarovsk to the revolution.¹⁰

The economic ties of Khabarovsk territory with foreign countries of the Far East developed with every year. Assessing the coastal trade with Japan, conducted by Khabarovsk territory through Dalintorg with numerous Japanese firms, the First Secretary of the Khabarovsk Territorial CPSU Committee A. K. Cherny noted already in 1972 that the economic organisations of Khabarovsk territory engaged in the export of goods along the line of coastal trade are interested in the purchase in Japan of consumer goods, as well as machinery, equipment and materials necessary for the manufacture of goods in demand on the Japanese market.¹¹ Long-term agreements on mutual deliveries of goods between Dalintorg and Japanese cooperative organisations should give a big impetus to the growth of trade turnover.

Whereas the country as a whole has moved in big strides from one five-year plan period to the next, for the Far East these were really gigantic strides. Thus, whereas the Russian Federation as a whole was to increase industrial output during the ninth five-year-plan period (1971-1975) by 44-47 per cent, the figure for the Far East was 50 per cent. Developing at a rapid pace there also are agriculture, transport, communication and branches that directly influence the growth of the population's material and cultural standard of life.¹²

The tenth five-year plan of developing the USSR's national economy in 1976-1980 provided for ensuring a comprehensive development of the economy in the Far East, for increasing the output of non-ferrous, rare and precious metals and diamonds, timber, pulp, paper and furniture. Assignments directly concerning the people of Khabarovsk were included in the programme of further developing the Eastern areas of the USSR that was outlined by the 25th Congress of the CPSU. They include increasing the catch of fish and sea products, the expansion of geological prospecting and research work concerning the comprehensive development of productive forces in the zone adjoining the Baikal-Amur railway. The further development of the iron ore base, including deposits in Khabarovsk territory (the Kimkinski, Kostengen and Starikovskoye deposits) was linked with the growth of ferrous metallurgy in the Far East and the prospects of export to Japan. It was planned to build new

⁹ See *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1966.

¹⁰ See *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1971.

¹¹ A. K. Cherny, "We Are for the Development of Goodneighbourly Relations", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1972, No. 2, p. 14.

¹² See M. S. Solomentsev, "The Wealth of Siberia and the Far East to Be Placed at the Service of the People", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 3, p. 7.

major pulp-and-paper complexes in Khabarovsk and Sovgavan also with a view to exporting timber and technological chip to Japan.¹³

The basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the period ending in 1990 adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress set new scientifically substantiated milestones for the development of the productive forces of the Soviet Far East and of further improving the living conditions of working people: "In the Soviet Far East to ensure further development of non-ferrous metals, oil refining, fishing, timber, woodworking and pulp-and-paper industries,¹⁴ to increase the production of soya beans, rice and other agricultural produce."¹⁵

Special attention is given in the directives of the Congress to concern for the working people of the Far East. "Create conditions for providing new enterprises, especially in Siberia and the Far East, with personnel", it was decreed by the supreme forum of our Party.¹⁶ In the eleventh five-year-plan period it is intended to carry out the construction of housing and all the necessary amenities at a still higher pace and to constantly improve the supply of the population with commodities.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government constantly show concern to ensure peaceful conditions for the work of Soviet people. Of tremendous importance in this respect are the proposals made from the rostrum of the 26th Congress on concrete talks on confidence-building measures among all interested countries. There is no doubt that the Far East, where such powers as the USSR, the PRC and Japan are neighbours and where a big number of American military bases are located, needs the elaboration and adoption of special measures that would lead not only to the restoration of detente and the strengthening of mutual trust on a regional level, but could also become useful for strengthening the foundations of universal peace.

The Soviet Union invariably comes out for improving relations with its Far Eastern neighbour—the People's Republic of China. The people of Khabarovsk actively support the course of the CPSU and the Soviet government of normalising Soviet-Chinese relations. As it was noted in his speech at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet by member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko: "The Soviet Union continues to come out for a normalisation of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of reciprocity, for the search of possibilities of gradually expanding bilateral ties and contacts. We stand for continuing the Soviet-Chinese political consultations that have been started and would want them to lead to positive results. We are convinced that the normalisation and improvement of relations between the two countries accord with the fundamental interests of their peoples."¹⁷ The certain positive changes achieved in this field, in particular, the commencement of bor-

¹³ See N. N. Nekrasov, "Eastern Areas of the USSR in the Tenth Five-Year-Plan Period", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1976, No. 1, pp. 8-9.

¹⁴ "In the north and north-western parts of Amur region and Khabarovsk territory alone there are forests with reserves of commercial timber amounting to more than 500 million cubic metres. Putting them to industrial use will make it possible to build along the Baikal-Amur railway dozens of timber-felling and wood-working enterprises. The construction of many of them has already been started." *Izvestiya*, March 18, 1983.

¹⁵ *Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1981, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, p. 225.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, June 17, 1983.

der trade between the two countries in the Far East are evidence that business cooperation can be mutually beneficial. The working people of Khabarovsk and Khabarovsk Territory ensure the favourable prospects of this cooperation by their labour accomplishments.

Today Khabarovsk is one of the biggest administrative, industrial and cultural centres of the Soviet Far East. Its enterprises put out more than 2,500 types of industrial products which are widely known not only in the Soviet Union, but also far beyond it, in fact in 40 countries of the world. These include ocean-going ships and programme-controlled machine-tools, grain harvesters and consumer goods, electrical equipment and medicines.

There are eleven establishments of higher learning in Khabarovsk graduating annually more than ten thousand specialists—engineers, doctors, teachers, cultural workers. The publishing house in Khabarovsk is one of the biggest in the country. Its output is diversified and enjoys well-deserved popularity. The Far Eastern Centre of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR has three academic institutes in Khabarovsk. Besides, there are 56 research and design organisations in the city.¹⁸

The working people of Khabarovsk are successfully solving their tasks of further developing the city and the territory as a whole. It is with much enthusiasm that they responded to the decisions of the June Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. The words said by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov at the Plenary Meeting are addressed to them just as to all working people of the country: "...To ensure the well-organised and smooth work of the entire economic mechanism is both a requirement of the present and a programme task for the future. This is a component of the overall process of perfecting our social system.

The main road to a qualitative change in the productive forces is, of course, the transition to intensive development, the fusion in practice of the advantages of our socialist system with the accomplishments of the scientific and technological revolution. More than that, of its latest stage that holds out a promise of a technical revolution in many spheres of production."¹⁹

These words are full of particularly deep meaning for the Soviet Far East where the growth of the productive forces outstrips the rates of population increment. Taking these words as a programme of their future work the people of Khabarovsk are successfully working to implement their most daring and cherished dreams. The anniversary of Khabarovsk offered an opportunity not only to sum up some of the accomplishments that have been achieved to date but also to see the wonderful perspectives of the further development of one of the most beautiful cities in the USSR.

¹⁸ See *Izvestiya*, May 28, 1983.

¹⁹ *Kommunist*, 1983, No. 9, p. 7.

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IN REFERENCE TO A HISTORICAL FACT

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[Article by Yu. I. Kychanov, doctor of historical sciences (Leningrad)]

The first issue of the *Bulletin of Wuhan University Studies* (social sciences)¹ for 1982 carries an article by the Chinese historian Wu Guaniao dealing with the history of the state of Xi Xia, particularly, with the formation of its districts and regions. The author of the article quoting one of my works, puts forward a concept that actually distorts facts of history.

"Xi Xia", Wu Guaniao writes, "is a principality founded together by Chinese, Tibetans, Uighurs and Tatars. It was ruled by the Dang xiang dynasty." The word "principality" (*wangguo*) is the only "terminological concession", so to speak, that the author makes in relation to the state of Xi Xia (982-1227). Though the word "state" can be found almost on every page of his article, it is used only in combination "our state", meaning the state of China.

"The Tanguts-Dangxiangs," the author reports, "is a branch of their historical ancestors Qiangs who lived in the Western regions of our [Chinese.—E. K.] state" (p. 84) and the territory of the Tangut state of Xi Xia is a "territory that from time immemorial was a region where ancient northwestern ethnic groups of our [Chinese.—E. K.] state and the Chinese had been living together for long gradually assimilating with each other" (p. 85).

Wu Guaniao tries to convince the reader that the Huns, the Xianbi, the Qiangs and other nationalities which once lived on the territories adjacent to the Chinese border were the nationalities that belonged to the Chinese state proper. As follows from this claim, there was neither the Hun state, from which China once fenced itself off by the Great Wall, nor the state of the Xianbi, nor independent Tibet. History evidences, the author says, that the Qiang nationality (including Dangxiangs) lived from the ancient times within the boundaries of the territories ruled by China. The territory of the state of Xi Xia, its population and its administrative regions, Wu Guaniao points out, lay within the limits of the state of China—in Ordos, in the northern part of Shenxi province and in Hexi where various Chinese ethnic groups, with the Han people leading them, communicated with each other assimilating gradually. The Qiangs (including Dangxiangs), Wu Guaniao stresses, evolved in the same direction as the Chinese.

Soviet historian Kychanov, Wu Guaniao goes on, in his article "The Chinese Manuscript Atlas of Maps of the Tangut State of Xi Xia Kept in the Lenin Library of the USSR" (1958) submitted to a session of the Oriental Commission of the USSR Geographical Society "distorted history" by claiming that Xi Xia was once an independent state and "the Tanguts, known as the Dangxiangs", "had to go under China's authority". In fact, the Chinese historian Wu Guaniao accuses the Soviet historian of virtually discrediting China's nationality policy and undermining the unity of the peoples of the PRC.

¹ *Wuhan daxue xue bao*, 1982.

And what did my article published 25 years ago say in reality? Here I quote: "In China and in Chinese chronicles the Tanguts were known under the name of Dangxiangs. In the 6th-7th centuries Dangxiangs occupied the territory south of Lake Kukunor in the upper reaches of the Hwang Ho river. Pressed by Tibetans they had to go under China's authority and were partially moved by the Chinese government to the north, where the Hwang Ho river made a curve."²

Is there any distortion of historical truth there? Wu Guaniao claims that to call Dangxiangs by the name of Tanguts is a distortion. But this fact is universally recognised, by Chinese scholars among others. In one of his articles (1982) Professor Wang Jingru, an expert on the history of the state of Xi Xia, writes that under the Tang dynasty northern nationalities called Dangxiangs Tang-wu (Tangut).³ As far as the map of the Tangut state is concerned, it was drawn by Chinese themselves in the 11th century. On the map the border between the state of Xi Xia and China is identified by the uninterrupted line and is marked by the character "jie", meaning "border". The conclusions of my research into the history of the Tangut state coincide with the conclusions drawn by such well-known experts in the ancient history of the Tangut states as Professor Okazaki Seiro (Japan)⁴ or Paul Fridland of the United States.⁵

Wu Guaniao claims that Qiangs, the ancestors of Tibetans, Tanguts and other Tibetan-Burmese ethnic groups, judging from their languages, "evolved, since the earliest times, in the same direction as the Chinese". I would not deny that in those times the Qiangs were, indeed, China's western neighbours, and, incidentally, all the territories that later became part of the state of Xi Xia had been the indigenous lands of the Qiang people. In the middle of the first millennium B. C. either all⁶ or many⁷ of the Western neighbours of China were Tibetan-Burmese ancestors of the western Qiangs. At the end of the first millennium B. C. the West-Qiang alliance of the Tibetan-Burmese tribes formed in the upper reaches of the Hwang Ho river and near Kukunor. The Western Qiangs waged blood-letting wars with Han China which ousted them, step by step, from Gansu plains to the West—to the Tibetan Upland, and to the south—to the mountainous regions of present-day western part of Sichuan.⁸ From the 3rd century A. D., following the downfall of the Han state and the beginning of the period of the Three Dynasties China's attacks against Qiangs subsided and part of them returned to the lands of Gansu and Shenxi, forming a number of states there ruled by the Qiang dynasties. The Qiangs who lived in Kukunor steppes, were partially conquered, in the year of 310, by the Xianbis who set up their own state of Tuguhun in that area. Among the Qiangs who refused to submit to Tuguhuns and who lived in Amduo, in the 4th and 5th centuries, Dangchang and Dangxiangs—immediate ancestors of the Tanguts of

² E. Kychanov, "The Chinese Manuscript Atlas of Maps of the Tangut State of Xi Xia Kept in the Lenin State Library of the USSR", *Countries and Peoples of Orient*, ed. 1: Moscow, 1959, p. 204 (in Russian).

³ Wang Jingru, "Xi Xia yin xi daoyan", *Min zu yu wen*, 1982, No. 2, p. 1.

⁴ See Seiro Okazaki, *Tanguto kōrai shi kenkyū*, Kyoto, 1972.

⁵ Paul Fridland, *A Reconstruction of Early Tangut History*, University Microfilm International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, 1980.

⁶ Wang Tongling, *Zhongguo minzu shi*, Peking, 1934, p. 18.

⁷ Xia Zengniu, *Zhongguo gudai shi*, Peking, 1955, p. 56-57.

⁸ Wang Jianying, "Qiangren fankang Dong Han fengjian tongzhi di douzheng", *Lishi chiaohe*, 1956, No. 11, pp. 8-9.

Xi Xia—stood apart. The Qiangs who moved deeper inside the Tibetan Upland laid down the foundations of the Tibetan state.

What did Wu Guaniao mean when he declared that the Qiangs and Dangxiangs "lived in the Western regions of our state?" If he meant the present-day territory of the People's Republic of China, one can agree with that. But in the first few centuries A. D. the bulk of the Qiang tribes did not live under the Han rule. They made no part of the Han state. In the 6th century both Tibetans and Dangxiangs-Tanguts, and in the 7th century Tibetans and part of the Dangxiang tribes were regarded as "foreigners" by the Chinese, as an "outside nationality". The fact is registered in Chinese official historical documents. As for the Tangut state Xi Xia, it was undeniably an "outside state" in relation to China, no matter how hard some Chinese historians try to deny that describing Xi Xia as "a Chinese breakaway political government".⁹ It is obvious that such "concepts" take their root outside genuine science. Their authors, in fact, turn historical research into an instrument of tendentious politics.

There can be no doubt that from the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist theory of state the Tangut state of Xi Xia should be regarded as an independent state. It was ruled by an emperor and that was the only title of the head of state used in Xi Xia at the time. The fact that Xi Xia's state apparatus was built on Chinese pattern is no argument in favour of the Tanguts' dependence. The same may be said about the acceptance of the Confucius doctrine. Leading expert in the Middle Age history of China Professor Herbert Franke shares this view. He writes that the Tangut state "claimed... independence".¹⁰ Throughout more than 200 years, in the Song period, the Tangut state of Xi Xia was one of the independent states in China's north. As one of the steps toward asserting their independence, the Tanguts invented the written language of their own¹¹—such is the opinion of the British expert on China and the Tangut state E. D. Grinstead. Leading American Sinologist L. C. Goodrich wrote that the Tanguts established an empire in the northwest of China and in Eastern Mongolia¹²—an empire and not a certain "breakaway political government".

Why do some Chinese historians refuse so stubbornly to recognise the independence of the Tangut state, a state that existed hundreds of years ago? Apparently, the reason lies in their support of the great-Han concept of a "united Chinese state at all times", and this leads, in fact, to the denial of the independent historical development of today's national minorities in the PRC.

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⁹ Huang Zhenhua, "Ping Sulian jin sanshi niandi Xi Xia xue yanjiu", *Shehui kexue zhanxian*, 1978, No. 2, p. 313.

¹⁰ *The Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies*, 1980, No. 15, pp. 109, 110.

¹¹ E. D. Grinstead, "Tangut Fragments in the British Museum", *The British Museum Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 34, pp. 83-84.

¹² L. C. Goodrich, "Tangut Printing", *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch*, 1976, p. 64.

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POPULATION CENSUS IN CHINA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 137-140

[Article by Ye. S. Bazhenova]

China has the world's largest population. During the last decade its demographic processes drew ever growing attention of the country's leadership. The importance of the demographic factor for China was emphasised in the Report of Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, to the 12th Congress of the CPC which took place in September 1982. "The population problem," he said, "has always been an exceedingly important one for China's social and economic development. Family planning is a cornerstone of our state's policies. We must bend every effort to prevent our population reaching the 1.2 billion mark at the turn of the century. Excessively rapid population growth would negatively affect not only the growth of per capita income, but also the satisfaction of the country's needs in grain, housing, education and jobs. This may become a serious problem with possible consequences for social stability. That is why the family planning effort, especially in the rural areas, must not be slackened."¹

The population census held in China on a nationwide scale in the summer of 1982 aroused not a little interest among the world's demographers, because data about the population of a country accounting for one-fifth of the world's total inevitably affect estimates and projections about the population of the vast region of Asia and the whole world, and absence of such data created a lot of problems for statisticians.

It is not surprising therefore that several international organisations took an interest in the conduct and financing of the 1982 census. For example, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) allocated \$14 million to China for the preparation and holding of the census, which was an impressive exercise. While over 5 million enumerators were used in the 1964 census,² the corresponding number for the 1982 census was much greater, for its scope was broader and included additional information about fertility trends and migration mobility.

In June 1980, a sample survey was held in the city and county of Wuxi (Jiangsu province), which was also financed by the UNFPA. The survey provided a welcome opportunity to test modern data-processing equipment and acquire the necessary expertise in obtaining accurate data. The UNFPA provided assistance in organising the work of the national and provincial computer centres, secondment of consultants, organisation of study tours abroad and training of Chinese statisticians abroad.

China's leaders considered the 1982 census to be a key element in the creation of a reliable statistical base for the planning of the country's socio-economic development and the conduct of a scientific demographic policy.

The preparatory work for the national census began in late 1979, with the census starting at 0 hours on July 1, 1982.

The 1982 census data published by China's Central Statistical Board show the population of the 29 provinces and autonomous regions of continental China to be 1,008,175,288.³

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 8, 1982.

² "Population" UNFPA Newsletter, NY, 1980, Vol. 6, No. 7.

³ *China Daily*, Oct. 28, 1982.

According to China's State Council guidelines about the methodology to be used in the 3rd national population census, it was primarily designed to obtain data about persons living on the territory of the PRC and therefore excluded the *huaqiao* of Chinese living abroad.

In the 18 years that passed since the 2nd national census held in 1964 the population of China's 29 provinces and autonomous regions went up from 694.6 million by 313.6 million, a growth of 45.1 per cent.⁴ The average annual growth during the period was therefore 17.4 million or 2.1 per cent.

The sex distribution of the population as before is characterised by the preponderance of males (519.4 million or 51.5 per cent) over females (488.7 million or 48.5 per cent), with 106 males per 100 females.

The national composition of the population is such that Hans account for 93.3 per cent of the total (or 936.7 million), the remaining 67.2 million spread among other 55 nationalities.

Since 1964 there have also been certain changes in the population's cultural level: the share of illiterates and semi-illiterates dropped from 38.1 to 23.5 per cent or 235.8 million people (the group includes persons over the age of 12 who know few or no hieroglyphs). This means that one-fifth of China's population can neither read nor write. The share of persons with higher education, 4.4 million, is very low.

China's urban population numbers 206.6 million. As before the share of the urban population in the country's total is small—20.6 per cent against 18.4 per cent in 1964. It is obvious that urban growth is mainly the result of physical growth. A characteristic feature of China is the concentration of urban population in large urban centres which include several of the world's largest cities: Peking—9.2 million, Tianjin—7.8 million and Shanghai—11.9 million.

During the more than 30 years of the PRC's existence, considerable changes have taken place in the country's demographic situation. The 1982 census data show that, in comparison with the 1950s, birth rates were nearly halved (20.9 per cent in 1981 against 38-40 per cent in the first years of people's power) and a considerable reduction of the death rate was achieved, down to 6.4 per cent, according to official data. As a result, the rate of physical growth dropped from 2 to 1.46 per cent annum. The drop in the birth rate was the result of socio-economic transformations accomplished in the 1950s and, to a certain extent, of the demographic policy pursued by the Chinese leadership especially actively during the last decade.

Following the census, the State Committee on Family Planning reporting to the State Council carried out a sample survey of fertility (the sample included 1 woman out of every thousand). Begun on 1 September 1982, it took 4 months to complete. It was the first nationwide fertility study in China. Its task was to take stock of the results of the family planning effort during the preceding few years. The questionnaire included 22 questions on different aspects of marriage, bearing of children and family planning. The survey's results are to be used for demographic projections, planning and the elaboration of new tendencies in the demographic policy.⁵

The active implementation of the demographic policy during the last few years has resulted in a considerable growth of demographic research, with greater attention paid to the interrelation between population

⁴ These and subsequent census data are from 20 October 1982 issue of *Guangming ribao*.

⁵ *China Daily*, Sept. 3, 1982.

processes and economic problems. Chinese publications have lately carried a number of theoretical articles devoted to China's population problems and their impact on social processes in the country. All sorts of research centres are now actively involved in demographic studies, with applied research also on the rise.

A population theory department at Peking's Institute of Economics was set up in February 1974, the first of its kind since the "cultural revolution" during which there was no demographic research in the country.⁶ In June 1978, the most part of the department's staff were transferred to Peking's People's University (Institute of Demographic Studies) headed by Professor Liu Zheng.

December 1977 saw the publication of a collective work of Chinese demographers entitled *Renkou lilun (Population Theory)*, prepared at Peking's Institute of Economics. The work's publication triggered off an animated discussion of the present and future demographic situations in China. The first open exchange of views among demographers took place at a symposium on population theory held in Peking in May 1979.

Soon after, the press reported the creation of associations on population problems all over the country. In April 1979, an association on population problems was set up at Tianjin's municipal council. By November 1980 such associations were set up in the provinces of Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Guangdong, Yunan and Heilongjiang and were being set up in other provinces and regions including Jilin, Fujian, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Shandong, Shenxi, Liaoning, Sichuan, Hubei, Gansu, Guizhou, and Inner Mongolia.⁷

The last few years also saw the creation of a network of research organisations and institutions involved in training of demographers.

The first group in the network, including more than 25 institutions, is constituted by centres operating within the system of higher education. The Institute of Demographic Studies at Peking's People's University is the country's main research and training centre in the field. Regional centres belonging to the first category cover the whole of the country's territory. They include the Fudan (Shanghai), Peking and Jilin (Changchun), Zhongshan (Guangzhou) and Sichuan (Chengdu) Universities, as well as the economics department of the Lanzhou University.

The second group of demographic research centres does not make part of the higher education system. In 1979, Peking's Academy of Social Sciences received an Institute of Sociological Studies, followed soon after by a Centre of Population Problems. By the autumn of 1980, 10 demographic research centres were established as a part of the Academy of Social Sciences' system in Tianjin and Shanghai, as well as in the provinces of Shanxi, Guangdong, Sichuan and Gansu.⁸

The third group of research and training centres includes special population departments created at Henan and Wuhan Medical Institutes, as well as those in at least four provincial Communist Party schools for party cadres (in the provinces of Hebei, Guangxi, Sichuan and Liaoning).⁹

By order of the Ministry of Education, beginning with the autumn term of 1980 the course Late Marriage and Family Planning in secondary schools was renamed Population Studies.¹⁰ The Sichuan Teachers'

⁶ See *Guangming ribao*, Feb. 5, 1980

⁷ See *Renkou yu jingji*, 1980, No. 1; *Renkou yanjiu*, 1981, No. 1.

⁸ See *Guangming ribao*, April 22, 1980; *Renkou yu jingji*, 1980, No. 1

⁹ *Population Index*, Vol. 47, No. 4, 1981, p. 685

¹⁰ See *Guangming ribao*, May 24, 1980

Training Institute and nine other institutes are now responsible for training teachers reading the course.¹¹

A Centre of Information on Population in the PRC with a staff of some 30 was established in 1980. Its tasks include the drawing up of catalogues, the systematisation of Chinese and foreign books, and other publications, and the coordination of activities with China's research institutions in the field of population studies. In 1981, five employees of the centre were engaged in collecting information about and studying the activities of population centres in Thailand, the USA and Japan.¹²

The Chinese leadership's concern about population problems also stems from a slight rise in birth rates and natural growth of population in the early 1980s which took place despite all measures to the contrary, including encouragement of one-child families. Experience shows that unless social and economic measures shaping the population's attitudes to marriage and family size go step-in-step with the family planning policy, the latter will not produce the desired effect—a rapid reduction of birth rates and, to an even greater extent, a radical solution of demographic problems.

Since the demographic factor affects all aspects of social life in China, the country's leaders place a considerable emphasis on demographic policy.

Family planning provisions were included in a number of acts and decrees. Article 53 of the PRC's Constitution (adopted in March 1978 by the 2nd Session of the National People's Assembly) says that "the state encourages and supports family planning".¹³ On 1 January 1981, a new Marriage Act went into force. It raised the marriageable age for men from 20 to 22 years and for women from 18 to 20 and included a number of family planning provisions. Article 12 says that "it is the duty of spouses to practise family planning".¹⁴

China's demographers have come up with a number of projections of the country's population. In beginning with 1980 every woman is going to bear only one child, China's population will continue to grow for another 25 years and by 2004 it will reach 1,054 million; if the average number of children per family is going to be 1.5, the population growth will continue for 47 years, and by the turn of the century China's population will reach a figure of 1,125 million; with two children per family on average the population will continue to grow for another 72 years reaching a figure of 1,217 million by 2000 and overshooting the 1.5 billion mark by the time of the PRC's 100th anniversary in 2049.¹⁵ With the average number of children per woman of 2.3 (the 1978 level) by the end of the century China's population will reach 1,282 million; while three children per family (the 1975 level) will result in a population of 1,414 million by 2000.¹⁶

That is why, after years of inconsistencies in demographic policy, the pressing needs of feeding a billion-strong population and securing the country's socio-economic development have compelled China's leaders to pursue a policy of demographic austerity designed to reduce the birth rate. It is not before the end of the century that the policy's results will begin to have an effect on the country's economic life.

¹¹ The training of teachers is partly financed by the ECAFE Population Commission, *Guangming ribao*, June 5, 1980.

¹² *Population Headliners* (Bangkok), Dec. 1980, No. 69.

¹³ *Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1981*, Peking, 1981, p. IV—213.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, April 15, 1980.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

SINOLOGIST'S MEMOIRS SHOW 'DEEP ROOTS' OF CHINESE-SOVIET TIES

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 141-144

[Review by Ye. F. Drozdov of book "Iz kitayskikh bloknotov. O kul'ture, traditsiyakh, obychayakh Kitaya" [Excerpts from the Chinese Notebooks. The Culture, Traditions and Customs of China] by O. B. Rakhmanin, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1982, 112 pages: "Reminiscences for the Sake of the Future"]

Every generation of Soviet people has its "discovery of China", has its acquaintance with its unique civilisation, with its unusual and difficult history, with its rich culture, enchanting art and with the character of the people—this great and most artful toiler and staunch soldier, with its life and language, as well as with the history of our country's ties with China, and the history of our joint struggle and creative endeavour born by the Great October Revolution and the Liberation of 1949.

The roads to this discovery are multiple and diverse: from personal participation in the events of the past decades to knowledge through the printed word—journalism (for instance, so brilliantly presented in the post-war years by K. M. Simonov), the fiction of both countries, plays and Soviet art (from the earlier works it is enough to recall R. Glier's ballet "Red Flower") and through the works of Soviet scholars—historians, economists, geographers, philologists. During the past decade this was enhanced also by the dozens of volumes of memoirs and reminiscences by Soviet officers and diplomats, public leaders and specialists who by their work had taken a direct part in the establishment and strengthening of friendship between the great peoples of the USSR and China.

It is not from the pre-revolutionary "illustrated" mass publications that the generations of past years had gained knowledge about China. The youth of the 1930s-1950s "discovered" China in the militant publications of our press, in the passionate poetry of Mayakovsky, in the essays and books by P. A. Mif, A. Ivin, S. Tretyakov and R. Karmen, in the publications of the *Internatsionalnaya Literatura* (*International Literature*)

magazine, the works of Russian experts on China as well as in the books of progressive Western journalists. That was a heroic image of a struggling people fighting for freedom, independence and national dignity, for a Red China. And it is not by chance, therefore, that many had later become professional students of China.

The present generation of our youth also inevitably encounters China, but encounters it differently and it is another China, with its more complex image, while involuntarily preserving in their memory the events which have complicated the situation in the world of socialism, the international situation and did not tally with the image of the country which for many years had evoked good and positive impressions of solidarity and cooperation.

So now there has come off the press a book which vividly and convincingly shows that what was bad and unjust, what distorted the image of that country, its behaviour in the world, was not something "natural", not a historical inevitability but a period of sinister fog that had concealed for a time what was true and necessary in the history of China, a period that is being followed by a natural and historically logical purification and, as we hope, by a return to the socialist nature of our relations.

This is not a book of memoirs. Neither is it a collection of essays although it does contain elements of both with an addition of laconic entries almost resembling a diary. But it is not the genre that is important. It has nothing to do with the importance and role of this publication. What is important is the reason why this book was written and the throbbing reality with which it is connected.

The author of this book, Professor Oleg Rakhmanin, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), is one of the leading Soviet Sinologists, a first deputy chairman of the Central Board of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. The author got a comprehensive education in Sinology in the USSR, spent many years in China, graduated from the People's University in Peking, represented the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties in the PRC, was a counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in China, travelled a lot in that country and had meetings with outstanding Chinese cultural figures, politicians and public leaders.

"As a man who has devoted some 40 years of his life to China I wanted to write not so much about political events in that

country, as I have had to do on numerous occasions, but to deal with other aspects of the life of the industrious and wonderful Chinese people who, I am convinced, will have a better future, including friendship and cooperation with all neighbours, with friends who have never let this people down in times of trial." Characterising his task, the aim of his book, the author expresses the hope that his readers, including, of course, the young generation will show a "greater interest in China, its people, history and customs", will show a "desire to get a deeper knowledge of the specificities of that unusual country" that "still remains mysterious for many" (p. 111) before they turn to definitive studies by Soviet researchers encompassing almost the entire diversity of the Chinese historical being. For this reason the author offers the reader not just random portraits of cultural figures, theatre genres or descriptions of Chinese traditions and daily life. Neither was he random in drawing on his memory. The seemingly kaleidoscopic presentation is, in fact, strictly controlled by the author's plan: firstly, to recreate the values of Chinese civilisation that are of a genuinely popular nature, to show what is fundamental and permanent in the life of the PRC, cleaned of what is chance, chimerical, artificial and transient, though possessing concrete, particular socio-historical roots and, secondly, to show on this basis the behests and traditions of friendship with the Soviet people that are organically inherent in Chinese culture, the organic ties with Soviet culture.

The entire content of O. B. Rakhmanin's book testifies to this: the deep roots of these ties (and not only in the field of culture) will not be destroyed by any zigzags of history or subjective intrigues, the more so that the Soviet side has on more than one occasion demonstrated signs of goodwill and desire to revive relations of friendship with the PRC. "The CPSU and the Soviet state sincerely want a development and improvement of relations with all socialist countries", Yuri Andropov stated at the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. "Mutual goodwill, respect for the lawful interests of one another, the common concern for the interests of socialism and peace should prompt correct decisions also in those instances where for various reasons

the necessary trust and mutual understanding are yet absent.

"This applies also to our great neighbour—the People's Republic of China." The ideas formulated by Leonid Brezhnev in his speeches in Tashkent and Baku, the emphasis made by him on "common sense, on the need to overcome inertia and prejudices" expressed the conviction of our entire Party, its striving to look ahead. And it is with much attention that we treat every positive response to this from the Chinese side."¹

This is evidenced by the author's numerous meetings and conversations, studies and direct observations starting with 1946, the time of his stay in the "Liberated Region of Manchuria".

The very first pages of the *Chinese Note Books* take the reader into the extremely interesting epoch of the establishment and development of Russo-Chinese ties. Attentively tracing this continuous process, the author acquaints the reader with a gallery of outstanding personalities, real devotees of science and sincere exponents of closer Russo-Chinese cultural ties, who devoted more spiritual energy to the study of China than was prescribed by their official duties, or formal functions, if such existed. The author showed us that the names of N. Y. Bichurin, P. I. Kafarov, V. P. Vasilyev and others have become a pride of national science.

Their works, and sometimes also the exploit of their life, have served as a basis for the flourishing of Chinese studies in our country that set in after the Great October Revolution, after victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism and the decisive success of the liberation movement in China as a consequence of these events. The new, Marxist-Leninist stage in the development of Soviet Sinology is represented by V. M. Alexeyev, S. L. Tikhvinsky, N. T. Fedorenko, M. I. Sladkovsky, M. S. Kapitsa and many other scholars. The name of the author of the reviewed book is in this honourary rank of the most significant names. O. B. Rakhmanin rightly stresses that the result of their work was not simply the development of Sinology as "informational" scientific discipline, but the promotion and consolidation of Soviet-Chinese friendship, the mutual enrichment of cultures, development of the historical tradition of the drawing together

and mutual understanding of the two neighbouring peoples, the Soviet and the Chinese, enhancement of their joint outstanding participation in the world revolutionary process, in the struggle for the triumph of communism.

O. B. Rakhmanin also notes that in contemporary times there was a reciprocal process from the other side—the steady growth of the keen interest of the Chinese people, cultural figures, of Chinese communists in our country's culture, in the successes of our revolution (this including also direct participation in it), in the experience of creating the new world and the new man. Not to speak of the scientific assimilation of the Soviet Union's accomplishments, the spirit of social creativity, the aims of implacable struggle against all types of oppression were profoundly shared by our Chinese friends. It was thus, jointly that the great event of the 20th century—Soviet-Chinese friendship—was created as, in effect, a regularity of world historic importance. Showing this process on the example of "Maxim Gorky—China" the author laconically and convincingly demonstrates the strengthening of this historic link, draws portraits and describes the activities of the outstanding propagandists of Russian and Soviet culture in China, the great champions of Sino-Soviet unity: Qu Quibo, Mao Dun, Lao She, Xiao San, Xu Beihong, Nie Er, Mei Lanfan and many others. The book is permeated with firm conviction that no chance and even fateful circumstances can disrupt this historical movement of peoples and cultures towards each other.

It is indicative, as the author rightly points it out, that all the outstanding Chinese cultural figures, all genuine patriots of their country had demonstrated a substantial facet of their souls and their creativity—the deep feeling of friendship and respect for the Soviet Union, for our culture. The outstanding Chinese prose writer Mao Dun (Shen Yanbing), the PRC's first Minister of Culture, Chairman of the Union of Writers, wrote, "Soviet literature ... increases our courage and instills confidence in us, helping us fulfil the tasks facing us". And further: "The Chinese people and Chinese writers are mastering the Soviet Union's priceless experience of creative endeavour and victories. Now and forever we, the writers of China, shoulder to shoulder with the writers of the Soviet Union, will

fight with the weapon of literature for peace, against the war-mongers" (pp. 19, 20).

When describing the lives of Chinese cultural figures O. B. Rakhmanin saw in this entire diversity something that is common to all and is of prime importance—the conscious and sincere striving for friendship with the Soviet people. Lao She, who died tragically in 1966, thus expressed his feelings in one of his numerous friendly conversations with the author in the 1950s: "Every trip to the Soviet Union gives me the same joy as is experienced in China during celebrations of the New Year" (p. 26).

The author takes us also into the magic world of the Chinese theatre, with its unique synthetic nature, original symbolism, the theatre represented by playwrights and actors often of a tragic fate, active proponents of ideas of friendship with the country of the October Revolution, the country of "The Man with the Rifle", "Optimistic Tragedy", Pogodin's trilogy about Lenin, and "Russian People" which inspired Chinese theatre workers and all patriots in their work and struggle.

O. B. Rakhmanin quotes in his book the wonderful words of the composer and violinist Ma Sicong: "I have understood one thing: the Chinese and Soviet peoples have the same ideals and common aims and that is why our understanding of each other often transcends the framework of language. It is on this commonality that the cornerstone of our friendship rests" (p. 53).

From O. B. Rakhmanin's book the modern reader will learn much about Chinese establishments of higher education and the activities of the House of Culture of the Peking Sino-Soviet Friendship Society, about the scores of invariable friends of our country and activists of cooperation with the USSR in the field of literature and art, sport and education. The author writes both about their past meetings with Soviet people and about the latest activities of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society in the 1980s.

Landscapes and descriptions of historical monuments in China and numerous illustrations make the book all the more interesting. Features of daily life and customs appear as exquisite elements of the whole—Chinese civilisation—described warmly and competently by a big friend of the Chinese people, a man who knows and treasures Chinese culture.

"Reminiscences in reminiscences"—this is one of the most important moments in the book. This is the Chinese people's memory of the years of joint struggle and work and it refutes the scepticism about the future of Soviet-Chinese relations.

O. B. Rakhmanin's book is not only about past impressions. It takes the reader, who might be discovering China for the first time, into the world of genuine China, its real future which no doubt is on the road to socialism. As to the latter, the joint road, it implies also a common conscience and shared duty. "And there is no doubt," the author concludes, "that in the long run goodneighbourly and friendly relations will be restored between the USSR and the People's Republic of China because this accords not only with the cardinal long-term interests of the Chinese and Soviet peoples, but also with the interests of the world system of socialism, the revolutionary, liberation movement of all oppressed peoples, and the interests of strengthening universal peace."

The book prepares the reader for a new page in our relations, and generates respect for and interest in that wonderful, heroic people. For this reason it is both a reminiscence and an introduction into the future.

MPRP AT ITS CURRENT STAGE

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 144-146

[Review by A. S. Zheleznyakov of book "The MPRP Increases Its Leading Role in the Building of Socialism" (in Mongolian) by G. Boldbator, edited by B. Ligden, Ulaanbaatar, 1982, 158 pages]

The state publishers of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) has put out a book by Sh. Boldbator *The MPRP Increases Its*

Leading Role in the Building of Socialism. The work contains a comprehensive analysis of the growing leading role of the MPRP at the present-day stage, that is a stage when the building of a material and technical foundation of socialism is nearing completion in Mongolia. Ample factual material and numerous examples from the life of Mongolian society and from practical activities of the MPRP are used by the author to convey the meaning of the notion "the leading role of the party". This approach serves to indicate that the author sees his main task in analysing the objective factors that provide for the enhancement of the MPRP's guiding role at the current stage of Mongolia's development and in showing the mechanism of their work in all the spheres of life of Mongolian society (p. 5).

Boldbator points out that the MPR is now working on a triple task: it is building the material and technical foundation of socialism, perfecting social relations and moulding a new man (pp. 26-27, 31). The author gives a convincing and profound characteristic of the complicated and multi-faceted process involved in the solution of this task (pp. 47-66, 67-86, 87-105) and arrives at the conclusion that the deeper the process of the building of a socialist society, the bigger the guiding role of the party and the higher its importance as the political leader, educator and organiser of the masses. He also focuses on the ideological and theoretical aspect of the activity of the party and its role in dealing with key issues of the country's social and economic development (pp. 27-46).

Boldbator looks at the enhancement of the party's leading role as a major objective factor of the development of a socialist society. This process is inseparable from the organisational and political consolidation of the party ranks, from the constant improvement and enrichment of the party inner life. In the book one can find a detailed account of how the Leninist principles make themselves manifest in the party's image and activities. The author shows that these principles form the foundation of the party, lie at the bottom of the methods of the party leadership based on the creative application of the theory of scientific communism. The party of the Mongolian communists emerges as a living political organism linked with the

masses by innumerable ties and keenly reacting to everything new in the life of society. As the genuine Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the Mongolian people the MPRP sees its primary duty in furthering its contacts and in promoting its unity with the people.

One of the chief indicators of the party's increasing leading role—the continuous growth of its ranks—is examined by the author in close connection with the question of selection, placing and upbringing of party cadres. With the help of graphic illustrations, concrete facts and figures the author shows the dynamics of growth of the party ranks, positive changes in the party's social foundation, the sex and age characteristics of party members and their educational level. The MPRP's overall membership today runs at 76,000. This means that one out of ten grown-ups is a party member in Mongolia. In the last 20 years the party ranks have almost doubled, thus confirming that the party policy, as far as cadres are concerned, has been a success and that its prestige among the people has grown considerably.

The author provides material illustrating the party's effort to increase the share of industrial workers in its ranks and stressing their role as the party nucleus. In 1981, the workers' share in the party rose to 32.6 per cent. "In the places where industrial development was particularly spectacular," the author writes, "the share of the workers among those joining the party rose to 60-70 per cent. For example, in Darkhan industrial workers made up nearly 70 per cent of those who joined the party in the period between 1976-1978" (p. 108). Boldbator sees the reason for the rapid growth of the workers' share in the party in the increasing contribution of the country's working class to the industrialisation programme, in the qualitative and quantitative growth of the working class and in its more active political role. More and more workers join the party because its prestige enhances all the time and because the party works untiringly and purposefully towards increasing its ranks and improving its composition.

The author points out that though the numerical growth of members of agricultural cooperatives is still observed in the party ranks, their share among the party members has lately been decreasing. In 1966, it was 21.8 per cent and in 1981—17.5 per cent.

Apart from the main reason of this reduction attributed to the general decrease of the share of members of agricultural cooperatives in the structure of the population, the author also lists some other factors such as the inadequate work of some party organisations in drawing cooperated cattle-breeders into party ranks—a shortcoming that the 4th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the MPRP pointed to (in 1978). The author writes that to draw more cooperated cattle-breeders into the party is a task acquiring an ever greater importance today. As for the office workers and the intelligentsia, they accounted for one-fourth of all who joined the party in 1980 (p. 109). The share of communists who have secondary and higher education now reaches 71.3 per cent (p. 115). The author observes the rapid growth of the share of women in the party. It now reaches 27 per cent. The book contains examples illustrating the party's efforts aimed at drawing young people into its ranks. In the period between the 17th and 18th congresses of the MPRP 85.7 per cent of those who were admitted to the party were people under 35. The average age of party members is 44 (p. 110). Using numerous facts and statistics the author gives a convincing picture of the party's changed make-up, and of its cadre reserves and arrives at profound scientifically-based conclusions. He examines the cadre policy of the party through the prism of its everyday activities involving the selection, training and placing of cadres, their upbringing and control over the implementation by them of party decisions. He views this policy through the criteria that the party itself uses in assessing the work of every communist.

Most issues touched upon in the book deal with how the MPRP brings the main principles of the Leninist style of party leadership into practice. This topic is specially reviewed in the last chapter of the book where the author concludes that the party must improve steadily the style of its work in order to ensure its leading and guiding role in the present-day conditions (p. 116).

The MPRP exercises its leading role in society through Khurals, trade unions, the revolutionary youth league and other public organisations. Far from substituting these organisations, the party pursues its own line in them through communists working in these organisations (p. 136), first, by outlining the

scientifically based course of activity for them (p. 134), second, by pursuing the cadre and educational policy in them (p. 135) and, third, by controlling, together with communists, members of these organisations, the implementation of their decisions (p. 136).

Much space is given in the book to the subject dealing with the generalisation and spread of advanced methods of party work, in public organisations among others, and to the enhancement of the vanguard role of the communists in them. Boldbator cites examples of red tape, suppression of criticism and bureaucratic ways that occur now and then in the work of the party and other organisations. He underlines in this connection the importance of the decisions of the 10th (1975), 3rd (1977), 4th (1978) and 7th (1980) plenary meetings of the CC of the MPRP, which called on the communists to analyse thoroughly the existing shortcomings and to eradicate them (p. 121).

The book takes up a very important subject and, what is more, views it in the light of the decisions approved by the 18th Congress of the MPRP—this major forum of the Mongolian communists—held in 1981. The book's merit is its complex approach to the present-day development of the MPRP and Mongolian society examined in its full complexity and in connection with international factors, such as the internationalisation of social life in Mongolia, in the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries (pp. 42-46), with the MPRP's persistent and systematic campaign against the bourgeois ideology and manifestations of opportunist trends of any kind (p. 157).

Regrettably, the book contains only brief surveys of some of these problems of world-wide importance, since its small size does not permit to go into greater detail. Some characteristics given by the author are therefore too fragmentary. The above-mentioned flaws, however, in no way overshadow everything new and interesting that the instructive book of the Mongolian researcher has.

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TRADE MONOPOLIES IN JAPAN

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No. 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 146-149

[Review by Yu. Ye. Yevgen'yev of book "Torgovyye monopolii v Yaponii" by A. A. Odintsov, Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 190 pages]

The questions of monopolisation of domestic and foreign trade and the activities of trade monopolies in Japan have not so far been studied sufficiently in Soviet research works dealing with the postwar development of the monopoly capital in Japan. But it's trade monopolies that play an exclusively important role in promoting Japan's economic expansion, as 9 leading trade monopolies account for more than half of the country's export-import transactions. This is a considerably higher level of monopolisation compared to other advanced capitalist countries. For example, in the United States a similar amount of export is handled by 300 big corporations.

Aware of the important role that the Japanese trade monopolies play in the national and international trade, including trade with the Soviet Union, Soviet researchers find it necessary to study their position and activities on external markets as

sub-contractors and rivals of Soviet foreign-trade agencies. The analysis of the formation, structure and activity of these monopolies helps get a clearer idea of the place that the monopoly trade capital occupies in the structure of the financial capital.

The book by A. Odintsov, *Trade Monopolies in Japan* is designed to help fill a certain gap in the study of these questions. In it the author analyses tendencies and the level of financial and economic development of trade monopolies, their place and role in the structure of financial groups, their contacts with industrial companies and banks concerning credits, the ownership of jointstock capital, marketing and taking part in production, their role and importance in the state-monopoly system. A particular attention is given in the book to the analysis of the place, role, forms and methods of activities of trade monopolies in the sphere of foreign economic contacts.

"The evolution of the present-day big trade capital of Japan is examined using

as an example, the activities of 10 leading trade monopolies whose trade turnover has ensured them dominating positions in the foreign and domestic (wholesale) trade: Mitsubishi shiyodji, Mitsui bussan, Marubeni, Itochu shiyodji, Nissyo-Iwai, Sumitomo shiyodji, Toyo menka, Nichimen jitsugyo, Kanematsu goshyo, and Ataka sangyo. Since in 1977 the Ataka company was taken over by Itochu shiyodji, the data of subsequent years therefore covers 9 monopolies." (pp. 10-11).

In view of the aggravated marketing situation, the capitalist countries have been doing their best in the last few decades to improve the organisation of trade; this includes developing the so-called marketing systems, introducing the latest scientific and technological achievements in trade and promoting contacts between trade and industry. The present-day capitalism sees a key to the solution of this problem in a further monopolisation of the sales' sphere.

While in some countries (in the United States, for example) where industrial capital has been a predominant force since its emergence, the tendency prevails for monopolising trade by industrial corporations through their own marketing systems, in others (the FRG or Japan) the monopolisation of trade is mainly achieved through concentrating and centralising trade capital and through establishing trade monopolies.

"While in West Germany and other capitalist countries," A. Odintsov writes, "the process of the concentration and growth of trade monopolies took place mainly in the postwar period, in Japan, in view of the historical peculiarities of the development of Japanese capitalism, monopolies emerged and became the prevailing form of the organisation of home and foreign trade long before the Second World War" (p. 16).

The author justifiably sees the main reason of that phenomenon in the economic backwardness of pre-war Japan which stepped on the road of capitalist development later than other industrialised countries. Hence, a big part played by the trade and usurious capital in the development of both pre-monopolistic and monopolistic capitalism in Japan. It was just the trade and usurious capital (the greater part of the finances was concentrated in the hands of such trade firms as Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Shimoda

and others) that provided a basis for the formation of zaibatsu, large monopoly amalgamations, which, in the period between two world wars, had acquired the form of multibranch concerns of a closed family nature. On the account of their merchant origin and specific economic conditions at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries big trade companies and banks formed within these concerns. They began playing an important role in subsequent years.

After the Second World War, especially in the 1960s, Japan, having finally coped with socio-economic backwardness typical of her past, entered the period of a rapid economic development and soon turned into a powerful industrial state. "But in the new conditions," A. Odintsov observes, "the institute of trade monopolies has not lost its importance" (p. 22). That was largely due to the fact that a huge number of medium- and small-sized enterprises were still part of the industrial structure in Japan. They lacked the opportunities for marketing their goods independently and needed trade intermediaries. Besides, the wholesale trade traditionally played a big role in the system of commodity circulation. The author links the growing domination of trade monopolies with the process of formation and consolidation of postwar monopoly amalgamations, i.e., financial groups. "The formation of these groups was accompanied by the merging of trade monopolies, leading banks and industrial monopolies and their development into a major component-part in the structure of these groups. That ensured them the solid financial and economic basis and helped them establish themselves as biggest commercial centres of the country" (p. 24).

Following numerous mergers and take-overs, a relatively stable group of 10 biggest firms (listed above) shaped up known as *sogo shiyosha*, or universal trade companies. The author deals at length with the growth of financial and economic potential of the *sogo shiyosha* firms which eventually, as to some indices, secured for themselves a place in one row with leading industrial concerns; he deals with their diversified activities, the consolidation of their own material and technical foundation, their investment policy and many other things.

He discusses, in particular, the place of trade monopolies in the structure of financial capital and financial groups.

"By now," A. Odintsov writes, "six clear-cut powerful financial groups have emerged in Japan: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo (Fuji), Daiichi-Kangin and Sanwa. The first three emerged as a result of the consolidation of contacts between certain banks and companies that were part of the pre-war zaibatsu... The others formed the so-called "new groups", through the amalgamation of separate, independent industrial and other companies with the Fuji, Daiichi-Kangyo and Sanwa banks" (pp. 50—51).

The author's spotlight on financial groups is justifiable, since the formation of powerful groupings out of big corporations, banks and trade firms linked together by the common pursuit of maximum profit is one of the essential characteristics of Japan's monopoly structure. In contrast to the pre-war zaibatsu, with their strict hierarchical structure and the centralised control, the financial groups have no special control and managerial bodies with a juridical status. Characteristic of the relationship inside the groups are many-sided contacts, mutual ownership of shares, the financing done mainly by a group's own bank, the joint boards of directors, mutual deliveries and barter, technology exchange and personal contacts. Universal trade firms occupy leading positions within financial groups, first of all, because they dominate the sphere of commodity circulation, especially, in foreign trade. They also perform important economic functions distributing economic resources within the groups, especially, dealing with the import and sales of industrial raw materials and organising the marketing of produce on the domestic and external markets. In the process of the postwar development the universal firms turned into major export-marketing and information centres. Yet, "the position of trade monopolies in the financial groups," the author points out, "is determined not only by their activities as trade centres. In the postwar period their role consolidated as business centres sponsoring group enterprise" (p. 74). Their organisational functions become more and more important today, including the supervision of large-scale projects inside

the country and abroad. On the convincing examples of the Mitsubishi shyodji, Mitsui bussan and other companies A. Odintsov proves that large-scale organisational activities of trade monopolies and their leading role in the export of capital were factors that turned them into conductors of the Japanese policy of economic aggression.

In the chapter entitled "The Role of Trade Monopolies in Japan's Foreign Trade" the author examines the concentration process in the country's foreign trade accompanied with the growing influence of trade monopolies. He describes the commodity structure, geographical distribution of their foreign trade dealings and the expansion in the last few years of their functions and organisational activities in foreign economic contacts.

A. Odintsov has collected in his book quite a few facts to illustrate the high level of concentration of foreign trade operations in Japan (pp. 95, 98). Among the companies with the turnover of more than 10 billion yen engaged in foreign trade a small group stands apart, for their foreign trade turnover reaches trillions of yen. These are, in the first place, universal trade monopolies which took the lead in the foreign trade back in pre-war Japan. But not all of them hold equal position. "Among the nine monopolies," A. Odintsov writes, "the commanding positions belong to the first six. In 1979 they concentrated in their hands about 48 per cent of imports and 42 per cent of exports" (p. 99). These are the already familiar Mitsubishi shyodji, Mitsui bussan, Marubeni, Itochu shyodji and Nissyo-Iwai. The author resorts to comparative analysis to show that the attained level of concentration in the Japanese foreign trade is considerably higher than in other countries.

The positions of trade monopolies as leading foreign trade dealers consolidated in parallel with their growing role as capital exporters. Leading trade monopolies today have left far behind, in the amount of investments and the number of foreign enterprises, the industrial companies that stand next to them on the list of capital exporters. For example, the company Mitsui bussan which tops the list, surpasses by 200 per cent one of the biggest electro-technical concerns Matsushita denki and

by 350 per cent the leading textile monopoly Torey, for the sum of its investments. The two of them had the largest sum total of foreign investments among industrial companies in 1979" (p. 139).

The domination of trade monopolies in the sphere of capital investments abroad is indicative of their great role and influence within the system of financial capital and state-monopoly capitalism. With the help and guidance of trade monopolies Japanese industrial companies and banks are carrying out jointly economic expansion at the financial groups' level.

"The trade monopolies of Japan, with their level of the concentration of capital, their scale of business operations, their position and influence in the structure of the financial groups and with the diversity of their activities, are a phenomenon typical only of that country", writes A. Odintsov in conclusion (p. 179). The conglomerate of leading universal trade companies of Japan begins to attract more and more attention of the business circles of capitalist states, particularly, of the United States, France and West Germany as an experience that can be borrowed from Japan and introduced at home. The author believes that the Japanese experience in organising trade may have some practical value for the Soviet Union as well. "Not all the methods used by capitalist countries are applicable to us". A. Odintsov concludes. But the analysis of latest tendencies in the organisation of trade and its methods practiced by capitalist firms as well as the critical assessment of everything positive may prove to be of certain value (p. 6).

The reader will find this analysis in the very interesting and instructive book by A. Odintsov, *Trade Monopolies in Japan*.

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JAPANESE NATIONAL CHARACTER AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

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[Review by V. B. Ramzes and V. N. Khlynov of book "Yaponiya. Etnograficheskiye ocherki" [Japan. Ethnographic Essays] by V. A. Pronikov and I. D. Ladanov, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 270 pages]

The publication of the book by V. A. Pronikov and I. D. Ladanov is a notable event in Soviet Japanology, and not only because it is dedicated to an interesting and important theme. We have gradually, somehow, become accustomed to the notion that studies of national character more often play a merely auxiliary role, serving, as though not ordinary, but still just as a starting point for conclusions about economic and political, much more seldom—social phenomena. The work under review leaves no doubt that such investigations may be important in their own right, and, far from losing in worth, they may somehow even add to it. More often than not, the gain lies in whetting the reader's interest, in prompting him to ponder the veracity of the book's contents, to contemplate his own behavioral attitudes.

Evaluatory descriptions of the national character of one or another people usually do not gain easy recognition. A similar situation frequently faces the economist operating with averages. When, for the sake of objective research, he uses a generalised model of this or other phenomenon, or operates with mean statistical data, he not infrequently comes under the fire of criticism which points to the "blurring" of poles, differences and contrasts, etc. It is not ruled out that accusations of this kind might be addressed to the authors of the book under review.

"Standing out in bold relief in the Japanese national character," they write, "...are: (a) general ethnic characters—industry, a well-developed aesthetic feeling, love for nature, devotion to traditions, a leaning for borrowings, ethnocentrism, practicism; (b) features of group behaviour—respect for discipline, devotion to authority, sense of duty; (c) everyday life features—politeness.

tidiness, self-control, thrift, inquisitiveness" (p. 31).

Unquestionably, many and many Japanese do not fit at all, or even partially, into the framework of these descriptions. But the main difficulty of this kind of investigations lies precisely in discerning among the huge mass of individual traits, features, deviations, manifestations, the most important general regularities determining substantial qualities. Have Pronnikov and Ladanov succeeded in this? In our view, the book's content allows to answer this question in the affirmative.

As you read on into the book the rather loose agglomeration of heterogeneous elements which go into the making of a national character, assume visible contours. And now, through the fanciful tracery of the factors and elements which have moulded this character down through the centuries and keep working also today, one clearly notices perhaps a decisive circumstance. This is the capacity of the Japanese to adapt to any, most sharp changes in the environment, their susceptibility to any new currents and tendencies in the various spheres of material and spiritual life. It is remarkable that these qualities belong to the Japanese national character, despite its inherent traditionalism, the latter being repeatedly (at times probably with excessive insistency) pointed out to the reader.

The traditionalism of geographically isolated and racially homogeneous peoples always had the distinction of being highly stable. In Japan this was for long augmented by political and economic isolation elevated to the rank of a basic state doctrine. Nevertheless, within some eighty years (from 1868 to 1945) the social consciousness in the country relatively easily absorbed two mighty waves of westernisation which seemed bound to cause a catastrophic, irreversible disruption of its structure. Yet no crises occurred, for the massive intrusion of the "new" was not accompanied by the inexorable elimination of the "old".

Both these waves of the "new" (the first—after the Meiji Restoration, the second—after the Second World War) overimposed the "old", preserving it in a viable condition. The newly emerging symbiosis excludes a nostalgic longing for the not infrequently idealised attributes of the past, ensuring the incessant introduction into the

nation's life of contemporary attributes, the attitude to which is now and then cautious or suspicious, provided they are not rejected out of hand. The book is full of illustrations of this contradictory harmony. The most picturesque of them possibly demonstrate how intertwined into the fabric of contemporary life with its typical high speeds, hustle and bustle, standardisation, monotony, depersonalisation, are the numerous ancient customs, rituals and ceremonies which "leave their stamp on every aspect of the life of the Japanese", and in which "the history of the nation and the life of every individual is steeped", and which "are manifest within the Japanese way of life, on festive and ordinary days alike" (p. 124). The authors describe a series of colourful pageants staged from month to month throughout the year and which enlist entire local societies for the roles of active participants or at least keen observers.

A cursory and far from complete list of them includes the building of bamboo gates adorned with pine branches and timed for the New Year, the expulsion of evil spirits in February, the March festival of dolls, the hanging of inflatable images of the carp in honour of boys in May, in July meeting and parting with the spirits of ancestors, admiring the Moon in September and October, the Children's Festival in November, etc. This is a veritable theatricalisation of everyday life, the striving of people long past their childhood to keep indulging in games throughout their life; all this asserts the tenuous bonds of the times, strengthens interpersonal ties, helps to relieve stresses. Never mind that many customs lose their original meaning, their mystical halo. The Japanese are prepared to accept more or less happy substitutes for the sake of preserving the flimsy connection between the "old" and the "new".

Thus, in an absolutely new city apartment a room or simply a corner will be set aside, furnished in the original national style with *tatami* matting, and *zabutonami* cushions for sitting on the floor, with a domestic altar, the *tokonoma*. Thus, both small crafts workshops and huge companies cultivate an atmosphere which allows them to exercise under present-day conditions the functions commensurate with the feudal family-clans, an institutions which in postwar Japan found itself

without its former legal status, and which condescended priority to nuclear families (pp. 50, 51).

Signs of this process is seen by the authors in that the *tokonoma*, a niche or recess "always formerly intended for a picture or a beautiful bouquet", nowadays accommodates, with the present shortage of living space, a TV-set (p. 108). And in that the tea ceremony, whose classical canons require a small pavillion standing in a cosy garden and approached by a flagstone path, an old flickering lantern, a stone well for the washing of hands and rinsing the mouth, the crawling through a low door-opening, squatting on one's heels, careful selection of tea things, the most complicated time-hallowed order of brewing the powdered green tea with the water boiled on the glowing charcoals made of the sakura, Japanese cherry tree, the food, the tea drinking itself and, lastly, the conversation, today proceeds in an "easier" variant. The "easier" ceremony is frequently held in ordinary rooms, even sitting on chairs round a table (pp. 197-198).

Pronnikov and Ladanov associate the high adaptivity of the Japanese national character with the effect of various forms of social regulation. The most important of these forms are religions. The religious pluralism of the Japanese is so unique that it hardly fits the habitual conceptions of religious belief. In an attempt to explain the situation in which, according to the well-known Russian Japanologist G. Vostokov, a Shinto temple may give a newborn its name and Buddhist priests would administer the last rites, while in the interval between these events he might for a time stay in the fold of Christianity, certain specialists have drawn the conclusion about the indifference of the Japanese to religion, about their atheism, while others—about their unusual religious tolerance.

One would be inclined to agree with the book's authors that the former conclusion is not quite accurate (p. 59). One can hardly argue that the religiosity of people in Japan is much less pronounced than, say, in Italy or Spain. As to their view on Japanese religious tolerance as a selective category, extending only "to those religions which do not upset local religious traditions" (p. 89), it seems to be lacking in substantiation.

Christianity, for example, if we discard

the hard-work ethics of the Protestants, so consonant with corresponding Confucian teachings, is without doubt alien, even hostile to local religious traditions. This is convincingly demonstrated by the Shinto tenets well described by Pronnikov and Ladanov. According to them (1) the world appeared on its own (not as a result of a volitional effort by a demiurg), it is good and perfect (not steeped in filth); (2) the first sexual congress occurred among the gods, i. e., "original sin" is something unheard-of; (3) there is no division into living and dead nature, alive in every person is a deity—*kami*, and man himself may become godly; the world of *kami* is united with the world of humans, so there is no need to seek salvation in another world; (4) there is a host of deities; (5) the gods gave birth not to all the peoples, but to the Japanese alone (pp. 62-63).

Thus, the radical differences between the two religions are obvious. Nevertheless, Christianity, which has no more than a million followers in Japan, quietly and peacefully exists side-by-side with other religions, and its dogmas, together with the dogmas of Shinto and Buddhism make up an integral part of the doctrines of the so-called new religions—*Shinku shykyo*. The persecution of Christians of long ago could by no means compare, for their duration and intensity, with European religious strifes.

Let us add that Buddhism, particularly its classical variant, is diametrically opposed to Shinto in its attitude to the material world, urging the abandoning of that world and the attainment of nirvana. Yet the hard-work ethics of Confucianism looks as a firm antithesis to serene and placid Buddhist contemplation turned within oneself, without any outward symptoms of any activity whatever. The religious tolerance of the Japanese is expressed in that they find it possible, without suffering any discomfort, to draw simultaneously upon all the above named religious and philosophical systems (which should also include Taoism, as well as folk beliefs) which mutually complement behavioral norms.

By the way, the reader may derive many and rather instructive examples of a sensible approach to religious practice from folk beliefs, whose outward primitivism should not conceal from them their profound inherent sense. Judging by these examples, the belief in the sacredness of certain animal species

and even in the gods of the Buddhist pantheon by no means prevents worshippers from haggling with them, at times resorting to outright blackmail.

Sick people catch in ponds the sacred gastropod *Tanishi* and promise the *kami* of the pond to release the captive "only after recovery". Hunters wrap up in paper the sacred fish *Okoze*, and promise to unwarp the sheet and let it see sunlight if it sends them luck. "When caught in a storm fishermen promise to present the *kami* of the sea with an *Okoze* if the *kami* takes mercy and rescues them" (p. 67). "In the court of one of the temples in Tokyo one can see the statue of Jizo [a popular Buddhist saint.—Auth.] tied up with straw ropes... If a person suffers the loss of some valuables through theft, he ties up Jizo and promises to release him only upon the recovery of the loss" (p. 70).

In their book Pronnikov and Ladanov return repeatedly to the analysis of behavioral norms borrowed from the aforementioned religious and philosophical systems. This is quite justified for they are rather specific themselves, rather vast are the spheres of activity more or less rigidly controlled by them, rather meaningful are the consequences of their "exploitation".

The specific feature of behavioral traditions lies first of all in that they form a dense network of norms spreading vertically and horizontally, which determine every step of the Japanese. One sometimes encounters in foreign literature a viewpoint, according to which the burden of this kind of norms shackles the manoeuvrability of the individual, narrows his intellectual outlook, hampers initiative. This viewpoint is erroneous, which is convincingly confirmed by the materials of the book under review.

The negative effects of behaviour programmed by uncompromising rules could present a difficult problem largely if they were artificially included into an already formed social consciousness, or had they been compromised in a manner clear to all and causing a cynical attitude despite all the lip service paid them.

But the norms of behaviour (*giri, ninzue* on), so competently described by the authors (pp. 113-122), may be regarded as long imprinted in the genes of the Japanese, settled in the very innermost parts of their subcon-

science. To them these rules are inconspicuous but vitally important, and the Japanese observe them automatically, instantly attuning themselves and responding to the signals of this or that situation. The criticism of some of the norms coming from the youth does not extend beyond expressions of discontent so typical of post-war years and evaporating as soon as the young people realise that, independently of their own will, they do observe, after all, if not the letter, then at least the spirit of these norms.

In postwar years the potential of the traditional norms of behaviour was mobilised in the interests of rapid economic development, was one of the pillars upholding the mechanism of labour motivation. The emphasis on moral obligations to one's "own" firm, to "one's own state" helped the official propaganda machine to stimulate to the highest possible degree personal factors of raising labour productivity, which largely facilitated the attaining by Japan of the position of the second economic power of the capitalist world, the positions of the Asian centre of imperialism.

The same potential had been used also in the past, and not at all without success, for befogging the masses by jingoist militaristic zealotry, for embroiling them in bloody foreign adventures which ended tragically for the Japanese people. One should not forget that following the *bushido* code which emphasised loyalty to duty, i. e., the same moral obligations, many Japanese in their time joined the suicidal *kamikaze* detachments. This rather free "flexibility" of the code of behaviour of the Japanese gives rise to certain apprehension. "One can hardly believe", write Pronnikov and Ladanov, "that the *kamikaze* spirit has already been thrown out onto the scarp-heap of history. The reactionary forces may still put their last stakes on the *kamikaze*" (p. 146). Yet one ought to point to encouraging circumstances as well. Thus, the ill-famed attempt at a "solitary putsch" by the writer Yu. Misima, who urged the country to turn around back to militant Tennoism, evoked no response in Japan. According to the press, the soldiers, addressed by Yu. Misima before he committed *harakiri*, just made fun of him.

The authors of the book under review are the first to describe in detail the *zen* doctrine. The reader will receive diverse information

about this phenomenon, the essence of which lies in the teaching that extreme concentration of attention or, on the contrary, complete relaxation, generate elements of inspiration. As Pronnikov and Ladanov write, "zen adherents maintain that the essence of zen can only be felt, sensed, experienced, but cannot be grasped by the mind [all the more so formalised through verbal definitions.—*Auth*]" (p. 150). Known, though, are the end results of applying the zen methodology. An ideal version of these are described by the authors as the detachment of consciousness, the dissolution of "selfness" and immersion in the general stream of the concrete situation, the individual's inner fusion with the object of his attention (pp. 158, 160).

Millions of Japanese regularly, or from time to time, on their own or with outside assistance, do the mediational exercises elaborated by the founders of the zen doctrine, and derive great benefit from them. Specialists refer in this connection to the raising of vital tone, stabilisation of the nervous system, and the buildup of will, and the enhancement of intellectual capacity, and the readjustment of temperament, and overcoming barriers of interpersonal incompatibility, and the appearance of a special attitude to work (pp. 162-163).

One gets the impression that the theory and practice of zen renders a strong influence on the character of the relations between the Japanese, determining, first of all, their restraint, whenever the communicants are other than "their own". The whole conception of concealing the truth (*honne*) behind the camouflage of the ostentatious (*tatemae*) is connected, of course, not with alleged inherent duplicity or hypocrisy which, one should say, have been repeatedly attributed to the Japanese people by superficial or biased observers, but by the desire of the Japanese to protect their inner world against gross outside interference. Such a wish is always stronger, the greater the role this inner world plays in the life of the individual, and Japanese leaning towards self contemplation realises it in a natural norm of behaviour expressed by different means, and lucidly expounded by the authors.

Among them there are facial expressions (the recording technique of which, by the way, shaped out as a whole genre of the true art of mask-making) and smiles, and laught-

er, and gestures, and postures, and glances, and turns of speech. The imperturbable face, concealing violent emotions; vague smiles distracting the other person from purely personal feelings; pretended laughter aimed at gaining time for suppressing one's own confusion; restrained gestures emphasising a dignified aloofness and precluding familiarity; the humbleness of pose, facilitating dissolution within the group of similar people, the indirect glance to overcome the embarrassment of the first steps in personal contact; ambiguity of speech, retaining the free manner and resources for keeping the discussion going—all these are easily recognised features whose many roots lead back to the zen doctrine (pp. 201-227). The knowledge of, and careful attention to, these special features may be of great help when analysing Japanese life, and when meeting Japanese people.

We have only touched upon the main lines of study into the Japanese national character undertaken by Pronnikov and Ladanov. But the panorama they unfold has depth, and many curious and impressive sidelights are thrown in.

These are small essays on the ethnogenesis of the Japanese, on the history of studying their social psychology, on processes of socialisation among the younger generation, about the family, about footwear, bathhouses, Japanese proverbs, and many other things. Closely related to them are the addenda which supply curious information on Japanese cooking, the go game, the nursing of *bonsai* dwarf trees, on the Oriental system of the signs of the zodiac and on physiognomy; there are also excerpts from the Book of *Hagakure* (Concealed Under the Leaves), which had formulated the main tenets of the *bushido* code of behavior.

At first glance some of the material in these sections may seem somewhat incidental, with only a remote bearing on the chief subject under investigation. Moreover, the authors may be reproached for repeating some of the descriptions in the text several times. But gradually the reader becomes convinced that every bit of information does an effective "job", adding to the mosaic of the whole picture, imparting new colours, highlighting some areas while leaving others in the shadows.

V. A. Pronnikov and I. D. Ladanov have written a good book and a much needed one. Indeed, no sooner was it published than it became a bibliographic rarity.

MILITARISM: FACTS AND FIGURES

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 4, Oct-Dec 83 pp 154-157

[Review by V. N. Usov, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Militarizm: tsifry i fakty" by V. V. Borisov, V. P. Vasyutovich, P. L. Ivanov et al, edited by R. A. Faramazyan, Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, 255 pages]

Militarism is a tool which has always been used by the exploiter classes for the preservation and consolidation of their dominance, for the seizure of new territories and enslavement of other countries and peoples. In recent decades the capitalist world has seen an unprecedented spread and growth of militarism, claim the authors of the book under review, a team of scholars from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences (p. 3). The authors note that "the economic and political roots of present-day militarism lie in the very nature of imperialism". Imperialists have twice plunged mankind into the abyss of sanguinary world wars, in which 65 million have perished and 110 million have been crippled. The over 120 wars and military conflicts that have occurred since World War II have taken a toll of millions upon millions of victims. "The unprecedented arms race carried out by imperialism in recent years has resulted in the creation of arsenals of lethal weapons so powerful that their use would jeopardise the very foundations of the existence of human society", state the book's authors. "But this in no way deters imperialists who are continuing the arms race. At the juncture of the 1970s and 1980s the militaristic processes in the USA and other members of

aggressive military blocs intensified. The arms race has entered a new round, with special emphasis being placed on modernisation and massive redesigning of all types of weapons on a qualitatively new basis" (p. 3).

Today the issue of war and peace has become the cardinal problem facing mankind. A sharp political and ideological struggle is being waged around it. The consistent

struggle for peace and disarmament carried out by countries of the socialist community headed by the USSR calls for indefatigable exposure of the present-day militarism and the threat it represents to the cause of peace.

On the strength of facts and figures, the book under review signals the immense danger of modern militarism. The authors characterise the essence of modern militarism and the specific attributes of its development in imperialist countries, cite data illustrating the huge expenditure of human, material, and financial resources in wars and in the present-day arms race. The book contains information on the aggressive military-political blocs, their arsenals, the location of their military bases, and on the international arms trade. Of interest are the data pointing out the socio-economic aftermath of the arms race. The authors make use of rich sources to illustrate the struggle being waged internationally against militarism and for peace and disarmament. They describe the principal public and government organisations which have been set up specifically for that purpose.

As the book rightly notes, the "development of militarism in our day and age occurs primarily under the banner of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism" (p. 7). At the same time military force is used on a wide scale by imperialist powers, the USA above all, as an instrument for pursuing a policy of neocolonialism, for suppressing national liberation movements, for toppling progressive regimes, and for preserving and strengthening their economic, political, and strategic positions in developing countries. The USA and other imperialist powers continue to arm and train military, para-military and police forces in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries to preserve their reactionary and dictatorial regimes. The book

makes it abundantly clear that the USA is the centre of modern-day militarism.

The US's expansion of its military presence abroad and the setting up of a string of military bases there is a major direction of its imperialist strategy. According to official data, US armed forces today have approximately 2,500 bases and military installations in 114 countries manned by close to 500,000 servicemen (p. 16). US bases are used to prepare for a war against the USSR and other socialist countries, to deal with national liberation movements, and to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. We need only to recall the recent past and list the major local wars and armed conflicts unleashed or provoked by imperialism in Asia in 1945-1978 to illustrate the aggressive nature of the militarist forces of the imperialist world led by the USA.

The first colonial war waged by the Netherlands against Indonesia (1945-1948). The declaration of economic blockade of Indonesia. The USA grants credits and military loans to the Netherlands. Great Britain gives military support to it.

Colonial war of France in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (1945-1954). The French troops occupy the territories of these countries. Economic blockade of the liberated areas.

The second colonial war of the Netherlands against Indonesia (1948-1949). A \$1.1 billion colonial debt to the Netherlands is imposed on Indonesia.

Great Britain's colonial war in Malaya (1948-1955). The USA, Australia and New Zealand give aid to Great Britain.

Imperialist aggression of the USA and its 15 allies against the DPRK (1950-1953). Massive bomb raids on Korean cities and temporary occupation of a part of Democratic Korea's territory.

The third and the fourth colonial wars of the Netherlands against Indonesia (1956 and 1958-1962).

US armed provocations in the Strait of Taiwan (1958). Broader US military and economic aid to Taiwan.

US armed aggression in Southeast Asia (1964-1973). Occupation of South Vietnam. Military operations on the territories of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, bomb raids on towns and villa-

ges. Direct military and economic support of the local puppet regimes.

At the peak of its military operations the USA employed in South Vietnam about 68 per cent of its ground forces, 60 per cent of the Marines, 32 per cent of tactical and 50 per cent of strategic aviation. The total strength of the expedition corps of the USA and five other capitalist countries that fought against Vietnam reached 600,000 officers and men. Besides, Americans trained and armed a one-million-strong puppet army to fight against the patriots. The imperialist aggression caused tremendous devastation in the territory of Vietnam. Between 1965 and 1974 alone, 9,000 villages (out of 15,000) were either destroyed or demolished completely; 10 million hectares of land under rice and other cereals were destroyed, as were 1.5 million head of cattle, 50 forest districts with the total area of 5 million hectares, two-thirds of mango woods, rubber plantations and coco groves. During the war US imperialists dropped 7.9 million bombs on Vietnam, used chemical weapons and different modern types of military hardware. Already towards the end of 1967 the total weight of bombs dropped by the USA on Vietnam exceeded the weight of bombs which had been dropped in Europe throughout the entire Second World War (pp. 82-83).

The book shows that the imperialist blocs present a grave danger to the peace and security of nations. The authors arrived at the following conclusion: "The bloc policy of imperialists contradicts the objective needs of the historical development of humankind." Today, under the impact of the national liberation movement, which is backed by other contemporary revolutionary forces, the crisis phenomena within the system of aggressive pacts set up by imperialism in postwar years have intensified. In the 1970s, practically all military blocs (with the exception of NATO) set up by imperialism in different regions of the world either collapsed (SEATO, CENTO) or encountered grave difficulties in their activities. It seems necessary to give a brief characteristic of the pro-imperialist aggressive blocs, whose activities encompassed or continue to encompass vast areas of Asia and the Pacific.

SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation)—an aggressive military-political bloc

formed in 1954 on the initiative of the USA. It included the USA, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. The bloc was set up to "contain communism" in South-east Asia. Its main task was to impede national liberation movements in countries of Asia and the Pacific. The majority of SEATO member-countries took part in the US aggression in Indochina. However, a successful struggle waged by the progressive forces in the countries of Southeast Asia against imperialism and reaction resulted in SEATO formally ceasing its existence on July 1, 1977. However, the political basis of the bloc—the Manila Pact (p. 104)—remains operative.

CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation)—an aggressive military-political bloc in the Middle East. It was formed after a military treaty between Turkey and Iraq, called the Baghdad Pact, was signed in February 1955. In that same year Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined it. In July 1959, after Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, the bloc was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation. Though formally the USA was not a member of CENTO, it took an active part in its activities and was represented in all its leading bodies. In March 1959 the USA concluded bilateral agreements with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, which granted the US permission to use its armed forces on the territory of the members of the bloc to rebuff "direct or indirect aggression" and "take joint defensive measures". In March 1979 after the collapse of the Shah regime, the new government of Iran declared Iran's withdrawal from CENTO. When Pakistan followed suit, this spelled the end of the CENTO pact (p. 105).

ANZUS (the Pacific Security Treaty)—a closed military-political organisation formed in 1951-1952 and uniting the USA, Australia, and New Zealand. It emerged as a result of the US urge to consolidate its positions in Southeast Asia and the south-east part of the Pacific Ocean in the struggle against national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in that region. ANZUS has no supreme command, joint armed forces, regularly operating apparatus or permanent headquarters. Exercises of the bloc members' air, naval and ground forces

are conducted regularly. The USA attaches much importance to the activities of that bloc and contributes to its invigoration in every possible way.

ANZUK—a military-political alliance consisting of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. It was set up in 1971 on the initiative of Great Britain primarily to protect its political and economic interests and to fight the national liberation and anti-imperialist movements in Southeast Asia. According to the agreement, in case of an armed conflict with the participation of the bloc members, Great Britain has no military responsibilities to its allies. Prior to 1975 there were joint command and armed forces of the bloc stationed on the territory of Malaysia and Singapore. On January 1, 1975, the united armed forces of the bloc were dissolved and military contingents of Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand were placed under the direct command of Malaysia and Singapore. Military advisers to ANZUK continue to work at the headquarters of that military grouping. Military exercises of the armed forces of member-countries are conducted on a regular basis (p. 108).

ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council)—a regional political organisation set up in June 1966. Its initial members were Australia, New Zealand, the Chiang Kaishek regime in Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and South Vietnam. The headquarters were in Seoul. In 1973 Malaysia withdrew from the ASPAC, and in 1975, due to the triumph of the liberation forces, South Vietnam dropped out of the bloc. Officially the organisation was formed on the initiative of the South Korean regime. In reality it was organised under the aegis of the USA.

Officially the ASPAC was created with the purpose of intensifying cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East in economic, cultural and social fields. In fact, however, it is a political alliance closely tied in with the system of aggressive military blocs of imperialism and spearheaded against Asian socialist countries and the national liberation movements in that region. All ASPAC members are bound by bilateral military agreements to the USA and Great Britain. The ASPAC has neither joint military com-

mand, nor joint armed forces. A great number of US naval and air bases are located on the territory of the participants in the bloc. ASPAC member-countries' contingents took part in the US aggression in Vietnam.

In the 1970s, the ASPAC, like almost all the other pro-imperialist blocs, experienced an acute crisis. Today its activities have been practically paralysed, and many members favour its reorganisation or disbandment (pp. 108-110).

Aware of the fact that the previously set up military blocs and pacts are at their death's door, the aggressive quarters of imperialism headed by the USA are trying either to revive them or to create an efficient replacement for the disintegrated blocs. They go out of their way to try to keep the ANZUK bloc afloat. In the future they hope to combine the bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea and the military ties with Taiwan into a single bloc—the Northeast Asia Treaty Organisation (NEATO). With this aim in view they are imposing on Japan an extended interpretation of the US-Japanese "security treaty". Apart from Japan, the USA is planning to include South Korea in the zone of action of that treaty, a country which has US bases and troops in its territory, and also Taiwan.

The reactionary imperialist quarters, primarily in the USA and Japan, are trying to push ASEAN—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which comprises Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, from the peaceful road.

The Association was formed in 1967 to promote economic and social development of each of its members. As is seen from the materials of the book under review and reports from abroad, the US today is bent on stepping up its military presence in that region, forming a military alliance (Washington-Tokyo-Seoul), and turning Japan and South Korea into a springboard of US imperialism in the Far East, something that is one of the main objectives of US military political strategy in the Far East. The Pentagon has 32 major military bases in Japan and 40 bases in South Korea. US troops in the Far East have reached almost 150,000 officers and men. The US Pacific Command has at its disposal seven aircraft carriers, dozens of other men-of-war, including nuclear submarines, and also large aircraft units numbering over a thousand combat planes.

The militaristic encroachments of certain quarters in Japan are turning into a factor which jeopardises the peace and security of the Asian peoples.

The book under review uses facts to expose the present-day militarists. It provides ample evidence that it is historically necessary to disband all aggressive blocs and discontinue the arms race. This will enable states to use the colossal material and financial resources thus saved to improve the standard of living of their citizens.

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